Joseph E. Harrington, Jr.

Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., is Patrick T. Harker Professor at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and author of The Theory of Collusion and Competition Policy (MIT Press) and other books.

  • Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, Fifth Edition

    Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, Fifth Edition

    W. Kip Viscusi, Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., and David E. M. Sappington

    A thoroughly revised and updated edition of the leading textbook on government and business policy, presenting the key principles underlying sound regulatory and antitrust policy.

    Regulation and antitrust are key elements of government policy. This new edition of the leading textbook on government and business policy explains how the latest theoretical and empirical economic tools can be employed to analyze pressing regulatory and antitrust issues. The book departs from the common emphasis on institutions, focusing instead on the relevant underlying economic issues, using state-of-the-art analysis to assess the appropriate design of regulatory and antitrust policy. Extensive case studies illustrate fundamental principles and provide insight on key issues in regulation and antitrust policy.

    This fifth edition has been thoroughly revised and updated, reflecting both the latest developments in economic analysis and recent economic events. The text examines regulatory practices through the end of the Obama and beginning of the Trump administrations. New material includes coverage of global competition and the activities of the European Commission; recent mergers, including Comcast-NBC Universal; antitrust in the new economy, including investigations into Microsoft and Google; the financial crisis of 2007–2008 and the Dodd-Frank Act; the FDA approval process; climate change policies; and behavioral economics as a tool for designing regulatory strategies.

    • Hardcover $110.00
  • The Theory of Collusion and Competition Policy

    The Theory of Collusion and Competition Policy

    Joseph E. Harrington, Jr.

    A review of the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, focusing on the impact and optimal design of competition law and enforcement.

    Collusion occurs when firms in a market coordinate their behavior for the purpose of producing a supracompetitive outcome. The literature on the theory of collusion is deep and broad but most of that work does not take account of the possible illegality of collusion. Recently, there has been a growing body of research that explicitly focuses on collusion that runs afoul of competition law and thereby makes firms potentially liable for penalties. This book, by an expert on the subject, reviews the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, with a focus on two issues: the impact of competition law and enforcement on whether, how long, and how much firms collude; and the optimal design of competition law and enforcement.

    The book begins by discussing general issues that arise when models of collusion take into account competition law and enforcement. It goes on to consider game-theoretic models that encompass the probability of detection and penalties incurred when convicted, and examines how these policy instruments affect the frequency of cartels, cartel duration, cartel participation, and collusive prices. The book then considers the design of competition law and enforcement, examining such topics as the formula for penalties and leniency programs. The book concludes with suggested future lines of inquiry into illegal collusion.

    • Hardcover $35.00