Eduardo S. Schwartz

Eduardo S. Schwartz is the California Professor of Real Estate and Professor of Finance, Anderson Graduate School of Management, the University of California, Los Angeles.

  • Real Options and Investment under Uncertainty

    Real Options and Investment under Uncertainty

    Classical Readings and Recent Contributions

    Eduardo S. Schwartz and Lenos Trigeorgis

    The study of investment under uncertainty was stagnant for several decades, until recent developments in real options provided the tools to revitalize the field. The techniques and insights derived from option pricing can now be used to quantify the elusive elements of managerial operating flexibility and strategic interactions ignored or underestimated by conventional Net Present Value and other quantitative approaches.Topics covered include the reasons for the under-investment problem and conceptual frameworks for viewing productive investment opportunities as real options; useful valuation building blocks; the quantifying of various types of real options separately and in combination; strategic aspects of investment under uncertainty; numerical analysis techniques; a variety of applications, including the valuing of natural resources, R&D and pioneer ventures, land development, strategic acquisitions, government subsidies, power plants and pollution options, flexible manufacturing, and multinational operations; and empirical evidence from oil leasing, land prices, and discontinued operations.

    • Hardcover $80.00 £55.95
    • Paperback $64.00 £50.00


  • The Natural Resources Trap

    The Natural Resources Trap

    Private Investment without Public Commitment

    William Hogan and Federico Sturzenegger

    Experts discuss the contractual instability resulting from commodity price volatility and its effect on private investment and public involvement.

    Volatility in commodity prices has been accompanied by perpetual renegotiation of contracts between private investors in natural resource production and the governments of states with mineral and energy wealth. When prices skyrocket, governments want a larger share of revenues, sometimes to the point of nationalization or expropriation; when prices fall, larger state participation becomes a burden and the private sector is called back in. Recent and newsworthy changes in the price of oil (which fell from an all-time high of $147 in mid-2008 to $40 by year's end) are notable for their speed and the steepness of their rise and fall, but the up-and-down pattern itself is not unusual. If the unpredictability of commodity prices is so predictable, why do contracts not allow for this with mechanisms that would provide a more stable commercial framework?

    In The Natural Resources Trap, top scholars address this question in terms of both theory and practice. Theoretical contributions range across a number of fields, from contract theory to public finance, and treat topics that include taxation, royalties, and expropriation cycles. Case studies examine experiences in the U.K., Bolivia, Argentina, Venezuela, and other parts of the world.

    Contributors Philippe Aghion, George-Marios Angeletos, Fernando Candia Castillo, Rafael di Tella, Juan Dubra, Eduardo Engel, Ramón Espinasa, Ronald Fischer, Jeffrey Frankel, Nicolás Gadano, Dieter Helm, William Hogan, Robert MacCulloch, Osmel Manzano, Francisco Monaldi, Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani, Erich Muehlegger, Fernando Navajas, Robert Pindyck, Lucía Quesada, Roberto Rigobon, Eduardo S. Schwartz, Federico Sturzenegger, Lawrence Summers, Laurence Tai, Michael Tomz, Anders B. Trolle, Louis T. Wells, Nils Wernerfelt, Mark L. J. Wright, Richard Zeckhauser, Jeromin Zettelmeyer

    • Hardcover $19.75 £14.99