Economic Learning and Social Evolution
The MIT Press series on Economic Learning and Social Evolution reflects the widespread renewal of interest in the dynamics of human interaction. This issue has provided a broad community of economists, psychologists, biologists, anthropologists, and others with a sense of common purpose so strong that traditional interdisciplinary boundaries have begun to melt away. The books in this series vary in character from theory, to expository, to commentary, but all have two unifying themes. First is the rejection of the outmoded notion that what happens away from equilibrium can safely be ignored. Second is the recognition that it is no longer enough to speak in vague terms of bounded rationality and spontaneous order.
Series editor: Ken Binmore
Search Results
Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics
Pub Date: Dec 17, 2010
Does Game Theory Work? The Bargaining Challenge
Pub Date: Mar 09, 2007
Moral Sentiments and Material Interests
Pub Date: Aug 11, 2006
Social Dynamics
Pub Date: Jan 30, 2004
Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games
Pub Date: Jun 06, 2003
Social Dynamics
Pub Date: Apr 13, 2001
Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection
Pub Date: Sep 01, 1998
Game Theory and the Social Contract
Pub Date: Jul 14, 1998
The Theory of Learning in Games
Pub Date: Jun 03, 1998