Index

Absent qualia hypothesis, 8
Access consciousness, 9
disunified (split-brain patients), 112, 121–125
Amputees. See Phantom limb experiences
Anesthetization, and body image, 44
Apple, unity of experiences of, 18
Arm-movement example, 32
Attention, and introspection, 10
Auditory linguistic images, 80 and thought, 72–73, 79–80
Automaton, split-brain patient as, 112, 117
Awareness
introspective, 5, 22–25, 95–96
and bundle theory, 134
in representationalist account, 165
Bayne, T., 20–21
Beer-and-ham-sandwich example, for one experience view, 26–27
Beliefs
contradictory, 115–116
and visual experiences, 175
Benchley, Robert, 82
Binding problem, 12
Bird-watcher (case), 2, 6
Black’s/BLACK’S club (example), 161–162
Blindsight, 121–123, 124, 125
Block, N., 123–124, 125
Bodily experience, 68
and perceptual consciousness, 68–78
unity of, 49, 62–66
Bodily sensations, 49
of heat, 61
hunger pangs, 61
itches, 60–61
orgasm, 58–59
pains, 50–58, 59–60 (see also Pain)
tastes, 58, 68–69
thirst, 61
tickles, 60
tingles, 61
touch, 68–69
Bodily unity, problem of, 62–66
Body image, 43–49. See also General bodily feeling
and conscious thoughts, 81
and experience of contact, 69
malleability of, 62
Body transplants, and personal identity, 135–137, 149
Brain, disembodied (examples), 71–75
Brain transplant with split brain, 149–151
Brief Encounter, The (case), 3, 6, 9–10
Broad, C. D., 92
Bundle theory of person, 133–134 objections to, 138–140
and subject-of-PF theory, 142
and unity of experience, 107
Buried-alive/roller-coaster example, 76–78, 118–119

Camus, P., 43–44
Carnap, Rudolf, 106–107
Casey, K., 55
Chalmers, D., 20–21
Cloud-and-droplets example, 29
Colored phi phenomenon (red-green flashes), 90–91, 96–97
Concrete individuals, and phenomenology, 168–169
Consciousness
and Cartesian ego theory, 133 cases of, 2–5
and epileptics, 177n. kinds of
access consciousness, 9, 112, 121–125
D-consciousness (discriminatory consciousness), 6, 8, 9
I-consciousness (introspective consciousness), 5–6, 7, 9, 10, 177n.8
P-consciousness (phenomenal consciousness), 7–11, 121–124, 126–129, 183n.8 (see also Phenomenal consciousness)
R-consciousness (responsive consciousness), 6, 9
single subject of, 118
and stream metaphor, 105 (see also Streams of consciousness)
as unified, xiv, 1 (see also at Unity)
Conscious experiences. See Experience(s)
Conscious thoughts, in unity with perceptual and bodily experiences, 78–81
Contradictory beliefs, and split-brain patient, 115–116
Copeland, Jack, 158
Corpus callosum, 109. See also Split-brain patients
Creature consciousness, 9
Dainton, Barry, 90
Dennett, G., 1, 56, 71
Deny, G., 43–44
Descartes, René
and ego theory of person, 133
and unified consciousness, 1
Designators rigid and precise, 151–156
vagueness of, 155–156
Diachronic unity, 86–95
Disassociation, reactive, 56
Discriminatory consciousness (D-consciousness), 6
as creature consciousness, 9
without P-consciousness, 8
Disembodied-brain examples, 71–75
Distracted Philosopher, The (case), 2, 5
Disunified access consciousness, in split-brain patients, 112, 121–126
Disunified experiences, in hallucinations and illusions, 37–38
Disunified phenomenal consciousness, and split-brain patients, 126–129, 134, 135
Dog, sleeping (case), 4, 10–11
Do–re–mi (musical scale) example, 87–88, 94, 97, 99–100, 106
Dreamer, The (case), 4, 10
Dretske, Fred, 24

Eagleman, D., 91–92
Ego theory of person, 133, 153–154 objections to, 134–138
Emotions, 81. See also Moods, felt
Epileptics, and consciousness, 177n.8
Evans, Gareth, 153–154, 155, 157, 159, 162–163
Everest, Mount, as vagueness example, 156, 157, 158, 183–184n.3

Experience(s)
bodily, 68–78 (see also Bodily sensations)
disunified, 37–38
individuation of through time, 34, 98–99
and introspection, 22–25, 95–96
one experience view, 25–35, 39–40
for bodily experience, 65–66
and individuating of experiences through time, 98
and perceptual-bodily unity, 76
PANIC (poised, abstract, nonconceptual, intentional content) of, 176 as maximal PANIC states, 40, 99 perceptual
phenomenal or subjective aspects of (case), 3–4, 8
presentness in, 86
redundancy in generation of, 127–128
unity of, 17–41
of unifying relation, 21–22
Experience, unity of. See at Unity

Experienced present. See Specious present(s)

Externalist representationalism, 167, 174–175

Feeling(s). See also Bodily sensations
phenomenal or subjective aspects of (case), 3–4, 8
physical basis of, 8–9
as private, 50
of succession, vs. succession of feelings, 86, 102
Felt moods, 81–84
persistence of, 85–86
Flash-lag illusion, 91
Fregian representationalism, 167–168
Fuzzy logic, 160

General bodily feeling, 43, 48, 63
as torso-relative, 48–49
unity of, 47
and unity of bodily experience, 64
Gestalt unity, 13
and McGurk effect, 178n.10
Glass partitions metaphor, 22–24
Gregory, Richard, 44, 45

Hallucinations
and concrete individuals, 168–169
disunified experiences in, 37–38
in “Haunted” Graveyard case, 5, 11
and introspective awareness, 24
phantom limb pain as, 54
and phenomenal content, 36
and representation, 64
and unity of experience through time, 98
Handwriting example, for one experience view, 25–26
“Haunted” Graveyard, The (case), 5, 11
Moods, felt, 81–84
  persistence of, 85–86
Movie analogy, 99
Multiple experiences, and problem of unity, 17–21
Multiple personality disorder
  and bundle theory of person, 138–139
  and persons as material substances, 137–138
  and single brain as more than one person, 142
  and split brains, 111–112, 113–116
Musical scale (do-re-mi) example, 87–88, 94, 97, 99–100, 106
Nagel, T., 117–120, 125
Neurophysiological unity, 12
Neuropsychology, and unified consciousness, 1
Nonreductive strong representationalism, 167
Nontransitivity of phenomenal unity, 113, 129–132

Object unity, 11–12
  and phenomenal unity, 19
One experience view, 25–35, 39–40
  for bodily experience, 65–66
  and individuating of experiences through time, 98
  and perceptual-bodily unity, 76
Order of representations, vs. represented order, 90
Orgasm, 58–59

Pain(s), 50–58, 59–60
  affective component of, 55–56, 57–58
  and belief production, 175–176
  and causal sense of “in,” 51–52
  and consciousness, 3, 7
  localization of, 63
  physical basis of, 9
  and projection, 63–64
Painting example, 47–48
PANIC (poised, abstract, nonconceptual, intentional content) states, 176
  maximal, 40, 99
Parfit, Derek, 134, 135, 147–148, 160–161
Party Animal, The (case), 4, 6
Peacocke, Chris, 173
Perception, and consciousness, 2
  in Distracted Philosopher case, 2
Perceptual consciousness
  and bodily experience, 68–78
  D-consciousness as, 6 (see also Discriminatory consciousness)
Perceptual experience(s)
  phenomenal or subjective aspects of (case), 3–4, 8
  presentness in, 86
  redundancy in generation of, 127–128
  unity of
    and one experience view, 25–35, 39–40
    as problem, 17–25
    and synchronous phenomenal unity, 36–41
Person and personal identity
  bundle theory on, 133–134
  objections to, 138–140
  and subject-of-PF theory, 142
  and unity of experience, 107
  ego theory on, 133, 153–154
  objections to, 134–138
  problem cases for
    body transport, 147–148
    radical discontinuity between life stages, 150–153, 162
    split-brain subject, 111–112, 115–117, 143–144
Person and personal identity (cont.)
split-brain transplants, 148–151
teletransportation, 144–148
as subject of distinct
psychological framework (PF), 140–143
and unity of experience, xiv
through time, 102–104
vagueness in, 154–163
PF. See Psychological framework
Phantom limb experiences, 45–46
as misrepresentation, 49
and pain, 54
as representing bodily
disturbances, 61
Phenomenal character, attended
and unattended, 10
Phenomenal consciousness
(P-consciousness), 7–11,
183n.8
and blindsight, 122–124, 125
without D-consciousness, 8
disunified (split-brain patients),
126–129, 134, 135
and hypotheses of inverted and
absent qualia, 8
without I-consciousness, 7, 10
and object unity, 12
Phenomenal flow, 108
Phenomenal look, 169–172
Phenomenal memory,
short-term, 87
Phenomenal succession, 101
Phenomenal unity, 13, 15, 20, 36,
84, 107
direct and indirect, 100
vs. introspective unity, 20
nontransitivity of, 129–132
as relation between qualities
experienced, 102
synchronic (of simultaneous
experiences), 19, 35, 36–41, 84
and wine taster example, 27
Phenomenal unity relation, 95, 107,
152–153. See also Unity of
experience through time
and moods, 83
nontransitivity of, 113
Phenomenological unity, 19,
20–21
of bodily experiences or
sensations, 49, 63, 66
and sense-specific experiences, 28
Phenomenology
and concrete individuals, 168
of occurrent thoughts, 79–80
technicolor, 8
of thinking, 80
Poised, abstract, nonconceptual,
intentional content (PANIC),
176
maximal, 40, 99
Pot-and-statue example, 30–31, 31,
40, 48
PPC (principle of presentational
occurrence), 89–90
Precise designator, 155–156
Present, specious. See Specious
present(s)
Presentational occurrence,
principle of (PPC), 89–90
Presntness, 86
Psychological framework (PF),
141–143, 146, 148
and radical discontinuity
between life stages,
150–152, 162
and split-brain transplant,
149–150
and teletransportation, 144,
145–148
Putnam, Hilary, 79
Qualia, hypotheses on
of absent qualia, 8
of inverted qualia, 8
Qualities
in bodily experiences, 66
in “looks” talk, 169–172
and pain, 55, 179n.4
and phenomenal concepts, 168
and phenomenal succession, 101
phenomenal unity of, 36
direct and indirect, 100
unity as relation between, 102

Ramachandran, V. S., 61–62
Reactive disassociation, 56
Red-green flashes experiment
(colored phi phenomenon), 90–91, 96–97
Red-square-and-green-triangle
example, 39–40, 40–41
Reductive strong
representationalism, 167
Referred pains, 54
Reid, Thomas, 140
Rene (multiple personality
patient), 137–138, 138–139
Repensationalism
(representational approach), xvi, 84, 165–176
and bodily sensations, 61
and phantom limbs, 61
externalist, 167, 174–175
Fregean, 167–168
hybrid, 168, 169, 172–174
internalist, 167
Millian, 168, 172, 173, 174
and pain, 52–54, 64
representational content of, 58, 59
strong, 166
nonreductive, 167
reductive, 167
weak, 166
Represented order, vs. order of
representations, 90
Responsiveness
(R-consciousness), 6
as creature consciousness, 9
Reynolds, Mary, 138, 139, 141, 142
Rigid designator, 155
Roller-coaster/buried-alive
example, 76–78, 118–119
Sacks, Oliver, body-image
experience of, 45
Sejnowski, T., 91–92
Sellars, Wilfrid, 21
Sensation, bodily. See Bodily
sensations
Sensation, streamlike quality of, 85.
See also Streams of
consciousness
Sense-datum theorists, 178n.4
Sequence of experiences. See Unity
of experience through time
Shoemaker, Sydney, 21
Simultaneous experiences,
phenomenal unity of, 19.
See also Synchronic
phenomenal unity
Single experience. See One
experience view
Sleep, and consciousness, 104,
182n.6
and dreaming (cases), 4, 10
and pain (case), 3, 7
Sleeping Dog, The (case), 4, 10–11
Smells, 69–70
Sounds, 69–70
Spatial unity, 12
Specious present(s), 87–92,
99–100
overlapping, 92–95
and phenomenal unity, 100
Sperry, Roger, 109
Split-brain patients, 109–113
and disunified access
consciousness, 112, 121–125
Split-brain patients (continued)
and disunified phenomenal consciousness, 126–129, 134, 135
generally unified consciousness of, 126, 128–129
as indeterminate number of persons, 112, 117–120
and multiple personality disorder, 111–112, 113–116
and nontransitivity of phenomenal unity, 129–132
and Parfit on ego theory, 134, 135
and personal identity, 111–112, 115–117, 143–144
and phenomenal unity, 20
and simultaneous phenomenal disunification, 37
as unconscious automatons, 112, 117
and unity of experience through time, 102–104
Split-brain transplant example, 149–151
Star Trek television series, and teletransportation, 147
Statue-and-pot example, 30–31, 31, 40, 48
Strawson, Galen, 104–105, 107
Streamlike quality of sensation, 85
Streams of consciousness, 104–106, 107–108
and bundle theory of person, 139
Carnap on, 106–107
and split-brain patients, 104, 112–113, 126, 128
Strong representationalism, 166
nonreductive, 167
reductive, 167
Subjects of consciousness and action, persons as, 140, 143
Subject unity, 12–13
on bundle theory, 134 (see also Bundle theory of person)
on ego theory, 133 (see also Ego theory of person)
higher-order, 13
Succession. See also Unity of experience through time
experiencing of, 106
of feelings, vs. feeling of succession, 86, 102
phenomenal, 101
representation of, 101
Synchronic (of simultaneous experiences) phenomenal unity, 19, 35, 36–41, 84
Tastings, 58, 68–69
Technicolor phenomenology, 8
Teletransportation, 144–148
Thirst, 61
Thought(s)
in auditory linguistic image, 72–73, 79–80
sequence of, 85
in unity with perceptual and bodily experiences, 78–81
Tickles, 60
Tingling sensations, 61
Torso
and experience of here, 70
and general bodily feeling, 48–49
viewpoint related to, 71
Touch, 68–69
Transitivity, phenomenal unity’s lack of, 129–132
Twin Earth
and PFs, 142
and phenomenology of occurrent thought, 79–80
Unconscious automaton, split-brain patient as, 112, 117
Unity of consciousness, 1
Unity of experience, xiv
  of bodily experience, 49
  problem of, 62–66
  and handwriting example, 26
  kinds of
    Gestalt unity, 13, 178n.10
    introspective unity, 13, 20
    neurophysiological unity, 12
    object unity, 11–12, 19
    phenomenal unity, 13, 15, 20, 36, 84, 107 (see also
      Phenomenal unity)
    subject unity, 12–13, 133, 134
  Unity of experience through time,
    95–101
    and assumption of individual
      experiences, 107
    examples of, 85–86
    and Hume, 102, 105, 107, 133
    and personal identity, 102–104
    and presentness, 86
    and specious present, 87–95, 99–100
    and stream(s) of consciousness,
      104–106, 107–108
    Carnap on, 106–107
  Unity of general bodily feeling, 47
  Unity of perceptual and bodily
    experiences, occurrent
    thoughts, and moods, 67–68
    conscious thoughts in, 78–81
    and moods, 83–84
  perceptual-body unity, 68–78
  Unity of perceptual experience
    at a time
    and one experience view, 25–35,
      39–40 (see also One experience
      view)
    as problem, 17–21
    difficulties in, 21–25
    and synchronic phenomenal
      unity, 36–41
Unity of persons, 133, 134.
  See also Person and personal
    identity
  Vagueness
    epistemic theorists on,
      183–184n.3
    in personal identity, 154–163
  Vesuvius, Mount, as identity
    example, 30
  Viewpoint, for vision, 71–72
  Vision, and bodily experience,
    70–72
  Visual experience
    and beliefs, 175
    and continuous consciousness
      (case), 4, 7
    and introspection, 23–24
    as unified experience, 28–35
    viewpoint of, 71
  Visual system, unifying function of,
    11–12
  Waterfall effect, 38
  Weak representationalism, 166
  Wiggins, David, 149
  Wine Taster, The (case), 2–3, 6
  Wine tasting, unity of experiences
    in, 18, 19, 27, 31, 32–33, 34–35
  Writing example, for one
    experience view, 25–26
  Zadeh, L., 160
  Zombies, 9