

Introduction: Reassessing Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific

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Introduction

For a region that is often perceived as being institutionally underdeveloped, the Asia-Pacific is currently, and somewhat paradoxically, home to a wide range of attempts at international cooperation on security issues. Since the 1990s, significant developments and trends in international affairs have brought about important changes in the Asia-Pacific security architecture. The end of the Cold War and the ensuing uncertainty about the future of American strategic commitments in East Asia, combined with the resurgence of China as Chinese economic growth continued apace, led to one major source of change: the emergence of new ideas and initiatives for regional multilateral security fora, culminating in the establishment of the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994. A second source of change was the economic crisis that hit Asia in 1997, traumatizing the region and casting a dark shadow over existing multilateral institutions, which aggravated doubts about them that had already been sown with the revival of bilateral alliances since 1995. Most recently, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the reactions of the George W. Bush administration, and the subsequent terrorist activities in Southeast Asia prompted states in the region to rethink their approaches to national and regional security.

These developments appear to have produced divergent and at times conflicting responses from Asia-Pacific countries. The region now accommodates a greater variety of approaches to security cooperation and regional order than was the case during the Cold War. In addition to the traditional bilateral security arrangements centered around the U.S. "hub

and spokes" alliance system, we now see a growing number of multilateral efforts at cooperative security beyond the ARF, within the ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN and China, Japan, and South Korea), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Shangri-la Dialogue of Defense Ministers, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, to name but a few. These efforts include general regional confidence-building dialogues, as well as transnational issue-specific cooperation in traditional and nontraditional security areas. Because of these organizations' varying membership, scope, and mandates, this plethora of attempts at security cooperation suffers from a lack of mutual coordination and overlap, and even some degree of competition.

This volume, which grew out of a November 2003 conference in Washington D.C. organized by the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, with funding from the Sasakawa Peace Foundation,¹ is intended as a reassessment of security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. In this "reassessment," we will focus on several areas where new trends are evident:

First, we look at existing regional institutions that are taking on new roles outside of the issue areas that they were intended to address. The best example is APEC, which has been accorded a greater role in security matters. What has prompted this shift? Part of the explanation lies in unforeseen developments, such as the war against terrorism after 9/11. But these shifts may also be attributed to the failure of the institution in question to fulfill its own initial mandate, which was trade liberalization. A third factor is institutional adaptability, or the presence of institutional mechanisms that could be adapted to respond to new challenges; in this case, the APEC's Leaders' Summit was one such institution that provided a ready forum for the discussion of pressing security concerns among the region's heads of state.

ASEAN and the ARF have also adopted additional security dimensions, but these are extensions of their existing mandate. ASEAN, for instance, is increasingly reorienting itself to transnational, as opposed to international, security issues. The ARF also has to deal with terrorism.

Second, we focus on the emergence of brand new institutions. The key example here is the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) dialogues. Although an offshoot of the once-defunct proposal by Malaysian Prime Minister

1. This is the fourth and final conference of a two year project entitled "Evolving Approaches to Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific." The proceedings of other conferences, focusing on national security interests and regional security cooperation, U.N. peacekeeping in the Asia Pacific, and economic security in East Asia, are being edited separately.

Mahathir bin Mohammed in 1993 for an East Asian Economic Caucus, APT was a response to the Asian economic crisis of 1997. In general, the catalysts for new institutions include the emergence of new challenges, the failure of existing institutions to achieve their stated objectives, and the emergence of new leadership. In the case of the APT, the Asian crisis, the failure of APEC to address it, and the willingness of China to support the APT—and even provide some leadership—has been crucial.

Third, we investigate how existing norms of regional interaction are being challenged. The most established norms tend to be the ones propagated by ASEAN, and the two most under threat are those of non-interference, and non-hegemonic leadership (meaning leadership of middle powers and weak state coalitions like ASEAN) of Asia-Pacific regional institutions. The ASEAN norm of non-interference has come under pressure from within and without. For instance, during the height of the financial meltdown in 1997, when it became painfully clear that national economic policies could have serious regional repercussions, Thailand's prime minister called for the norm of non-interference to be altered to one of "flexible engagement," by which national policies that have wider regional implications would be subject to consultation and dialogue. More recently, in 2002, ASEAN, partly in response to pressures from the United States and the European Union (EU), set a precedent by calling on Myanmar to relax its internal policy of detention of pro-democracy activists and leaders.

The norm of non-hegemonic leadership, on the other hand, is likely to be coming under stress due to China's increasingly "proactive" diplomacy with respect to Southeast Asia, particularly within the APT. The U.S. approach of developing coalitions of the willing to combat terrorism also affects ASEAN leadership of Asia-Pacific regionalism.

Fourth, there is increasing formalization or legalization of Asia-Pacific regional institutions. Some of the examples include the dispute settlement mechanisms created under the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), new rules for managing forest fires in ASEAN countries, the Declaration of Conduct (admittedly a weaker example) in the South China Sea, and moves to deviate from the consensus principle in ASEAN and the ARF. These moves might be read as steps away from the informal, consensual style of cooperation that has prevailed in the region under ASEAN-led regionalism, but they do not yet clearly signal the alternative forms of security cooperation that might be accepted and adopted by the region.

Fifth, modes of security cooperation that were once seen as mutually exclusive are now being reconstructed to establish a certain degree of convergence. Chief among these is the distinction and tension between

bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Yet, bilateralism and multilateralism are not simply quantitative indicators, they are also qualitative notions. Neither do they necessarily have to be found in a zero-sum relationship. What sort of synergy can be achieved between bilateral and multilateral approaches? In this context, initiatives such as Admiral Dennis Blair's "security community" proposal and ideas such as William Tow's "convergent security" merit closer scrutiny.²

Finally, the relationship between formal and informal security approaches and arrangements needs to be reconsidered. Noteworthy are the emergence of *ad hoc* forms of multilateral diplomacy, such as the Six Party Talks on the Korean Peninsula and functional issue-based cooperation, such as the new sub-ASEAN arrangements against terrorism. These are emerging forms of multilateral cooperation that do not fall within the scope of existing regional institutions, but which may in fact represent areas of the most dynamic cooperative endeavor, because they are formed to tackle specific and limited problems.

In reassessing the state of regional security cooperation in light of the trends discussed above, this volume addresses three basic questions:

1. How successful are cooperative security efforts in the Asia-Pacific? To what extent have some cooperative channels and institutions been more successful than others?
2. Why have some modes of security cooperation proven more feasible than others in the region? The Asia-Pacific historically has been more receptive to cooperative security and "security community" approaches than to notions of collective security or collective defense, which have been the hallmark of the European security architecture. The region has also been much more open to bilateral than multilateral security arrangements. What are the reasons for these differences, and does the mode of cooperation affect the efficacy of cooperative outcomes?
3. Is there competition between "security against" approaches (such as formal alliances and functional cooperation against terrorism) and "security with" styles (such as ASEAN and the ARF) to promote cooperative security in the region? If the relationship is competitive, then what kind of transformation is needed to develop a more complementary or convergent relationship between the two?

2. Admiral Dennis Blair, "Security Communities the Way Ahead for Asia," *International Herald Tribune*, April 21, 2000; William Tow, *Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

When considering the first two questions about the relative success of the various forms and modes of security cooperation in the region, it is useful to refer to actors' motivations for engaging in cooperative security efforts. Broadly, we might identify two sets of reasons. The first is a combination of liberal institutionalist and constructivist explanations, which begins from the premise that benefits are accrued in terms of cost reduction when a group of states agree on procedures that ensure transparency, coordination, and regulation. Furthermore, as these states' awareness of regional interdependence grows, with more attention being paid to transnational problems and opportunities, such conscious coordination of policies with neighbors deepens. Eventually, not only regional institutions, but also a regional identity and community, may be forged, as the density of interaction and cooperation fosters a sense of community and renders the use of force in security matters unlikely.³

These approaches help to explain the formation of ASEAN, the recent regional financial arrangements being negotiated under the APT, and regional functional cooperation in key security areas. An appreciation of the close relationship between economic and strategic security has once again arisen in the wake of the financial crisis and may be seen especially in some of the more recent efforts at regional cooperation in East Asia, such as the APT, the Boao Forum, and the new suggestion for an Asian cooperation dialogue. The economics-security nexus has been analyzed extensively, but it is interesting that a more independent concept of "strategic economic security" has yet to be developed in a region with such a clear economic imperative.⁴

Furthermore, the liberal/constructivist explanations cannot account for the fact that some vital regional security issues—arms control and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the conflicts over Taiwan and the South China Sea; human security—have not found their way onto the cooperative security agenda. At the same time, these rational-choice or identity motivations do not predetermine the mode or form of

3. Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); John Gerard Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Karl Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

4. For instance, Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill, eds., *Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995); Stuart Harris and Andrew Mack, eds., *Asia-Pacific Security: The Economics-Politics Nexus* (New South Wales: Allen and Unwin, 1997); Helen Nesarurai, ed., *Globalisation and Economic Security in East Asia* (London: Routledge, 2005).

cooperation. Thus we see existing institutions that are either not developed or “hardened” enough to deal with or withstand crises, partly because of the persistence of intra-regional conflicts of interest and principle or because of the reticent “ASEAN-style” of consensual diplomacy. Moreover, functional cooperation is subject to short-termism. For instance, it is unclear whether the current regional emphasis on cooperative arrangements against transnational crime and anti-terrorism can last beyond the height of these concerns, or whether they can become institutionalized or spawn more institutionalized security cooperation structures.

States in the Asia-Pacific might also have been motivated by a second set of realist and instrumental concerns when deciding to embark on security cooperation. These concerns are tied up with systemic changes in the post-Cold War era. Publicly, ASEAN’s reason for establishing the ARF has been presented as the need to engage the great powers in order to maintain regional stability. On the one hand, membership in the security forum would help to tie the United States into the region and to justify an integral U.S. role in regional security. On the other hand, participating in such regional institutions would allow for U.S.-Chinese dialogue in a regional setting and help in “socializing” China into the norms of constructive regional relations.⁵ Michael Wesley argues that Asia-Pacific regionalism has always been geared toward “mediating” the impacts of global order for the region. In this sense, after the Cold War, the ARF accommodated “the more benign aspects of world order, while keeping its more interventionist aspects at bay” by “tying the U.S. presence to the region but trying to dilute U.S. influence through diffuse and highly consensual mechanisms.”⁶ One might add that ASEAN has also been keen to maintain its own relevance as a leading regional group in pushing for such regional institutions that reflect its own preferred style. Finally, we may begin to see security institutions being used as mechanisms of competitive influence by the various powers in the region: China is strongly backing the APT as a truly “Asian” institution; the United States has tried to shift APEC’s focus to include security issues; while Japan continues to support the ARF.

Indeed, the region’s most recent new institution, the East Asia Sum-

5. See Michael Leifer, “China in Southeast Asia: Interdependence and Accommodation,” in David Goodman and Gerald Segal, eds., *China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence* (London: Routledge, 1997); Evelyn Goh, “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian Strategy,” *Pacific Review*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2004), pp. 47–69.

6. Michael Wesley, “Mediating the Global Order: The Past and Future of Asia-Pacific Regional Organizations,” in David Lovell, ed., *Asia-Pacific Security: Policy Challenges* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), p. 161.

mit (EAS), appears to reflect these tensions. While it was conceived initially as the highest-level political-strategic fulfillment of Mahathir's hopes for an exclusively Asian regional organization, preparations for the summit quickly became mired in disagreements about the countries that would be invited. Concerns about excluding the United States prompted Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia to insist that India, Australia, and New Zealand be included so as to forestall Chinese domination of the summit. The expansion of the summit's membership subsequently diminished Chinese interest and has bolstered Beijing's preference for the APT process. The promise of the EAS was limited by the rivalry among the three major powers—China, India, and Japan—which were thus unable to play a leadership role.

These observations suggest a much more competitive view of what motivates regional security cooperation. They highlight firmly the continued importance of the major powers in shaping the agenda and architecture in a region which does not have a core small group of medium or even-sized countries backing regionalism. There is remarkable agreement within the region that the United States plays a positive role as a security guarantor, yet analyses of bilateral U.S. alliance relationships and its actual influence in the region may indicate a less rosy picture. There are very real worries about the durability of these alliances, and doubts about the positive influence the U.S. presence has for key security issues in the region. China, on the other hand, remains something of a dark horse just emerging into the light. While the hoped-for "socialization" of the Chinese elite into regional diplomacy and institutionalism appears to have borne fruit, the question now may be whether China is in fact beginning to drive the regionalism agenda towards its own destination.⁷ If so, we may see intensified "institution-racing" between the United States, China, and Japan—a development which is likely to devalue the efficacy and image of regional institutions and regionalism in the Asia-Pacific.

The overall picture of security cooperation in the region is one of flux. New institutions are being created, some existing institutions are expanding their original mandates, a number of key regional norms have been challenged, some new arrangements are being formalized, and alternative modes of cooperation coexist and compete with each other. The main driving factors are: the strategies, priorities, and growing competition of the major powers; the dynamics of underdeveloped regional cohesion

7. See, for instance, Alastair Iain Johnston, "Socialization in International Institutions: The ASEAN Way and International Relations Theory," in G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastaduno, eds., *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).

and identity; and the domination of the contemporary agenda by a few key security issues.

Is there any possibility of synthesis in conceptualizing this state of affairs? It is clear that the Asia-Pacific is far from having conceived a security community in the Deutschian sense. While some argue that the initial six-member ASEAN achieved some semblance of a nascent security community, at the wider regional level, evidence for dense socioeconomic and political interactions increasing a sense of trust and community and thus ameliorating the security dilemma is thin.⁸

Against this backdrop, the contributors to this volume examine a range of regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific with a view to ascertaining their role in regional security. The chapters fall into two broad categories—the first deals with individual regional organizations, such as ASEAN, ARF, and APEC, as well as ASEAN Plus Three, while the second examines thematic issues in security cooperation, such as arms control, economic interdependence, transnational crime, and human security. Together, they cover the broad spectrum of issues and institutions in Asia-Pacific security cooperation, with security being defined in a broad, rather than traditionally narrow, sense.

Structure of the Volume

In Chapter 1, Amitav Acharya focuses, in broad and historical terms, on the evolution of security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region through regional institution-building. The first part of the chapter examines how the principal modes of security cooperation in international relations, especially collective security, collective defense, and cooperative security, have shaped security interactions in the Asia-Pacific region. This is explored from a historical perspective, as well as with respect to the contemporary trends in security cooperation. As the Asia-Pacific region enters the twenty-first century, new developments in the regional and global security environment are challenging its existing security architecture. The next part of the chapter assesses changes to the role of key regional institutions in the wake of the Asian economic crisis. Finally, the chapter evaluates the contribution of regional institutions to security order in the face of skepticism about their approach and role. A related aim is to ascertain the extent to which the divergent approaches to security

8. Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia* (London: Routledge, 2001); John Garofano, "Power, Institutions, and the ASEAN Regional Forum: A Security Community for Asia?" *Asian Survey*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (2002), pp. 502–521.

cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region complement or compete with each other. The argument in this chapter is that the reorientation of regional institutions in response to emerging transnational threats is an important development that makes them distinctive in relation to the persisting bilateral security arrangements in the region and enhances the prospects for a synergetic relationship between bilateralism and multilateralism. This in turn could reshape the importance of regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific security order.

In Chapter 2, Victor Cha asks how alliance resilience ought to be measured and seeks to determine how some U.S. alliances in Asia born from the Cold War period will survive in the twenty-first century while others will not. It emphasizes the role of identity as a critical element that is overlooked by realists in their assessment of U.S. alliances. A common normative framework is central to alliance resilience. During the Cold War, the U.S.-Soviet confrontation transformed the ideational element into a non-issue by making all alliance commitments unquestioned. In contrast, after the Cold War, the ideational variable influences how the United States looks at its alliances, regarding some as purely pragmatic and replaceable and others as irreplaceable. A strong alliance identity may be said to exist when there is a muted security dilemma between allies; a relationship in which changes in capabilities tend to be examined in absolute, rather than relative, terms; a greater sharing of sensitive information and technology; a low degree of concern about being abandoned by an ally; a lower likelihood of domestic change affecting the alliance; and a greater public portrayal of the relationship. As a result of these ideational elements, some alliances can survive the disappearance of a common threat. The ideational dimension is important for the United States and its alliances in Asia, where the notion of alliance is being replaced by coalitions of the willing to address certain types of security problems. The United States has a wider spectrum of relationships with states to choose from to fight terrorism and ensure homeland security. While the United States is likely to keep several central alliances at the core of this spectrum of relationships, the resilience of each alliance will depend on both material and ideational variables.

David Kang's chapter, "U.S. Alliances and the Security Dilemma in the Asia-Pacific," begins by observing that part of the standard explanation for continued stability in East Asia is the presence of U.S. power and its alliances that balance potential threats, reassure other nations, and keep traditional power rivals at bay. Kang then asks whether this view stands up to closer scrutiny. Does the U.S. alliance system reduce conflict in the region? Is the presence of U.S. power and its alliance system the

cork that keeps battles from boiling over? Kang argues that while the United States is undoubtedly the most powerful nation in the region, the existing security dilemmas between Asian nations are few, and thus balance-of-power considerations do not characterize Asian international relations. The study uses Vietnam, the Korean Peninsula, and Japan as case studies in exploring U.S. influence in East Asia.

What is the role of regional institutions in conflict management? Analysts focusing on the prospects for war and peace in the Asia-Pacific invariably point to the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, and the South China Sea as the potential “flashpoints” or “hot spots” of the region. Moreover, they have largely fallen outside the negotiating remit of the region’s security institutions. The two main factors that have so far prevented these hot spots from deteriorating into major war are mutual deterrence and a focus on goals that would be severely damaged were war to come about as a result of a failure to manage the tensions that these three disputes generate. But Rosemary Foot’s chapter, “Modes of Regional Conflict Management: Comparing Security Cooperation in the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, and the South China Sea,” argues that both factors induce varying levels of cooperation among the involved parties, with the highest levels of formal institutional cooperation apparent in the case of the South China Sea, and the other two cases relying more on ad hoc, less formalized arrangements. The primary explanation for this variation in modes of cooperation relates to the role of the major states in each of these conflicts, the level of the stakes associated with them when compared with other desired policy objectives, and whether there is the presence of an institutionalized arrangement that provides a venue for a negotiated outcome. Overall, these disputes have been managed but not resolved. Inherent in all of them, but especially the cases involving Korea and Taiwan, are instabilities that could tip crisis into major war.

Although regional security organizations are burgeoning in East Asia with ASEAN, ASEAN post-ministerial conferences, ASEAN + 3, and the ARF all addressing the war on terror, their efficacies vary. In “Whither Security Regionalism? ASEAN and the ARF in the Face of New Security Challenges,” Sheldon Simon addresses the issue of how ASEAN and the ARF have responded to the threat of terrorism. Simon argues that for ASEAN, Southeast Asia’s core security body, counterterrorism cooperation could provide an opportunity to restore cohesion and create a new security agenda in the wake of the association’s weak response to the financial crisis of the late 1990s and its general reticence to become involved in bilateral disputes among its members. Counterterrorism resolutions have been adopted by ASEAN regularly since November 2001,

acknowledging the region-wide terrorist challenge and agreeing to enhance intelligence cooperation and the coordination of anti-terror laws. While significant progress has been achieved, a major gap persists in that the region's members have not yet developed an ASEAN-wide extradition protocol for terrorist crimes. The ARF, with a much larger Asia-Pacific membership, has also addressed transnational terrorism, linking it to ongoing concerns about transnational crime. The ARF has focused on shutting down terrorist finances through member agreements. Both ASEAN and ARF anti-terrorist exhortations are exemplary, but they are not mandatory; and the consensus principle in each organization inhibits the implementation of agreements. Because of the procedural difficulties facing ASEAN and the ARF, some of the most effective counterterror actions take place at the sub-national level, with cooperation among national intelligence and law enforcement agencies and their U.S. and Australian counterparts. ASEAN and ARF resolutions seem to create legitimacy for transnational anti-terror cooperation by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. By doing this, ASEAN and the ARF provide an important service in meeting the regional anti-terror challenge.

John Ravenhill's chapter, "Mission Creep or Mission Impossible? APEC and Security," examines the role of the other major regional institution to emerge after the end of the Cold War: APEC. During the first decade of APEC's operations, most of its participants warned against the institution's becoming involved in discussion of security issues. Such a discussion, they suggested, would inevitably distract APEC from its economic goals and introduce new sources of friction among members. Ravenhill's chapter asserts, however, that APEC's mission has always been the promotion of peaceful relations among the disparate countries of the Pacific Rim. The belief was that regional economic cooperation would create a virtuous circle: it would facilitate and sustain rapid economic growth; economic growth would reduce the risk of domestic political instability and of a breakdown in inter-state relations; and domestic and international political stability would provide the foundations for sustained economic growth.

In the eyes of its founding fathers, however, APEC was not intended to confront security issues directly, in that "security" issues, as conventionally understood, remained off the primarily economic agenda. Even before the events of September 11, 2001, however, security issues were discussed at APEC, notably in efforts to enhance energy security. Beyond the official agenda, APEC Leaders' Meetings provided an opportunity for wide-ranging discussions at the highest political level of the region's problems, which inevitably included security issues. Post-September 11,

security issues have dominated APEC's agenda. One dimension of the new agenda is a straightforward extension of APEC's activities on trade facilitation—efforts to ensure that the enhanced security measures for international commerce and travel post-September 11 do not unduly impede international trade. For the most part, this “securitization” of trade has been uncontroversial. Two other developments have been much more contentious: the issuance, for the first time, by APEC's Leaders' Meeting of statements on security issues (with North Korea as the first topic); and a commitment to regulate production and trade in portable air defense systems. APEC's new security agenda has revitalized the institution at a time when it appeared to have lost influence on its traditional agenda of trade liberalization. The broadening of APEC's agenda inevitably creates overlap between its activities and those of the ARF. As yet, it is unclear to what extent the institutions will succeed in collaboration and devising a new division of labor, or whether institutional rivalries will intensify.

Chu Shulong's chapter, “ASEAN Plus Three and East Asian Security Cooperation,” takes up the case of another regional entity. Among the multilateral activities, approaches, processes, organizations, and institutions in East Asia, ASEAN Plus Three is the only one which is a truly Asian regional multilateral process. All others are either sub-regional or trans-regional and include non-Asian countries. Until now, ASEAN Plus Three has been a multilateral approach for economic cooperation, and its direction is neither clear nor certain. Its membership and areas of cooperation also seem to be open. ASEAN Plus Three has not become a regional political-security approach. It still has a long way to go even in the areas of meaningful economic cooperation in East Asia. The direction-setting “The Joint Statement of East Asian Cooperation” issued after the 1999 ASEAN Plus Three Summit clearly emphasizes economic cooperation as the central theme, task, and goal of the approach. Another important limitation is the national strategies of its member states. While there has been increasing common ground among member countries, they are far from consensus as to where and when ASEAN Plus Three and other regional multilateral approaches should go. However, Chu argues that although ASEAN Plus Three is only seven years old, it has made steady progress and has become the central Asian multilateral mechanism. It is the most promising multilateral approach and has the possibility to develop into a European Union-style regional integration in East Asia and perhaps in the whole of Asia.

After discussing the role of formal regional organizations, the book turns its attention to thematic and functional areas in regional security co-

operation. In "Arms Control Regimes in the Asia-Pacific: Managing Armament and WMD Proliferation," Jing-dong Yuan notes that Asia faces serious weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation challenges today and remains a region where historical rivalry, territorial disputes, divided states, and emerging threats abound, while multilateral arms control and other security institutions are either preliminary and weak or virtually nonexistent. Five of the eight *de facto* nuclear weapons states (China, India, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States) and three states with nuclear ambitions (Iran, Iraq, and North Korea) are also located in this region. Since the end of the Cold War, the region has witnessed continued overt or covert activities related to the acquisition of WMD and their delivery systems. The May 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests posed a serious challenge to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Recent evidence of the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs also raises serious questions about the effectiveness of the nuclear nonproliferation regime in detecting, dissuading, and deterring proliferation activities.

These developments pose serious threats to regional and global security. However, current strategies have invariably focused on the symptoms and the means to address them rather than more integrated approaches that begin to tackle the sources and motivations for WMD proliferation. Yuan's chapter seeks to outline effective WMD nonproliferation strategies in Asia. It reviews the WMD proliferation developments since the late 1990s, paying particular attention to the motivations behind proliferation activities. It discusses the existing arms control and WMD nonproliferation processes at both the regional and global levels. It tries to explain why efforts to develop region-wide arms control and WMD nonproliferation mechanisms have been less successful and suggests the need to develop arms control mechanisms to regulate the region's continuing growth in conventional armament and to address WMD proliferation issues. Clearly, Asia's divergent security challenges require an integrated approach that combines diplomacy, deterrence, and security assurance to address the security needs of all concerned.

Shaun Narine's contribution to this volume examines the nexus between economics and security in Asia-Pacific regionalism. It specifically focuses on the connection between "economic security" and the development of a "security community" in the Asia-Pacific. The chapter examines whether or not regional efforts at developing economic institutions can facilitate the creation of a durable security community in the Asia-Pacific. Narine argues that regional economic initiatives can alleviate traditional security concerns. However, the security community that might emerge will be inherently fragile. The traditional security concerns of the

Asia-Pacific remain highly complex, and economic interaction can exacerbate conflict as easily as it can mitigate it. A security community characterized by a genuine shift in regional identity is unlikely to develop in the Asia-Pacific in the foreseeable future. Economic security in the Asia-Pacific will be driven by considerations of national self-interest.

While economic interdependence and the Asian economic crisis have become important concerns for regional institutions, so have transnational criminal networks, although the latter have received far less attention. John McFarlane's chapter, "Cooperation on Countering Transnational Criminal Networks in the Asia-Pacific: Cautious Optimism for the Future?" argues that the advent of globalization over the last decade has been accompanied by an expansion of serious transnational organized crime in the Asia-Pacific region. Rather than retaining the traditional hierarchical structures, most of the criminal groups involved have been characterised by entrepreneurship, the provision of specialized services, and good networking, all of which contribute to improved efficiency and security. It is not the commodity trafficked or the service provided by these groups that count; rather, it is the capacity to undertake these activities at the lowest risk of detection while generating the highest profit that motivates them. Regional cooperation to meet the new challenges of transnational organized and serious crime has significantly improved over the last decade, partly due to mutual concern over the regional terrorist threat and the dependence of many terrorist groups on criminal syndicates or methods to generate the funds, provide the weapons and explosives, and document their activists to enable them to operate effectively. While multilateral cooperation against these threats is improving, the most effective form of cooperation at the regional level remains bilateral relationships. The United Nations remains a key player in developing instruments, such as the Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime 2000, which entered into force on September 29, 2003, and the draft Convention Against Corruption 2003. At the regional level, the Work Program to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime 2002 provides an excellent platform for effective cooperation against both transnational crime and terrorism. However, there is a long way to go to translate words into action, and it is essential that the momentum achieved so far is maintained.

In the next chapter, Amitav Acharya takes up another new issue area for regional cooperation: human security. Acharya argues that the emerging global norm of human security has a potential to redefine and shape the agenda of regional cooperation in Asia. Global advocates of the norm, such as the Human Security Commission, argue that human security is both a moral and practical necessity for Asia in addressing the root

causes of its insecurity. But ideas do not float freely; their reception in new locales is conditioned by pre-existing normative structures. In Asia, human security is perceived as a “Western” notion, closely linked to the other globally prominent norms concerning human rights and humanitarian intervention. Hence, tensions are evident between human security and the existing agenda of Asian regional organizations, which accords no place to human rights promotion and remains firmly wedded to Westphalian sovereignty.

Thus far, human security has had little impact on Asian regional cooperation. Whether this will change depends very much on a set of conditioning forces. These have been identified in the framework of “constitutive localization” of ideas in world politics. Drawing upon this framework, Acharya’s chapter argues that the impact of human security in Asian regionalism will depend on the quality and role of its local proponents; their ability to find and build congruence between human security and pre-existing regional normative frameworks, such as comprehensive security and non-intervention; and the potential of the norm to legitimize existing principles, identities, and institutional mechanisms of Asian regionalism. Using human security as a case study, Acharya examines the pathways, issues, and possibilities involved in the process of norm transmission and normative change in international relations, especially from the global to local arenas.

The last chapter in the volume compares Asia-Pacific security cooperation with the European security architecture. Written by Hanns Maull, the chapter argues that while both Europe and the Asia-Pacific had been strategically integrated into the U.S. global grand strategy of containing the Soviet Union during the Cold War, in Europe this strategy was pursued primarily through collective defense arrangements (NATO), as well as cooperative security institutions like the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In the Asia-Pacific, by contrast, the security architecture featured mainly balance of power and deterrence, built on bilateral security arrangements. After the end of the Cold War, European and Asia-Pacific security systems followed different pathways as well. Europe’s highly complex and variegated security architecture, featuring both security and non-security arrangements in different geographical configurations, contrasts with the less complex and more traditional patterns found in Asia. This, according to Maull, reflected the differences in sources of conflict, but also of historical experience, which in East Asia was marked by struggles to cope with the impact of Western modernity, colonialism, and imperialism. Maull argues that the security architecture of the Asia-Pacific in the early twenty-first century seems more fragile, with major sources of conflict and tension in the Korean

Peninsula, China, and the South China Sea, and great power rivalries involving China, the United States, and Japan. Furthermore, whereas Europe's security architecture has emphasized the pooling of sovereignty, the Asia-Pacific has been trying to enhance national sovereignty. Security arrangements in this region therefore are more informal and less institutionalized. Overall, Asia-Pacific security appears not only more important, but also more at risk than that of Europe. Maull's observations, however, suggest that the strategic importance of Asia has increased in relation to Europe, and regional organizations in Asia face a more daunting task in preserving security and order than do their European counterparts.

Conclusion

This book is intended for an audience of both academics and general and policy-oriented observers of Asia-Pacific security. Having adopted a broad focus on regional security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, this volume reveals that the regional security structure is one of pronounced pluralism. The wide range of security arrangements and institutions is not necessarily coordinated, suffers from overlaps, and includes enterprises of varying efficacy, but these initiatives are above all pragmatic and often reactive. This state of flux and adjustment is likely to continue for some time because of the differences within the region and among the major powers, and because of the lack of a regional identity and a common sense of purpose. States will continue to react to events and try to balance between domestic exigencies, the demands of regional politics, and international or systemic pressures.

For those who wish to see the development of one or more credible regional multilateral security institutions, there will be four main challenges ahead. First, these institutions will have to deal with the key trouble spots in the region, particularly the Korean Peninsula, and be able to develop mechanisms of preventive diplomacy and conflict arbitration and resolution. The nuclear test conducted by North Korea in October 2006 underscores the severity of this challenge. Rather than spawning ad hoc stand-alone security arrangements, the management of these "hot spots" needs to be fully integrated into a regional security framework. Second, such an institution should be able to mediate the inevitable suspicions that its goal is either constraining Chinese expansion or countering U.S. hegemony. Third, it must address some pressing longer term issues, especially regional economic security and human security. These sub- and trans-national security concerns constitute a critical underpin-

ning to the realm of “high politics” and “hardcore” security. Finally, the Asia-Pacific region needs to evolve its own modes of hardening institutional development. While this does not necessarily need to be based upon the European model, certain basic requirements must be met, including formalizing rules of conduct, forging transparency and accountability, creating coordinating bodies that can also monitor implementation of agreements, and establishing mechanisms to ensure continued high-level commitment from member states.