Jeremy J. Stone

Jeremy Stone was a mathematician and leader in arms control. Stone formed a firm, Catalytic Diplomacy, which resolved conflicts with arms control in developing countries.

  • Containing the Arms Race

    Some Specific Proposals

    Jeremy J. Stone

    “The unique characteristic of this book is that it musters the facts and arguments pertinent to current and emerging public debates....” Jerome B. Wiesner, Special Assistant for Science and Technology to President Kennedy

    Avoiding abstract models of conflict, speculation on national character, and other generalized frameworks for debate, Containing the Arms Race is distinguished by its specificity – by its attempt to discover and analyze the arms control problems associated with specific proposals. This concrete discussion of possibilities for arms limitation, or for disarmament, will probably double the number of arms control proposals that have been given a detailed analysis in documents. Dealing with the disclosed characteristics of both U.S. and Soviet strategic weapon systems – bombers, missiles, antimissile systems, missile-firing submarines – as well as the major political stumbling blocks, Dr. Stone devises plans grounded in the actual technical and political problems. The book will be eye-opening to those whose desires for disarmament exceeds their appreciation of its problems, while the specialists will undoubtedly be curious to discover how well concrete problems can be studied from unclassified sources only.

    The book is composed of five closely related chapters. Two are devoted to bombers, and one each is given to missile defense, to missile reduction, and to a proposal to limit strategic force levels. Every chapter puts forth a policy suggestion and argues for it. But by revealing the basic political and technical issues that are involved in any proposal concerned with a certain weapon system, the chapters allow the reader to consider for himself what other policy might be followed.

    The first chapter sets forth the situation and argues that missile defenses should be avoided. The second chapter discusses heavy-bomber disarmament and argues that the elimination of heavy bombers from the armories of both major powers should be considered. It sets forth the underlying considerations, as of early 1964. By late 1964 it was becoming possible to see how the problem of dismantling heavy bombers would be handled by the major powers in the absence of a formal treaty. The third chapter describes the situation and suggests that informal bomber disarmament agreements are more likely to be implemented than formal ones. Chapter Four treats the problem of missile reduction and suggests that a Soviet proposal calling for “reductions to strictly limited and agreed numbers” of missiles might be accepted in principle. A proposal is made in Chapter Five that the United States should consider a particular kind of freeze of strategic weapons.

    • Hardcover $12.50


  • Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control

    Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control

    Morton H. Halperin

    This book, which offers the work of a group of distinguished contributors, is designed to clarify the bearing of the arms control issue on the Sino-Soviet dispute and to suggest future policy directions for the United States.

    Arms control and security issues have been at the heart of much of Russian-Chinese disagreement since the opening of the rift in the 1950's. This book, which offers the work of a group of distinguished contributors, is designed to clarify the bearing of the arms control issue on the Sino-Soviet dispute and to suggest future policy directions for the United States. Specifically, the contributors seek to illuminate the security problems facing the United States and to examine the prospects for arms control as they are affected by conflict within the Communist world.

    Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control begins with the observation that the Soviet Union and Communist China use disarmament talk as a way of pointing out issues of major importance in their dispute, of competing for support within the third world and the Communist bloc, and of expressing genuine disagreement over the fundamental causes of the Sino-Soviet rift.

    The first section of the book deals with the impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute on the arms control policies of the Soviet Union, China, and the United States. The authors argue that arms control is possible without China, that the Chinese are unlikely to be interested in arms control agreements in the near future, and that arms control could be of paramount importance to relations among the three countries. Part II of the book is a historical exploration of the interrelation between specific arms control measures and the Sino-Soviet dispute. The authors give the most detailed account yet available of Sino-Soviet nuclear relations between 1957 and 1960 and document the extent to which the quarrel has centered on military and security issues. The role of the test ban in widening the Sino-Soviet rift is explored. In Part III each author poses the same question: what would be the nature of Sino-Soviet relations during a Washington-Peking crisis? The first three chapters in this section answer the question from the viewpoint of each country concerned; the last examines these relations during the 1958 Quemoy crisis.

    Definitive information on the events pertinent to the Sino-Soviet dispute of the 1950's and early 1960's is rare; although it does not pretend to tell the entire story, this book makes a significant contribution to the body of knowledge on the evolution of the Sino-Soviet dispute. As a learned, perceptive comment on the security problems created by the dispute and on the possibilities for agreement that it presents, Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control will have a wide audience among political scientists, specialists in Sino-Soviet affairs, and a lay public that recognizes the importance of this political issue.

    • Hardcover $15.00
    • Paperback $40.00