Antitrust policy in the United States and Europe relies increasingly on economic analysis. Economic theory and empirical analysis play a central role in antitrust decisions in the courts and in the formulation and enforcement of policy. Antitrust cases are argued using sophisticated economic thinking; both plaintiffs and defendants in U.S. v. Microsoft, for example, made extensive use of game theory, the economics of information, and transaction cost economics in their arguments.
Shipping is among the most globalized of industries. Shipowners can choose where to register their vessels, based on cost, convenience, and the international and domestic regulations that would govern their operation. This system of open registration, also known as flags of convenience (FOC), can encourage a competition in regulatory laxity among states that want to attract shipping revenues—a race to the regulatory bottom. In Flagging Standards, Elizabeth DeSombre examines the effect of globalization on environmental, safety, and labor standards in the shipping industry.
The repeal of Britain's Corn Laws in 1846—one of the most important economic policy decisions of the nineteenth century—has long intrigued and puzzled political scientists, historians, and economists. Why would a Conservative prime minister act against his own party's interests?
In 2000, the average driver in US metropolitan areas endured 27 hours of traffic delays, a rise from 7 hours in 1980. In many other countries, traffic delays are considerably worse than in the United States, and in developing countries urban traffic congestion is increasing with alarming rapidity. For fifty years, economists have been advocating congestion pricing as the way to deal with urban traffic congestion; but today, even after some successes, congestion pricing is encountering considerable political resistance.
This new edition of the leading text on business and government focuses on the insights economic reasoning can provide in analyzing regulatory and antitrust issues. Departing from the traditional emphasis on institutions, Economics of Regulation and Antitrust asks how economic theory and empirical analyses can illuminate the character of market operation and the role for government action and brings new developments in theory and empirical methodology to bear on these questions.
Recent business scandals point to a disturbing breakdown of values in corporate America. This book responds to the crisis by examining the responsibilities of "gatekeepers"—corporate directors, regulators, auditors, lawyers, investment bankers, and business journalists—who stand between corporate misconduct and the public. The essays, by prominent scholars and practitioners, argue that market pressures have made gatekeepers too focused on financial self-interest and too heedless of the public good to live up to society's legitimate expectations.
The six studies collected in this CESifo volume analyze the sometimes unpredictable effects of public regulation on the labor market. Examining a wide range of policy interventions—from subsidized employment to an increased tax on capital—and using a variety of methodologies to analyze them, these contributions by leading scholars of the European labor market will advance the policy debate over regulation at a time of serious labor market problems in Europe and elsewhere.
The effectiveness of market discipline—the strong built-in incentives that encourage banks and financial systems to operate soundly and efficiently—commands much attention today, particularly in light of recent accounting scandals. As government discipline, in the form of regulation, seems to grows less effective as the banking industry and financial markets grow more complex, the role of market discipline becomes increasingly important.
Public Regulation studies the formation of institutions and government policies that regulate industry, offering new data, new contexts, and new tools for analyzing the structure and performance of regulatory activity. It addresses both how these institutions and policies came into being and how well or poorly they work. The contributors examine them variously, from economic, political, social, and historical points of view.
M. A. Adelman is one of the preeminent authorities on the economics of mineral resources. This book brings together his work, written over the past thirty years, on mineral depletion and the nature of monopoly in world oil. Organized into three groups, the twenty-seven papers cover theory and measurement of mineral scarcity and depletion, analysis of the OPEC cartel and control of the oil market, and public policy problems and options.