Santayana's idea of the Baron de Charlus, a major character from Marcel Proust's *A L'Ombre des Jeunes Filles en Fleurs* Courtesy of Rare Books Collections, Georgetown University Library, Special Collections Research Center, Washington, D.C.
David McCord  
*Poet always Next But One*

Hugh McCulloch  
*Written in Florence: The Last Verses of Hugh McCulloch*

Niccolo Machiavelli  
*Erotica*
Milano: 1924. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Frederick Walter Macran  
*English Apologetic Theology*

[Signed and dated 1905. Several passages are illegible.]

1 pp 98–99, marked

Just as a watch from the skill of its contrivance, and the elaborate construction of its mechanism, inferred an intelligent maker, so, only in a higher manner, did that vast machine the universe […] imply that it was the product of a vast and wise intelligence.

> **I wonder if the ingenious mechanism of the artist’s mind, too, must prove another artist, and so ad infinitum.**

2 p 150, marked

More dangerous [to faith than materialism], because more subtle, is that pantheistic idealism which, starting from apparently the opposite pole of thought to materialism, issues in results scarcely less hostile to religion and morals.

3 p 150, marked

||The problem of reconciling the truth of the divine immanence with that of the personality of both God and man|| can be answered […] by the assertion of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity which, while maintaining firmly the _im_ personality of God, asserts that the nature of the Divine existence is not fully expressed by that term, […] He is supra-personal.

> **If there are three persons in God God is not one person:** disunity is impersonal, like humanity, though it resides, of
course, in individuals. Individuals alone are facts. The question then becomes: Find the divine persons.

4 p 153

||The moral difficulties posed by the Old Testament anthropomorphic notions of the deity.|| But in the case of a progressive revelation, as in all other developments, we can only judge of it as a whole and with reference especially to its final goal in Tennyson and Browning.

5 p 165, marked

||Tennyson’s “Nature, red in tooth and claw” quoted as evidence of the evolutionists’ disparagement of the theory of Divine origin.|| Their ethics were decidedly utilitarian, and the theory of Herbert Spencer, that truths which seem to us intuitive are really an inheritance transmitted from the slowly formed habits of our forefathers, was eagerly taken up by the school of sense philosophers.

A man who grasps at every sophism supporting his prejudices naturally thinks his opponents will do likewise.

6 p 169, underlined

||Paradoxically, evolution has affirmed man’s dignity and made his position as the crown of creation more certain than previously.|| It further proves [...] that on this earth, as it now exists, there can never be a higher creature than man, and thus goes a long way towards restoring to him that place as the head and crown of creation, of which science since the days of the Copernican theory, to say nothing of the various forms of materialism, had tended to deprive him.

7 p 169, marked

Finally, the development of personality and character is seen to go hand in hand with that of the religious consciousness, and man can read in his own constitution and possibilities the assurance of his own immortality.

Can twiddle twaddle do and escape whipping?

8 p 173

||Macran finds a relationship between Christianity and the cosmic.||

What has Christianity ever had to do with “the cosmic”?

9 p 187, underlined

||Tennyson described as|| the great poet and thinker [...].

Hurrah!
Champions, however, were not wanting for the defence of the doctrine of the incarnation, and the creed of Nice, at this critical juncture.

Does he think it was at the Riviera? How English!

The creed of Nicaea was proclaimed in A.D. 325 at that city in Asia Minor, not at Nice on the Riviera.

It may thus be quite true that, while Cerinthus and the Ebionites held humanitarian notions concerning the Person of Jesus, Theodotus and Artemon were the first heretics who denied the Divinity of Christ. If this view of the belief of the primitive Church be accepted, Priestley’s theory, that Christian dogma originated in the influence of the Platonic philosophy upon the faith of the early Church, falls at once to the ground.

Suavity and the desire to deceive are real gifts in the clergy. Of course, Greek philosophy admitted the divinity of the intellect and of the god, but why say these were in Jesus in particular? That was the christian and new element in Gnosticism. They were christians by accident.

[From “If this view”:]

As if Christ had an “actual mind”? Conceive a psychology of the Holy Ghost and his hot feelings when his lineage from both Father and Son is called into question!

[Fairbairn, Christ in Modern Theology, p. 17, quoted:]

As if Christ had an “actual mind”? Conceive a psychology of the Holy Ghost and his hot feelings when his lineage from both Father and Son is called into question!

Macran lists at length the achievements of modern theology, saying that one can look to it for the presence with us of a Divine Spirit and Person; for that sacrifice was not merely the assurance of Divine forgiveness, but contained in its bosom the seed which was to blossom forth in a regenerated and purified humanity of the time of King Edward VII.

On the moral excellence of Christ:

If, as we mark the ascent of the soul in piety and holiness, we invariably notice that the sense of sin is deepened and the experience of contrition is more marked, [...].
Didn’t Jesus see through “sin” altogether? In a clear mind repentance is only sadness, and one is nothing but the “son of man”.

15 p 241, marked Z

[Charles Gore, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 169, quoted approvingly:] In past ages, “the versatility and intellect of the Greeks, the majestic discipline of the Romans, the strong individuality of the Teutons—each in turn has been able to find its true ideal in Jesus of Nazareth, […].”

**Bosh!**

16 pp 251–52, marked

For in our age men are more logical in their deductions, and more determined to draw inferences and extend the circle of results contained in any primary truth or idea.

**Listen to this.**

17 p 262, marked

[A quotation from Edward Caird, *Evolution of Religion*, Vol. II, p. 222:] “While the individual influence is very limited in its operation, and the bare universal is like a disembodied soul that has lost the power of action in the finite world, the individual who is regarded as the organ of a universal principle […] which has incarnated itself for perception or imagination in an individual life, takes hold upon man by both sides of his nature, and works with irresistible force upon all his thought and life.”

**This is good. When a man has a certain talent, as the Master of Balliol has, it comes out even through the mists of a perverse phraseology.**

18 p 267, underlined and marked

The great texts which assert the Deity of our Lord or His oneness with the Father may be forced into statements of the Divine immanence which found in Him its highest manifestation, and thus be deprived of all their significance. It would seem then advisable […] to direct attention rather to statements concerning the office, than those with regard to the Person, of Christ. Thus, He claims to stand in a peculiar relation to the human race as the Son of Man.

**It seems to me plain, when I read the gospel, that Jesus was a person who saw through myths, even when he had to use them, and that his intuitions were more, not less, “rationalistic” than those of the philosophers. He knew**
what he was talking about when he said “The Father” etc. The prophets had meant something, too.

19 p 271

||Macran ventures that half a century after his death was necessary for the transformation of Jesus into Christ, the Messiah.||

Three weeks would suffice. These good people have evidently no experience of a “religious” atmosphere. They should read the Lives of the Saints, or hear the pious gossip about a convent.

20 pp 272–73

||The Jews had no reason to think that Jesus would be born of a virgin.|| At least this would seem to be the case, judging from the dialogue of Justin Martyr with the Jew Trypo, when he endeavours to prove to the latter that the “prophecy had been spoken not with reference to Hezekiah as ye were taught, but to this my Christ”.

What a world these Jews and Christians lived in! What assumptions! What standards!

21 p 274, marked

||Pagan links to the accounts of Christ|| have been adduced, such as the Buddhist legend, are not by any means so close as is sometimes supposed, and really bear a stronger resemblance to the stories contained in the apocryphal gospels than to the narrative of our Lord’s birth as contained in St. Matthew and St. Luke.

There are connecting links.

22 p 299, underlined and marked

Paley, the one great theologian of that epoch [the 18th century], was a disciple of the school of sense philosophy, a Utilitarian, if not a Hedonist, in his ethics, [...].

“Cindy, don’t be vulgar.”

[End-papers:]

Things learned from this book.

1. The incorruptible nature of parsons.

2. That Newman was, and remained, a disciple of Butler, and that both made the “conscience”, which they didn’t venture to disentangle, an avenue to the supernatural. A comparison with Kant’s “Practical Reason” here suggests itself.
3. That the High Church party, in building up its defences again, has not thought of their foundation, but that its apparent return to catholic doctrine is a merely literary and pietistic pose. The whole pantheistic and evolutionist doctrine has been let in underneath, only an exception, honoris causa,¹ being made for the person of Christ.

4. That the contradiction between creation and redemption is not yet perceived, but is horribly troublesome none the less, the incarnation (both philosophical and traditional) being made, as far as possible, a substitute for both doctrines. But in orthodox doctrine it is not a substitute but a link.

(over)

5. That religion is always several thousand years behind conscience. Personal immortality, that flatulent exaggeration of selfishness, is called the “chief hope of mankind”, in an age when unselfishness is the virtue best felt and best practised.

¹For reason of honor.

---

James J. Mallon and E. C. T. Lascelles  
*Poverty Yesterday & Today*  

1 p 85, marked  
||The measure used to define poverty is a very low standard.||

2 p 94, marked  
Family Endowment cannot fail to interest anyone whose object is the reduction of poverty.

Guido Manacorda  
*Benedetto Croce, ovvero: Dell’improntitudine*  

Thomas Mann  
*Der Zauberberg*  

[Marginalia are principally translations of words or phrases.]
Dem einzelnen Menschen mögen mancherlei persönliche Ziele, Zwecke, Hoffnungen, Aussichten vor Augen schweben, aus denen er den Impuls zu hoher Anstrengung und Tätigkeit schöpft; wenn das Unpersönliche um ihn her, die Zeit selbst der Hoffnungen und Aussichten bei aller äusseren Regsamkeit im Grunde entbehrt, wenn sie sich ihm als hoffnungslos, aussichtlos und ratlos heimlich zu erkennen gibt und der bewusst oder unbewusst gestellten, aber doch irgendwie gestellten Frage nach einem letzten, mehr als persönlichen, unbedingten Sinn aller Anstrengung und Tätigkeit ein hohles Schweigen entgegensetzt, so wird gerade in Fällen redlicheren Menschentums eine gewisse lähmende Wirkung solches Sachverhalts fast unausbleiblich sein, […]

Style & philosophy slump together.

[Santayana’s comment may be unfair. Mann gives us Hans Castorp’s meandering reflections, meandering in part because he suffers the constant fever of a man slowly dying of tuberculosis; hence “slump.” But if the comment describes Mann’s own style, it is mistaken, surely.]

To the solitary man, various personal aims, purposes, hopes and prospects might dangle before the eye, prospects in which to find the impulse to greater striving and achievement. But with impersonality all about him, and according to all signs the time itself of hopes and prospects were lacking, when those signs made it clear to him that they were hopeless, unpromising and hidden, and some manner of known or unknown question posed, after a final, more than personal, unconditional sense of all striving and activity were opposed by a hollow silence, so directly in the instance of honest humanity a certain paralyzing consequence of such circumstances virtually constant ….
Ho pietà di colui che non sa liberarsi
dal proprio egoismo,
nella città incendiata dei desideri [...].

*I pity him who is not free from / His own ego, / In the burning city of desires ....*

3 Table 50

So once the starlight drank the fire of love
And spirit knew the flesh that it was of.

---

Jacques Maritain

*Art et scolastique*


1 p 14

[Summary and critique:]

Is the separation of entelechies from their organs counte-
nanced by Aristotle? All this is a view of the forest from
the air, and *illegible* the roots. All habits are habits in mat-
ter, though they may be sciences & arts of the spirit.

2 p 19

||Manual dexterity has no part in art; it is only a material, extrinsic quality.||

Art being a good, the agility is not more than a means to
the pre-ordained degree of excellence. You may trill too
much.

3 p 31, underlined

||The scholastics saw the virtue of the artificer not as muscle work or
suppleness of fingers. It was no more than pure empirical agility|| *which
is formed in the memory and in the animal reason, which imitates art and dont
l’art a absolument besoin*.1

This ought to be looked up, to see how near the
Aristotelians come to recognising the genetic order of
things.

1 Which art absolutely needs.

4 p 36, underlined

La beauté est essentiellement objet d’*intelligence*, car ce qui *connaît*—au
sense plein du mot, c’est l’*intelligence*, qui seule est ouverte a l’infinité de
l’être.1

*Intuition* not understanding, because there is no refer-
ence to the not-given, no animal faith concerned in this
“intellection”. The point is the beauty is an essence & can lodge only in essences.

1Beauty is essentially an object of intelligence, for whoever understands—in the full sense of the word, it is the intelligence which alone is open to the infinity of being.

5 pp 36–37, marked

[...] our intelligence is not so intuitive as that of the angels; [...] only the sensitive understanding perfectly possessed in man is required for the perception of beauty. Thus man may doubtless enjoy purely intelligible beauty, but the beautiful co-natural to man is that which comes from the delectation of the intelligence by sense and intuition. Such, also, is the distinctive beauty of our art, which operates through tangible matter to cause joy to the mind. He would also thus believe that paradise is not lost. He has the taste for an earthly paradise, the peace and delight simultaneously of the intelligence and the senses.

Excellent.

6 p 39

[Santayana’s gloss:]

What a pity that an actual correspondence with spirit should be attributed to an origin in spirit! As if spirit were matter, power, or potentiality, and not the actuality & fruition of everything else.

7 p 45fn1, underlined

Ajoutons, s’il s’agit de la “lisibilité” de l’œuvre, que si l’éclat de la forme peut paraître dans une œuvre “obscure” comme dans une œuvre “claire”, l’éclat du mystère peut paraître dans une œuvre “claire” aussi bien que dans une œuvre “obscure”.

“What Phèdre!”

1Let us add that if it is a question of the “readability” of a work, if the brilliance of the form may appear in an “obscure” work just as in a “clear” work, the brilliance of the mystery may appear in a “clear” work just as well as in an “obscure” one.

2Santayana’s favorite play, which he tells us he recited to himself when, in old age, he slept little.

8 p 46, marked

||On the attributes of beauty in a work of art|| [...] it is the reflection on those attributes of a man’s thought or of a divine thought; it is above all the splendor of the soul which shows through, of the soul, principle of life and of animal energy, or the principle of spiritual life, of pain and of passion.

The Psyche well understood.
9 p 49, underlined
Dieu est beau. Il est beau par lui-même et en lui-même, beau absolument.¹

Pure Being is absolutely fitted for intuition, each essence being so, & all their external relatives.

¹God is beautiful. He is beautiful by himself and in himself, beautiful absolutely.

10 p 52, underlined
As soon as one touches upon the transcendental, one touches upon l'être¹ itself, upon a likeness of God, upon an absolute [...].

Pure being, i.e. essence.

¹Being.

11 p 99
[Santayana’s gloss:]
In the senses usually employed in action essence is unsatisfying; the psyche requires truth. This is a practical man’s prejudice. Beauty, in nature and in pure art, is non-significance.

12 p 119, marked
||Christianity does not make art easy, but while it raises difficulties, it solves others, and makes known hidden beauties.||

13 p 181, underlined
||God prefers the charity of one soul to the greatest works of art.|| [... les âmes, sa nourriture à lui, la pâture de son amour.¹

How sentimental the axiom of the democracy of spirit becomes in modern Catholicism!

¹… souls, his best and only nourishment, the pasture of his love.

Jacques Maritain
Réflexions sur l'intelligence et sur sa vie propre

1 p 20, underlined
Je peux savoir par la raison que Dieu existe, mais à condition de partir de l'être que je touche et je vois.¹

i.e. in animal perception, not in intuition.

¹I may know by reason that God exists, but on condition that such knowledge is apart from the being that I touch and see.

2 p 21, marked
[On the conception of Being:]}
Pure Being = the Realm of Essence: as for Existence, it is many, essentially because in flux.

3 p 25, underlined

J’ai parlé de la vérité de à l’intelligence. L’intelligence est vraie, selon qu’elle juge la chose comme elle est. Mais les choses aussi sont vraies, selon qu’elles sont conformes à l’intelligence dont elles dépendent.1 [...] Translate: Things are true (there is a truth of things) as they possess essence.

1I have spoken about the the truth of the intelligence. Intelligence is true according to how it judges the thing as it is. But things are also true, according to how they conform with the intelligence on which they depend.

4 pp 37–38, marked

Nietzsche’s madness is the consummation in a human body of everything awry in the spirit since Luther and Descartes. He was a lamentable victim! A great and generous writer who foundered in dementia because he wanted, in order to live, to improve on the truth. After believing that he could regenerate the world by the suppression of the ascetic ideal, and possessing a lively hatred for chri-

5 p 41, marked Z

[Maritain quotes I. J. Marechal, Le Point de départ de la Métaphysique, cahier II, 1923, p. 78.]

[L]e “contenu objectif de la conscience considéré en lui-même, abstraction faite de son inherence à un sujet psychologique et de sa valeur représentative d’un objet ontologique, le contenu de conscience considéré comme objet phénoménal.”1

Almost essence but not quite, since “content of consciousness” is an adventitious circumstance.

1The “objective content of the consciousness considered in itself, an abstraction made of its inherence in a psychological subject and of its representative value as an ontological object; the content of consciousness considered as a phenomenal object.”

6 p 45

[Santayana’s gloss:]

Given essences are terms, not objects, in perception or opinion. They become objects only in pure intuition, if this fills the mind.

7 p 48–49, marked

Descartes et Kant se sont trompés de même, parce qu’ils ont conçu la connaissance, et en particular la connaissance intellectuelle, qui est ce
qu’il y a de plus élevé dans la nature, secundum modum infimarum creaturarum, quæ sunt corpora, parce qu’ils ont confondu les choses du connaître avec les choses de l’action transitive.

1 Which transitive action is only the physical basis of knowledge.

1Descartes and Kant were both wrong, because they conceived of intellectual knowledge, which is the highest order in nature, to be the second mode in low beings, which are bodies, because they confounded things [objects] of knowledge with those of transitive action.

8 p 58

[Summary:]
Essence defined in intuition.
Intuition is not knowledge.

9 p 62, marked

||God, according to Cajetan on Aquinas’s Summa, has endowed us with certain kinds of perfection.||

Life is the deity that has worked this miracle.

10 p 67, marked

||Post-Kantian commentators on Aquinas believed consciousness derived from an automatic process.||

[Santayana summarizes:]
Imagery without intelligence.

11 p 68

[Santayana’s free translation of St. Thomas, de Veritate, I, 3:]
Description is on a different plane—the spiritual plane—from existence. But it is true description—partakes of truth—when it borrows the essence of the thing and asserts it of that thing.

12 pp 73–74, marked

||Kant was correct to wish, contrary to Hume and Leibniz, to restore the progressive and “synthetic” movement of reason. Of synthetic judgments a priori,|| he searched in them for the full law and complete regulation in the subject and its alleged forms a priori, rather than believing them to reside completely in the object […].

13 p 74, marked

[Of Maritain’s phrase, “spontanéité vitale”:] Very good: the only true spontaneity of mind is curiosity—desire to discover the object.
Nous rendons grâces à Pascal d’avoir rappelé à tant de baptisés en partance pour les paradis de la science humaine, et à certains théologiens qui plaquent les vertus chrétiennes sur l’homme de la nature comme un peu d’or sur du cuivre, que ce n’est pas une chose plus ou moins difficile, comme d’être un Archimède ou un César, mais bien une chose entièrement impossible à la seule nature que d’être chrétien: *ex Deo natus*. Nous lui rendons grâces d’avoir affirmé magnifiquement la surnaturalité de la foi. C’est à la lumière de cette doctrine qu’il faut considérer les *Pensées*.¹

**What Cory means by “supernatural”.**² But being Christian is horribly human. The irrational force in conversion or faith is an animal force, common to all religions and all madmen.

¹ We give thanks to Pascal for having recalled to so many of the baptized leaving for the paradise of human science, and to certain theologians who plate Christian virtues on natural man rather like gold on copper, that it is not so difficult to be an Archimedes or a Caesar, but something entirely impossible to the solely natural as to be a Christian, born of God. We thank him for having magnificently affirmed the supernaturalism of the faith. It is in the light of this doctrine that we must consider the *Pensées*.

² Daniel Cory, Santayana’s literary executor, read proofs and did occasional jobs for Santayana while regarding himself as a philosopher and viveur.

||Physical reality, which is the subject matter of natural science|| is observed, weighed, measured, and noted; then it is translated into algebraic symbols: but it is not *sue*,¹ in respect to its physical reality.

i.e. it’s intrinsic essence is not specified. **Can the essence of matter in existence be specified?**

¹ Known.

||Moderns investigating matter|| continuent pourtant de l’appeler «science,» parce que ce qui leur importe ce n’est pas ce qui importait aux Anciens: la conquête intellectuelle et spéculative de la vérité procurée à des hommes libres par des *qualités* perfectionnant leur intelligence et surélevant intrinsèquement leur humanité; mais c’est avant tout, depuis Bacon et Descartes, la conquête *pratique* du monde sensible, pour la béatitude temporelle du genre humain, qui usant de *métodes* automatiquement infaillibles, s’emploiera à dompter la matière et les forces physiques,—(et qui par là même augmentera indéfiniment sa
dépendance à l’égard de celles-ci, et entrera sous la loi de fer du factibile matériel).\(^1\)

[At top:]

**Quote in Americanism**

This is all true, but expressed unamiably. The quality expressed in modern reflexion is not cognitive dogmatically, but aesthetic and emotional. We are satisfied with practice and poetry.

\(^1\)... moreover continue to name their activity “science,” because what concerns them is not that which concerned the ancients: the speculative and intellectual conquest of truth, procured for free men through qualities which made perfect their intelligence and intrinsically elevating their humanity. But since Bacon and Descartes above all, the moderns would conquer the sensible world for the temporal beatitude of the human race, using methods automatically infallible, and would control matter and physical forces,—(and in consequence would indefinitely increase their dependence on those forces, and would subscribe to the factitious iron law of materiality).

17 p 200, underlined

Or la «Physique» des modernes, si elle ne nous apprend rien sur l’être de son objet, sur la nature de la réalité physique comme telle, nous met en état d’utiliser merveilleusement cette réalité; aussi pour ceux qui jugent des choses au point de vue utilitaire et pratique, mérite-t-elle par excellence le nom de «science».)\(^1\)

\(^1\)Now modern “Physics,” if it teaches us nothing about the being [or essence] of its object concerning the nature as such of physical reality, permits us wonderfully well to use that reality; for those who judge things from the point of view of utility and practicality, it superbly merits the name of “science.”

18 p 205, marked

[…] when we set out in quest of verifying experimentally if two masses are or are not equal, we do not know at the outset, or by another method, what it is that constitutes equality.

The verification itself must be intuitive. The essence is given both to thought and to sense.

N.B. as if that didn’t touch the substance of things.

19 p 218

[Santayana summarizes and comments on a long footnote relating to P. Langevin, *La Physique depuis vingt ans:*

**Intuition of time in eternity fixes the order of time: does it create that order? No: then that order lies in the events themselves.**
Maritain considers Einsteinian relativity in space-time with reference to simultaneity of thought between two minds. I am in the presence of a major event, unknown until now, the relativity of identity. Each system of reference has its own truth; and it is not even possible to conceive of a thought that is what it is independently of a system of reference. What I think varies with the relative speed of the apparatus that registers thought [...].

**Capital.** But while the essences of thought are determinate, the essences of instants are identical. All, therefore, in pure time, are the same instant!

On Einstein’s concept of time; it is not mathematical: separated from things and independent of all real movement, from rational mechanics, but it is none the less real time, the time of the philosophy of nature or of physics in the Aristotelian sense of the word, the continuity of impermanence in movement [...].

All that reminds one that Einsteinian physics is a mathematics of phenomena based on an integral empiricism.

It would be ridiculous not to admire Einstein’s scientific work. It is the end-product of the research of Maxwell, Lorentz, and Poincaré, and of the entire secular effort in modern quantum physics.

||Of the Thomist idea of man; Kant and Rousseau were anomalies.||

Man an omnipotent spirit in chains!

Rousseau confounded pessimism with Christian dogma, and rationalism with art and civilization. But as for Aquinas, the love of God which infuses and creates the good in all things inclines toward all existence because all that exists is good exactly in its place; an optimistic metaphysical formula to which, this time, it is Rousseau who would counter [with] the motto of romantic pessimism: [...].

Everything would be good if it were perfect after its kind: but nothing is. Thus the two maxims can be reconciled. Is this, I wonder, what you are going to say?
Maritain represents as Manichean certains grands artistes modernes, comme Baudelaire ou Oscar Wilde.

Thomist and modern idealism contrasted in terms of mental activity and spontaneity. While Kant affirms mental activity only in the course of destroying objectivity, because he has in view only fabricated activity, Thomism, because it sees mental activity truly immanent and truly vital, makes the objectivity of the understanding reason itself and the purpose [fin] of its activity.

Aristotle is a moralist in metaphysics.

Thomism “drains” modern idealism insofar as the interiority of consciousness is concerned. The Thomists say que l’intelligence est une faculé attirant les choses à soi d’une façon parfaite, «perfecte trahens res ad se».

That is, things are conceived as their essences: the matter is accidental to their “being”. Yet makes possible their existence. This existence, however, ought to be included in the “thing”.

That intelligence is a faculty that draws things to itself in a perfect manner.

---

Jacques Maritain

Sept leçons sur l’être, et les premiers principes de la raison spéculative


Progress by substitution is appropriate to the natural sciences; it is their law. The more purely they realize their type, the greater their progress. But that progress is not the law of wisdom. Its progress is a progress of deepening, of progress by adhesion and of the most profound union, of increasing intimacy.

Good science does this too.

The idea that existence does not exist is not a contradiction, because the word existencia, the concept that the name of existence designates existence itself from the point of view of essence, insofar as it has a certain intelligible density, a certain source [foyer] of intelligible determination, is existentia ut significata [existence as signified], as apprehended in a concept [...].
The essence of existence is a definition: essence caught in non-essential relations. This does not exist except when exemplified.

3 p 33

Maritain quotes St. Thomas on necessity and on knowledge or cognition.

Poor stuff.

4 p 34

It is an error of many contemporaries who confound being [être]], le sens commun et les sciences de la nature, || with metaphysics.||

Etre = substance rather than essence.

... common sense and natural science, ....

5 p 37

[Santayana tersely paraphrases:]

Animal faith excited by sense-data.

6 p 41

Terms. “Being” or “reality” as a mere term.

Logic, according to this, treats of terms only, not of essences. It is properly only a grammar.

7 p 42, underlined

Voilà la différence entre l’être du logicien et celui du métaphysicien, il est considéré là dans l’esprit [...].

There is an equivocation here. The terms, in their essence, are not “in the mind”: they exist only as objects of thought—as non-existent objects.

^There lies the difference between the logician’s Being and the metaphysician’s; it is considered in the mind ....

8 p 46 note 1, underlined

[Aquinas on what Maritain calls the old meaning of the term, dialectic, in which Aquinas distinguishes between dialectic and philosophy.]

Dialecticus auter circa omnia praedicta procedit ex probabilibus; unde non facit scientiam, sed quamdam opinionem. Et hoc ideo est, quia ens est duplex: ens scilicet rationis et ens naturae. Ens autem rationis dicitur proprie de illis intentionibus, quas ratio adinventit in rebus consideratis; sicut intentio generis, speciei et simillium, quae quidem non inveniuntur in rerum natura, sed considerationem rationis consequuntur. [At consequuntur:]
i.e. are attained. If you see “yellow” it would mean that intent creates essence when it selects it: which would defeat all dialectic since it would have no constant terms.

1 Dialectic, however, in all predictions proceeds from the probable, thus it does not produce knowledge, but mere opinion. This idea derives from the two-fold nature of being: obviously, rational being and natural being. Being, however, is properly said to be rational by intention, as if reason found things by reflection, and the purpose of genera, species and the like were not found in the nature of things, but resulted from human thought.

9 p 54, underlined

||Concerning intuition:|| [...] dans un moment d’émotion décisive et comme de feu spirituel l’âme est en contact vivant, transverbérant, illuminateur, avec une réalité qu’elle touche [...].

Is there any such rot as this in St. Thomas?

1 ... in a moment of decisive emotion and like a spiritual fire, the soul is in living contact, reverberating, alight with a tangible reality ....

10 p 55, underlined

||More concerning intuition: Intelligence and the concept of being [être] respond to such rat-like intuition [as above, 9 p 54].|| [...] il faut toute la métaphysique non seulement faite mais à faire et dans toute sa croissance future pour savoir ce que contient de richesses virtuelles le concept d’être.

Are you talking of the universe?

1 ... all metaphysics already known but also to be known, as well as complete future faith are necessary in order to realize the potential richness of the concept of being.

11 pp 56–57

||On the relationship between spirituality, intellect, and readiness to recognize metaphysical and natural reality.||

This is a notion of a divine plan or will behind the natural world; something truly “metaphysical and oracular”. It is not the object of philosophy but only of the metaphysics of the Socratic school.

12 p 61

||Of the perception of the ineffable:|| Here we come to the first root of the whole of intellectual life, discovered finally in itself.

Do you mean animal faith, the assertiveness of living mind?