Paperback | $40.00 Short | £27.95 | ISBN: 9780262731218 | 265 pp. | 6 x 9 in | August 1997
Evolutionary Game Theory
This text introduces current evolutionary game theory—where ideas from evolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet—emphasizing the links between static and dynamic approaches and noncooperative game theory. Much of the text is devoted to the key concepts of evolutionary stability and replicator dynamics. The former highlights the role of mutations and the latter the mechanisms of selection. Moreover, set-valued static and dynamic stability concepts, as well as processes of social evolution, are discussed. Separate background chapters are devoted to noncooperative game theory and the theory of ordinary differential equations. There are examples throughout as well as individual chapter summaries.
Because evolutionary game theory is a fast-moving field that is itself branching out and rapidly evolving, Jörgen Weibull has judiciously focused on clarifying and explaining core elements of the theory in an up-to-date, comprehensive, and self-contained treatment. The result is a text for second-year graduate students in economic theory, other social sciences, and evolutionary biology. The book goes beyond filling the gap between texts by Maynard-Smith and Hofbauer and Sigmund that are currently being used in the field.
Evolutionary Game Theory will also serve as an introduction for those embarking on research in this area as well as a reference for those already familiar with the field. Weibull provides an overview of the developments that have taken place in this branch of game theory, discusses the mathematical tools needed to understand the area, describes both the motivation and intuition for the concepts involved, and explains why and how it is relevant to economics.
About the Author
Jörgen W. Weibull is A. O. Wallenberg Professor of Economics at Stockholm School of Economics.
“This book is a timely one in the rapidly growing area of evolutionary game theory applied to economics. . . . Students and researchers alike will be delighted by its thorough analysis of man ystandard examples and their generalizations. Research in the theory of evolutionary games by economists has exploded. . . while that by biologists has leveled off. The author has achieved an excellent balance between describing the biological foundations of the theory while constantly justifying and explaining the resultant concepts froma more rationalistic and/or economic perspective.”—Ross Cressman, Mathematical Reviews