This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point.
This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory—including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information—in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises. The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics.
Game Theory by Fudenberg and Tirole provides a comprehensive and precise exposition of the theory and the main applied topics, plus challenging exercises conveying the key ideas from a wide literature. The treatments of dynamics and incomplete information unify developments of the 1980s. This book will be a standard text and reference.
Robert Wilson, Professor, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Both broad and deep, this book belongs on the shelf of every serious student of game theory.
David Kreps, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Game Theory is the book to read if you want to be published in Econometrica.
Ken Binmore, Professor of Economics, University of Michigan and University College London
Fudenberg and Tirole's text will have an immediate and important impact on the way game theory is taught at the graduate level. Not only does it cover most of the central topics in noncooperative game theory, it is as up-to-date and complete as a book in this area could hope to be.
Charles Wilson, Professor of Economics, New York University