

Introduction

Seven Tenets

Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow

Almost from the beginning, a central theme of U.S. foreign policy has been support for democracy against dictatorship. For practical reasons, nevertheless, the U.S. government has tolerated, aided, and even allied itself with dictators. In the World War II contest with Nazi Germany and the other Axis powers, the United States allied with the Soviet Union. In the Cold War, when the Soviet dictatorship was the chief adversary, the United States had as allies a dictator in Spain, previously on the side of the Axis, and a dictator in Yugoslavia who had been an ally of the Soviet Union, had broken with Moscow, but remained a dedicated Communist.

Though such examples testify to opportunism and moral relativism, links with dictators caused Americans qualms even when conflict with the Axis or the Soviet bloc was most intense, and the management of those links posed chronic dilemmas for American decisionmakers. On one hand, officials have felt some obligation to nudge dictators toward democracy, or at least to appear to do so. On the other hand, they have felt a strong obligation to be cautious, not only for fear of losing the benefits of an alliance but also because of a countervailing commitment to the principle of national self-determination and the corollary of non-intervention.

These dilemmas were apparent in U.S. relations with Latin America from the time that the United States became dominant in its region. They became much more prominent and bothersome during the Cold War, for several reasons: because the United States had a much wider array of allies; because many opponents of dictators, posing as champions of democracy, were actually Communists working in the interest of the Soviet Union; and because the U.S. government had significantly greater capacity for attempting to influence internal affairs in other nations. The United States provided economic and military assistance to these nations, sometimes on a large scale, and it had a new and large intelligence establishment collecting and analyzing data about other governments, recruiting secret agents within those governments, and developing and maintaining capacities for covert action—officially defined as “action

undertaken at the direction of the President to further U.S. foreign policy aims without leaving visible traces of American involvement.”

The case studies in this book illustrate how these moral and political dilemmas presented themselves to the U.S. government at a variety of points during the Cold War when almost nothing else of relevance was constant. External circumstances, domestic climates of opinion, institutions of government, and the resources available to presidents were not what they had been earlier or would be later. The first case, that of Chiang Kai-shek and China, concerns the Truman administration not long after World War II, when the Cold War was in its early stages and a “national security state” had only begun to emerge.¹ The second case, that of the Congo from Patrice Lumumba to Joseph Mobutu (later Mobutu Sese Seko), concerns the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations at the high point of the Cold War—in the interval between the Berlin and Taiwan Straits crises of 1958 and the *détente* that began to develop after the great Cuban missile crisis of 1962—when the U.S. defense and intelligence establishments were at the peak of their power and autonomy. The third and fourth cases (Nicaragua and Iran in the late 1970s) arose after the Vietnam War and the Watergate affair, when consensus about foreign policy seemed to have dissolved, and Congress and the news media were holding the executive branch to much more demanding standards of accountability. The fifth case, that of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, comes from the 1980s, when tension with the Soviet Union had revived, and some of the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate restraints on the executive had loosened. The sixth and last case, that of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, comes from the late 1980s, when the long Cold War was giving way to what President George H.W. Bush characterized hopefully as “a new world order.”

The cases illustrate the chronic dilemmas inhering in U.S. dealings with dictators not only in different periods but in different parts of the world. They are intended to provide students of the Cold War with in-depth examples of the types of problems that confronted every U.S. administration in almost every part of the world. They are intended also to provide students of decisionmaking with examples of the types of challenges that are apt in the future to face anyone attempting to manage U.S. relations with the developing world, even though the Cold War is now in the distant past.

These examples are of a particular type. Written for students not only of history or political science but also of management and organization,

1. See Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

they are designed for use in case-method teaching and have been so used, in progressively improved drafts, by students at many levels, from college freshmen on up through senior officials and flag and general officers participating in professional-school executive programs at Harvard and elsewhere. Each is self-contained and designed to be read or studied without necessary reference to other cases or to this introduction or the concluding chapter in this volume.

A reader or student not familiar with case-method teaching and study may need a few pointers to understand the character and potential uses of these case studies. Each case is written as if by a newspaper reporter trying simply to set forth facts. Although some interpretation inheres in any narrative, the effort here is to minimize retrospective comment or analysis. The objective is to enable the reader to participate in the case and to ask at various points: "What would I do if I had been a character in this story and had had to take or recommend action on the basis of no more evidence than is here?"

The potential educational value of such exercises of imagination is hard to overstate. We usually see the past through eyes of second-guessers, focusing on whether a past choice was right or wrong. Historical controversies pit one set of second-guessers against others. Regarding the episodes that are bookends here, concerning China in 1945–1948 and Iraq in 1988–1990, most writings to which one might turn are organized around post-hoc judgments. Some authors argue that President Harry S. Truman made a huge mistake in not trying to keep Chiang Kai-shek in power, others that he should have sought an accommodation with the Communists before Mao Zedong locked himself into an alliance with the Soviet Union. Similarly, some authors upbraid President George H.W. Bush for not having taken a hard line against Iraq from the beginning of his administration, while others argue that if he had been more conciliatory, he could have prevented the 1991 Gulf War.

Such disputes about the past, valuable as they can be, make it hard for readers or students to understand how difficult and uncertain are the forces that produce policy choices. More often than not, decisionmakers have little sure knowledge. They have to act mostly on the basis of shaky presumptions about actual conditions and even shakier guesswork about the consequences of alternative courses of action.

Attentive readers of these cases, or teachers and students who discuss them in class, can experience vicariously the processes of formulating policy under conditions of high uncertainty. In doing so, they can arrive, not at a more certain verdict on the rightness or wrongness of past choices, but at a deeper understanding of how uncertainty and cross purposes, both practical and moral, penetrate the processes. This vicarious experience can be at least as instructive as trying to second-guess the wisdom of

the actual choices. It is a kind of study of history that has potential for yielding real lessons. The question to ask is not: did Truman or Bush make the right choices? Instead: did Truman, Bush, and their aides—given the inevitable fog of uncertainty and the inevitable pressure to make some kind of decision, even if there is a fifty-fifty chance that it may be wrong—ask all of the questions that could have been asked and answered?

By studying historical episodes in this way, one can build a checklist of generic questions worth asking about other episodes in the past or about problems of the present or future that in any way resemble the cases in hand. We do not maintain that these cases necessarily offer lessons directly applicable to dealing with dictators today. We do argue that efforts to relive cases can equip one for better understanding of such relationships now and in the present. We are influenced by Mark Twain, who reportedly said that history never repeats itself, but sometimes it rhymes.

Precepts

The following are general precepts that Neustadt, May, Zelikow, and their collaborators developed from studying and teaching about the cases in this volume and a large number of others.


PRECEPT ONE

Information, whether raw or analyzed, enters the policy stream as part of policymakers' "appreciations." In his classic work, *The Art of Judgment*, Sir Geoffrey Vickers defines "appreciation" as the product of interaction among reality judgments ("What is going on?"), value judgments ("What difference does it make?"), and action judgments ("What do we do about it?").² An appreciation comprises both an action decision and the rationale that underpins it. The quality of the decision depends on the thought devoted to each component and the thought applied to relating one component to another. Perfect knowledge of reality is not of much use without criteria for separating the important from the unimportant. Knowing clearly what is important is not much use in practical affairs without capacity for matching knowledge to action.

Vickers, who was a lawyer and public official in Britain, gives a simple private-sector example. He describes the dilemma of an employer who concludes that a long-serving and loyal manager is not up to a job for which he seems to be in line. The employer goes back and forth in reality judgments about the manager's qualities and abilities; value judgments

2. Geoffrey Vickers, *The Art of Judgment: A Study of Policy Making (Rethinking Public Administration)* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1995; orig. Chapman and Hall, 1965).

Figure 1. The Appreciative System.



about possible effects on the individual, the morale of others, and the prospective performance of the firm. Reviewing again and again alternative action judgments, he hits eventually on moving the individual to a different part of the company, promoting him, but keeping him doing work that he can do well. Vickers uses the term “innovative appreciation” to describe this kind of analytical discovery of how to match up understanding of facts, assessment of their relative importance, and creative thought about what to do.

PRECEPT TWO

None of the elements of appreciation is fixed; they change rapidly and sometimes unpredictably. When one element changes, the others are likely also to change. Figure 1 illustrates the process, but someone looking at it needs to bear in mind that it captures Vickers’ concept only if one imagines that the arrows are constantly in motion until the process is sufficiently complete so that action can actually be taken.

That this is a dynamic, not a static, image is critically important, because both intelligence analysts and decisionmakers often make the mistake of assuming that one set of judgments or another is fixed. This mistake is most often made regarding value judgments, for it is all too easy to suppose that the actions or policies of another person or organization or government derive from ascertainable and more or less permanent interests. Such a supposition is often alluring because it is seldom wholly wrong. Interests are ascertainable and are more or less permanent. But the mix that answers the question “So what?” can change almost from moment to moment.

The final case study in this volume provides a memorable example. It deals with U.S. policy toward Iraq in 1988–1990. Participants in class

discussion never have any trouble naming U.S. interests affected by Iraq at that time or, for that matter, at almost any other time: oil, regional stability, security of Israel, hope for an accord between the Israelis and the Palestinian Arabs, U.S. agricultural exports, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, human rights, and so on. The only item for 1988–1990 that would be missing later is concern about Soviet influence.

The interests that mattered at particular moments in 1988–1990 depended, however, on changing judgments as to what was going on and what the United States could possibly do. In the autumn of 1989, President George H.W. Bush signed a National Security Directive defining U.S. policy toward Iraq as one of “constructive engagement.” The directive had originated in the Department of State, where the dominant concern of Secretary of State James Baker and his aides was to get some progress in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Iraq, originally the hardest-line opponent of any such negotiations, had recently softened its position and moved toward an apparent entente with some of the more moderate Arab states. Iraq had also recently accepted an inconclusive end to a long and exhausting war with Iran. Baker and his aides believed that Iraq might help their negotiating effort, especially if they could capitalize on Iraq’s need for funds for postwar reconstruction. Hence, “constructive engagement”: the United States would put up a billion dollars in Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) funds, guaranteeing that U.S. firms would be paid if they sold wheat or other commodities to Iraq. This was not direct aid to Iraq: the money would never leave the United States, but it would enable Iraq to get better terms from American suppliers than it could get based just on its unsupported promise to pay.

In the spring of 1990, the U.S. government backed away from “constructive engagement” and cut off the CCC credits. The dominant interest then was one hardly in play the previous autumn: evidence had come to light suggesting mismanagement of CCC funds passing through the Atlanta branch of the Italian-based Banco Nacional de Lavoro (BNL). Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein had meanwhile shown few signs of really relenting in his antagonism toward Israel. Instead of concentrating on domestic reconstruction, he had resumed the build-up of his armed forces, taking some steps toward acquisition of advanced weaponry, including possibly nuclear weaponry. Ignoring protests from Washington and London, he had publicly executed a British journalist whom he alleged to be a spy. Footage of the execution figured in prime-time news throughout the United States. The decision to reverse “constructive engagement” originated in the Department of Agriculture, which managed CCC credits. Agriculture Department officials had said little earlier. Now, their voices dominated. State Department representatives argued for continuing the existing policy but lost.

In the summer of 1990, after sending many signals that were missed or misunderstood in Washington and among Iraq's Arab neighbors, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. This new reality brought to the foreground interests previously subordinated: oil, regional stability, and, more broadly, the maintenance of international order. The chief framer of the "appreciation" from which U.S. leadership in the first Gulf War emerged was President Bush himself.

The moral of this case study is that value judgments change along with changes in reality judgments and action judgments. While the interests may be constant, priorities among those interests are not.

PRECEPT THREE

As argued in some detail by Neustadt and May in *Thinking in Time*, initial reality judgments can be sharpened by taking care to distinguish clearly what is known from what is merely presumed to be true. Presumptions often have great influence in appreciations. Participants in the policy process frequently push particular presumptions because they suit either their value preferences or their action preferences. *Thinking in Time* goes into reasons why separating the known from the presumed can help protect against this risk. Here, the point expands, for intelligence analysts need to note presumptions of their own (and of other analysts) that might have distorting effects; they need to gauge the mixture of known and presumed in the reality judgments of the other governments or organizations; and—at least as important—they must try to sort out what is known and presumed by the policymakers they hope to inform.

The injunction to think about what is in the minds of U.S. policy-makers sits uncomfortably with many intelligence analysts. They have been schooled not to let their own policy preferences intrude into assessments. This salutary teaching has often, however, encouraged deliberate inattention to, or attempts to avoid any appearance of attention to, ongoing debates about alternative courses of action. The consequence has sometimes been Sergeant Friday-style "just the facts, ma'am" reportage, which contributes to the lack of connection between the intelligence and policy communities that Robert Gates observed and experienced during his tours in the White House.

The precept here is not counsel to intelligence analysts to become advocates of particular courses of action. It is counsel to become as sensitive as possible to the differing presumptions in the minds of users of intelligence analysis. That is how they can best help decisionmakers convert judgments about what is going on into judgments about what matters and what to do about it.

The point is illustrated by the next to last case in this volume. It concerns the Philippines in the mid-1980s. Intelligence analysts as well as

decisionmakers recognized that the regime of Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos was increasingly shaky. The intelligence analysts recognized also that the decisionmakers came to this reality with varied sets of values. Those in the State and Defense departments and in the U.S. mission in Manila were much of one mind. They were concerned about U.S. base rights, the stakes of U.S. investors, and the ability of Marcos or a successor to keep peace in the islands.

But the circle of decisionmakers was wider, and so was the range of their concerns. Some individuals in Congress wanted Marcos to fall, in part because he had ordered the murder of an opponent whom they admired. In the executive branch, the ultimate decisionmaker, President Ronald Reagan, regarded Marcos as a personal friend and thought in addition that the United States owed him loyalty as a longtime ally in the Cold War.

Analysts in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) collaborated to an unusual degree both with one another and with the individuals working out action choices on the seventh floor of the Department of State, the E-ring of the Pentagon, the embassy in Manila, and National Security Council (NSC) staff in the Old Executive Office Building. As a reader of Chapter 5 will see, intelligence estimates and other analytic products were specifically tailored to take into account President Reagan's particular outlook. Though they agreed that the Marcos regime was probably doomed, they kept saying only that Marcos was part of the problem but possibly also part of the solution. This language made it more likely that the president would not simply reject the estimates as prejudiced against Marcos and that he would, as a result, be influenced by the evidence, which showed that Marcos was the problem.

Purists may think that these analysts were wrong to skew what they said for the sake of getting the attention of the president. They might, however, note that this is the one case in this volume where the United States can be said to have been most successful in managing a relationship with a dictator.

A case not included in this collection illustrates the price paid when analysts do not engage decisionmakers' presumptions. It concerns U.S. involvement in Lebanon in the early 1980s. At the time, Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger were open antagonists, quarreling about almost every visible issue. Lebanon was then suffering civil warfare, compounded by the occupation of parts of the country by elements of the Palestine Liberation Organization and by the armed forces of Syria and of Israel. Shultz supported special envoy Philip Habib, who was attempting to broker a truce that would lead to Syrian and Israeli withdrawal. A key presumption for Habib and therefore for

Shultz was that the Syrians and Israelis had forces in Lebanon only to offset one another; hence, if one party seemed credibly willing to withdraw, the other would agree to do likewise. Weinberger did not directly dispute Habib's presumption; he simply took the position that the chance of a truce and mutual withdrawal was too slim to justify keeping a substantial contingent of U.S. Marines in Lebanon, especially since the Marines were increasingly viewed by the Lebanese as supporters of one particular faction in their civil war.

Analysts in the intelligence community, seldom in perfect agreement about any subject, were in this instance harmonious to a degree that would have delighted a choir director. They believed unanimously that Habib's key presumption was wrong, and that the Syrians intended to stay in Lebanon regardless of what the Israelis did. Although they were aware of differences of opinion within the Israeli government, they believed that the person in charge, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, had no more intention of voluntarily withdrawing from Lebanon than of abandoning Arab lands conquered in the Six-Day War.

For practical reasons, however, the intelligence analysts kept their opinions to themselves. Even Robert Ames, the highly respected and personally forthright National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East who was on good personal terms with Shultz, kept his mouth shut. No analyst was willing to appear to intervene in a dispute between Shultz and Weinberger unless the White House specifically asked for an estimate. Even when that happened—at much too late a date to matter—the resulting estimate was guarded and ambiguous. For the most part, all that the analysts did to influence the policy debate was to insert into the *National Intelligence Daily*, and other such publications, bits of information that hinted at their doubts concerning Habib's presumption. For example, they highlighted a report that the Israelis, throughout their zone of occupation, were putting up road signs in Hebrew. But the fact that the whole intelligence community thought the U.S. government to be guided by a false presumption remained virtually unknown until after Lebanese terrorists drove an explosives-laden truck into the Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 241 Marines and prompting President Reagan to, as he put it, “redeploy to sea” and back off from any role as mediator.

In this instance, the intelligence community would have served the United States better if analysts had volunteered their assessments of Syrian and Israeli policies. They would not have been weighing in on the side of Weinberger against Shultz, but simply identifying reigning presumptions and laying out the evidence that caused them to question those presumptions. As was said to May once by Robert Bowie, former overseer of CIA's analysts and before that an assistant secretary of state for policy planning, “if analysts see that there's a cliff on one side of the road, it's their duty to warn the people who are driving the bus.”

PRECEPT FOUR

In framing reality judgments, it can be useful to test alternative paradigms of explanation. The classic book *Essence of Decision*, written by Graham Allison and recently revised by Allison and Zelikow, describes three essentially different paradigms that can account for the observed behavior of another government or organization.³

One paradigm—the unitary rational actor—seeks explanations in the interests and motives (that is, in the collective value judgments) of the entity in question. Reliance on this paradigm would lead one to say that road signs in Hebrew went up in Lebanon because “Israel” planned permanent occupation of the area.

The second paradigm, organizational behavior, seeks explanations in the standard operating procedures or routines of the government or organization in question or in processes that organizational theorists label “satisficing,” that is, processes that settle on the first minimally acceptable course of action rather than “maximizing” or searching for the best course. This paradigm could yield a conclusion that the road signs might have gone up because Israeli Defense Force manuals prescribed putting up such signs, or because the Israeli command in Lebanon was concerned to minimize road mishaps.

The third paradigm, governmental politics (originally mislabeled “bureaucratic politics”) seeks explanations in political bargaining within a government or organization. The observed outcome reflects not so much the purposes of the government or organization as the conflicting purposes of leaders within the government or organization, one-upping or compromising with one another. From this paradigm, the road signs could be interpreted as a maneuver by Sharon, or possibly the result of an internal bargain in Jerusalem.

Figure 2 offers a matrix suggesting questions to be asked in the framing of any and all reality judgments.

PRECEPT FIVE

Regarding value judgments, understanding can be sharpened by use of a different matrix. Broadly considered, value judgments derive from axiomatic beliefs or from calculations of interest, advantage, opportunity, and the like.⁴ At the end of World War II, the United States occupied

3. Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972); Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999).

4. This matrix is sketched in Ernest R. May, “The Nature of Foreign Policy,” in Akira Iriye, ed., *Rethinking International Relations: Ernest R. May and the Study of World Affairs* (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1998), pp. 3–14.

Figure 2. Tests for Reality Judgments.

Product of:	Known	Presumed
Unitary Rational Actor?		
Organizational Processes?		
Internal Organizational or Governmental Politics?		
Something Else?		

southern Korea while the Soviet Union occupied northern Korea. Negotiations about creating a unified nation broke down. After 1948 there was an independent Republic of Korea in the south and a nominally independent People's Republic of Korea in the north. President Harry S. Truman and his top advisers formally reviewed the question of what, given the burgeoning Cold War with the Soviet Union, should be U.S. policy regarding the Korean Peninsula. Not just once but twice, the president accepted a recommendation from his National Security Council to act on the premise that the United States had no strategic interest in Korea. In June 1950, however, when North Korea invaded South Korea, President Truman decided almost at once to defend South Korea. A costly two-and-a-half year war ensued. The president and his advisers had seen the North Korean action as sponsored by Moscow (which, indeed, it was) and as an act of aggression that called into play the axiom derived from experiences of the 1930s, namely that aggression, if not resisted immediately, would feed upon itself and lead eventually to large-scale war. In this instance, the axiom overwhelmed calculation. Something similar occurred in 1990, when President Bush reacted to Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait.

But value judgments, whether derived from axioms or calculations, vary in their substantive emphasis. A reality judgment may seem to "make a difference" because of inherent characteristics or because of anticipated consequences. (This is similar to the distinction made by students of ethics between the deontological and the consequentialist.) Many of the cases in this volume show decisionmakers and analysts concerned about a dictatorship, but with the center of concern on the one hand the fact of being a dictatorship or, on the other hand, the potential consequences of supporting it or not supporting it. The case studies here concerning Nicaragua and Iran illustrate sharply how the axiom that dictatorship is bad can conflict with calculations either that the dictator has his uses or that an alternative government might be unfriendly.

Figure 3 offers a simple matrix for disaggregating value judgments.

PRECEPT SIX

Action judgments also fall into two broad categories. They answer one of two questions: *what* to do? And what to *do*? In other words, what strategy

Figure 3. Tests for Value Judgments.

		Principal basis	
		Axiom	Calculation
Center of concern	Inherent characteristics		
	Possible consequences		

or broad course of action is appropriate, given the mix of reality and value judgments, and what tactics, or specific actions, could implement a strategy? There are at least five levels of disaggregation for these choices, applicable to both categories of action judgments, though in differing degrees.⁵

First comes definition of the operational objective. Though an individual or organization or government may have general objectives such as security or prosperity, an action judgment should include a definition of a measurably attainable objective. In the Philippine case in this volume, the United States had general hopes, but its operational objective narrowed down to peaceful removal of President Marcos from office.

Second, an action judgment depends on some type of theory as to how the operational objective can be attained. In the Lebanon case described above, Shultz and Habib acted on a theory that the United States would be accepted as an honest broker by Syria, Israel, and the various factions in Lebanon. This theory turned out to be wrong.

Thirdly, an action judgment involves some type of plan that applies the theory to the particular case. The fourth and fifth considerations are resources and implementation. Are the necessary resources available? Can the plan actually be carried out? In several cases here—the Congo, Iran, and Nicaragua—the reader will find that these considerations did not receive adequate attention within the U.S. government.

Figure 4 gives a matrix for calling attention to the most important elements of action judgments.

PRECEPT SEVEN

Effective intelligence analysts have to estimate not only the appreciations of other analysts and of the decisionmakers to whom they are responsible,

5. The argument here is amplified in Philip D. Zelikow, "Foreign Policy Engineering: From Theory to Practice and Back Again," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 143–171.

Figure 4. Tests for Action Judgments.

	<u>What to do</u>	<u>What to do</u>
Operational objective		
Theory		
Plan		
Resources		
Implementation		

but also those of prospective decisionmakers in other governments. They have to take into account the ways in which presumptions, axiomatic beliefs, calculations, and action plans can vary with histories, cultures, and circumstances. After defeating Saddam Hussein's armed forces and occupying Iraq in 2003, Americans expected to find stocks of weapons of mass destruction. They found none. They found it hard to understand why Saddam had not tried to prove that he had no such weapons. Had he done that, he might have dissuaded the United States from attacking him. Only in retrospect did analysts recognize that he had probably not been thinking of Washington as much as of Teheran. The possibility that this might be the case should have, but apparently did not, figure in intelligence estimates given to U.S. decisionmakers before the war. Good intelligence analysis ought to involve a disciplined imaginative effort to understand and describe processes of thought and decision in foreign areas. Metaphorically, intelligence analysts should think of themselves as always using bifocals or even trifocals.

These precepts emerged from discussion of the many cases developed for the Intelligence and Policy Program. Each of the cases that follows can be thought of as a laboratory for trying out and testing some or all of them.

