Perpetual Inventory

Rosalind E. Krauss

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It was a commonplace of criticism in the 1960s that a strict application of symmetry allowed a painter “to point to the center of the canvas” and, in so doing, to invoke the internal structure of the picture-object. Thus, “pointing to the center” was made to serve as one of the many blocks in that intricately constructed arch by which the criticism of the last decade sought to connect art to ethics through the “aesthetics of acknowledgement.” But what does it mean to point to the center of a TV screen?

In a way that is surely conditioned by the attitudes of pop art, artists’ video is largely involved in parodying the critical terms of abstraction. Thus when Vito Acconci makes a videotape called *Centers* (1971), he realizes the critical notion of “pointing” by filming himself pointing to the center of a television monitor, a gesture he sustains for the twenty-minute running time of the work. The parodistic quality of Acconci’s gesture, with its obvious debt to Duchampian irony, is clearly intended to disrupt and dispense with an entire critical tradition. It is meant to render nonsensical a critical engagement with the formal properties of a work, or indeed, a genre of works—such as “video.” The kind of criticism *Centers* attacks is obviously one that takes seriously the formal qualities

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of a work, or tries to assay the particular logic of a given medium. And yet, by its very mise-en-scène, *Centers* typifies the structural characteristics of the video medium. For *Centers* was made by Acconci’s using the video monitor as a mirror. As we look at the artist sighting along his outstretched arm and forefinger toward the center of the screen we are watching, what we see is a sustained tautology: a line of sight that begins at Acconci’s plane of vision and ends at the eyes of his projected double. In that image of self-regard is configured a narcissism so endemic to works of video that I find myself wanting to generalize it as the condition of the entire genre. Yet what would it mean to say “The medium of video is narcissism”?2

For one thing, that remark tends to open up a rift between the nature of video and that of the other visual arts. The statement describes a psychological rather than a physical condition; and while we are accustomed to thinking of psychological states as the possible subject of works of art, we do not think of psychology as constituting their medium. Rather, the medium of painting, sculpture, or film has much more to do with the objective, material factors specific to a particular form: pigment-bearing surfaces; matter extended through space; light projected through a moving strip of celluloid. That is, the notion of a medium contains the concept of an object-state, separate from the artist’s own being, through which his intentions must pass.

Video depends—in order for anything to be experienced at all—on a set of physical mechanisms. So perhaps it would be easiest to say that this apparatus—both at its present and future levels of technology—comprises the television medium, and leave it at that. Yet with the subject of video, the ease of defining it in terms of its machinery does not seem compatible with accuracy; and my own experience of video keeps urging me toward the psychological model.

Everyday speech contains an example of the word “medium” used in a psychological sense; the uncommon terrain for that common-enough usage is the world of parapsychology: telepathy, extrasensory perception, and communication with an afterlife, for which people with certain kinds of psychic powers are understood to be mediums. Whether or not we give credence to the claims of mediumistic experience, we understand the referents for the language that
describes it. We know, for instance, that configured within the parapsychological sense of the word “medium” is the image of a human receiver (and sender) of communications arising from an invisible source. Further, this term contains the notion that the human conduit exists in a particular relation to the message, which is one of temporal concurrence. Thus, when Freud lectured on the phenomenon of telepathic dreams, he told his audience that the fact insisted upon by reports of such matters is that the dreams occur at the same time as the actual (but invariably distant) event.

Now these are the two features of the everyday use of medium that are suggestive for a discussion of video: the simultaneous reception and projection of an image; and the human psyche used as a conduit. Most of the work produced over the very short span of video art’s existence has used the human body as its central instrument. In the case of work on tape, this conduit has most often been the body of the artist-practitioner. In the case of video installations, it has usually been the body of the responding viewer. And no matter whose body has been selected for the occasion, there is a further condition that is always present. Unlike the other visual arts, video is capable of recording and transmitting at the same time—producing instant feedback. The body is therefore centered, as it were, between two machines that are the opening and closing of a parenthesis. The first of these is the camera; the second is the monitor, which reprojects the performer’s image with the immediacy of a mirror.

The effects of this centering are multiple. And nowhere are they more clearly named than in a tape made by Richard Serra, with the help of Nancy Holt, who made herself its willing and eloquent subject. The tape is called *Boomerang* (1974), and its situation is a recording studio in which Holt sits in a tightly framed close-up, a technician’s headset on her ears. As Holt begins to talk, her words are fed back to her through the earphones she wears. Because the apparatus is attached to a recording instrument, there is a slight delay (of less than a second) between her actual locution and the audio feedback to which she is forced to listen. For the ten minutes of the tape, Holt describes her situation. She speaks of the way the feedback interferes with her normal thought process and of
confusion caused by the lack of synchronism between her speech and what she hears of it. “Sometimes,” she says, “I find I can’t quite say a word because I hear a first part come back and I forget the second part, or my head is stimulated in a new direction by the first half of the word.” As we hear Holt speak and intuit that delayed voice echoing in her ears, we are witness to an extraordinary image of distraction. Because the audio delay keeps hypostatizing her words, she has great difficulty coinciding with herself as a subject. It is a situation, she says, that “puts a distance between the words and their apprehension—their comprehension,” a situation that is “like a mirror reflection . . . so that I am surrounded by me and my mind surrounds me . . . there is no escape.”

The prison Holt both describes and enacts, from which there is no escape, could be called the prison of a collapsed present, that is, a present time which is completely severed from a sense of its own past. We get some feeling for what it is like to be stuck in that present when Holt at one point says, “I’m throwing things out in the world and they are boomeranging back . . . boomeranging . . . eran-ging-ing . . . an-ginging.” Through that distracted reverberation of a single word—and even word fragment—there forms an image of what it is like to be totally cut off from history, even, in this case, the immediate history of the sentence one has just spoken. Another word for that history from which Holt feels herself to be disconnected is “text.”

Most conventional performers are of course enacting or interpreting a text, whether that is a fixed choreography, a written script, a musical score, or a sketchy set of notes around which to improvise. By the very fact of that relationship, the performance ties itself to something that existed before the given moment. Most immediately, this sense of something having come before refers to the specific text for the performance at hand. But in a larger way it evokes the more general historical relationship between a specific text and the history constructed by all the texts of a given genre. Independent of the gesture made within the present, this larger history is the source of meaning for that gesture. What Holt is describing in Boomerang is a situation in which the action of the mirror reflection (which is auditory in this case) severs her from a sense of text:
from the prior words she has spoken; from the way language connects her both to her own past and to a world of objects. What she comes to is a space where, as she says, “I am surrounded by me.”

Self-encapsulation—the body or psyche as its own surround—is everywhere to be found in the corpus of video art. Acconci’s *Centers* is one instance; another is his *Air Time* of 1973. In *Air Time* Acconci sits between the video camera and a large mirror which he faces. For thirty-five minutes he addresses his own reflection with a monologue in which the terms “I” and “you”—although they are presumed to be referring to himself and an absent lover—are markers of the autistic intercourse between Acconci and his own image. Both *Centers* and *Air Time* construct a situation of spatial closure, promoting a condition of self-reflection. The response of the performer is to a continually renewed image of himself. This image, supplanting the consciousness of anything prior to it, becomes the unchanging text of the performer. Skewered on his own reflection, he is committed to the text of perpetuating that image. So the temporal concomitant of this situation is, like the echo effect of *Boomerang*, the sense of a collapsed present.

Bruce Nauman’s tapes are another example of the double effect of the performance-for-the-monitor. In *Revolving Upside Down* (1968), Nauman films himself through a camera that has been rotated so that the floor on which he stands is at the top of the screen. For sixty very long minutes, Nauman slowly moves, turning on one foot, from the depths of his studio forward toward the monitor and then back again, repeating this activity until the tape runs out. In Lynda Benglis’s *Now* (1973), there is a similar leveling out of the effects of temporality. The tape is of Benglis’s head in profile, performing against the backdrop of a large monitor that is replaying an earlier tape of herself doing the same actions, but reversed left and right. The two profiles, one “live,” the other taped, move in mirrored synchrony with one another. As they do, Benglis’s two profiles perform an autoerotic coupling, which, because it is being recorded, becomes the potential background for another generation of the same activity.

Through this spiral of infinite regress, as the face merges with the double and triple reprojections of itself merging with itself, Benglis’s voice is heard either issuing the command “Now!” or asking “Is it now?” Clearly, Benglis is using the word “now” to underline the ambiguity of temporal reference: we realize we do not know whether the sound of the voice is coming from the live or the taped source, and if from the latter, from which level of taping. We also realize that because of the activity of replaying the past generations, all layers of the “now” are equally present.

But what is far more arresting in Now than the technological banality of the question “Which ‘now’ is intended?” is the way the tape enacts a collapsed present time. In that insistence it connects itself to the tapes by Nauman and Acconci already described, and ultimately to Boomerang. In all these examples the nature of video performance is specified as an activity of bracketing out the text and substituting for it the mirror reflection. The result of this substitution is the presentation of a self understood to have no past, and as well, no connection with any objects that are external to it. For the double that appears on the monitor cannot be called a true external object. Rather, it is a displacement of the self that has the effect—as Holt’s voice has in Boomerang—of transforming the performer’s subjectivity into another, mirror, object.

It is at this point that one might want to go back to the proposition with which this argument began, and raise a particular objection. Even if it is agreed, one might ask, that the medium of video art is the psychological condition of the self split and doubled by the mirror reflection of synchronous feedback, how does that entail a “rift” between video and the other arts? Isn’t it rather a case of video’s using a new technique to achieve continuity with the modernist ambitions of the rest of the visual media? Specifically, isn’t the mirror reflection a variant on the reflexive mode in which contemporary painting, sculpture, and film have successively expressed themselves? Implicit in this question is the idea that autoreflexion and self-reflexiveness refer to the same thing; that both are cases of consciousness doubling back upon itself in order to perform and portray a separation between forms of art and their contents, between the procedures of thought and their objects. In its simplest form, this question would be the
following: Aside from their divergent technologies, what is the difference, really, between Vito Acconci’s *Centers* and Frank Stella’s *Gran Cairo* (1962)?

**Answer:** The difference is total. Reflection, when it is a case of mirroring, is a move toward an external symmetry (screen and actor); while reflexiveness is a strategy to achieve a radical asymmetry, from within. *Gran Cairo* organizes a concentric nest of square stripes, each stripe the shape and width of the canvas stretcher on which the image is painted. As the squares diminish, they converge at the picture’s center; and in this way, they “point” to it. Pointing to the center of the canvas distinguishes between the painting as a physical object (bounded by its framing edge) and the painting as a visual field (opening laterally from its fixed center).

Mirror reflection implies the vanquishing of separateness. Its inherent movement is toward fusion. The self and its reflected image are of course literally separate. But the agency of reflection is a mode of appropriation, of an illusionistic erasure of the difference between subject and object. Facing mirrors on opposite walls squeeze out the real space between them. When we look at *Centers*, we see Acconci sighting along his arm to the center of the screen we are watching. But latent in this setup is the monitor that he is, himself, regarding. There is no way for us to see *Centers* without reading that sustained connection between the artist and his double. So for us, as for Acconci, video is a process which allows these two terms to fuse.

One could say that if the reflexiveness of modernist art is a *dédoublément* or doubling back in order to locate the object (and thus the objective conditions of one’s experience), the mirror reflection of absolute feedback is a process of bracketing out the object. This is why it seems inappropriate to speak of a physical medium in relation to video; for the object (the electronic equipment and its capabilities) has become merely an appurtenance. And instead, video’s real medium is a psychological situation, the very terms of which are to withdraw attention from an external object—an Other—and invest it in the Self. Therefore, it is not just any psychological condition one is speaking of. Rather it is the condition of someone who has, in Freud’s words, “abandoned the investment of
objects with libido and transformed object-libido into ego-libido.” And that is the specific condition of narcissism.

By making this connection, then, one can recast the opposition between the reflective and the reflexive into the terms of the psychoanalytic project. Because it is there, too, in the drama of the couched subject, that the narcissistic reprojection of a frozen self is pitted against the analytic (or reflexive) mode. One finds a particularly useful description of that struggle in the writing of Jacques Lacan. In *The Language of the Self*, Lacan begins by characterizing the space of the therapeutic transaction as an extraordinary void created by the silence of the analyst. Into this void the patient projects the monologue of his own recitation, which Lacan calls “the monumental construct of his narcissism.” Using this monologue to explain himself and his situation to his silent listener, the patient begins to experience a very deep frustration. And this frustration, Lacan charges, although it is initially thought to be provoked by the maddening silence of the analyst, is eventually discovered to have another source:

Is it not rather a matter of a frustration inherent in the very discourse of the subject? Does the subject not become engaged in an ever-growing dispossession of that being of his, concerning which—by dint of sincere portraits which leave its idea no less incoherent, of rectifications which do not succeed in freeing its essence, of stays and defenses which do not prevent his statue from tottering, of narcissistic embraces which become like a puff of air in animating it—he ends up by recognizing that this being has never been anything more than his construct in the Imaginary and that this construct disappoints all his certitudes? For in this labor which he undertakes to reconstruct this construct for another, he finds again the fundamental alienation which made him construct it like another one, and which has always destined it to be stripped from him by another.

What the patient comes to see is that this “self” of his is a projected object, and that his frustration is due to his own capture by this object with which he can
never really coincide. Further, this “statue” which he has made and in which he believes is the basis for his “static state,” for the constantly “renewed status of his alienation.” Narcissism is characterized, then, as the unchanging condition of a perpetual frustration.7

The process of analysis is one of breaking the hold of this fascination with the mirror; and in order to do so, the patient comes to see the distinction between his lived subjectivity and the fantasy projections of himself as object. “In order for us to come back to a more dialectical view of the analytic experience,” Lacan writes, “I would say that the analysis consists precisely in distinguishing the person lying on the analyst’s couch from the person who is speaking. With the person listening [the analyst], that makes three persons present in the analytical situation, among whom it is the rule that the question . . . be put: Where is the moi of the subject?”8 The analytic project is then one in which the patient disengages from the “statue” of his reflected self, and through a method of reflexiveness, rediscovers the real time of his own history. He exchanges the atemporality of repetition for the temporality of change.

If psychoanalysis understands that the patient is engaged in a recovery of his being in terms of its real history, modernism has understood that the artist locates his own expressiveness through a discovery of the objective conditions of his medium and their history. That is, the very possibilities of finding his subjectivity necessitate that the artist recognize the material and historical independence of an external object (or medium).

In distinction to this, the feedback coil of video seems to be the instrument of a double repression: for through it, consciousness of temporality and of separation between subject and object are simultaneously evacuated. The result of this repression is, for the maker and the viewer of most video art, a kind of weightless fall through the suspended space of narcissism.

There are, of course, a complex set of answers to the question of why video has attracted a growing set of practitioners and collectors. These answers would involve an analysis of everything from the problem of narcissism within the wider context of our culture, to the specific inner workings of the present art market. Although I would like to postpone that analysis for a future essay, I do wish to make one connection here: and that is the connection between the
institution of a self formed by video feedback and the real situation that exists in the art world from which the makers of video come. In the last fifteen years that world has been deeply and disastrously affected by its relation to mass media. That an artist’s work be published, reproduced, and disseminated through the media has become, for the generation that has matured in the course of the last decade, virtually the only means of verifying its existence as art. The demand for instant replay in the media—in fact the creation of work that literally does not exist outside of that replay, as is true of conceptual art and its nether side, body art—finds its obvious correlative in an aesthetic mode by which the self is created through the electronic device of feedback.

There exist, however, three phenomena within the corpus of video art that run counter to what I have been saying so far, or at least are somewhat tangential to it. They are (1) tapes that exploit the medium in order to criticize it from within; (2) tapes that represent a physical assault on the video mechanism in order to break out of its psychological hold; and (3) installation forms of video that use the medium as a subspecies of painting or sculpture. The first is represented by Richard Serra’s *Boomerang*. The second can be exemplified by Joan Jonas’s *Vertical Roll* (1972). And the third is limited to certain of the installation works of Bruce Nauman and Peter Campus, particularly Campus’s two companion pieces *mem* and *dor* (1974).

I have already described how narcissism is enacted in *Boomerang*. But what separates it from, say, Benglis’s *Now* is the critical distance it maintains on its own subject. This is primarily due to the fact that Serra employs audio rather than visual feedback. As a result, the angle of vision we take on the subject does not coincide with the closed circuit of Holt’s situation, but looks onto it from outside. Further, the narcissistic condition is given through the cerebrated form of language, which opens simultaneously onto the plane of expression and the plane of critical reflexiveness. Significantly, Serra’s separation from the subject of *Boomerang*, his position outside it, promotes an attitude toward time that is different from that of many other video works. The tape’s brevity—it is ten minutes long—is itself related to discourse: to how long it takes to shape and develop an argument; and how long it takes for its receiver to get the “point.”
Latent within the opening situation of *Boomerang* is its own conclusion; when that is reached, it stops.

*Vertical Roll* is another case where time has been forced to enter the video situation, and where that time is understood as a propulsion toward an end. In this work, access to a sense of time has come from fouling the stability of the projected image by desynchronizing the frequencies of the signals on camera and monitor. The rhythmic roll of the image, as the bottom of its frame scans upward to hit the top of the screen, causes a sense of decomposition that seems to work against the grain of those 525 lines of which the video raster is made. Because one recognizes it as intended, the vertical roll appears as the agency of a will that runs counter to an electronically stabilized condition. Through the effect of its constant wiping away of the image, one has a sense of a reflexive relation to the video grid and the ground or support for what happens to the image.

Out of this is born the subject of *Vertical Roll*, which visualizes time as the course of a continuous dissolve through space. In it a sequence of images and actions are seen from different positions—both in terms of the camera’s distance and its orientation to a horizontal ground. With the ordinary grammar of both film and video, these shifts would have to be registered either by camera movement (in which the zoom is included as one possibility) or by cutting. And while it is true that Jonas has had to use these techniques in making *Vertical Roll*, the constant sweep of the image renders these movements invisible. That is, the grammar of the camera is eroded by the dislocating grip of the roll. As I have said, the illusion this creates is one of a continuous dissolve through time and space. The monitor, as an instrument, seems to be winding a ribbon of experience into itself, like a fishing line being taken up upon a reel, or like magnetic tape being wound upon a spool. The motion of continuous dissolve becomes, then, a metaphor for the physical reality not only of the scan lines of the video raster but of the tape deck itself, whose reels objectify a finite amount of time.

Earlier, I described the paradigmatic situation of video as a body centered in the parenthesis between camera and monitor. Due to *Vertical Roll*’s visual reference through the monitor’s action to the physical reality of the tape, one
side of this parenthesis is made more active than the other. The monitor side of the double bracket becomes a reel through which one feels prefigured the imminence of a goal or terminus for the motion. That end is reached when Jonas, who has been performing the actions recorded on the tape, from within the coils of the camera/monitor circuit, breaks through the parenthetical closure of the feedback situation to face the camera directly—without the agency of the monitor’s rolling image.

If it is the paired movement of the video scan and the tape reel that is isolated as a physical object in Vertical Roll, it is the stasis of the wall plane that is objectified in Campus’s mem and dor. In both of the Campus works there is a triangular relationship created between (1) a video camera, (2) an instrument that will project the live camera image onto the surface of a wall (at life- and over-life-size), and (3) the wall itself. The viewer’s experience of the two works is the sum of the cumulative positions his body assumes within the vectors formed by these three elements. When he stands outside the triangular field of the works, the viewer sees nothing but the large, luminous plane of one of the walls in a darkened room. Only when he moves into the range of the camera is he able to realize an image (his own) projected onto the wall’s pictorial field. However, the conditions of seeing that image are rather special in both mem and dor.

In the latter, the camera is placed in the hallway leading to the room that contains the projector. Inside the room, the viewer is out of the range of the camera, and therefore nothing appears on the wall surface. It is only as he leaves the room, or rather is poised at the threshold of the doorway, that he is both illumined enough and far enough into the focal range of the camera to register as an image. Since that image projects onto the very wall through which the doorway leads, the viewer’s relation to his own image must be totally peripheral; he is himself in a plane that is not only parallel to the plane of the illusion, but continuous with it. His body is therefore both the substance of the image and, as well, the slightly displaced substance of the plane onto which the image is projected.

In mem, both camera and projector are to one side of the wall plane, stationed in such a way that the range of the camera encompasses a very thin
corridor-like slice of space that is parallel to, and almost fused with, the illuminated wall. Due to this, the viewer must practically be up against the wall in order to register. As he moves far enough away from the wall in order to be able to see himself, the image blurs and distorts, but if he moves near enough to place himself in focus, he has formed such closure with the support for the image that he cannot really see it. Therefore in *mem*, as in *dor*, the body of the viewer becomes physically identified with the wall plane as the “place” of the image.

There is a sense in which we could say that these two works by Campus simply take the live feedback of camera and monitor, which existed for the video artist while taping in his studio, and recreate it for the ordinary visitor to a gallery. However, *mem* and *dor* are not that simple. Built into their situation are two kinds of invisibility: the viewer’s presence to the wall in which he is himself an absence; and his relative absence from a view of the wall which becomes the condition for his projected presence upon its surface.

Campus’s pieces acknowledge the very powerful narcissism that propels the viewer of these works forward and backward in front of the muralized field. And, through the movement of his own body, his neck craning and head turning, the viewer is forced to recognize this motive as well. But the condition of these works is to acknowledge as separate the two surfaces on which the image is held—the one the viewer’s body, the other the wall—and to make them register as absolutely distinct. It is in this distinction that the wall surface—the “pictorial” surface—is understood as an absolute Other, as part of the world of objects external to the self. Further, the works specify that the mode of projecting oneself onto that surface entails recognizing all the ways that one does not coincide with it.

There is, of course, a history of the art of the last fifteen years into which works like *mem* and *dor* insert themselves, although it is one about which little has been written. That history involves the activities of certain artists who have made work that conflates psychologistic and formal means to achieve very particular ends. The art of Robert Rauschenberg is a case in point. His work, in bringing together groupings of real objects and found images and suspending them within the static matrix of a pictorial field, attempts to convert that field
into something we could call the plane of memory. In so doing, the static pictorial field is both psychologized and temporally distended. I have argued elsewhere⁹ that the impulse behind this move arose from questions that have to do with commodity fetishism. Rauschenberg, among many other artists, has been working against a situation in which painting and sculpture have been absorbed within a luxury market—absorbed so totally that their content has been deeply conditioned by their status as fetish prizes to be collected, and thereby consumed. In response, Rauschenberg’s art asserts another, alternative, relationship between the work of art and its viewer. And to do this Rauschenberg has had recourse to the value of time: to the time it takes to read a text or a painting, to rehearse the activity of cognitive differentiation that that entails, to get its point. That is, he wishes to pit the temporal values of consciousness against the stasis of the commodity fetish.

Although responsive to the same considerations, the temporal values that were built into the minimalist sculpture of the 1960s were primarily engaged with questions of perception. The viewer was therefore involved in a temporal decoding of aspects of scale, placement, or shape—issues that are inherently more abstract than, say, the contents of memory. Pure, as opposed to applied psychology, we might say. But in the work of certain younger sculptors, Joel Shapiro for example, the issues of minimalism are being inserted into a space that, like Rauschenberg’s pictorial field, defines itself as mnemonic. So that physical distance from a sculptural object is understood as being indistinguishable from temporal remove.

It is to this body of work that I would want to add Campus’s art. For him, the narcissistic enclosure inherent in the video medium becomes part of a psychologistic strategy by which he is able to examine the general conditions of pictorialism in relation to its viewers. It can, that is, critically account for narcissism as a form of bracketing out the world and its conditions, at the same time as it can reassert the facticity of the object against the grain of the narcissistic drive toward projection.