| Acknowledgments | xi |
|
| Introduction
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
 Sample Chapter - Download PDF (73 KB) | xiii |
|
| 1 | Moral Intuition = Fast and Frugal Heuristics?
Gerd Gigerenzer | 1 |
|
| 1.1 | Fast, Frugal, and (Sometimes) Wrong
Cass R. Sunstein | 27 |
|
| 1.2 | Moral Heuristics and Consequentialism
Julia Driver and Don Loeb | 31 |
|
| 1.3 | Reply to Comments
Gerd Gigerenzer | 41 |
|
| 2 | Framing Moral Intuitions
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong | 47 |
|
| 2.1 | Moral Intuitions Framed
William Tolhurst | 77 |
|
| 2.2 | Defending Ethical Intuitionism
Russ Shafer-Landau | 83 |
|
| 2.3 | How to Apply Generalities
Reply to Tolhurst and Shafer-Landau
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong | 97 |
|
| 3 | Reviving Rawls's Linguistic Analogy
Operative Principles and the Causal Structure of Moral Actions
Marc D. Hauser, Liane Young and Fiery Cushman | 107 |
|
| 3.1 | Reviving Rawls's Linguistic Analogy Inside and Out
Ron Mallon | 145 |
|
| 3.2 | Resisting the Linguistic Analogy
A Commentary on Hauser, Young, and Cushman
Jesse J. Prinz | 157 |
|
| 3.3 | On Misreading the Linguistic Analogy
Response to Jesse Prinz and Ron Mallon
Marc D. Hauser, Liane Young and Fiery Cushman | 171 |
|
| 4 | Social Intuitionists Answer Six Questions about Moral Psychology
Jonathan Haidt and Fredrik Bjorklund | 181 |
|
| 4.1 | Does Social Intuitionism Flatter Morality or Challenge It?
Daniel Jacobson | 219 |
|
| 4.2 | The Social Intuitionist Model
Some Counter-Intuitions
Darcia Narvaez | 233 |
|
| 4.3 | Social Intuitionists Reason, in Conversation
Jonathan Haidt and Fredrik Bjorklund | 241 |
|
| 5 | Sentimentalism Naturalized
Shaun Nichols | 255 |
|
| 5.1 | Normative Theory or Theory of Mind?
A Response to Nichols
James Blair | 275 |
|
| 5.2 | Sentimental Rules and Moral Disagreement
Comment on Nichols
Justin D'Arms | 279 |
|
| 5.3 | Sentiment, Intention, and Disagreement
Replies to Blair and D'Arms
Shaun Nichols | 291 |
|
| 6 | How to Argue about Disagreement
Evaluative Diversity and Moral Realism
John M. Doris and Alexandra Plakias | 303 |
|
| 6.1 | Against Convergent Moral Realism
The Respective Roles of Philosophical Argument and Empirical Evidence
Brian Leiter | 333 |
|
| 6.2 | Disagreement about Disagreement
Paul Bloomfield | 339 |
|
| 6.3 | How to Find a Disagreement
Philosophical Diversity and Moral Realism
Alexandra Plakias and John M. Doris | 345 |
|
| 7 | Moral Incoherentism
How to Pull a Metaphysical Rabbit out of a Semantic Hat
Don Loeb | 355 |
|
| 7.1 | Metaethical Variability, Incoherence, and Error
Michael B. Gill | 387 |
|
| 7.2 | Moral Semantics and Empirical Inquiry
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord | 403 |
|
| 7.3 | Reply to Gill and Sayre-McCord
Don Loeb | 413 |
|
| 8 | Attributions of Causation and Moral Responsibility
Julia Driver | 423 |
|
| 8.1 | Causal Judgment and Moral Judgment
Two Experiments
Joshua Knobe and Ben Fraser | 441 |
|
| 8.2 | Can You Be Morally Responsible for Someone's Death If Nothing You Did Caused It?
John Deigh | 449 |
|
| 8.3 | Kinds of Norms and Legal Causation
Reply to Knobe and Fraser and Deigh
Julia Driver | 459 |
|
| References | 463 |
|
| Contributors | 499 |
|
| Index to Volume 1 | 501 |
|
| Index to Volume 2
Sample Chapter - Download PDF (162 KB) | 529 |
|
| Index to Volume 3 | 559 |
|
