nouncement that the painting is not a re-presentation of any actual event. Rather Seurat demonstrates how an alliance of art (e.g., Reynaud’s drawing) with techniques of perceptual modernization constitutes an autonomous space of invention and imposes its own constructed visions and truths on viewers. The mechanization

is one of the earliest dreams of an impossible and inhuman vision, of a desire for a perceptual ubiquity exceeding the spatial and temporal limits of human faculties. The related ambition of Seurat is not to emulate the high-speed recording machines of Marey and Muybridge, but to remake the self into a sovereign eye that would create and impose its own truths. The horses of both Gericault and Seurat, in their airborne oneiric trajectories, incarnate a deeper truth of the body. They become abstract correlates of physiological and kinetic response to perceived movement; they affirm the primacy of ideomotor experience rather than the truth of mechanical spatial movement. Seurat thus chooses a very different path from Ernst Meissonier, who in the 1880s anxiously sought to reconcile his equine imagery with Muybridge’s work. See the important account of Muybridge and Meissonier in Marc C. Gotlieb, *The Plight of Emulation: Ernst Meissonier and French Salon Painting* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 171–184.
of vision had no intrinsic link to objectivity or veracity but rather to new capacities for simulation, illusion, conjuration.

Clearly this is an image in which Seurat is experimenting with the management of attention and techniques of attraction. In his use of the dark, wide frame, he is attempting his own reinvention of a “Bayreuth effect,” an effect analogous to the autonomous luminous field of Reynaud’s projected color images. At the same time he is openly manipulating the artifice and abstraction inherent in those techniques. The clown’s shadow cast onto the image dismantles the apparent unity of the space contained by the frame. The impossible frozen character of the image establishes it as a detachable or unbound component of a larger machinic synthesis or binding of images into the simulation of movement. Even though Cirque has long seemed an explicit, even inordinate demonstration of dynamogenic effects, it produces a stasis no less powerful than Parade de cirque. The inelegant austerity with which the “moving” figures and animal are arrested announces that “presence” here is not directly accessible to human vision but can only be the product of technical procedures of simulation. The collapse of scenographic space in Parade de cirque is the very precondition for the impossible, unseeable apparition which is the spectacle in Cirque. The whole bureaucratization of response and affect in Seurat, regardless of the physiological provocation implied, is fully compatible with the phantasmal homeostasis of Parade de cirque and with a de-temporalization of both individual and collective experience.

If Cirque can be read as the other side or interior of Parade de cirque, it is no less an abstract conceptualization of perceptual experience. If the possibility of spectacle in Parade de cirque is deferred, displaced, and denied, the image of spectacle that is seemingly displayed in Cirque is equally derealized and drained of presence. But the social world that Seurat diagrams for us in both of these images is one in which the attentiveness of an observing subject is the site of increasingly specialized operations of power. Durkheim’s hoped-for solidarities are redrawn here as collective states in which a delimited and managed field of stimuli maintains a twilight state of restricted consciousness, in which the autonomy of the individual is reduced. The importance of Seurat’s work, in these last years of his brief career, was to have intuited how the collapse of scenic space allowed new imaginary figurations of immediacy, of a regressive unity based on a corporeal engagement of the spectator. As early as anyone, he sensed something fundamental about the industrialization of contemplation, and like Wagner he anticipated, before the actual inception of cinema, the effects of a phantasmic luminous image.
on which essence had been displaced by appearance.\footnote{See Carl Dahlhaus, *Nineteenth-Century Music*, trans. J. Bradford Robinson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 195–196.} The formal harmony into which he sought to fashion his work certainly presumes an escape into psychological time, but he never completely erases a sense of the obdurate historical conditions out of which this dream of equilibrium emerges. Unlike Wagner and others, Seurat resisted the temptation of the phantasmagoric and of myth, both through his exposure of the technical premises of his work and the parallel subversion of any stable “formation” or Gestalt on which the allure of myth depends.\footnote{If we choose to label Seurat’s work as “avant-garde,” it would be within the terrain of Benjamin Buchloh’s valuable delineation of this term: “It seems more viable to define avant-garde practice as a continually renewed struggle over the definition of cultural meaning, the discovery and representation of cultural truth, and the articulation and representation of experience.”} His work
is clearly adjacent to larger processes of modernizing human perception, but it is hardly identical with them. As an artwork, *Parade de cirque* is still, in Adorno’s words, an object “incompatible with the forces that want to humble and subsume it.”

It may be built out of mechanisms for the production of subjective response (and it is irrelevant whether or not they are effective), but it is never reducible to them. At the same time, in its opacity, in its hostility to virtuosity and expressionism, it prevents any consoling eclipse of self in the work. It leaves its viewer hovering between submission to its empirical operation and anticipation of a luminous fusion of all that is unreconciled in it.

But freedom always remains that vision, that silence in which all voices echo. It is always attention which creates time, wins time, so that all these voices speak distinctly, in a succession.

—Paul Ricoeur, *Freedom and Nature*

Art historian Meyer Schapiro characterized the work of Cézanne as “an art of grave attention.” Schapiro’s use of this phrase was carefully weighed, informed by his own discernment of the paradoxes involved: “It is the art of a man who dwells with his perceptions, steeping himself in this world of the eye, though he is often stirred. Because this art demands of us a long concentrated vision, it is like music as a mode of experience—not as an art of time, however, but as an art of grave attention, called out only by certain works of the great composers.”1 Schapiro elucidates the notion of a “long concentrated vision” by reference to a nonoptical experience, and he poses Cézanne’s sustained attentiveness, occurring out of time, as a suspension of perception, a hovering within a drawn-out moment, in which a dynamic play of relationships results in “a restoration of objects.” Whether or not there really is any “restoration” in Cézanne’s late work has been central to the most important debates about this artist, and in this chapter I will examine how the particular reinvention of synthesis in his work from around 1900 raises a very different set of problems than in Manet and Seurat. The partial recourse by those artists to strategies of binding, homeostasis, and fixation is no longer an option for

Cézanne. Through Cézanne’s late work I will explore the uncertain status of an attentive observer in a range of locations around this time, in works of philosophy, scientific psychology, early cinema, art theory, and neurology. My aim is not to identify a set of homologous objects but rather to highlight the highly contested nature of questions of attention and perception at the end of the century. These problems took shape around many, often radically different positions and practices concerning the possibility of “pure perception,” and the possibility of “presence” within perception. I will be concerned here with how the notion of attentive presence was recreated amid the impact of new conceptualizations and organizations of motion, memory, and temporality, including emerging technological arrangements. By the late 1890s the very possibility and value of a sustained looking, of a “fixed” vision, became inseparable from the effects of dynamic, kinetic, and rhythmic modalities of experience and form.

Schapiro’s remarks can serve as an entry into another contemporary “attentive” practice, or at the least the discursive proposal of such a practice, in the early work of Edmund Husserl. A number of influential accounts of Cézanne’s work have associated it in general ways with aspects of early twentieth-century phenomenology. In brief, what the two supposedly have in common is an attempt to bypass the accumulated cultural and commonsense assumptions about the world as it appears in consciousness, an attempt described in Cézanne’s words as: “to produce the image of what we see while forgetting everything that has appeared before our day.”2 The dubious assumption here is that a Cézannean venture of “forgetfulness” corresponds to Husserl’s goal of the isolation of a “pure” form of consciousness, stripped of all the accretions of habit and socialization. According to Merleau-Ponty’s well-known account, Cézanne sought “a vision which penetrates right to the root of things beneath the imposed order of humanity,” and establishes a position vis-a-vis the world that is prior to distinctions between mind and body, thought and vision.3 Cézanne, he wrote, “returns to just that pri-

2. Paul Cézanne, letter to Emile Bernard of October 23, 1905. Reprinted in Conversations avec Cézanne, p. 46. At the same time, the long nineteenth-century preoccupation with an “innocent vision” is not unimportant here, including Ruskin but also Schopenhauer who declared, “To have original, extraordinary thoughts, possibly even immortal ideas, it is sufficient to become so completely estranged from the world and things for a few moments that the most ordinary objects and events appear to be wholly new and unfamiliar, whereby their true nature is disclosed.” Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena, vol. 2 (1851), trans. E. F. J. Payne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 77.
mordial experience from which these notions are derived and in which they are inseparable.”⁴ Cezanne’s work, in this view, provides a purified route of access to things-in-themselves, parallel to Husserl’s own appropriation of a visual model to his quest for “seeing essences.”⁵

First, let’s consider further Husserl’s stake in these problems, or to what extent it might be worthwhile to treat them as common problems. In the very late 1890s, in the pre-phenomenological Logical Investigations (a work that contains a comprehensive theory of perception), Husserl declared his opposition to prevailing notions of attention.⁶ He wanted to define an intuition fundamentally different from an attention that was merely a heightened awareness of a narrowed or focused range of perception. According to Jacques Derrida, Husserl’s aim in the Logical Investigations was the description of objectivities “in a certain atemporal fixedness,” which entailed “the fixing of attention on the formal.”⁷ In this text Husserl writes: “Men speak of attention as if it were a name for modes of special relief imparted to experienced contents.”⁸ Husserl here is countering dominant psychologistic models of attention, such as Wundt’s, and the sculptural metaphor is tied into the well-established idea of attention as an operation of selection, in which a given set of stimuli are perceived as if three-dimensional in relation to a more flattened-out apprehension of a surrounding field. But Husserl is calling for a dramatic reorientation of such a notion and argues that attention is unrelated to either empirical observation or traditional introspection; it is not a question of the mere existence of a content in consciousness.⁹ “Nothing has so hindered right views in

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⁴. Ibid.
⁶. Many commentators consider the two volumes of Logical Investigations to belong to distinct phases of Husserl’s thought—the first volume associated with his “pre-phenomenological” years in Halle and the second volume with his first articulations of phenomenology as a limited epistemology.
⁹. See Harrison Hall, “Was Husserl a Realist or an Idealist?,” in Hubert L. Dreyfus, ed., Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982), p. 174: “Phenomenological reflection is reflection which shifts the focus of attention from the objects of ordinary experience to the noemata which mediate such experience. . . . Thus, disconnecting the objective reference from the meaning of the perceptual act is not simply a matter of shifting attention within the natural context of experience, but of transforming or abandoning that context as well.”
this field as the by-passing of the fact that attention is an emphatic function which belongs among acts in the above defined sense of intentional experiences. . . . There must be a basic act in which what we attend to becomes objective, becomes presented in the widest sense of this word.”

Husserl believed that, in spite of all the study of attention in the late nineteenth century, he was the first to grasp the significance of the connection between attention and intentionality.

Husserl’s work, like Cézanne’s, is one of many sites in the late nineteenth century where a crisis in perception is diagnosed, but it is also one of the most singular and implacable responses to such a crisis. Part of what he attacks as “psychologism” in the late 1890s are epistemological positions that were the targets of others as well: various psychophysical, associationist, sensationalist, atomistic accounts of perception and cognition. Helmholtz’s *Optics*, aligned as it was with his theory of unconscious inferences, was one of the foundations for subsequent nineteenth-century epistemological positions that began with *physiological* premises in order to demonstrate how merely “reliable” and “consistent” knowledge about the world was possible. Husserl clearly found deplorable the idea of consciousness as a bundle of sensations, as repeated associations or fusions of psychological contents. His response was not to restore a perceiving subject to a privileged point of view from which the objectivity of the world could be apprehended (as in classical models of vision). Nor did he refute any empirical or physiological claims about perception. Rather he posed the possibility of a parallel, alternative model of intuition that allowed a more purified and fundamental understanding of the nature of experience, and which revealed the inevitable intertwining of subject and object. Issues of cognitive and perceptual *synthesis* were not primary because of his position (important for the Gestaltists) that the material of perception is given with much of its order and organization directly.


However one characterizes the philosophical significance of his efforts to resecure an unconditional basis for logic and science, the less lofty cultural importance of Husserl’s work must be seen as one of a range of attempts (including Cézanne’s) to escape from reified, habitual patterns of perception inherent in various aspects of the rationalization and commodification of experience in the 1890s and early 1900s. One of his central problems (and it’s a problem that relates to issues in Cézanne) was to explain how the realm of the psychical, which is intrinsically one of perpetual modulations, fusions, entrances and exits of contents, can yield stable, objectively valid cognitions. The very idea of attention as a malleable, entropic force susceptible to fatigue, distraction, and external management would have been unacceptable to Husserl. The dynamic, kinetic, distracted texture of modern sensory life could be tolerable only if there was a guarantee that beneath it, over it, or embedded in it was access to the primordial oneness of consciousness. The fragmentation, dissociation, and fluctuations of ordinary perceptual experience concealed what was actually invariant and constitutive of those perceptions. The widespread interest in nineteenth-century psychology in the study of optical illusions, like the reversible Necker cube or the deceptively longer and shorter Müller-Lyer lines, continually raised questions about the relativity of individual perception, in both nativist and empiricist explanations. For Husserl, such relativity could not be part of a quest for the logic of meaning.

Husserl’s work proposes the possibility of an impersonal, preindividual transcendent sphere, free of anything empirical, of anything spatiotemporal, to which attention appertains. His remaking of attention is a move from the empirical to the universal, in which attention ceases to be “natural” and becomes an intentional act with an absolute structure. Here is a quote from the first volume of the Logical Investigations: “Significant talk of attention embraces the whole sphere of thinking and not merely the sphere of intuition. . . . If our judgement is of the form All A’s are B’s, our attention is given to this universal state of affairs, we are concerned with allness, and not with this or that single matter.”12 Conceived in this way, attention becomes allied with a process of abstraction, in which the universal itself is “given.” It is an attention that bypasses everything nonformal, so that the purely formal aspects of the world can be discovered.

Over the following decade Husserl would develop this notion of attention into an image of a projected ray of light, a searchlight, the “attentional beam”

illuminating not objects and empirical relations but essences and noema. Atten-
tion, as a searchlight beam, becomes a quasi-machinic figure for an un-
wavering mode of looking at the act of looking, and thus for a suspension of the “natural
attitude.” According to Michel Foucault and other critics, Husserl is seeking to
preserve the rootedness and stability of the observer and the coordinates of so-
called “natural perception,” including a primal horizon against which allegedly
unconditional perceptual meanings can arise. Gilles Deleuze insisted that Husserl
and phenomenological thought in general were unable to go beyond what are essen-
tially “pre-cinematographic conditions,” in which movement can be thought only
from the anchorage of a static “pose.” In a world in which previously stable
meanings, signs, social relations were being uprooted, made exchangeable, and
put into circulation, Husserl aims to discern a halo of absolute authenticity around
every object or set of relations. Amid the dynamic dissolutions of modernization,
he proposes a monolithic technique of attention that will impose a unity, clarity,
and consistency on the most dispersed, ambiguous, and kinetic of psychic con-
tents. In order to salvage the authenticity of a subjective lifeworld, Husserl initiated
a hopeless quest to determine its universal structure.

Despite all of the obvious incommensurability between the projects of Ge-
zanne and Husserl, they both must be understood and positioned in relation to

Gibson (New York: Collier, 1962), pp. 248–249. The idea of attention as a radiant beam occurs in many
widely differing bodies of thought. For uses of a “spotlight” theory in recent studies on attention, see,
for example, A. M. Treisman, “Features and Objects,” *Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology* 40
*Annual Review of Neuroscience* 13 (1990), pp. 25–42.

14. Albert Camus lucidly discusses Husserl’s model of attention, freely explicating it thus: “From the
evening breeze to this hand on my shoulder, everything has its truth. Consciousness illuminates it by
paying attention to it. Consciousness does not form the object of its understanding, it merely focuses,
it is the act of attention, and, to borrow a Bergsonian image, it resembles the projector that suddenly
focuses on an image. The difference is that there is no scenario, but a successive and incoherent illustra-
tion. In that magic lantern all the pictures are privileged. Consciousness suspends in experience the
objects of its attention. Through its miracle it isolates them. Henceforth they are beyond all judgments.”
emphasis added.

15. See Michel Foucault, *Language, Counter-memory and Practice*, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and
Sherry Simon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 175–176; Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The
58–61.

16. According to Francisco Varela, “The irony of Husserl’s procedure, then, is that although he claimed
to be turning philosophy toward a direct facing of experience, he was actually ignoring both the con-
sensual aspect and the direct embodied aspect of experience. . . . Husserl’s turn toward experience and
‘the things themselves’ was entirely theoretical, or, to make the point the other way around, it comple-
ently lacked any pragmatic dimension.” Varela argues that this criticism holds as well for Merleau-
Ponty, who stressed the “embodied context of human experience but in a purely theoretical way.”
processes of rationalization and modernization. As I’ve already emphasized, attention emerges as a discursive and practical object at the historical moment when vision and hearing have become progressively severed from the various historical codes and practices that had invested them with a level of certainty, dependability, and naturalness. The more the senses are revealed to be inconsistent, conditioned by the body, prey to the threat of distraction and nonproductivity, the more a normative individual is defined in terms of objective and statistical attentional capacities that facilitate the subject’s functional compatibility within institutional and technological environments. In spite of Cézanne’s and Husserl’s relative remoteness from these arenas of production and consumption, their work challenged and sought to exceed the same features of perception which those apparatuses regulated and standardized.

What are we to make, then, of the familiar theme of Cézanne’s will to forget? What, if anything, did he seek to “suspend”? It has long been said of Cézanne that he never acquired the trucs or gimmicks of the atelier, that he sought to rid himself of ready-made schema and traditional solutions for pictorial organization (for example, the historically accumulated practices associated with linear perspective). But if these accounts of Cézanne as a kind of primitive, avoiding any premade interpretations of the world, are useful, it is for how they suggest his particular sensitivity to and observation of perceptual experiences that had been ignored, marginalized, or been incompatible (and hence unarticulated) within older (classical) organizations of knowledge about vision. Rather than attempting to lodge him within a nineteenth-century mythology of the “innocent” or infantine eye, Cézanne must be thought of as an observer who was astonishingly alert to whatever was anomalous in perceptual experience. In his late work, he is not working with a perceptual tabula rasa from which to build afresh the essential structure of the world; rather he has become open to engaging a discordant exterior which acts on him, jarring his hold on a recognizable world.

Beginning in the early nineties, with his abandonment of the unifying all-over constructive touch of the so-called third period (1878–1887), Cézanne enters into a project of unprecedented experimentation. One of the discoveries he made over the next decade is that perception can take no other form than the process

17. Lawrence Gowing discusses the “riddle” of the disintegration of the object in the late work. “Cézanne’s work from 1900 onward is radically different from the object-based structures of earlier years... After 1900 separable objects in Cezanne’s work increasingly merge into the flux of color.” Gowing, “The Logic of Organized Sensations,” in William Rubin, ed., Cézanne: The Late Work (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1977), p. 55.
of its formation. This is no longer a question of recording the evanescent appearances of the world but of confronting and inhabiting the instability of perception itself. Perhaps more piercingly than anyone else, Cezanne disclosed the paradoxes of attention through an understanding of perception’s essential *difference from itself.* What Manet had partially intuited became a productive part of Cezanne’s practice—the creative discovery that looking at any one thing intently did *not* lead to a fuller and more inclusive grasp of its presence, its rich immediacy. Rather, it led to its perceptual disintegration and loss, its breakdown as intelligible form;

18. Jacques Derrida’s critique of Husserl contains one of the most influential accounts of the impossibility of a self-identical perception, an account that also has relevance for an analysis of temporality in Cezanne: “One then sees quickly that the presence of the perceived present can appear as such only inasmuch as it is *continuously compounded* with a nonpresence and nonperception, with primary memory and expectation (retention and protention). These nonperceptions are neither added to, nor do they *occasionally* accompany, the actually perceived now; they are essentially and indispensably involved in its possibility.” Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 64.
and that breakdown was one of the conditions for the invention and discovery of previously unknown relations and organizations of forces. That is, attention was part of a dynamic continuum in which it was always of limited duration, inevitably decomposing into a distracted state or a state incapable of maintaining what had initially seemed like a grip on an object or constellation of objects. In the same way the clarity associated with the intense fixation of vision on an isolated point is continuous with the dissolution of clarity that any fixation produces. For Cézanne, the dissolution inherent in attentiveness not only supported his radical desymbolization of the world but also produced an interface with a perpetually modulating set of relations between what had been thought of as “external” events and sensations. Thus one of the first casualties of his retrained attentiveness was any assumption of perceptual constancy.

We will never know the nature of Cézanne’s elusive “goal” that he mentioned several days before his death. Was it a “harmony parallel to nature,” or “the realizing of one’s sensations”? He may well have started out believing that his goal was, as several critics have claimed, some notion of “spatial unity.” But the final destination was somewhere else, necessarily beyond the inadequate language available to him for the verbal elucidation of experiments that were overwhelming in their novelty. Examining Cézanne through the problem of attention reveals how his work coincides with much more than a domain of the optical, and how it is the product of a broader corporeal engagement. To what then was Cézanne attentive, if not exclusively to the activity of the eye, to visual sensation, to wavelengths of light? Perhaps, in spite of himself, he became attentive to the body, its pulsings, its temporalities, and to the intersection of that body with a world of transitions, of events and of becoming. Clearly he became intuitively aware of the myriad intricacies of subjective vision, and of ways in which physiological limitations condition all sensory experience. One valuable hypothesis about his late work is that he became increasingly sensitive to this discontinuous composition of the visual field, especially to its “concentric” format.¹⁹ Before examining Cézanne further, I want to briefly indicate how powerful institutional reformations of vision in the late nineteenth century had confronted some of these problems.

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¹⁹. See Gowing’s extraordinary insights into Cézanne’s “abandonment of the prime hypothesis of plane perspective.” He associates his optical preoccupation with an ever-shifting “culminating point” with the fact that “random color mutations were noted in groups of brush strokes in contrasting directions, beginning to form into discrete patches, with no reference to separable objects, amounting sometimes to a whirling blizzard of color changes, which left an even deposit of apparently random color differentiations.” Gowing, “The Logic of Organized Sensations,” pp. 57–58.
Scientific research in the late nineteenth century confirmed what had always been available to naive observation, now systematized for the first time into a comprehensive account of human perception: the disjunct nature of the visual field, in both a physiological and a subjective sense. Empirical studies showed that the central area of the retina—the fovea—was tightly packed with photoreceptor cells, whereas the peripheral areas of the retina had a much sparser distribution of them. This small foveal area gave the greatest detail and most acute color vision, while the larger peripheral or fringe areas provided only vague, indistinct, or even distorted impressions with little clarity or color. The periphery was, however, highly sensitive to movement. By the 1850s scientists were attempting to determine the capacities of the retina in terms of zones of varying sensitivity. After several centuries during which the visual field was conceived to be like a conal section of homogeneous clarity and range, the notion now developed that most of what we saw at any given moment hovered in an irreducible vagueness, in which a reading of space or distance was not possible. It was a major shift that led to a reformulation of how a subjective visual field came into being: not through an instantaneous intake of an image but through a complex aggregate of processes of eye movement that provisionally built up the appearance of a stable image. It was only in


21. “Ears have nothing corresponding to the fovea centralis; consequently the indispensable shifting of attention within the auditory field does not involve any parallel shifting of the bodily organ. The discriminating and selecting of auditory sensa can be done by the mind alone, and do not require corresponding movements of the ears.” Aldous Huxley, *The Art of Seeing* (New York: Harper and Row, 1942), p. 44. At the same time it should be noted that hearing is also an aggregate perceptual process. Michel Chion notes that “we need to correct the formulation that hearing occurs in continuity. The ear in fact listens in brief slices and what it perceives and remembers already consists in short syntheses of two or three seconds of the sound as it evolves. . . . We don’t hear sounds, in the sense of recognizing them, until shortly after we have perceived them.” Chion, *Audio-Vision: Sound on Screen*, trans. Clau-
1878 that the French scientist Emile Javal (who had translated Helmholtz’s *Optics* into French) formalized an understanding that vision occurs in terms of short fast jumps, which he termed “saccadic” movements. Most significant about this new physiological schema of a disjunct field is that it became part of new psychological models of the human subject. While it is no longer significant on an empirical level, it can certainly stand as an early instance of a whole range of twentieth-century models in which visual experience is the *composite* product of highly segregated activities, whether in the retina or in the visual cortex.

One of the most influential instances of such research was the work of Wilhelm Wundt, who in the 1880s declared: “Consciousness is regarded as a field of vision: objects enter it and are at first only obscurely and indefinitely perceived, as those visual objects whose images enter the field of the eye at the sides of the retina. Time is required for the objects to arrive at the spot of clear vision . . . where discerning attention is bestowed on them and they are *apperceived.*”

Wundt’s schema was based on a distinction between what he called *Blickfeld* and

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