Economic Learning and Social Evolution

The MIT Press series on Economic Learning and Social Evolution reflects the widespread renewal of interest in the dynamics of human interaction. This issue has provided a broad community of economists, psychologists, biologists, anthropologists, and others with a sense of common purpose so strong that traditional interdisciplinary boundaries have begun to melt away. The books in this series vary in character from theory, to expository, to commentary, but all have two unifying themes. First is the rejection of the outmoded notion that what happens away from equilibrium can safely be ignored. Second is the recognition that it is no longer enough to speak in vague terms of bounded rationality and spontaneous order.

Series editor: Ken Binmore

Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics

William H. Sandholm

Dec 17, 2010

Moral Sentiments and Material Interests

Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd, Ernst Fehr

Aug 11, 2006

Social Dynamics

Steven N. Durlauf, H. Peyton Young

Jan 30, 2004

Social Dynamics

Brookings Inst Press

Apr 13, 2001

Game Theory and the Social Contract

Ken Binmore

Jul 14, 1998

The Theory of Learning in Games

Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine

Jun 03, 1998