“It is beyond the ken of any man to see down the road into Vietnam's future beyond a few weeks. Beware of those who claim to be able to do so. Because we cannot see ahead, we tend to despair that the war will never end. This sense of endlessness in wartime is neither new nor unique.... That we cannot see the end to a war is not the same as that there is no end. Wars do end, thank God, and often sooner than we have a right to expect.” – from the Preface
Douglas Pike looks ahead toward the eventual end of the war in Vietnam – not as a prophet but as a knowledgeable observer who has spent eight years on the scene. In the words of the late Bernard Fall, “In his job Pike sees more [NFL] material than anyone except the Front Leaders themselves.” One purpose of this new book is to update to 1969 the appraisals contained in his earlier Viet Cong, of which the Washington Post said: “Now, at last, we have a book, written by an expert, that is without doubt the most exhaustive and thorough study of the NLF-Viet Cong. No Government official, indeed no concerned citizen, can claim to be informed unless he has read it.”
In the present book, Pike examines the major contends in the struggle (including those engaged only indirectly) and documents their objectives, their real desires, and their stated demands. As background, he surveys the sweep of events from early times to the present and establishes the milieu of the life of the people in its social-psychological and its historical-political aspects. From this basis of understanding, he traces for the reader alternative possible outcomes of the struggle and evaluates their likelihood. These range from the total victory or defeat of each side to political settlement by means of public or private accommodation. This careful examination of variables and contingencies is much more meaningful than flat prediction because in so complex and delicate a situation a small variation can produce widespread and unexpected results that are likely to be overlooked in a simple extrapolation of present trends.
In particular, the book examines the three strategic options that the author believes are under debate by the Politburo in Hanoi. One faction calls for massive, coordinated military attack, feeling that time is running out for the insurgents. Another supports protracted guerrilla war, believing that time is on their side. The third, including the younger elements, is holding out for a political settlement.
For the short term, Pike concludes that gradual military reduction is the most likely course of events, whether by formal pact, implicit agreement attrition of commitment, or unilateral withdrawals by which each side tests the responses of the other. He argues that the real aims of the established South Vietnamese government and the insurgents are not in principle too far apart; that their differences are more emotional than ideological; that time will be the “chief negotiator” in healing these wounds.
For the long term, the author looks forward to a stable Federation of Indochina, a loose alliance, gradually growing more cohesive, held together by mutual economic interests, socialist at home and neutralist abroad. Under these conditions it would be possible for diverse groups to divide and share power among themselves rather than engage in the all-or-nothing struggles that mark and mar the present.