This is the first book to explore the cognitive science of effortless attention and action. Attention and action are generally understood to require effort, and the expectation is that under normal circumstances effort increases to meet rising demand. Sometimes, however, attention and action seem to flow effortlessly despite high demand. Effortless attention and action have been documented across a range of normal activities—ranging from rock climbing to chess playing—and yet fundamental questions about the cognitive science of effortlessness have gone largely unasked. This book draws from the disciplines of cognitive psychology, neurophysiology, behavioral psychology, genetics, philosophy, and cross-cultural studies. Starting from the premise that the phenomena of effortless attention and action provide an opportunity to test current models of attention and action, leading researchers from around the world examine topics including effort as a cognitive resource, the role of effort in decision-making, the neurophysiology of effortless attention and action, the role of automaticity in effortless action, expert performance in effortless action, and the neurophysiology and benefits of attentional training.
Contributors: Joshua M. Ackerman, James H. Austin, John A. Bargh Roy F. Baumeister, Sian L. Beilock, Chris Blais, Matthew M. Botvinick, Brian Bruya, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Marci S. DeCaro, Arne Dietrich, Yuri Dormashev, László Harmat, Bernhard Hommel, Rebecca Lewthwaite, Örjan de Manzano, Joseph T. McGuire, Brian P. Meier, Arlen C. Moller, Jeanne Nakamura, Michael I. Posner, Mary K. Rothbart, M.R. Rueda, Brandon J. Schmeichel, Edward Slingerland, Oliver Stoll, Yiyuan Tang, Töres Theorell, Fredrik Ullén, Gabriele Wulf
These essays on a range of topics in the cognitive neurosciences report on the progress in the field over the twenty years of its existence and reflect the many groundbreaking scientific contributions and enduring influence of Michael Gazzaniga, "the godfather of cognitive neuroscience"—founder of the Cognitive Neuroscience Society, founding editor of the Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, and editor of the major reference work, The Cognitive Neurosciences, now in its fourth edition (MIT Press, 2009). The essays, grouped into four sections named after four of Gazzaniga's books, combine science and memoir in varying proportions, and offer an authoritative survey of research in cognitive neuroscience. "The Bisected Brain" examines hemispheric topics pioneered by Gazzaniga at the start of his career; "The Integrated Mind" explores the theme of integration by domination; the wide-ranging essays in "The Social Brain" address subjects from genes to neurons to social conversations and networks; the topics explored in "Mind Matters" include evolutionary biology, methodology, and ethics.
Contributors: Kathleen Baynes, Giovanni Berlucchi, Leo M. Chalupa, Mark D’Esposito, Margaret G. Funnell, Mitchell Glickstein, Scott A. Guerin, Todd F. Heatherton, Steven A. Hillyard, William Hirst, Alan Kingstone, Stephen M. Kosslyn, Marta Kutas, Elisabetta Làdavas, Joseph Ledoux, George R. Mangun, Michael B. Miller, Elizabeth A. Phelps, Steven Pinker, Michael I. Posner, Patricia A. Reuter-Lorenz, Mary K. Rothbart, Andrea Serino, Brad E. Sheese
Intention was seen traditionally as a philosophical concept, before being debated more recently from psychological and social perspectives. Today the cognitive sciences approach intention empirically, at the level of its underlying mechanisms. This naturalization of intention makes it more concrete and graspable by empirical sciences. This volume offers an interdisciplinary integration of current research on intentional processes naturalized through action, drawing on the theoretical and empirical approaches of cognitive neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, and sociology. Each chapter integrates several disciplinary perspectives. Taken together, the chapters show that the reunification of the different dimensions of intentional processes may constitute an adequate basis for a general model of intentional processes and their links to action. This can be applied at various levels, from neuronal activity to self-constitution, from the expression of intentional actions at the individual level to their expression in social contexts, and to the recognition of intention in actions executed by others.
Contributors: Colin Allen, Mireille Bonnard, Vittorio Gallese, Jozina B. de Graaf, Franck Grammont, Patrick Haggard, Marco Iacoboni, Dorothée Legrand, Pierre Livet, Albert Ogien, Jean Pailhous, Jean-Luc Petit, Jean-Michel Roy, Jessica A. Sommerville, Manos Tsakiris, Amanda L. Woodward
Each edition of this classic reference has proved to be a benchmark in the developing field of cognitive neuroscience. The fourth edition of The Cognitive Neurosciences continues to chart new directions in the study of the biologic underpinnings of complex cognition—the relationship between the structural and physiological mechanisms of the nervous system and the psychological reality of the mind. The material in this edition is entirely new, with all chapters written specifically for it.
Since the publication of the third edition, the field of cognitive neuroscience has made rapid and dramatic advances; fundamental stances are changing and new ideas are emerging. This edition reflects the vibrancy of the field, with research in development and evolution that finds a dynamic growth pattern becoming specific and fixed, and research in plasticity that sees the neuronal systems always changing; exciting new empirical evidence on attention that also verifies many central tenets of longstanding theories; work that shows the boundaries of the motor system pushed further into cognition; memory research that, paradoxically, provides insight into how humans imagine future events; pioneering theoretical and methodological work in vision; new findings on how genes and experience shape the language faculty; new ideas about how the emotional brain develops and operates; and research on consciousness that ranges from a novel mechanism for how the brain generates the baseline activity necessary to sustain conscious experience to a bold theoretical attempt to make the problem of qualia more tractable.
Science tries to understand human action from two perspectives, the cognitive and the volitional. The volitional approach, in contrast to the more dominant "outside-in" studies of cognition, looks at actions from the inside out, examining how actions are formed and informed by internal conditions. In Disorders of Volition, scholars from a range of disciplines seek to advance our understanding of the processes supporting voluntary action by addressing conditions in which the will is impaired. Philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, and psychiatrists examine the will and its pathologies from both theoretical and empirical perspectives, offering a conceptual overview and discussing specific neurological and psychiatric conditions as disorders of volition.After presenting different conceptual frameworks that identify agency, decision making, and goal pursuit as central components of volition, the book examines how impairments in these and other aspects of volition manifest themselves in schizophrenia, depression, prefrontal lobe damage, and substance abuse.Contributors:George Ainslie, Tim Bayne, Antoine Bechara, Paul W. Burgess, Anna-Lisa Cohen, Daniel Dennett, Stéphanie Dubal, Philippe Fossati, Chris Frith, Sam J. Gilbert, Peter Gollwitzer, Jordan Grafman, Patrick Haggard, Jay G. Hull, Marc Jeannerod, Roland Jouvent, Frank Krueger, Neil Levy, Peter F. Liddle, Kristen L. Mackiewitz, Thomas Metzinger, Jack B. Nitschke, Jiro Okuda, Adrian M. Owen, Chris Parry, Wolfgang Prinz, Joëlle Proust, Michael A. Sayette, Werner X. Schneider, Natalie Sebanz, Jon S. Simons, Laurie B. Slone, Sean A. Spence
The question of consciousness is perhaps the most significant problem still unsolved by science. In Inner Presence, Antti Revonsuo proposes a novel approach to the study of consciousness that integrates findings from philosophy, psychology, and cognitive neuroscience into a coherent theoretical framework. Arguing that any fruitful scientific approach to the problem must consider both the subjective psychological reality of consciousness and the objective neurobiological reality, Revonsuo proposes that the best strategy for discovering the connection between these two realities is one of "biological realism," using tools of the empirical biological sciences. This approach, which he calls the "biological research program," provides a theoretical and philosophical foundation that contemporary study of consciousness lacks.
Revonsuo coins the term "world simulation metaphor" and uses this metaphor to develop a powerful way of thinking about consciousness as a biological system in the brain. This leads him to propose that the dreaming brain and visual consciousness are ideal model systems for empirical consciousness research. He offers a comprehensive overview and critical analysis of consciousness research and defends his approach against currently popular philosophical views, in particular against approaches that deny or externalize phenomenal consciousness, or claim that brain activity is not sufficient for consciousness. He systematically examines the principal issues in the science of consciousness—the contents of consciousness, the unity of consciousness and the binding problem, the explanatory gap and the neural correlates of consciousness, and the causal powers and function of consciousness.
Revonsuo draws together empirical data from a wide variety of sources, including dream research, brain imaging, neuropsychology, and evolutionary psychology, into the theoretical framework of the biological research program, thus pointing the way toward a unified biological science of consciousness. Applying imaginative thought experiments, Inner Presence reaches beyond the current state-of-the-art, revealing how the problem of consciousness may eventually be solved by future science.
The evolution of cognitive neuroscience has been spurred by the development of increasingly sophisticated investigative techniques to study human cognition. In Methods in Mind, experts examine the wide variety of tools available to cognitive neuroscientists, paying particular attention to the ways in which different methods can be integrated to strengthen empirical findings and how innovative uses for established techniques can be developed. The book will be a uniquely valuable resource for the researcher seeking to expand his or her repertoire of investigative techniques.
Each chapter explores a different approach. These include transcranial magnetic stimulation, cognitive neuropsychiatry, lesion studies in nonhuman primates, computational modeling, psychophysiology, single neurons and primate behavior, grid computing, eye movements, fMRI, electroencephalography, imaging genetics, magnetoencephalography, neuropharmacology, and neuroendocrinology. As mandated, authors focus on convergence and innovation in their fields; chapters highlight such cross-method innovations as the use of the fMRI signal to constrain magnetoencephalography, the use of electroencephalography (EEG) to guide rapid transcranial magnetic stimulation at a specific frequency, and the successful integration of neuroimaging and genetic analysis. Computational approaches depend on increased computing power, and one chapter describes the use of distributed or grid computing to analyze massive datasets in cyberspace. Each chapter author is a leading authority in the technique discussed.
Contributors: Peyman Adjamian, Peter A. Bandettini, Mark Baxter, Anthony S. David, James Dobson, Ian Foster, Michael Gazzaniga, Dietmar G. Heinke, Stephen Hall, John M. Henderson, Glyn W. Humphreys, Andreas Meyer-Lindenburg, Venkata Mattay, Elisabeth A. Murray, Gina Rippon, Tamara Russell, Carl Senior, Philip Shaw, Krish D. Singh, Marc A. Sommer, Lauren Stewart, John D. Van Horn, Jens Voeckler, Vincent Walsh, Daniel R. Weinberger, Michael Wilde, Jeffrey Woodward, Robert H. Wurtz, Eun Young Yoon, Yong Zhao Carl Senior, Tamara Russell and Michael S. Gazzaniga
It has long been known that aspects of behavior run in families; studies show that characteristics related to cognition, temperament, and all major psychiatric disorders are heritable. This volume offers a primer on understanding the genetic mechanisms of such inherited traits. It proposes a set of tools--a conceptual basis--for critically evaluating recent studies and offers a survey of results from the latest research in the emerging fields of cognitive genetics and imaging genetics. The chapters emphasize fundamental issues regarding the design of experiments, the use of bioinformatic tools, the integration of data from different levels of analysis, and the validity of findings, arguing that associations between genes and cognitive processes must be replicable and placed in a neurobiological context for validation. The Genetics of Cognitive Neuroscience aims to give the reader a working understanding of the influence of specific genetic variants on cognition, affective regulation, personality, and central nervous system disorders. With its emphasis on general methodological points, it will remain a valuable resource in a fast-evolving field. ContributorsKristin L. Bigos, Katherine E. Burdick, Jingshan Chen, Aiden Corvin, Jeffrey L. Cummings, Ian J. Deary, Gary Donahoe, Eco J. C. de Geus, Jin Fan, Erika E. Forbes, John Fossella, Terry E. Goldberg, Ahmad R. Hariri, Lucas Kempf, Anil K. Malhotra, Venkata S. Mattay, Lauren M. McGrath. Kristin K. Nicodemus, Francesco Papaleo, Bruce F. Pennington, Michael I. Posner, Danielle Posthuma, John M. Ringman, Shelley D. Smith, Daniel R. Weinberger, Fengyu Zhang
In the past few decades, sources of inspiration in the multidisciplinary field of cognitive science have widened. In addition to ongoing vital work in cognitive and affective neuroscience, important new work is being conducted at the intersection of psychology and the biological sciences in general. This volume offers an overview of the cross-disciplinary integration of evolutionary and developmental approaches to cognition in light of these exciting new contributions from the life sciences. This research has explored many cognitive abilities in a wide range of organisms and developmental stages, and results have revealed the nature and origin of many instances of the cognitive life of organisms. Each section of Cognitive Biology deals with a key domain of cognition: spatial cognition; the relationships among attention, perception, and learning; representations of numbers and economic values; and social cognition. Contributors discuss each topic from the perspectives of psychology and neuroscience, brain theory and modeling, evolutionary theory, ecology, genetics, and developmental science. ContributorsChris M. Bird, Elizabeth M. Brannon, Neil Burgess, Jessica F. Cantlon, Stanislas Dehaene, Christian F. Doeller, Reuven Dukas, Rochel Gelman, Alexander Gerganov, Paul W. Glimcher, Robert L. Goldstone, Edward M. Hubbard, Lucia F. Jacobs, Mark H. Johnson, Annette Karmiloff-Smith, David Landy, Lynn Nadel, Nora S. Newcombe, Daniel Osorio, Mary A. Peterson, Manuela Piazza, Philippe Pinel, Michael L. Platt, Kristin R. Ratliff, Michael E. Roberts, Wendy S. Shallcross, Stephen V. Shepherd, Sylvain Sirois, Luca Tommasi, Alessandro Treves, Alexandra Twyman, Giorgio Vallortigara
Our intuition tells us that we, our conscious selves, cause our own voluntary acts. Yet scientists have long questioned this; Thomas Huxley, for example, in 1874 compared mental events to a steam whistle that contributes nothing to the work of a locomotive. New experimental evidence (most notable, work by Benjamin Libet and Daniel Wegner) has brought the causal status of human behavior back to the forefront of intellectual discussion. This multidisciplinary collection advances the debate, approaching the question from a variety of perspectives.
The contributors begin by examining recent research in neuroscience that suggests that consciousness does not cause behavior, offering the outline of an empirically based model that shows how the brain causes behavior and where consciousness might fit in. Other contributors address the philosophical presuppositions that may have informed the empirical studies, raising questions about what can be legitimately concluded about the existence of free will from Libet's and Wegner's experimental results. Others examine the effect recent psychological and neuroscientific research could have on legal, social, and moral judgments of responsibility and blame—in situations including AClockwork Orange-like scenario of behavior correction.
Contributors: William P. Banks, Timothy Bayne, Sarah-Jayne Blakemore, Suparna Choudhury, Walter J. Freeman, Shaun Gallagher, Susan Hurley, Marc Jeannerod, Leonard V. Kaplan, Hakwan Lau, Sabine Maasen, Bertram F. Malle, Alfred R. Mele, Elisabeth Pacherie, Richard Passingham, Susan Pockett, Wolfgang Prinz, Peter W. Ross