Marcel Savioz

Marcel Savioz is former Head of Research Coordination and Economic Education at the Swiss National Bank.

  • Karl Brunner and Monetarism

    Thomas Moser and Marcel Savioz

    Economists consider the legacy of Karl Brunner's monetarism and its influence on current debates over monetary policy.

    Monetarism emerged in the 1950s and 1960s as a school of economic thought that questioned certain tenets of Keynesianism. Emphasizing the monetary nature of inflation and the responsibility of central banks for price stability, monetarism held sway in the inflation-plagued 1970s, but saw its influence begin to decline in the 1980s. Although Milton Friedman is the economist most closely associated with the development of monetarism, it was Karl Brunner (1916–1989) who introduced the term into the current vocabulary of economics and shaped its meaning. In this volume, leading economists—many of them Brunner's friends and former colleagues—consider the influence of Brunner's monetarism on current debates over monetary policy.

    Some contributors were participants in debates between Keynesians and monetarists; others analyze specific aspects of monetarism as theorized by Brunner and his close collaborator Allan Meltzer, or address its influence on US and European monetary policy. Others take the opportunity to examine Brunner-Meltzer monetarism through the lens of contemporary macroeconomics and monetary models. The book grows out of a symposium that marked the 100th anniversary of Brunner's birth.

    Contributors

    Ernst Baltensperger, Michael D. Bordo, Pierrick Clerc, Alex Cukierman, Michel De Vroey, James Forder, Benjamin M. Friedman, Kevin D. Hoover, Thomas J. Jordan, David Laidler, Allan H. Meltzer, Thomas Moser, Edward Nelson, Juan Pablo Nicolini, Charles I. Plosser, Kenneth Rogoff, Marcel Savioz, Jürgen von Hagen, Stephen Williamson

    • Hardcover $50.00

Contributor

  • The Long Journey of Central Bank Communication

    The Long Journey of Central Bank Communication

    Otmar Issing

    A leading economist and former central banker discusses the evolution of central bank communication from secretiveness to transparency and accountability.

    Central bank communication has evolved from secretiveness to transparency and accountability—from a reluctance to give out any information at all to the belief in communication as a panacea for effective policy. In this book, Otmar Issing, himself a former central banker, discusses the journey toward transparency in central bank communication. Issing traces the development of transparency, examining the Bank of England as an example of extreme reticence and European Central Bank's President Mario Draghi as a practitioner of effective communication. He argues that the ultimate goal of central bank communication is to make monetary policy more effective, and describes the practice and theory of communication as an evolutionary process. For a long time, the Federal Reserve never made its monetary policy decisions public; the European Central Bank, on the other hand, had to adopt a modern communication strategy from the outset.

    Issing discusses the importance of guiding expectations in central bank communication, and points to financial markets as the most important recipients of this communication. He discusses the obligations of accountability and transparency, although he notes that total transparency is a “mirage.” Issing argues that the central message to the public must always be that the stability of a nation's currency is the bank's priority.

    • Paperback $30.00
  • Reform of the International Monetary System

    Reform of the International Monetary System

    Why and How?

    John B. Taylor

    An argument that a rules-based reform of the international monetary system, achieved by applying basic economic theory, would improve economic performance.

    In this book, the economist John Taylor argues that the apparent correlation of monetary policy decisions among different countries—largely the result of countries' concerns about the exchange rate—causes monetary policy to deviate from effective policies that stabilize inflation and the economy. He argues that a rules-based reform of the international monetary system, achieved by applying basic economic theory, would improve economic performance.

    Taylor shows that monetary polices in recent years have been deployed either defensively, as central banks counteract forces from abroad that affect the exchange rate, or offensively, as central banks attempt to move the exchange rate to gain a competitive advantage. Focusing on the years from 2005 to 2017, he develops an empirical framework to examine two monetary policy instruments: the policy interest rate (the more conventional of the two) and the size of the balance sheet. He finds that an international contagion in central bank decisions about the policy interest rate has accentuated the deviation from standard interest rate rules that have worked in the past. He finds a similar contagion in decisions about the size of the balance sheet. By considering a counterfactual policy in the estimated model, Taylor is able to estimate by how much the policy of recent years has increased exchange rate volatility. After several rounds of monetary actions and reactions aimed at exchange rates, Taylor finds, the international monetary system is left with roughly the same interest rate configuration, but much larger balance sheets to unwind.

    • Paperback $30.00