Jean-Charles Rochet

Jean-Charles Rochet is Professor of Mathematics and Economics at the University of Toulouse School of Economics.

  • Microeconomics of Banking, Second Edition

    Microeconomics of Banking, Second Edition

    Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet

    The second edition of an essential text on the microeconomic foundations of banking surveys the latest research in banking theory, with new material that covers recent developments in the field.

    Over the last thirty years, a new paradigm in banking theory has overturned economists' traditional vision of the banking sector. The asymmetric information model, extremely powerful in many areas of economic theory, has proven useful in banking theory both for explaining the role of banks in the economy and for pointing out structural weaknesses in the banking sector that may justify government intervention. In the past, banking courses in most doctoral programs in economics, business, or finance focused either on management or monetary issues and their macroeconomic consequences; a microeconomic theory of banking did not exist because the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model of complete contingent markets (the standard reference at the time) was unable to explain the role of banks in the economy. This text provides students with a guide to the microeconomic theory of banking that has emerged since then, examining the main issues and offering the necessary tools for understanding how they have been modeled.

    This second edition covers the recent dramatic developments in academic research on the microeconomics of banking, with a focus on four important topics: the theory of two-sided markets and its implications for the payment card industry; “non-price competition” and its effect on the competition-stability tradeoff and the entry of new banks; the transmission of monetary policy and the effect on the functioning of the credit market of capital requirements for banks; and the theoretical foundations of banking regulation, which have been clarified, although recent developments in risk modeling have not yet led to a significant parallel development of economic modeling.

    Praise for the first edition:"The book is a major contribution to the literature on the theory of banking and intermediation. It brings together and synthesizes a broad range of material in an accessible way. I recommend it to all serious scholars and students of the subject. The authors are to be congratulated on a superb achievement."—Franklin Allen, Nippon Life Professor of Finance and Economics, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

    "This book provides the first comprehensive treatment of the microeconomics of banking. It gives an impressive synthesis of an enormous body of research developed over the last twenty years. It is clearly written and apleasure to read. What I found particularly useful is the great effort that Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet have taken to systematically integrate the theory of financial intermediation into classical microeconomics and finance theory. This book is likely to become essential reading for all graduate students in economics, business, and finance."—Patrick Bolton, Barbara and David Zalaznick Professor of Business, Columbia University Graduate School of Business

    "The authors have provided an extremely thorough and up-to-date survey of microeconomic theories of financial intermediation. This work manages to be both rigorous and pleasant to read. Such a book was long overdue and shouldbe required reading for anybody interested in the economics of banking and finance."—Mathias Dewatripont, Professor of Economics, ECARES, Universit

    • Hardcover $80.00
  • Microeconomics of Banking

    Microeconomics of Banking

    Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet

    Twenty years ago, most banking courses focused on either management or monetary aspects of banking, with no connecting. Since then, a microeconomic theory of banking has developed, mainly through a switch of emphasis from the modeling of risk to the modeling of imperfect information. This asymmetric information model is based on the assumption that different economic agents possess different pieces of information on relevant economic variables, and that they will use the information for their own profit. The model has been extremely useful in explaining the role of banks in the economy. It has also been useful in pointing out structural weaknesses of the banking sector that may justify government intervention—for example, exposure to runs and panics, the persistence of rationing in the credit market, and solvency problems. Microeconomics of Banking provides a guide to the new theory. Topics include why financial intermediaries exist, the industrial organization approach to banking, optimal contracting between lenders and borrowers, the equilibrium of the credit market, macroeconomic consequences of financial imperfections, individual bank runs and systemic risk, risk management inside the banking firm, and bank regulation. Each chapter ends with a detailed problem set and solutions.

    • Hardcover $62.00

Contributor

  • Handbook of Antitrust Economics

    Handbook of Antitrust Economics

    Paolo Buccirossi

    Experts examine the application of economic theory to antitrust issues in both the United States and Europe, discussing mergers, agreements, abuses of dominance, and the impact of market features.

    Over the past twenty years, economic theory has begun to play a central role in antitrust matters. In earlier days, the application of antitrust rules was viewed almost entirely in formal terms; now it is widely accepted that the proper interpretation of these rules requires an understanding of how markets work and how firms can alter their efficient functioning. The Handbook of Antitrust Economics offers scholars, students, administrators, courts, companies, and lawyers the economist's view of the subject, describing the application of newly developed theoretical models and improved empirical methods to antitrust and competition law in both the United States and the European Union. (The book uses the U.S. term “antitrust law” and the European “competition law” interchangeably, emphasizing the commonalities between the two jurisdictions.)

    After a general discussion of the use of empirical methods in antitrust cases, the Handbook covers mergers, agreements, abuses of dominance (or unilateral conducts), and market features that affect the way firms compete. Chapters examine such topics as analyzing the competitive effects of both horizontal and vertical mergers, detecting and preventing cartels, theoretical and empirical analysis of vertical restraints, state aids, the relationship of competition law to the defense of intellectual property, and the application of antitrust law to “bidding markets,” network industries, and two-sided markets.

    ContributorsMark Armstrong, Jonathan B. Baker, Timothy F. Bresnahan, Paulo Buccirossi, Nicholas Economides, Hans W. Friederiszick, Luke M. Froeb, Richard J. Gilbert, Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Paul Klemperer, Kai-Uwe Kuhn, Francine Lafontaine, Damien J. Neven, Patrick Rey, Michael H. Riordan, Jean-Charles Rochet, Lars-Hendrick Röller, Margaret Slade, Giancarlo Spagnolo, Jean Tirole, Thibaud Vergé, Vincent Verouden, John Vickers, Gregory J. Werden

    • Hardcover $95.00
    • Paperback $65.00