Economic Learning and Social Evolution

The MIT Press series on Economic Learning and Social Evolution reflects the widespread renewal of interest in the dynamics of human interaction. This issue has provided a broad community of economists, psychologists, biologists, anthropologists, and others with a sense of common purpose so strong that traditional interdisciplinary boundaries have begun to melt away. The books in this series vary in character from theory, to expository, to commentary, but all have two unifying themes. First is the rejection of the outmoded notion that what happens away from equilibrium can safely be ignored. Second is the recognition that it is no longer enough to speak in vague terms of bounded rationality and spontaneous order.

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Moral Sentiments and Material Interests

The Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life

Edited by Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd and Ernst Fehr

ISBN: 9780262572378

Publisher: The MIT Press

Pub Date: August 11, 2006

Moral Sentiments and Material Interests presents an innovative synthesis of research in different disciplines to argue that cooperation stems not from the stereotypical selfish agent acting out of disguised...

Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection

by Larry Samuelson

ISBN: 9780262692199

Publisher: The MIT Press

Pub Date: September 1, 1998

The author examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games.

The Theory of Learning in Games

by Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine

ISBN: 9780262529242

Publisher: The MIT Press

Pub Date: June 3, 1998

In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The traditional explanation for when and why equilibrium arises is...

Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics

by William H. Sandholm

ISBN: 9780262195874

Publisher: The MIT Press

Pub Date: December 17, 2010

A systematic, rigorous, comprehensive, and unified overview of evolutionary game theory.

Game Theory and the Social Contract

Just Playing

by Ken Binmore

ISBN: 9780262024440

Publisher: The MIT Press

Pub Date: July 14, 1998

In Volume 1 of Game Theory and the Social Contract, Ken Binmore restated the problems of moral and political philosophy in the language of game theory. In Volume 2, Just Playing, he unveils his own...

Does Game Theory Work? The Bargaining Challenge

by Ken Binmore

ISBN: 9780262026079

Publisher: The MIT Press

Pub Date: March 9, 2007

A collection of Ken Binmore's influential papers on bargaining experiments, with the author's newly written commentary addressing the challenges to game theory posed by the behavioral school of economics.

Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games

by Ross Cressman

ISBN: 9780262033053

Publisher: The MIT Press

Pub Date: June 6, 2003

An analysis of standard evolutionary dynamics adapted to extensive form games.

Social Dynamics

Edited by Steven N. Durlauf and H. Peyton Young

ISBN: 9780262541763

Publisher: The MIT Press

Pub Date: January 30, 2004

Economists have traditionally studied aggregate behavior as the outcome of individual decisions made interactively, while sociologists have focused on the role of social influences on individual behavior....