Banking is now, and always has been, a risky business. The key to success both in operating a bank and in supervising a banking system is appropriate risk management. Yet risk management has become increasingly difficult because of higher and more volatile interest rates, faster and cheaper transfer of funds and information, a movement toward deregulation, and subsidies for many institutions embedded in the flat-rate premium structure of the federal deposit insurance system.In this book five leading bank scholars explore the safety and soundness of the U.S. banking system in an economic environment where the likelihood of failures of individual banks has significantly increased.The book's ten chapters cover: the risks of the failure of individual banks and of the banking system; consequences of bank failure on other banks, financial markets, and economic activity; the role of government deposit insurance; alternative ways of resolving insolvencies; the role of lender of last resort; risk and organizational issues in the expansion of banking activities; market discipline as a means of limiting banking problems and failures; feasibility and desirability of permitting or requiring market-value reporting for financial institutions; risk rated premiums; the effectiveness of supervision and field and remote examinations; the effectiveness of centralization or decentralization of regulation, supervision, and examination in multiple federal and state agencies.George J. Benston is at the University of Rochester, Robert A. Eisenbeis at the University of North Carolina, Paul M. Horvitz at the University of Houston, Edward J. Kane at Ohio State University, and George G. Kaufman at Loyola University.Perspectives on Safe and Sound Banking is copublished with the American Bankers Association and is included in the Regulation of Economic Activity Series, edited by Richard Schmalensee.
The system of federal deposit insurance adopted during the 1930s has become increasingly costly and unreliable. This timely study warns bankers, regulators, politicians, and taxpayers that no matter how well the deposit-insurance system may have run in the past it is headed for an expensive bureaucratic breakdown. It forcefully argues that unless market discipline can be reintroduced, this breakdown threatens to take depository institutions into de facto nationalization. Reversing these trends, it points out, requires redesigning the deposit insurance system to curtail the subsidizing of risk taking by deposit institutions, a practice that has resulted in widespread insolvency among financial institutions.
The Gathering Crisis in Federal Deposit Insurance provides more than a warning. It shows that the current system is unfair and has transformed the federal government into the chief supplier of equity funds to depository institutions. And it observes that whenever the financial environment is changing rapidly, the existing system of deposit insurance subsidizes risk-taking in ways that impose a huge, but largely unrecognized burden on the general taxpayer and conservatively managed financial institutions. In one way or another, the taxpayer is going to be called upon to make good the financially staggering amount of the system's guarantees.
The book provides a comprehensive discussion of FDIC and FSLIC policies and procedures, describes the variety of risks facing deposit institutions and their implications for the insurance system, explains the perverse risk-bearing incentives inherent in the current deposit insurance system, documents the extent of actual insolvency at insured institutions, and proposes a framework for reform.
Edward J. Kane is Everett Reese Professor of Banking and Monetary Economics, The Ohio State University. The Gathering Crisis in Federal Deposit Insurance is eleventh in the series, Regulation of Economic Activity, edited by Richard Schmalensee.
Explicit deposit insurance (DI) is widely held to be a crucial element of modern financial safety nets. For this reason, establishing a DI system is frequently recommended by outside experts to countries undergoing reform. Predictably, DI systems have proliferated in the developing world. The number of countries offering explicit deposit guarantees rose from twenty in 1980 to eighty-seven by the end of 2003. This book challenges the wisdom of encouraging countries to adopt DI without first repairing observable weaknesses in their institutional environment. The evidence and analysis presented confirm that many countries would do well to delay the installation of a DI system. Analysis shows that many existing DI systems are not adequately designed to control possible DI-induced risk taking by financial institutions, and the book provides advice on principles of good design for those countries in the process of adopting or reforming their DI systems. Empirical evidence on the efficiency of real-world DI systems has been scarce, and analysis has focused on the experience of developed countries. The contributors to this book draw on an original cross-country dataset on DI systems and design features to examine the impact of DI on banking behavior and assess the policy complications that emerge in developing countries. Chapters covers decisions about DI adoption, design, and pricing, and review individual country experiences with DI--including issues raised by the EU’s DI directive, banking reform in Russia, and policy efforts to protect depositors in China. Recent bank runs on loss-making banks in Germany and the U.K. have pushed the issues of DI systems back to the center of debates on regulatory policy in both developing and industrialized countries. The guiding principles identified in this book can contribute powerfully to that debate. ContributorsThorsten Beck, Modibo K. Camara, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Kalina Dimitrova, Stephen Haber, Patrick Honohan, Harry Huizinga, Edward Kane, Baybars Karacaovali, Randall Kroszner, Luc Laeven, William Melick, Fernando Montes-Negret, Nikolay Nenovsky