In recent decades, antitrust investigations and cases targeting mergers—including those involving Google, Ticketmaster, and much of the domestic airline industry—have reshaped industries and changed business practices profoundly. And yet there has been a relative dearth of detailed evaluations of the effects of mergers and the effectiveness of merger policy.
Why do financial institutions, industrial companies, and households hold low-yielding money balances, Treasury bills, and other liquid assets? When and to what extent can the state and international financial markets make up for a shortage of liquid assets, allowing agents to save and share risk more effectively? These questions are at the center of all financial crises, including the current global one.
The multinational firm and its main vehicle, foreign direct investment, are key forces in economic globalization. Their importance to the world economy can be seen in the fact that since 1990 foreign direct investment has grown more rapidly than the world GDP and world trade. Despite this, the causes and consequences of multinational firm activity are little understood and until recently relatively unexamined in the theoretical literature.
Contract Theory by Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont, a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels, covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory and presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance.
Antitrust policy in the United States and Europe relies increasingly on economic analysis. Economic theory and empirical analysis play a central role in antitrust decisions in the courts and in the formulation and enforcement of policy. Antitrust cases are argued using sophisticated economic thinking; both plaintiffs and defendants in U.S. v. Microsoft, for example, made extensive use of game theory, the economics of information, and transaction cost economics in their arguments.
Interest in intellectual property and other institutions that promote innovation exploded during the 1990s. Innovation and Incentives provides a clear and wide-ranging introduction to the economics of innovation, suitable for teaching at both the advanced undergraduate and graduate levels. It will also be useful to legal and economics professionals. Written by an expert on intellectual property and industrial organization, the book achieves a balanced mix of institutional details, examples, and theory.
In The Venture Capital Cycle, Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner correct widespread misperceptions about the nature and role of the venture capitalist and provide an accessible and comprehensive overview of the venture capital industry. Bringing together fifteen years of ground-breaking research into the form and function of venture capital firms, they examine the fund-raising, investing, and exit stages of venture capitalists.
Digital technology has dramatically changed the structure of many industrial sectors. The rise of the Internet and increased broadband access have given rise to new business models and strategies for firms dealing with both electronic and physical goods. Industrial Organization and the Digital Economy focuses on changes in the two industries most affected by the new technology: software and music.
A vast theoretical and empirical literature in corporate finance considers the interrelationships of corporate governance, takeovers, management turnover, corporate performance, corporate capital structure, and corporate ownership structure. Most of the studies look at two variables at a time. In this book, Sanjai Bhagat and Richard Jefferis argue that from an econometric viewpoint, the proper way to study the relationship between any two of these variables is to set up a system of simultaneous equations that specifies the relationships among the six variables.