Most of what humans do and experience is best understood in terms of dynamically unfolding interactions with the environment. Many philosophers and cognitive scientists now acknowledge the critical importance of situated, environment-involving embodied engagements as a means of understanding basic minds—including basic forms of human mentality. Yet many of these same theorists hold fast to the view that basic minds are necessarily or essentially contentful—that they represent conditions the world might be in. In this book, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin promote the cause of a radically enactive, embodied approach to cognition that holds that some kinds of minds—basic minds—are neither best explained by processes involving the manipulation of contents nor inherently contentful. Hutto and Myin oppose the widely endorsed thesis that cognition always and everywhere involves content. They defend the counter-thesis that there can be intentionality and phenomenal experience without content, and demonstrate the advantages of their approach for thinking about scaffolded minds and consciousness
About the Authors
Daniel D. Hutto is Professor of Philosophical Psychology at the University of Wollongong. He is the author of Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons (MIT Press) and other books.
Erik Myin is Professor of Philosophy and Head of the Centre for Philosophical Psychology at the University of Antwerp.
—Evan Thompson, Professor of Philosophy, University of Toronto
—Anthony Chemero, Professor of Philosophy and Psychology, University of Cincinnati; author of Radical Embodied Cognitive Science
CHOICE Outstanding Academic Title, 2013
Honorable Mention, 2013 American Publishers Award for Professional and Scholarly Excellence (PROSE Award) in Philosophy, presented by the Professional and Scholarly Publishing Division of the Association of American Publishers