Empirical Evidence on Money, Prices, and Output

1.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews some of the basic empirical evidence on money, inflation, and output. This review serves two purposes. First, these basic facts about long-run and short-run relationships serve as benchmarks for judging theoretical models. Second, reviewing the empirical evidence provides an opportunity to discuss the approaches monetary economists have taken to estimate the effects of money and monetary policy on real economic activity. The discussion focuses heavily on evidence from vector autoregressions (VARs) because these have served as a primary tool for uncovering the impact of monetary phenomena on the real economy. The findings obtained from VARs have been criticized, and these criticisms as well as other methods that have been used to investigate the money-output relationship are also discussed.

1.2 Some Basic Correlations

What are the basic empirical regularities that monetary economics must explain? Monetary economics focuses on the behavior of prices, monetary aggregates, nominal and real interest rates, and output, so a useful starting point is to summarize briefly what macroeconomic data tell us about the relationships among these variables.

1.2.1 Long-Run Relationships

A nice summary of long-run monetary relationships is provided by McCandless and Weber (1995). They examined data covering a 30-year period from 110 countries using several definitions of money. By examining average rates of inflation, output growth, and the growth rates of various measures of money over a long period of time and for many different countries, McCandless and Weber provided evidence
on relationships that are unlikely to depend on unique country-specific events (such as the particular means employed to implement monetary policy) that might influence the actual evolution of money, prices, and output in a particular country. Based on their analysis, two primary conclusions emerge.

The first is that the correlation between inflation and the growth rate of the money supply is almost 1, varying between 0.92 and 0.96, depending on the definition of the money supply used. This strong positive relationship between inflation and money growth is consistent with many other studies based on smaller samples of countries and different time periods.\(^1\) This correlation is normally taken to support one of the basic tenets of the quantity theory of money: a change in the growth rate of money induces “an equal change in the rate of price inflation” (Lucas 1980b, 1005). Using U.S. data from 1955 to 1975, Lucas plotted annual inflation against the annual growth rate of money. While the scatter plot suggests only a loose but positive relationship between inflation and money growth, a much stronger relationship emerged when Lucas filtered the data to remove short-run volatility. Berentsen, Menzio, and Wright (2008) repeated Lucas’s exercise using data from 1955 to 2005, and like Lucas, they found a strong correlation between inflation and money growth as they removed more and more of the short-run fluctuations in the two variables.\(^2\)

This high correlation between inflation and money growth does not, however, have any implication for causality. If countries followed policies under which money supply growth rates were exogenously determined, then the correlation could be taken as evidence that money growth causes inflation, with an almost one-to-one relationship between them. An alternative possibility, equally consistent with the high correlation, is that other factors generate inflation, and central banks allow the growth rate of money to adjust. Any theoretical model not consistent with a roughly one-for-one long-run relationship between money growth and inflation, though, would need to be questioned.\(^3\)

The appropriate interpretation of money-inflation correlations, both in terms of causality and in terms of tests of long-run relationships, also depends on the statistical properties of the underlying series. As Fischer and Seater (1993) noted, one cannot ask how a permanent change in the growth rate of money affects inflation unless

---

1. Examples include Lucas (1980b); Geweke (1986); and Rolnick and Weber (1994), among others. A nice graph of the close relationship between money growth and inflation for high-inflation countries is provided by Abel and Bernanke (1995, 242). Hall and Taylor (1997, 115) provided a similar graph for the G-7 countries. As will be noted, however, the interpretation of correlations between inflation and money growth can be problematic.

2. Berentsen, Menzio, and Wright (2008) employed an HP filter and progressively increased the smoothing parameter from 0 to 160,000.

3. Haldane (1997) found, however, that the money growth rate–inflation correlation is much less than 1 among low-inflation countries.
actual money growth has exhibited permanent shifts. They showed how the order of integration of money and prices influences the testing of hypotheses about the long-run relationship between money growth and inflation. In a similar vein, McCallum (1984b) demonstrated that regression-based tests of long-run relationships in monetary economics may be misleading when expectational relationships are involved.

McCandless and Weber’s second general conclusion is that there is no correlation between either inflation or money growth and the growth rate of real output. Thus, there are countries with low output growth and low money growth and inflation, and countries with low output growth and high money growth and inflation—and countries with every other combination as well. This conclusion is not as robust as the money growth—money growth one; McCandless and Weber reported a positive correlation between real growth and money growth, but not inflation, for a subsample of OECD countries. Kormendi and Meguire (1984) for a sample of almost 50 countries and Geweke (1986) for the United States argued that the data reveal no long-run effect of money growth on real output growth. Barro (1995; 1996) reported a negative correlation between inflation and growth in a cross-country sample. Bullard and Keating (1995) examined post–World War II data from 58 countries, concluding for the sample as a whole that the evidence that permanent shifts in inflation produce permanent effects on the level of output is weak, with some evidence of positive effects of inflation on output among low-inflation countries and zero or negative effects for higher-inflation countries. Similarly, Boschen and Mills (1995b) concluded that permanent monetary shocks in the United States made no contribution to permanent shifts in GDP, a result consistent with the findings of R. King and Watson (1997).

Bullard (1999) surveyed much of the existing empirical work on the long-run relationship between money growth and real output, discussing both methodological issues associated with testing for such a relationship and the results of a large literature. Specifically, while shocks to the level of the money supply do not appear to have long-run effects on real output, this is not the case with respect to shocks to money growth. For example, the evidence based on postwar U.S. data reported in King and Watson (1997) is consistent with an effect of money growth on real output. Bullard and Keating (1995) did not find any real effects of permanent inflation shocks with a cross-country analysis, but Berentsen, Menzio, and Wright (2008), using the same filtering approach described earlier, argued that inflation and unemployment are positively related in the long run.

4. Kormendi and Meguire (1985) reported a statistically significant positive coefficient on average money growth in a cross-country regression for average real growth. This effect, however, was due to a single observation (Brazil), and the authors reported that money growth became insignificant in their growth equation when Brazil was dropped from the sample. They did find a significant negative effect of monetary volatility on growth.
However, despite this diversity of empirical findings concerning the long-run relationship between inflation and real growth, and other measures of real economic activity such as unemployment, the general consensus is well summarized by the proposition, “about which there is now little disagreement, . . . that there is no long-run trade-off between the rate of inflation and the rate of unemployment” (Taylor 1996, 186).

Monetary economics is also concerned with the relationship between interest rates, inflation, and money. According to the Fisher equation, the nominal interest rate equals the real return plus the expected rate of inflation. If real returns are independent of inflation, then nominal interest rates should be positively related to expected inflation. This relationship is an implication of the theoretical models discussed throughout this book. In terms of long-run correlations, it suggests that the level of nominal interest rates should be positively correlated with average rates of inflation. Because average rates of inflation are positively correlated with average money growth rates, nominal interest rates and money growth rates should also be positively correlated. Monnet and Weber (2001) examined annual average interest rates and money growth rates over the period 1961–1998 for a sample of 31 countries. They found a correlation of 0.87 between money growth and long-term interest rates. For developed countries, the correlation is somewhat smaller (0.70); for developing countries, it is 0.84, although this falls to 0.66 when Venezuela is excluded. This evidence is consistent with the Fisher equation.

1.2.2 Short-Run Relationships

The long-run empirical regularities of monetary economics are important for gauging how well the steady-state properties of a theoretical model match the data. Much of our interest in monetary economics, however, arises because of a need to understand how monetary phenomena in general and monetary policy in particular affect the behavior of the macroeconomy over time periods of months or quarters. Short-run dynamic relationships between money, inflation, and output reflect both the way in which private agents respond to economic disturbances and the way in which the monetary policy authority responds to those same disturbances. For this reason, short-run correlations are likely to vary across countries, as different central banks implement policy in different ways, and across time in a single country, as the sources of economic disturbances vary.

Some evidence on short-run correlations for the United States are provided in figures 1.1 and 1.2. The figures show correlations between the detrended log of real

5. Venezuela’s money growth rate averaged over 28 percent, the highest among the countries in Monnet and Weber’s sample.

6. Consistent evidence on the strong positive long-run relationship between inflation and interest rates was reported by Berentsen, Menzio, and Wright (2008).
1.2 Some Basic Correlations

Figure 1.1
Dynamic correlations, GDP and \( M_{t+j} \), 1967:1–2008:2.

Figure 1.2
Dynamic correlations, GDP and \( M_{t+j} \), 1984:1–2008:2.
GDP and three different monetary aggregates, each also in detrended log form. Data are quarterly from 1967:1 to 2008:2, and the figures plot, for the entire sample and for the subperiod 1984:1–2008:2, the correlation between real GDP, and \( M_{t+j} \) against \( j \), where \( M \) represents a monetary aggregate. The three aggregates are the monetary base (sometimes denoted \( M0 \)), \( M1 \), and \( M2 \). \( M0 \) is a narrow definition of the money supply, consisting of total reserves held by the banking system plus currency in the hands of the public. \( M1 \) consists of currency held by the nonbank public, travelers checks, demand deposits, and other checkable deposits. \( M2 \) consists of \( M1 \) plus savings accounts and small-denomination time deposits plus balances in retail money market mutual funds. The post-1984 period is shown separately because 1984 often is identified as the beginning of a period characterized by greater macroeconomic stability, at least until the onset of the financial crisis in 2007.

As figure 1.1 shows, the correlations with real output change substantially as one moves from \( M0 \) to \( M2 \). The narrow measure \( M0 \) is positively correlated with real GDP at both leads and lags over the entire period, but future \( M0 \) is negatively correlated with real GDP in the period since 1984. \( M1 \) and \( M2 \) are positively correlated at lags but negatively correlated at leads over the full sample. In other words, high GDP (relative to trend) tends to be preceded by high values of \( M1 \) and \( M2 \) but followed by low values. The positive correlation between GDP, and \( M_{t+j} \) for \( j < 0 \) indicates that movements in money lead movements in output. This timing pattern played an important role in M. Friedman and Schwartz’s classic and highly influential *A Monetary History of the United States* (1963a). The larger correlations between GDP and \( M2 \) arise in part from the endogenous nature of an aggregate such as \( M2 \), depending as it does on banking sector behavior as well as on that of the nonbank private sector (see King and Plosser 1984; Coleman 1996). However, these patterns for \( M2 \) are reversed in the later period, though \( M1 \) still leads GDP. Correlations among endogenous variables reflect the structure of the economy, the nature of shocks experienced during each period, and the behavior of monetary policy. One objective of a structural model of the economy and a theory of monetary policy is to provide a framework for understanding why these dynamic correlations differ over different periods.

Figures 1.3 and 1.4 show the cross-correlations between detrended real GDP and several interest rates and between detrended real GDP and the detrended GDP deflator. The interest rates range from the federal funds rate, an overnight interbank rate used by the Federal Reserve to implement monetary policy, to the 1-year and 10-year rates on government bonds. The three interest rate series display similar correlations

---

7. Trends are estimated using a Hodrick-Prescott filter.
8. Perhaps reflecting the greater volatility during 1967–1983, cross-correlations during this period are similar to those obtained using the entire 1967–2008 period.
1.2 Some Basic Correlations

Figure 1.3

Figure 1.4
with real output, although the correlations become smaller for the longer-term rates. For the entire sample period (figure 1.3), low interest rates tend to lead output, and a rise in output tends to be followed by higher interest rates. This pattern is less pronounced in the 1984:1–2008:2 period (figure 1.4), and interest rates appear to rise prior to an increase in detrended GDP.

In contrast, the GDP deflator tends to be below trend when output is above trend, but increases in real output tend to be followed by increases in prices, though this effect is absent in the more recent period. Kydland and Prescott (1990) argued that the negative contemporaneous correlation between the output and price series suggests that supply shocks, not demand shocks, must be responsible for business cycle fluctuations. Aggregate supply shocks would cause prices to be countercyclical, whereas demand shocks would be expected to make prices procyclical. However, if prices were sticky, a demand shock would initially raise output above trend, and prices would respond very little. If prices did eventually rise while output eventually returned to trend, prices could be rising as output was falling, producing a negative unconditional correlation between the two even though it was demand shocks generating the fluctuations (Ball and Mankiw 1994; Judd and Trehan 1995). Den Haan (2000) examined forecast errors from a vector autoregression (see section 1.3.4) and found that price and output correlations are positive for short forecast horizons and negative for long forecast horizons. This pattern seems consistent with demand shocks playing an important role in accounting for short-run fluctuations and supply shocks playing a more important role in the long-run behavior of output and prices.

Most models used to address issues in monetary theory and policy contain only a single interest rate. Generally, this is interpreted as a short-term rate of interest and is often viewed as an overnight market interest rate that the central bank can, to a large degree, control. The assumption of a single interest rate is a useful simplification if all interest rates tend to move together. Figure 1.5 shows several longer-term market rates of interest for the United States. As the figure suggests, interest rates do tend to display similar behavior, although the 3-month Treasury bill rate, the shortest maturity shown, is more volatile than the other rates. There are periods, however, when rates at different maturities and riskiness move in opposite directions. For example, during 2008, a period of financial crisis, the rate on corporate bonds rose while the rates on government debt, both at 3-month and 10-year maturities, were falling.

Although figures 1.1–1.5 produce evidence for the behavior of money, prices, interest rates, and output, at least for the United States, one of the challenges of monetary economics is to determine the degree to which these data reveal causal relationships, relationships that should be expected to appear in data from other countries and during other time periods, or relationships that depend on the particular characteristics of the policy regime under which monetary policy is conducted.
Almost all economists accept that the long-run effects of money fall entirely, or almost entirely, on prices, with little impact on real variables, but most economists also believe that monetary disturbances can have important effects on real variables such as output in the short run. As Lucas (1996) put it in his Nobel lecture, “This tension between two incompatible ideas—that changes in money are neutral unit changes and that they induce movements in employment and production in the same direction—has been at the center of monetary theory at least since Hume wrote” (664). The time series correlations presented in the previous section suggest the short-run relationships between money and income, but the evidence for the effects of money on real output is based on more than these simple correlations.

The tools that have been employed to estimate the impact of monetary policy have evolved over time as the result of developments in time series econometrics and changes in the specific questions posed by theoretical models. This section reviews some of the empirical evidence on the relationship between monetary policy and U.S. macroeconomic behavior. One objective of this literature has been to determine...
whether monetary policy disturbances actually have played an important role in U.S. economic fluctuations. Equally important, the empirical evidence is useful in judging whether the predictions of different theories about the effects of monetary policy are consistent with the evidence. Among the excellent recent discussions of these issues are Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999), where the focus is on the role of identified VARs in estimating the effects of monetary policy, and R. King and Watson (1996), where the focus is on using empirical evidence to distinguish among competing business-cycle models.

1.3.1 The Evidence of Friedman and Schwartz

M. Friedman and Schwartz’s (1963a) study of the relationship between money and business cycles still represents probably the most influential empirical evidence that money does matter for business cycle fluctuations. Their evidence, based on almost 100 years of data from the United States, relies heavily on patterns of timing; systematic evidence that money growth rate changes lead changes in real economic activity is taken to support a causal interpretation in which money causes output fluctuations. This timing pattern shows up most clearly in figure 1.1 with $M_2$.

Friedman and Schwartz concluded that the data “decisively support treating the rate of change series [of the money supply] as conforming to the reference cycle positively with a long lead” (36). That is, faster money growth tends to be followed by increases in output above trend, and slowdowns in money growth tend to be followed by declines in output. The inference Friedman and Schwartz drew was that variations in money growth rates cause, with a long (and variable) lag, variations in real economic activity.

The nature of this evidence for the United States is apparent in figure 1.6, which shows two detrended money supply measures and real GDP. The monetary aggregates in the figure, $M_1$ and $M_2$, are quarterly observations on the deviations of the actual series from trend. The sample period is 1967:1–2008:2, so that is after the period of the Friedman and Schwartz study. The figure reveals slowdowns in money leading most business cycle downturns through the early 1980s. However, the pattern is not so apparent after 1982. B. Friedman and Kuttner (1992) documented the seeming breakdown in the relationship between monetary aggregates and real output; this changing relationship between money and output has affected the manner in which monetary policy has been conducted, at least in the United States (see chapter 11).

While it is suggestive, evidence based on timing patterns and simple correlations may not indicate the true causal role of money. Since the Federal Reserve and the banking sector respond to economic developments, movements in the monetary aggregates are not exogenous, and the correlation patterns need not reflect any causal effect of monetary policy on economic activity. If, for example, the central
bank is implementing monetary policy by controlling the value of some short-term market interest rate, the nominal stock of money will be affected both by policy actions that change interest rates and by developments in the economy that are not related to policy actions. An economic expansion may lead banks to expand lending in ways that produce an increase in the stock of money, even if the central bank has not changed its policy. If the money stock is used to measure monetary policy, the relationship observed in the data between money and output may reflect the impact of output on money, not the impact of money and monetary policy on output.

Tobin (1970) was the first to model formally the idea that the positive correlation between money and output—the correlation that Friedman and Schwartz interpreted as providing evidence that money caused output movements—could in fact reflect just the opposite—output might be causing money. A more modern treatment of what is known as the reverse causation argument was provided by R. King and Plosser (1984). They show that inside money, the component of a monetary aggregate such as $M_1$ that represents the liabilities of the banking sector, is more highly correlated with output movements in the United States than is outside money, the liabilities of the Federal Reserve. King and Plosser interpreted this finding as evidence that much of the correlation between broad aggregates such as $M_1$ or $M_2$ and output arises from the endogenous response of the banking sector to economic disturbances that are not the result of monetary policy actions. More recently, Coleman (1996), in an estimated equilibrium model with endogenous money, found that
the implied behavior of money in the model cannot match the lead-lag relationship in the data. Specifically, a money supply measure such as $M_2$ leads output, whereas Coleman found that his model implies that money should be more highly correlated with lagged output than with future output.\footnote{Lacker (1988) showed how the correlations between inside money and future output could also arise if movements in inside money reflect new information about future monetary policy.}

The endogeneity problem is likely to be particularly severe if the monetary authority has employed a short-term interest rate as its main policy instrument, and this has generally been the case in the United States. Changes in the money stock will then be endogenous and cannot be interpreted as representing policy actions. Figure 1.7 shows the behavior of two short-term nominal interest rates, the 3-month Treasury bill rate (3MTB) and the federal funds rate, together with detrended real GDP. Like figure 1.6, figure 1.7 provides some support for the notion that monetary policy actions have contributed to U.S. business cycles. Interest rates have typically increased prior to economic downturns. But whether this is evidence that monetary policy has caused or contributed to cyclical fluctuations cannot be inferred from the figure; the movements in interest rates may simply reflect the Fed’s response to the state of the economy.

Simple plots and correlations are suggestive, but they cannot be decisive. Other factors may be the cause of the joint movements of output, monetary aggregates,
and interest rates. The comparison with business cycle reference points also ignores much of the information about the time series behavior of money, output, and interest rates that could be used to determine what impact, if any, monetary policy has on output. And the appropriate variable to use as a measure of monetary policy will depend on how policy has been implemented.

One of the earliest time series econometric attempts to estimate the impact of money was due to M. Friedman and Meiselman (1963). Their objective was to test whether monetary or fiscal policy was more important for the determination of nominal income. To address this issue, they estimated the following equation:

\[
y^n_t = y^*_t + p_t = y^*_0 + \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} a_i A_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} b_i m_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} h_i z_{t-i} + u_t, \tag{1.1}
\]

where \(y^n\) denotes the log of nominal income, equal to the sum of the logs of output and the price level, \(A\) is a measure of autonomous expenditures, and \(m\) is a monetary aggregate; \(z\) can be thought of as a vector of other variables relevant for explaining nominal income fluctuations. Friedman and Meiselman reported finding a much more stable and statistically significant relationship between output and money than between output and their measure of autonomous expenditures. In general, they could not reject the hypothesis that the \(a_i\) coefficients were zero, while the \(b_i\) coefficients were always statistically significant.

The use of equations such as (1.1) for policy analysis was promoted by a number of economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, so regressions of nominal income on money are often called St. Louis equations (see L. Andersen and Jordon 1968; B. Friedman 1977a; Carlson 1978). Because the dependent variable is nominal income, the St. Louis approach does not address directly the question of how a money-induced change in nominal spending is split between a change in real output and a change in the price level. The impact of money on nominal income was estimated to be quite strong, and Andersen and Jordon (1968, 22) concluded, “Finding of a strong empirical relationship between economic activity and... monetary actions points to the conclusion that monetary actions can and should play a more prominent role in economic stabilization than they have up to now.”

12. This is not exactly correct; because Friedman and Meiselman included “autonomous” expenditures as an explanatory variable, they also used consumption as the dependent variable (basically, output minus autonomous expenditures). They also reported results for real variables as well as nominal ones. Following modern practice, (1.1) is expressed in terms of logs; Friedman and Meiselman estimated their equation in levels.

13. B. Friedman (1977a) argued that updated estimates of the St. Louis equation did yield a role for fiscal policy, although the statistical reliability of this finding was questioned by Carlson (1978). Carlson also provided a bibliography listing many of the papers on the St. Louis equation (see his footnote 2, p. 13).
The original Friedman-Meiselman result generated responses by Modigliani and Ando (1976) and De Prano and Mayer (1965), among others. This debate emphasized that an equation such as (1.1) is misspecified if $m$ is endogenous. To illustrate the point with an extreme example, suppose that the central bank is able to manipulate the money supply to offset almost perfectly shocks that would otherwise generate fluctuations in nominal income. In this case, $y^u$ would simply reflect the random control errors the central bank had failed to offset. As a result, $m$ and $y^u$ might be completely uncorrelated, and a regression of $y^u$ on $m$ would not reveal that money actually played an important role in affecting nominal income. If policy is able to respond to the factors generating the error term $u_t$, then $m_t$ and $u_t$ will be correlated, ordinary least-squares estimates of (1.1) will be inconsistent, and the resulting estimates will depend on the manner in which policy has induced a correlation between $u$ and $m$. Changes in policy that altered this correlation would also alter the least-squares regression estimates one would obtain in estimating (1.1).

### 1.3.2 Granger Causality

The St. Louis equation related nominal output to the past behavior of money. Similar regressions employing real output have also been used to investigate the connection between real economic activity and money. In an important contribution, Sims (1972) introduced the notion of Granger causality into the debate over the real effects of money. A variable $X$ is said to Granger-cause $Y$ if and only if lagged values of $X$ have marginal predictive content in a forecasting equation for $Y$. In practice, testing whether money Granger-causes output involves testing whether the $a_i$ coefficients equal zero in a regression of the form

$$y_t = y_0 + \sum_{i=1} a_i m_{t-i} + \sum_{i=1} b_i y_{t-i} + \sum_{i=1} c_i z_{t-i} + e_t,$$

where key issues involve the treatment of trends in output and money, the choice of lag lengths, and the set of other variables (represented by $z$) that are included in the equation.

Sims’s original work used log levels of U.S. nominal GNP and money (both $M1$ and the monetary base). He found evidence that money Granger-caused GNP. That is, the past behavior of money helped to predict future GNP. However, using the index of industrial production to measure real output, Sims (1980) found that the fraction of output variation explained by money was greatly reduced when a nominal interest rate was added to the equation (so that $z$ consists of the log price level and an interest rate). Thus, the conclusion seemed sensitive to the specification of $z$. Eichenbaum and Singleton (1987) found that money appeared to be less important if the regressions were specified in log first difference form rather than in log levels.
with a time trend. Stock and Watson (1989) provided a systematic treatment of the trend specification in testing whether money Granger-causes real output. They concluded that money does help to predict future output (they actually used industrial production) even when prices and an interest rate are included.

A large literature has examined the value of monetary indicators in forecasting output. One interpretation of Sims’s finding was that including an interest rate reduces the apparent role of money because, at least in the United States, a short-term interest rate rather than the money supply provides a better measure of monetary policy actions (see chapter 11). B. Friedman and Kuttner (1992) and Bernanke and Blinder (1992), among others, looked at the role of alternative interest rate measures in forecasting real output. Friedman and Kuttner examined the effects of alternative definitions of money and different sample periods and concluded that the relationship in the United States is unstable and deteriorated in the 1990s. Bernanke and Blinder found that the federal funds rate “dominates both money and the bill and bond rates in forecasting real variables.”

Regressions of real output on money were also popularized by Barro (1977; 1978; 1979b) as a way of testing whether only unanticipated money matters for real output. By dividing money into anticipated and unanticipated components, Barro obtained results suggesting that only the unanticipated part affects real variables (see also Barro and Rush 1980 and the critical comment by Small 1979). Subsequent work by Mishkin (1982) found a role for anticipated money as well. Cover (1992) employed a similar approach and found differences in the impacts of positive and negative monetary shocks. Negative shocks were estimated to have significant effects on output, whereas the effect of positive shocks was usually small and statistically insignificant.

1.3.3 Policy Uses

Before reviewing other evidence on the effects of money on output, it is useful to ask whether equations such as (1.2) can be used for policy purposes. That is, can a regression of this form be used to design a policy rule for setting the central bank’s policy instrument? If it can, then the discussions of theoretical models that form the bulk of this book would be unnecessary, at least from the perspective of conducting monetary policy.

Suppose that the estimated relationship between output and money takes the form

\[ y_t = y_0 + a_0m_t + a_1m_{t-1} + c_1z_t + c_2z_{t-1} + u_t. \]  

(1.3)

According to (1.3), systematic variations in the money supply affect output. Consider the problem of adjusting the money supply to reduce fluctuations in real output. If this objective is interpreted to mean that the money supply should be manipulated to minimize the variance of \( y_t \) around \( y_0 \), then \( m_t \) should be set equal to
\[ m_t = -\frac{d_1}{d_0} m_{t-1} - \frac{c_2}{d_0} z_{t-1} + v_t = \pi_1 m_{t-1} + \pi_2 z_{t-1} + v_t, \tag{1.4} \]

where for simplicity it is assumed that the monetary authority’s forecast of \( z_t \) is equal to zero. The term \( v_t \) represents the control error experienced by the monetary authority in setting the money supply. Equation (1.4) represents a feedback rule for the money supply whose parameters are themselves determined by the estimated coefficients in the equation for \( y \). A key assumption is that the coefficients in (1.3) are independent of the choice of the policy rule for \( m \). Substituting (1.4) into (1.3), output under the policy rule given in (1.4) would be equal to \( y_t = y_0 + c_1 z_t + u_t + a_0 v_t \).

Notice that a policy rule has been derived using only knowledge of the policy objective (minimizing the expected variance of output) and knowledge of the estimated coefficients in (1.3). No theory of how monetary policy actually affects the economy was required. Sargent (1976) showed, however, that the use of (1.3) to derive a policy feedback rule may be inappropriate. To see why, suppose that real output actually depends only on unpredicted movements in the money supply; only surprises matter, with predicted changes in money simply being reflected in price level movements with no impact on output.\(^\text{14}\) From (1.4), the unpredicted movement in \( m_t \) is just \( v_t \), so let the true model for output be

\[ y_t = y_0 + d_0 v_t + d_1 z_t + d_2 z_{t-1} + u_t. \tag{1.5} \]

Now from (1.4), \( v_t = m_t - (\pi_1 m_{t-1} + \pi_2 z_{t-1}) \), so output can be expressed equivalently as

\[ y_t = y_0 + d_0 [m_t - (\pi_1 m_{t-1} + \pi_2 z_{t-1})] + d_1 z_t + d_2 z_{t-1} + u_t = y_0 + d_0 m_t - d_0 \pi_1 m_{t-1} + d_1 z_t + (d_2 - d_0 \pi_2) z_{t-1} + u_t, \tag{1.6} \]

which has exactly the same form as (1.3). Equation (1.3), which was initially interpreted as consistent with a situation in which systematic feedback rules for monetary policy could affect output, isobservationally equivalent to (1.6), which was derived under the assumption that systematic policy had no effect and only money surprises mattered. The two are observationally equivalent because the error term in both (1.3) and (1.6) is just \( u_t \); both equations fit the data equally well.

A comparison of (1.3) and (1.6) reveals another important conclusion. The coefficients of (1.6) are functions of the parameters in the policy rule (1.4). Thus, changes in the conduct of policy, interpreted to mean changes in the feedback rule parameter...
ters, will change the parameters estimated in an equation such as (1.6) (or in a St. Louis–type regression). This is an example of the Lucas (1976) critique: empirical relationships are unlikely to be invariant to changes in policy regimes.

Of course, as Sargent stressed, it may be that (1.3) is the true structure that remains invariant as policy changes. In this case, (1.5) will not be invariant to changes in policy. To demonstrate this point, note that (1.4) implies

\[ m_t = (1 - \pi_1 L)^{-1}(\pi_2 z_{t-1} + v_t), \]

where L is the lag operator.\(^{15}\) Hence, we can write (1.3) as

\[
y_t = y_0 + a_0 m_t + a_1 m_{t-1} + c_1 z_t + c_2 z_{t-1} + u_t
\]

\[
= y_0 + a_0 (1 - \pi_1 L)^{-1}(\pi_2 z_{t-1} + v_t)
+ a_1 (1 - \pi_1 L)^{-1}(\pi_2 z_{t-2} + v_{t-1}) + c_1 z_t + c_2 z_{t-1} + u_t
\]

\[
= (1 - \pi_1) y_0 + \pi_1 y_{t-1} + a_0 v_t + a_1 v_{t-1} + c_1 z_t
+ (c_2 + a_0 \pi_2 - c_1 \pi_1) z_{t-1} + (a_1 \pi_2 - c_2 \pi_1) z_{t-2} + u_t - \pi_1 u_{t-1}, \tag{1.7}
\]

where output is now expressed as a function of lagged output, the \(z\) variable, and money surprises (the \(v\) realizations). If this were interpreted as a policy-invariant expression, one would conclude that output is independent of any predictable or systematic feedback rule for monetary policy; only unpredicted money appears to matter. Yet, under the hypothesis that (1.3) is the true invariant structure, changes in the policy rule (the \(\pi_1\) coefficients) will cause the coefficients in (1.7) to change.

Note that starting with (1.5) and (1.4), one derives an expression for output that is observationally equivalent to (1.3). But starting with (1.3) and (1.4), one ends up with an expression for output that is not equivalent to (1.5); (1.7) contains lagged values of output, \(v\), and \(u\), and two lags of \(z\), whereas (1.5) contains only the contemporaneous values of \(v\) and \(u\) and one lag of \(z\). These differences would allow one to distinguish between the two, but they arise only because this example placed a priori restrictions on the lag lengths in (1.3) and (1.5). In general, one would not have the type of a priori information that would allow this.

The lesson from this simple example is that policy cannot be designed without a theory of how money affects the economy. A theory should identify whether the coefficients in a specification of the form (1.3) or in a specification such as (1.5) will remain invariant as policy changes. While output equations estimated over a single

---

15. That is, \(L'x_t = x_{t-l}\).
policy regime may not allow the true structure to be identified, information from several policy regimes might succeed in doing so. If a policy regime change means that the coefficients in the policy rule (1.4) have changed, this would serve to identify whether an expression of the form (1.3) or one of the form (1.5) was policy-invariant.

1.3.4 The VAR Approach

Much of the understanding of the empirical effects of monetary policy on real economic activity has come from the use of vector autoregression (VAR) frameworks. The use of VARs to estimate the impact of money on the economy was pioneered by Sims (1972; 1980). The development of the approach as it moved from bivariate (Sims 1972) to trivariate (Sims 1980) to larger and larger systems as well as the empirical findings the literature has produced were summarized by Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996). Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) provided a thorough discussion of the use of VARs to estimate the impact of money, and they provided an extensive list of references to work in this area.16

Suppose there is a bivariate system in which \( y_t \) is the natural log of real output at time \( t \), and \( x_t \) is a candidate measure of monetary policy such as a measure of the money stock or a short-term market rate of interest.17 The VAR system can be written as

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
  y_t \\
  x_t
\end{bmatrix} = A(L) \begin{bmatrix}
  y_{t-1} \\
  x_{t-1}
\end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix}
  u_{yt} \\
  u_{xt}
\end{bmatrix},
\]

where \( A(L) \) is a 2 \times 2 matrix polynomial in the lag operator \( L \), and \( u_t \) is a time \( t \) serially independent innovation to the \( i \)th variable. These innovations can be thought of as linear combinations of independently distributed shocks to output \( (e_{yt}) \) and to policy \( (e_{xt}) \):

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
  u_{yt} \\
  u_{xt}
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
  e_{yt} + \theta e_{xt} \\
  \phi e_{yt} + e_{xt}
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
  1 & \theta \\
  \phi & 1
\end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix}
  e_{yt} \\
  e_{xt}
\end{bmatrix} = B \begin{bmatrix}
  e_{yt} \\
  e_{xt}
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

The one-period-ahead error made in forecasting the policy variable \( x_t \) is equal to \( u_{xt} \), and since, from (1.9), \( u_{xt} = \phi e_{yt} + e_{xt} \), these errors are caused by the exogenous output and policy disturbances \( e_{yt} \) and \( e_{xt} \). Letting \( \Sigma_u \) denote the 2 \times 2 variance-covariance matrix of the \( u_{it} \), \( \Sigma_u = B\Sigma_e B' \), where \( \Sigma_e \) is the (diagonal) variance matrix of the \( e_{it} \).

16. Two references on the econometrics of VARs are Hamilton (1994) and Maddala (1992).
17. How one measures monetary policy is a critical issue in the empirical literature (see, e.g., C. Romer and Romer 1990a; Bernanke and Blinder 1992; D. Gordon and Leeper 1994; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 1996a; 1999; Bernanke and Mihov 1998; Rudebusch 1997; Leeper, Sims, and Zha 1996; and Leeper 1997). Zha (1997) provided a useful discussion of the general identification issues that arise in attempting to measure the impact of monetary policy; see chapter 11.
The random variable $e_{xt}$ represents the exogenous shock to policy. To determine the role of policy in causing movements in output or other macroeconomic variables, one needs to estimate the effect of $e_x$ on these variables. As long as $\phi \neq 0$, the innovation to the observed policy variable $x_t$ will depend both on the shock to policy $e_{xt}$ and on the nonpolicy shock $e_{yt}$; obtaining an estimate of $u_{xt}$ does not provide a measure of the policy shock unless $\phi = 0$.

To make the example even more explicit, suppose the VAR system is

$$
\begin{bmatrix}
y_t \\
x_t
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
a_1 & a_2 \\
0 & 0
\end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix}
y_{t-1} \\
x_{t-1}
\end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix}
u_{yt} \\
u_{xt}
\end{bmatrix},
$$

with $0 < a_1 < 1$. Then $x_t = u_{xt}$, and $y_t = a_1 y_{t-1} + u_{yt} + a_2 u_{xt-1}$, and one can write $y_t$ in moving average form as

$$
y_t = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} a_1^i u_{yt-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} a_1^i a_2 u_{xt-i-1}.
$$

Estimating (1.10) yields estimates of $A(L)$ and $\Sigma_u$, and from these the effects of $u_{xt}$ on $\{y_t, y_{t+1}, \ldots\}$ can be calculated. If one interpreted $u_x$ as an exogenous policy disturbance, then the implied response of $y_t, y_{t+1}, \ldots$ to a policy shock would be

$$
0, a_2, a_1 a_2, a_1^2 a_2, \ldots.
$$

To estimate the impact of a policy shock on output, however, one needs to calculate the effect on $\{y_t, y_{t+1}, \ldots\}$ of a realization of the policy shock $e_{xt}$. In terms of the true underlying structural disturbances $e_y$ and $e_x$, (1.9) implies

$$
y_t = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} a_1^i (e_{yt-i} + \theta e_{xt-i}) + \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} a_1^i a_2 (e_{xt-i-1} + \phi e_{yt-i-1})
$$

$$
= e_{yt} + \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} a_1^i (a_1 + a_2 \phi) e_{yt-i-1} + \theta e_{xt} + \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} a_1^i (a_1 \theta + a_2) e_{xt-i-1},
$$

so the impulse response function giving the true response of $y$ to the exogenous policy shock $e_x$ is

$$
\theta, a_1 \theta + a_2, a_1 (a_1 \theta + a_2), a_1^2 (a_1 \theta + a_2), \ldots.
$$

18. This represents the response to an nonorthogonalized innovation. The basic point, however, is that if $\theta$ and $\phi$ are nonzero, the underlying shocks are not identified, so the estimated response to $u_y$ or to the component of $u_x$ that is orthogonal to $u_y$ will not identify the response to the policy shock $e_x$. 1.3 Estimating the Effect of Money on Output 19
This response involves the elements of $A(L)$ and the elements of $B$. And while $A(L)$ can be estimated from (1.8), $B$ and $\Sigma_e$ are not identified without further restrictions.\footnote{In this example, the three elements of $\Sigma_u$, the two variances and the covariance term, are functions of the four unknown parameters, $\phi$, $\theta$, and the variances of $e_y$ and $e_c$.}

Two basic approaches to solving this identification problem have been followed. The first imposes additional restrictions on the matrix $B$ that links the observable VAR residuals to the underlying structural disturbances (see (1.9)). This approach was used by Sims (1972; 1988); Bernanke (1986); Walsh (1987); Bernanke and Blinder (1992); D. Gordon and Leeper (1994); and Bernanke and Mihov (1998), among others. If policy shocks affect output with a lag, for example, the restriction that $\theta = 0$ would allow the other parameters of the model to be identified. The second approach achieves identification by imposing restrictions on the long-run effects of the disturbances on observed variables. For example, the assumption of long-run neutrality of money would imply that a monetary policy shock ($e_x$) has no long-run permanent effect on output. In terms of the example that led to (1.11), long-run neutrality of the policy shock would imply that $\theta + (a_1 \theta + a_2) \sum a_i = 0$ or $\theta = -a_2$.

Examples of this approach include Blanchard and Watson (1986); Blanchard (1989); Blanchard and Quah (1989); Judd and Trehan (1989); Hutchison and Walsh (1992); and Galí (1992). The use of long-run restrictions is criticized by Faust and Leeper (1997).

In Sims (1972), the nominal money supply ($M_1$) was treated as the measure of monetary policy (the $x$ variable), and policy shocks were identified by assuming that $\phi = 0$. This approach corresponds to the assumption that the money supply is predetermined and that policy innovations are exogenous with respect to the nonpolicy innovations (see (1.9)). In this case, $u_{xt} = e_{xt}$, so from the fact that $u_{yt} = \theta e_{xt} + e_{yt} = \theta u_{xt} + e_{yt}$, $\theta$ can be estimated from the regression of the VAR residuals $u_{yt}$ on the VAR residuals $u_{xt}$.\footnote{This represents a Choleski decomposition of the VAR residuals with the policy variable ordered first.} This corresponds to a situation in which the policy variable $x$ does not respond contemporaneously to output shocks, perhaps because of information lags in formulating policy. However, if $x$ depends contemporaneously on nonpolicy disturbances as well as policy shocks ($\phi \neq 0$), using $u_{xt}$ as an estimate of $e_{xt}$ will compound the effects of $e_{yt}$ on $u_{xt}$ with the effects of policy actions.

An alternative approach seeks a policy measure for which $\theta = 0$ is a plausible assumption; this corresponds to the assumption that policy shocks have no contemporaneous impact on output.\footnote{This represents a Choleski decomposition with output ordered before the policy variable.} This type of restriction was imposed by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Bernanke and Mihov (1998). How reasonable such an assumption might be clearly depends on the unit of observation. In annual data, the assump-
tion of no contemporaneous effect would be implausible; with monthly data, it might be much more plausible.

This discussion has, for simplicity, treated both $y$ and $x$ as scalars. In fact, neither assumption is appropriate. One is usually interested in the effects of policy on several dimensions of an economy’s macroeconomic performance, and policy is likely to respond to unemployment and inflation as well as to other variables, so $y$ would normally be a vector of nonpolicy variables. Then the restrictions that correspond to either $\phi = 0$ or $\theta = 0$ may be less easily justified. While one might argue that policy does not respond contemporaneously to unemployment when the analysis involves monthly data, this is not likely to be the case with respect to market interest rates. And, using the same example, one might be comfortable assuming that the current month’s unemployment rate is unaffected by current policy actions, but this would not be true of interest rates, since financial markets will respond immediately to policy actions.

In addition, there generally is no clear scalar choice for the policy variable $x$. If policy were framed in terms of strict targets for the money supply, for a specific measure of banking sector reserves, or for a particular short-term interest rate, then the definition of $x$ might be straightforward. In general, however, several candidate measures of monetary policy will be available, all depending in various degrees on both policy actions and nonpolicy disturbances. What constitutes an appropriate candidate for $x$, and how $x$ depends on nonpolicy disturbances, will depend on the operating procedures the monetary authority is following as it implements policy.

Money and Output
Sims (1992) provided a useful summary of the VAR evidence on money and output from France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. He estimated separate VARs for each country, using a common specification that includes industrial production, consumer prices, a short-term interest rate as the measure of monetary policy, a measure of the money supply, an exchange rate index, and an index of commodity prices. Sims ordered the interest rate variable first. This corresponds to the assumption that $\phi = 0$; innovations to the interest rate variable potentially affect the other variables contemporaneously (Sims used monthly data), whereas the interest rate is not affected contemporaneously by innovations in any of the other variables.\(^{22}\)

The response of real output to an interest rate innovation was similar for all five of the countries Sims examined. In all cases, monetary shocks led to an output response that is usually described as following a hump-shaped pattern. The negative output

\(^{22}\) Sims noted that the correlations among the VAR residuals, the $u'_{t\nu}$, are small so that the ordering has little impact on his results (i.e., sample estimates of $\phi$ and $\theta$ are small).
effects of a contractionary shock, for example, build to a peak after several months and then gradually die out.

Eichenbaum (1992) compared the estimated effects of monetary policy in the United States using alternative measures of policy shocks and discussed how different choices can produce puzzling results, at least puzzling relative to certain theoretical expectations. He based his discussion on the results obtained from a VAR containing four variables: the price level and output (these correspond to the elements of $y$ in (1.8)), $M_1$ as a measure of the money supply, and the federal funds rate as a measure of short-term interest rates (these correspond to the elements of $x$). He considered interpreting shocks to $M_1$ as policy shocks versus the alternative of interpreting funds rate shocks as policy shocks. He found that a positive innovation to $M_1$ is followed by an increase in the federal funds rate and a decline in output. This result is puzzling if $M_1$ shocks are interpreted as measuring the impact of monetary policy. An expansionary monetary policy shock would be expected to lead to increases in both $M_1$ and output. The interest rate was also found to rise after a positive $M_1$ shock, also a potentially puzzling result; a standard model in which money demand varies inversely with the nominal interest rate would suggest that an increase in the money supply would require a decline in the nominal rate to restore money market equilibrium. D. Gordon and Leeper (1994) showed that a similar puzzle emerges when total reserves are used to measure monetary policy shocks. Positive reserve innovations are found to be associated with increases in short-term interest rates and unemployment increases. The suggestion that a rise in reserves or the money supply might raise, not lower, market interest rates generated a large literature that attempted to search for a liquidity effect of changes in the money supply (e.g., Reichenstein 1987; Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992a; Leeper and Gordon 1992; Strongin 1995; Hamilton 1996).

When Eichenbaum used innovations in the short-term interest rate as a measure of monetary policy actions, a positive shock to the funds rate represented a contractionary policy shock. No output puzzle was found in this case; a positive interest rate shock was followed by a decline in the output measure. Instead, what has been called the price puzzle emerges: a contractionary policy shock is followed by a rise in the price level. The effect is small and temporary (and barely statistically significant) but still puzzling. The most commonly accepted explanation for the price puzzle is that it reflects the fact that the variables included in the VAR do not span the full information set available to the Fed. Suppose the Fed tends to raise the funds rate whenever it forecasts that inflation might rise in the future. To the extent that the Fed is unable to offset the factors that led it to forecast higher inflation, or to the extent that the Fed acts too late to prevent inflation from rising, the increase in the funds rate will be followed by a rise in prices. This interpretation would be consistent
with the price puzzle. One solution is to include commodity prices or other asset prices in the VAR. Since these prices tend to be sensitive to changing forecasts of future inflation, they serve as a proxy for some of the Fed’s additional information (Sims 1992; Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum 1995; Bernanke and Mihov 1998). Sims (1992) showed that the price puzzle is not confined to U.S. studies. He reported VAR estimates of monetary policy effects for France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom as well as for the United States, and in all cases a positive shock to the interest rate led to a positive price response. These price responses tended to become smaller, but did not in all cases disappear, when a commodity price index and a nominal exchange rate were included in the VAR.

An alternative interpretation of the price puzzle is provided by Barth and Ramey (2002). They argued that contractionary monetary policy operates on aggregate supply as well as aggregate demand. For example, an increase in interest rates raises the cost of holding inventories and thus acts as a positive cost shock. This negative supply effect raises prices and lowers output. Such an effect is called the cost channel of monetary policy. In this interpretation, the price puzzle is simply evidence of the cost channel rather than evidence that the VAR is misspecified. Barth and Ramey combined industry-level data with aggregate data in a VAR and reported evidence supporting the cost channel interpretation of the price puzzle (see also Ravenna and Walsh 2006).

One difficulty in measuring the impact of monetary policy shocks arises when operating procedures change over time. The best measure of policy during one period may no longer accurately reflect policy in another period if the implementation of policy has changed. Many authors have argued that over most of the past 35 years, the federal funds rate has been the key policy instrument in the United States, suggesting that unforecasted changes in this interest rate may provide good estimates of policy shocks. This view has been argued, for example, by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Bernanke and Mihov (1998). While the Fed’s operating procedures have varied over time, the funds rate is likely to be the best indicator of policy in the United States during the pre-1979 and post-1982 periods.23 Policy during the period 1979–1982 is less adequately characterized by the funds rate.24

While researchers have disagreed on the best means of identifying policy shocks, there has been a surprising consensus on the general nature of the economic responses to monetary policy shocks. A variety of VARs estimated for a number of

23. Chapter 11 provides a brief history of Fed operating procedures.
24. During this period, nonborrowed reserves were set to achieve a level of interest rates consistent with the desired monetary growth targets. In this case, the funds rate may still provide a satisfactory policy indicator. Cook (1989) found that most changes in the funds rate during the 1979–1982 period reflected policy actions. See chapter 11 for a discussion of operating procedures and the reserve market.
countries all indicate that in response to a policy shock, output follows a hump-shaped pattern in which the peak impact occurs several quarters after the initial shock. Monetary policy actions appear to be taken in anticipation of inflation, so that a price puzzle emerges if forward-looking variables such as commodity prices are not included in the VAR.

If monetary policy shocks cause output movements, how important have these shocks been in accounting for actual business cycle fluctuations? Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996) concluded that monetary policy shocks have been relatively unimportant. However, their assessment is based on monthly data for the period from the beginning of 1960 until early 1996. This sample contains several distinct periods characterized by differences in the procedures used by the Fed to implement monetary policy, and the contribution of monetary shocks may have differed over various subperiods. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) concluded that estimates of the importance of monetary policy shocks for output fluctuations are sensitive to the way monetary policy is measured. When they used a funds-rate measure of monetary policy, policy shocks accounted for 21 percent of the four-quarter-ahead forecast error variance for quarterly real GDP. This figure rose to 38 percent of the 12-quarter-ahead forecast error variance. Smaller effects were found using policy measures based on monetary aggregates. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans found that very little of the forecast error variance for the price level could be attributed to monetary policy shocks.

**Criticisms of the VAR Approach**

Measures of monetary policy based on the estimation of VARs have been criticized on several grounds.\(^\text{25}\) First, some of the impulse responses do not accord with most economists’ priors. In particular, the price puzzle—the finding that a contractionary policy shock, as measured by a funds rate shock, tends to be followed by a rise in the price level—is troublesome. As noted earlier, the price puzzle can be solved by including oil prices or commodity prices in the VAR system, and the generally accepted interpretation is that lacking these inflation-sensitive prices, a standard VAR misses important information that is available to policymakers. A related but more general point is that many of the VAR models used to assess monetary policy fail to incorporate forward-looking variables. Central banks look at a lot of information in setting policy. Because policy is likely to respond to forecasts of future economic conditions, VARs may attribute the subsequent movements in output and inflation to the policy action. However, the argument that puzzling results indicate a misspecification implicitly imposes a prior belief about what the correct effects of

\(^{25}\) These criticisms are detailed in Rudebusch (1998).
monetary shocks should look like. Eichenbaum (1992), in fact, argued that short-
term interest rate innovations have been used to represent policy shocks in VARs
because they produce the types of impulse response functions for output that econo-
mists expect.

In addition, the residuals from the VAR regressions that are used to represent ex-
ogenous policy shocks often bear little resemblance to standard interpretations of the
historical record of past policy actions and periods of contractionary and expansion-
ary policy (Sheffrin 1995; Rudebusch 1998). They also differ considerably depending
on the particular specification of the VAR. Rudebusch (1998) reported low correla-
tions between the residual policy shocks he obtained based on funds rate futures and
those obtained from a VAR by Bernanke and Mihov. How important this finding is
depends on the question of interest. If the objective is to determine whether a partic-
ular recession was caused by a policy shock, then it is important to know if and when
the policy shock occurred. If alternative specifications provide differing and possibly
inconsistent estimates of when policy shocks occurred, then their usefulness as a tool
of economic history would be limited. If, however, the question of interest is how
the economy responds when a policy shock occurs, then the discrepancies among
the VAR residual estimates may be of less importance. Sims (1998a) argued that in
a simple supply-demand model different authors using different supply curve shifters
may obtain quite similar estimates of the demand curve slope (since they all obtain
consistent estimators of the true slope). At the same time, they may obtain quite dif-
ferent residuals for the estimated supply curve. If the true interest is in the parameters
of the demand curve, the variations in the estimates of the supply shocks may not be
of importance. Thus, the type of historical analysis based on a VAR, as in Walsh
(1993), is likely to be more problematic than the use of a VAR to determine the
way the economy responds to exogenous policy shocks.

While VARs focus on residuals that are interpreted as policy shocks, the system-
atic part of the estimated VAR equation for a variable such as the funds rate can be
interpreted as a policy reaction function; it provides a description of how the policy
instrument has been adjusted in response to lagged values of the other variables
included in the VAR system. Rudebusch (1998) argued that the implied policy reac-
tion functions look quite different than results obtained from more direct attempts to
estimate reaction functions or to model actual policy behavior. A related point is
that VARs are typically estimated using final, revised data and will therefore not cap-
ture accurately the historical behavior of the monetary policymaker who is reacting

26. For example, Taylor (1993a) employed a simple interest rate rule that closely matches the actual be-
havior of the federal funds rate in recent years. As Khoury (1990) noted in a survey of many earlier studies
of the Fed’s reaction function, few systematic conclusions have emerged from this empirical literature.
to preliminary and incomplete data. Woolley (1995) showed how the perception of the stance of monetary policy in the United States in 1972 and President Richard Nixon’s attempts to pressure Fed Chairman Arthur F. Burns into adopting a more expansionary policy were based on initial data on the money supply that were subsequently very significantly revised.

At best the VAR approach identifies only the effects of monetary policy shocks, shifts in policy unrelated to the endogenous response of policy to developments in the economy. Yet most, if not all, of what one thinks of in terms of policy and policy design represents the endogenous response of policy to the economy, and “most variation in monetary policy instruments is accounted for by responses of policy to the state of the economy, not by random disturbances to policy” (Sims 1998a, 933). So it is unfortunate that a primary empirical tool—VAR analysis—used to assess the impact of monetary policy is uninformative about the role played by policy rules. If policy is completely characterized as a feedback rule on the economy, so that there are no exogenous policy shocks, then the VAR methodology would conclude that monetary policy doesn’t matter. Yet while monetary policy is not causing output movements in this example, it does not follow that policy is unimportant; the response of the economy to nonpolicy shocks may depend importantly on the way monetary policy endogenously adjusts.

Cochrane (1998) made a similar point related to the issues discussed in section 1.3.3. In that section, it was noted that one must know whether it is anticipated money that has real effects (as in (1.3)) or unanticipated money that matters (as in (1.5)). Cochrane argued that while most of the VAR literature has focused on issues of lag length, detrending, ordering, and variable selection, there is another fundamental identification issue that has been largely ignored—is it anticipated or unanticipated monetary policy that matters? If only unanticipated policy matters, then the subsequent systematic behavior of money after a policy shock is irrelevant. This means that the long hump-shaped response of real variables to a policy shock must be due to inherent lags of adjustment and the propagation mechanisms that characterize the structure of the economy. If anticipated policy matters, then subsequent systematic behavior of money after a policy shock is relevant. This means that the long hump-shaped response of real variables to a policy shock may only be present because policy shocks are followed by persistent, systematic policy actions. If this is the case, the direct impact of a policy shock, if it were not followed by persistent policy moves, would be small.

Attempts have been made to use VAR frameworks to assess the systematic effects of monetary policy. Sims (1998b), for example, estimated a VAR for the interwar years and used it to simulate the behavior of the economy if policy had been determined according to the feedback rule obtained from a VAR estimated using postwar data.
1.3.5 Structural Econometric Models

The empirical assessment of the effects of alternative feedback rules for monetary policy has traditionally been carried out using structural macroeconometric models. During the 1960s and early 1970s, the specification, estimation, use, and evaluation of large-scale econometric models for forecasting and policy analysis represented a major research agenda in macroeconomics. Important contributions to the understanding of investment, consumption, the term structure, and other aspects of the macroeconomy grew out of the need to develop structural equations for various sectors of the economy. An equation describing the behavior of a policy instrument such as the federal funds rate was incorporated into these structural models, allowing model simulations of alternative policy rules to be conducted. These simulations would provide an estimate of the impact on the economy’s dynamic behavior of changes in the way policy was conducted. For example, a policy under which the funds rate was adjusted rapidly in response to unemployment movements could be contrasted with one in which the response was more muted.

A key maintained hypothesis, one necessary to justify this type of analysis, was that the estimated parameters of the model would be invariant to the specification of the policy rule. If this were not the case, then one could no longer treat the model’s parameters as unchanged when altering the monetary policy rule (as the example in section 1.3.3 shows). In a devastating critique of this assumption, Lucas (1976) argued that economic theory predicts that the decision rules for investment, consumption, and expectations formation will not be invariant to shifts in the systematic behavior of policy. The Lucas critique emphasized the problems inherent in the assumption, common in the structural econometric models of the time, that expectations adjust adaptively to past outcomes.

While large-scale econometric models of aggregate economies continued to play an important role in discussions of monetary policy, they fell out of favor among academic economists during the 1970s, in large part as a result of Lucas’s critique, the increasing emphasis on the role of expectations in theoretical models, and the dissatisfaction with the empirical treatment of expectations in existing large-scale models. The academic literature witnessed a continued interest in small-scale rational-expectations models, both single and multicountry versions (for example, the work of Taylor 1993b), as well as the development of larger-scale models (Fair 1984), all of which incorporated rational expectations into some or all aspects of the model’s behavioral relationships. Other examples of small models based on rational expectations and forward-looking behavior include Fuhrer (1994b; 1997c), and Fuhrer and Moore (1995a; 1995b).

27. For an example of a small-scale model in which expectations play no explicit role, see Rudebusch and Svensson (1997).
More recently, empirical work investigating the impact of monetary policy has relied on estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. These models combine rational expectations with a microeconomic foundation in which households and firms are assumed to behave optimally, given their objectives (utility maximization, profit maximization) and the constraints they face. Many central banks have built and estimated DSGE models to use for policy analysis, and many more central banks are in the process of doing so. Examples of such models include Adolfson et al. (2007b) for Sweden and Gouvea et al. (2008) for Brazil. In general, these models are built on the theoretical foundations of the new Keynesian model. As discussed in chapter 8, this model is based on the assumption that prices and wages display rigidities and that this nominal stickiness accounts for the real effects of monetary policy. Early examples include Yun (1996); Ireland (1997a); and Rotemberg and Woodford (1998). Among the recent examples of DSGE models are Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), who estimated the model by matching VAR impulse responses, and Smets and Wouter (2003), who estimated their model using Bayesian techniques. The use of Bayesian estimation is now common; recent examples include Levin et al. (2006); Smets and Wouter (2003; 2007); and Lubik and Schorfheide (2007).

1.3.6 Alternative Approaches

Although the VAR approach has been the most commonly used empirical methodology, and although the results have provided a fairly consistent view of the impact of monetary policy shocks, other approaches have also influenced views on the role policy has played. Two such approaches, one based on deriving policy directly from a reading of policy statements, the other based on case studies of disinflations, have influenced academic discussions of monetary policy.

Narrative Measures of Monetary Policy

An alternative to the VAR statistical approach is to develop a measure of the stance of monetary policy from a direct examination of the policy record. In recent years, this approach has been taken by C. Romer and Romer (1990a) and Boschen and Mills (1991), among others.²⁸

Boschen and Mills developed an index of policy stance that takes on integer values from \(-2\) (strong emphasis on inflation reduction) to \(+2\) (strong emphasis on “promoting real growth”). Their monthly index is based on a reading of the Fed’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) policy directives and the records of the FOMC meetings. Boschen and Mills showed that innovations in their index corre-

²⁸ Boschen and Mills (1991) provided a discussion and comparison of some other indices of policy. For a critical view of Romer and Romer’s approach, see Leeper (1993).
sponding to expansionary policy shifts are followed by subsequent increases in monetary aggregates and declines in the federal funds rate. They also concluded that all the narrative indices they examined yield relatively similar conclusions about the impact of policy on monetary aggregates and the funds rates. And in support of the approach used in section 1.3.4, Boschen and Mills concluded that the funds rate is a good indicator of monetary policy. These findings are extended in Boschen and Mills (1995a), which compared several narrative-based measures of monetary policy, finding them to be associated with permanent changes in the level of $M_2$ and the monetary base and temporary changes in the funds rate.

Romer and Romer (1990a) used the Fed’s “Record of Policy Actions” and, prior to 1976 when they were discontinued, minutes of FOMC meetings to identify episodes in which policy shifts occurred that were designed to reduce inflation. They found six different months during the postwar period that saw such contractionary shifts in Fed policy: October 1947, September 1955, December 1968, April 1974, August 1978, and October 1979. Leeper (1993) argued that the Romer-Romer index is equivalent to a dummy variable that picks up large interest rate innovations. Hoover and Perez (1994) provided a critical assessment of the Romers’ narrative approach, noting that the Romer dates are associated with oil price shocks, and Leeper (1997) found that the exogenous component of the Romers’ policy variable does not produce dynamic effects on output and prices that accord with general beliefs about the effects of monetary policy.

The narrative indices of Boschen and Mills and the dating system employed by Romer and Romer to isolate episodes of contractionary policy provide a useful and informative alternative to the VAR approach that associates policy shocks with serially uncorrelated innovations. The VAR approach attempts to identify exogenous shifts in policy; the estimated effects of these exogenous shifts are the conceptual parallels to the comparative static exercises for which theoretical models make predictions. To determine whether the data are consistent with a model’s predictions about the effects of an exogenous policy action, one needs to isolate empirically such exogenous shifts. Doing so, however, does not yield a measure of whether policy is, on net, expansionary or contractionary. The narrative indices can provide a better measure of the net stance of policy, but they capture both exogenous shifts in policy and the endogenous response of monetary policy to economic developments. It is presumably the latter that accounts for most of the observed changes in policy variables such as the funds rate as policy responds to current and future expected economic conditions. In fact, a major conclusion of Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996), and one they viewed as not surprising, was that most movements in monetary policy

29. The FMOC resumed publishing its minutes in 2005.
30. Bernanke and Mihov (1998) used their VAR estimates in an attempt to develop such a measure.
instruments represent responses to the state of the economy, not exogenous policy shifts.

**Case Studies of Disinflation**

Case studies of specific episodes of disinflation provide, in principle, an alternative means of assessing the real impact of monetary policy. Romer and Romer’s approach to dating periods of contractionary monetary policy is one form of case study. However, the most influential example of this approach is that of Sargent (1986), who examined the ends of several hyperinflations. As discussed more fully in chapter 5, the distinction between anticipated and unanticipated changes in monetary policy has played an important role during the past 30 years in academic discussions of monetary policy, and a key hypothesis is that anticipated changes should affect prices and inflation with little or no effect on real economic activity. This implies that a credible policy to reduce inflation should succeed in actually reducing inflation without causing a recession. This implication contrasts sharply with the view that any policy designed to reduce inflation would succeed only by inducing an economic slowdown and temporarily higher unemployment.

Sargent tested these competing hypotheses by examining the ends of the post–World War I hyperinflations in Austria, German, Hungary, and Poland. In each case, Sargent found that the hyperinflations ended abruptly. In Austria, for example, prices rose by over a factor of 20 from December 1921 to August 1922, an annual inflation rate of over 8800 percent. Prices then stopped rising in September 1922, actually declining by more than 10 percent during the remainder of 1922. Unemployment did rise during the price stabilizations, Sargent concluded that the output cost “was minor compared with the $220 billion GNP that some current analysts estimate would be lost in the United States per one percentage point inflation reduction” (Sargent 1986, 55). Sargent’s interpretation of the experiences in Germany, Poland, and Hungary is similar. In each case, the hyperinflation was ended by a regime shift that involved a credible change in monetary and fiscal policy designed to reduce government reliance on inflationary finance. Because the end of inflation reduced the opportunity cost of holding money, money demand grew and the actual stock of money continued to grow rapidly after prices had stabilized.

Sargent’s conclusion that the output costs of these disinflations were small has been questioned, as have the lessons he drew for the moderate inflations experienced by the industrialized economies in the 1970s and early 1980s. As Sargent noted, the ends of the hyperinflations “were not isolated restrictive actions within a given set of rules of the game” but represented changes in the rules of the game, most importantly in the ability of the fiscal authority to finance expenditures by creating money. In contrast, the empirical evidence from VARs of the type discussed earlier in this chapter reflects the impact of policy changes within a given set of rules.
Schelde-Andersen (1992) and Ball (1993) provided more recent examples of the case study approach. In both cases, the authors examined disinflationary episodes in order to estimate the real output costs associated with reducing inflation. Their cases, all involving OECD countries, represent evidence on the costs of ending moderate inflations. Ball calculated the deviation of output from trend during a period of disinflation and expressed this as a ratio to the change in trend inflation over the same period. The 65 disinflation periods he identified in annual data yield an average sacrifice ratio of 0.77 percent; each percentage point reduction in inflation was associated with a 0.77 percent loss of output relative to trend. The estimate for the United States was among the largest, averaging 2.3 percent based on annual data. The sacrifice ratios are negatively related to nominal wage flexibility; countries with greater wage flexibility tend to have smaller sacrifice ratios. The costs of a disinflation also appear to be larger when inflation is brought down more gradually over a longer period of time.

The case study approach can provide interesting evidence on the real effects of monetary policy. Unfortunately, as with the VAR and other approaches, the issue of identification needs to be addressed. To what extent have disinflations been exogenous, so that any resulting output or unemployment movements can be attributed to the decision to reduce inflation? If policy actions depend on whether they are anticipated or not, then estimates of the cost of disinflating obtained by averaging over episodes, episodes that are likely to have differed considerably in terms of whether the policy actions were expected or, if announced, credible, may yield little information about the costs of ending any specific inflation.

1.4 Summary

The consensus from the empirical literature on the long-run relationship between money, prices, and output is clear. Money growth and inflation essentially display a correlation of 1; the correlation between money growth or inflation and real output growth is probably close to zero, although it may be slightly positive at low inflation rates and negative at high rates.

The consensus from the empirical literature on the short-run effects of money is that exogenous monetary policy shocks produce hump-shaped movements in real


32. Brayton and Tinsley (1996) showed how the costs of disinflation can be estimated under alternative assumptions about expectations and credibility using the FRB/U.S. structural model. Their estimates of the sacrifice ratio, expressed in terms of the cumulative annual unemployment rate increase per percentage point decrease in the inflation rate, range from 2.6 under imperfect credibility and VAR expectations to 1.3 under perfect credibility and VAR expectations. Under full-model expectations, the sacrifice ratio is 2.3 with imperfect credibility and 1.7 with full credibility.
economic activity. The peak effects occur after a lag of several quarters (as much as two or three years in some of the estimates) and then die out. The exact manner in which policy is measured makes a difference, and using an incorrect measure of monetary policy can significantly affect the empirical estimates one obtains.

There is less consensus, however, on the effects, not of policy shocks but of the role played by the systematic feedback responses of monetary policy. Structural econometric models have the potential to fill this gap, and they are widely used in policy-making settings. Disagreements over the true structure and the potential dependence of estimated relationships on the policy regime have, however, posed problems for the structural modeling approach. A major theme of subsequent chapters is that the endogenous response of monetary policy to economic developments can have important implications for the empirical relationships observed among macroeconomic variables.