Tyler Burge has produced groundbreaking work on the semantics of proper names and indexicals, de re belief, formal truth theories, semantic and epistemic paradoxes, the philosophy of Gottlob Frege, and other areas of the philosophy of language and of mind. But he is best known for his arguments for anti-individualism, or externalism about mental content. Burge's aim in pursuing anti-individualism is nothing less than the solution to some of the most trenchant metaphysical and epistemological problems, including the nature of objectivity and norms, the force of skeptical arguments, apriority, and the nature of the self. Central to all of these is an account of intentional content that includes a penetrating critique of the empiricist notion of a concept.
This book focuses mainly on Burge's work on anti-individualism. In it, various philosophers either comment on Burge's work or relate it to their own. An unusual feature is the generosity—both in volume and content—of Burge's contribution to this philosophical conversation. The section containing his responses comprises the most sustained, detailed, and interconnected body of writing that he has published in one place.