In recent decades, antitrust investigations and cases targeting mergers—including those involving Google, Ticketmaster, and much of the domestic airline industry—have reshaped industries and changed business practices profoundly. And yet there has been a relative dearth of detailed evaluations of the effects of mergers and the effectiveness of merger policy. In this book, John Kwoka, a noted authority on industrial organization, examines all reliable empirical studies of the effect of specific mergers and develops entirely new information about the policies and remedies of antitrust agencies regarding these mergers. Combined with data on outcomes, this policy information enables analysis of, and creates new insights into, mergers, merger policies, and the effectiveness of remedies in preventing anticompetitive outcomes.
After an overview of mergers, merger policy, and a common approach to merger analysis, Kwoka offers a detailed analysis of the studied mergers, relevant policies, and chosen remedies. Kwoka finds, first and foremost, that most of the studied mergers resulted in competitive harm, usually in the form of higher product prices but also with respect to various non-price outcomes. Other important findings include the fact that joint ventures and code sharing arrangements do not result in such harm and that policies intended to remedy mergers—especially conduct remedies—are not generally effective in restraining price increases. The book’s uniquely comprehensive analysis advances our understanding of merger decisions and policies, suggests policy improvements for competition agencies and remedies, and points the way to future research.
Why do financial institutions, industrial companies, and households hold low-yielding money balances, Treasury bills, and other liquid assets? When and to what extent can the state and international financial markets make up for a shortage of liquid assets, allowing agents to save and share risk more effectively? These questions are at the center of all financial crises, including the current global one.
In Inside and Outside Liquidity, leading economists Bengt Holmström and Jean Tirole offer an original, unified perspective on these questions drawing on insights from modern corporate finance. In a slight, but important departure from the standard theory of finance, they show how imperfect pledgeability of corporate income leads to a demand for as well as a shortage of liquidity with interesting implications for the pricing of assets, investment decisions, and liquidity management. The government has an active role to play in improving risk-sharing between consumers with limited commitment power and firms dealing with the high costs of potential liquidity shortages. In this perspective, private risk sharing is always imperfect and may lead to financial crises that can be alleviated through government interventions. In an epilogue, Holmström and Tirole show how their theory can be used to understand some aspects of the recent financial crisis.
This definitive study uses theory, history, and data to analyze the evolution of the US brewing industry from a fragmented market to an emerging oligopoly. Drawing on a rich and extensive data set and applying the theoretical tools of industrial organization, game theory, and management strategy, the authors provide new quantitative and qualitative perspectives on an industry they characterize as "a veritable market laboratory." The US brewing industry illustrates many of the important topics in industrial organization, economic policy, and business strategy, including industry concentration, technological change, brand proliferation, and mixed pricing strategies.
After giving an overview of the industry, Tremblay and Tremblay discuss basic demand and cost conditions and industry concentration. They describe the evolution of the leading mass-producing brewers and the emergence of both specialty brewers and imports. They analyze the history and the causes of product and brand proliferation (showing how product proliferation leads to firm dominance), discuss price, advertising, merger, and other management strategies, and examine the industry's economic performance. Finally, they discuss public policy, including anti-trust and public health issues. The authors' set of industry, firm, and brand data for the period 1950-2002—the most comprehensive data set of economic variables available for an oligopolistic industry—will be available to purchasers of the book who send an e-mail request. Data sources are listed in an appendix. Robert S. Weinberg, a management strategy scholar and leading consultant to the brewing industry, contributes a foreword. This ambitious, authoritative work, capping the authors' 25-year study of the brewing industry, will be a valuable resource for industry analysts, economists, and students of industrial organization.
The multinational firm and its main vehicle, foreign direct investment, are key forces in economic globalization. Their importance to the world economy can be seen in the fact that since 1990 foreign direct investment has grown more rapidly than the world GDP and world trade. Despite this, the causes and consequences of multinational firm activity are little understood and until recently relatively unexamined in the theoretical literature. This CESifo volume fills this gap, examining the multinational enterprise (MNE) and foreign direct investment (FDI) from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. In the theoretical chapters, leading scholars take a wide range of modern analytical approaches--from new growth and trade theories to new economic geography, industrial organization, and game theory. Taking current theoretical work on MNE and FDI as a starting point and aiming to extend the existing theoretical framework, the contributors consider such topics as investment liberalization and firm location, tax competition, and welfare consequences of FDI and outsourcing. The empirical chapters test several of the key hypotheses of recent theoretical work on MNE and FDI, examining topics that include productivity effects on Italian MNEs, the different effects of outsourcing in Austria and Poland, location decisions of MNEs in the European Union, and other topics. ContributorsOscar Amerighi, Bruce A. Blonigen, Steven Brakman, Davide Castellani, Ronald B. Davies, Alan V. Deardorff, Fabrice Defever, Harry Garretsen, Anders N. Hoffman, Andzelika Lorentowicz, James R. Markusen, Charles van Marrewijk, Dalia Marin, James R. Marukusen, Alireza Naghavi, Helen T. Naughton, Giorgio Barba Navaretti, J. Peter Neary, Gianmarco Ottaviano, Alexander Raubold, Glen R. WaddellSteven Brakman is Professor of Globalization in the Faculty of Economics at the University of Groningen. Harry Garretsen is Professor of International Economics at the Utrecht School of Economics, Utrecht University.
Contract Theory by Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont, a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels, covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory and presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The exercises at the end of the book not only review, chapter by chapter, the basic concepts introduced in the text but also explore additional ideas and applications based on teaching material accumulated over the years by the authors and other instructors of contract theory. The solutions manual to this essential text gives complete solutions to 27 of the 54 exercises in the text, allowing students to study and compare their answers and take greater advantage of this crucial part of the book. The solutions manual follows the structure of the text, grouping exercises by chapter. Chapters 2-6 cover such static bilateral contracting problems as screening, signaling, and moral hazard; chapters 7 and 8 treat multilateral contracting, including auctions, bilateral trade under private information, and multiagent moral hazard; chapters 9 and 10 explore problems of repeated bilateral contracting; and chapters 11-13 cover incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, contracting with externalities, and common agency. Arthur Campbell, Moshe Cohen, Florian Ederer, and Johannes Spinnewijn are all Ph.D. candidates in Economics at MIT.
Antitrust policy in the United States and Europe relies increasingly on economic analysis. Economic theory and empirical analysis play a central role in antitrust decisions in the courts and in the formulation and enforcement of policy. Antitrust cases are argued using sophisticated economic thinking; both plaintiffs and defendants in U.S. v. Microsoft, for example, made extensive use of game theory, the economics of information, and transaction cost economics in their arguments. In this CESifo volume, specialists from the United States and the European Union examine conceptual and empirical issues involved in antitrust policy in light of recent developments in the field.The first three chapters address theoretical issues that have been important in recent antitrust actions: durable goods markets, two-sided markets and platform competition, and tying arrangements. Contributors then take up empirical concerns, discussing such topics as bundling and tying as seen in the market for cold and pain-relief medicine; the political aspects of merger control; and market definition and differentiated products in the car and soft drink markets. Contributors also address antitrust and regulatory issues in markets with imperfect information, examining comparative advertising and incentives for information disclosure. The final chapter treats the ownership structure of cable television networks and its effect on competition in the local access market. The importance of economic analysis in antitrust policy makes this overview of recent theoretical and empirical developments essential reading for academics and policymakers.Contributors:Mark Armstrong, Francesca Barigozzi, Randy Brenkers, Duarte Brito, Jay Pil Choi, David S. Evans, Vivek Ghosal, Jos Jansen, Franco Mariuzzo, Martin Peitz, Pedro Pereira, Michael Salinger, Frank Verboven, Michael Waldman, Patrick Paul Walsh, Ciara Whelan
Interest in intellectual property and other institutions that promote innovation exploded during the 1990s. Innovation and Incentives provides a clear and wide-ranging introduction to the economics of innovation, suitable for teaching at both the advanced undergraduate and graduate levels. It will also be useful to legal and economics professionals. Written by an expert on intellectual property and industrial organization, the book achieves a balanced mix of institutional details, examples, and theory. Analytical, empirical, or institutional factors can be given different emphases at different levels of study.
Innovation and Incentives presents the historical, legal, and institutional contexts in which innovation takes place. After a historical overview of the institutions that support innovation, ranging from ancient history through today's government funding and hybrid institutions, the book discusses knowledge as a public good, the economic design of intellectual property, different models of cumulative innovation, the relation of competition to licensing and joint ventures, patent and copyright enforcement and litigation, private/public funding relationships, patent values and the return on R&D investment, intellectual property issues arising from direct and indirect network externalities, and globalization. The text presents technical and abstract analysis and at the same time sheds light on current controversies and policy-relevant topics, including the difficulty of enforcing copyright in the digital age and international protection of intellectual property.
In The Venture Capital Cycle, Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner correct widespread misperceptions about the nature and role of the venture capitalist and provide an accessible and comprehensive overview of the venture capital industry. Bringing together fifteen years of ground-breaking research into the form and function of venture capital firms, they examine the fund-raising, investing, and exit stages of venture capitalists. Three major themes run throughout the process: venture investors confront tremendous information and incentive problems; venture capital processes are inherently interrelated, and a complete understanding of the industry requires a full understanding of the venture cycle; and, unlike most financial markets, the venture capital industry adjusts very slowly to shifts in the demand for and the supply of investment capital.
This second edition has been thoroughly revised in light of recent research findings, and includes six new chapters. The first part, on fund-raising, now includes a chapter that examines what determines the level of venture capital fund-raising and how tax policy influences the demand for venture capital. Three new chapters in the second part, on investing, examine what kind of distortions are introduced when the venture capital market goes dramatically up, a question prompted by the 1999-2000 market bubble; demonstrate that the venture capital industry does indeed spur innovation, an important determinant of economic growth; and examine whether and under what circumstances governments can be effective venture capitalists. Two new chapters in the third part, on exiting venture capital investments, discuss whether venture capital firms affiliated with investment-banks are prone to conflicts of interest with public offerings and how lockups on initial public offerings are used to limit conflicts of interest.
Digital technology has dramatically changed the structure of many industrial sectors. The rise of the Internet and increased broadband access have given rise to new business models and strategies for firms dealing with both electronic and physical goods. Industrial Organization and the Digital Economy focuses on changes in the two industries most affected by the new technology: software and music. The book offers the theoretical and factual grounding necessary for understanding the changes in industrial organization brought about by the digital economy, with the chapters together providing an accessible and interesting cross-fertilization of fact and theory. Moreover, two chapters demonstrate the relevance of the emerging literature on two-sided markets for the digital economy.The contributors consider such topics as the innovation value of software; empirical evidence and theoretical analysis regarding the impact of file sharing on music sales; the ability of firms to modify their products and offer them in different versions; the practice of preannouncing information goods; the effects of electronic commerce on both consumers and retailers; and price-setting by electronic mediators. The studies in Industrial Organization and the Digital Economy provide a valuable starting point for future research on other aspects of the subject, including the open-source movement and trust and reputation.Contributors:Paul Belleflamme, Jay Pil Choi, Emin M. Dinlersoz, David S. Evans, Chaim Fershtman, Neil Gandal, Amit Gayer, Andrei Hagiu, Gerhard Illing, Bruno Jullien, Eirik Gaard Kristiansen, Stan J. Liebowitz, Jae Nahm, Martin Peitz, Pedro Pereira, Richard Schmalensee, Oz Shy, Patrick Waelbroeck
A vast theoretical and empirical literature in corporate finance considers the interrelationships of corporate governance, takeovers, management turnover, corporate performance, corporate capital structure, and corporate ownership structure. Most of the studies look at two variables at a time. In this book, Sanjai Bhagat and Richard Jefferis argue that from an econometric viewpoint, the proper way to study the relationship between any two of these variables is to set up a system of simultaneous equations that specifies the relationships among the six variables. The specification and estimation of such a system of simultaneous equations, however, is nontrivial.
The authors illustrate their argument with a discussion of the impact of corporate anti-takeover measures on takeovers and managerial job-tenure. During the past two decades, an overwhelming majority of publicly held US corporations have adopted anti-takeover measures. The authors show that, contrary to expectation, defense measures are ineffective in preventing takeovers and the frequency of CEO departures is unrelated to takeover defenses. At firms with poison pill defenses, however, there is a statistically significant relationship between management turnover and company performance.