Chapter 1
Approaches to Meaning

1 Historical Perspective

The problem is to give an adequate and illuminating account of the concept of meaning. In the past there have been many varied attempts to do this. There is no easy nonmisleading way to summarize or classify these attempts, but some rude organization of the material may help to provide a place for the account of meaning that H. P. Grice introduced into the philosophical world in 1957 and that is the subject of this book.¹

It is unclear whether or not it is useful to view Grice’s work as furthering some preexisting approach to the problem of meaning. What is true is that Grice, in his first paper on the topic, considers and rejects the causal approach to meaning found in the writings of C. L. Stevenson.² This approach has its roots in the stimulus-response theories of J. B. Watson.³ The causal approach to meaning is thus directly associated with the school of radical behaviorism that became prominent in the first part of the twentieth century. Causal theorists recognize that to account for meaning one must pay attention to the role of speakers and hearers. Their behaviorist roots require that whatever it is about speakers and hearers that is relevant to meaning should be accessible to observation. The initial idea, drawn from Pavlov’s work on conditioned responses in dogs, is to identify the meaning of a word with the response a certain sound (or mark) induces in the hearer. This idea is in need of substantial modification, however, if for no other reason than that in this crude form the constancy of meaning is lost in the welter of possible responses.

Stevenson identifies the dilemma confronting the theorist of meaning in the following way: on the one hand, if a word is divorced from the “psychological habits” of those who use it, it “becomes devoid of any referent [and] no more interesting than any other complex noise”; on the other hand, the meaning of a word is (relatively) constant, while the psychological states of speakers are in constant flux.⁴ Stevenson suggests that the way out of this dilemma is to identify
meaning with a dispositional property of a word; the crucial psychological processes come in as responses to the word. Meaning, then, is said to be a disposition of a sign to affect certain responses in a hearer. Stevenson is careful to add: "A sign's disposition to affect a hearer is to be called a 'meaning'... only if it has been caused by, and would not have developed without, an elaborate process of conditioning which has attended the sign's use in communication." In other words, not just anything that has a tendency to produce a certain response in another is a case of meaning. To see this consider Grice's example: Putting on a tail coat may lead some observer to conclude that the wearer of the coat is about to go to a dance. But we would not want to say that putting on a tail coat meant anything (in the sense these philosophers are interested in). Grice is aware that his counterexample would be ruled out by Stevenson's insistence that the conditioning which leads to the response be the result of "the sign's use in communication." However, as Grice points out, this excludes the unwanted case only at the cost of introducing a circularity into the proposed account of meaning. We want an account of precisely what makes something a communicative use of a sign.

Having offered a few perfunctory criticisms of causal theories, Grice then proceeds to offer a "different and... more promising line." The most notable feature of this "new line" is its unselfconscious employment of such concepts as intention and belief. For reasons having nothing to do with the antimentalistic scruples of Grice's predecessors and contemporaries, some of the most difficult problems with Grice's account of meaning still center around the understanding of these concepts, as I shall soon explain.

It is interesting to consider what relation Grice's account of meaning has to the "ideational theories" of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. Such a theory is to be found, for example, in the writings of John Locke. In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke speaks as if language is essentially an instrument for the communication of some preformed and otherwise invisible thought. Words are "marks for the ideas within [the speaker's] own mind," and where those "internal conceptions" are absent, the sounds we associate with language are as insignificant as the articulations of a parrot. According to Locke the speaker uses words as signs (or marks) of his ideas; communication is achieved when the words excite the same ideas in the hearer as they are made to stand for in the speaker. In this way the content of the utterance (what it is about) is said to derive from the content of the thoughts with which it is associated. Locke thus writes:
The comfort and advantage of society not being to be had without communication of thought, it was necessary that man should find some external signs, whereof those invisible ideas, which his thoughts are made up of, might be known to others. . . . The use, then, of words is to be sensible marks of ideas; and the ideas they stand for are their proper and immediate signification.11

This account of meaning is part of Locke’s general empiricist account of concepts: words are associated with ideas, and all ideas derive ultimately from experience. According to Locke and the empiricists, then, one accounts for the meaning (signification) attached to utterances by reference to the ideas for which they stand.12 But this raises the question of how we are to understand the signification that ideas have. To say that all ideas are derived from experience is to gesture in the direction we should look, but it alone provides few answers. Furthermore, since ideas depend on the subject, it is hard to see how reference to them can be used to explain the commonality of language. This account of meaning also raises the question of how that signification that ideas are said to have is conveyed from the idea to the utterance. To say that words are “external signs” of ideas, to suggest that words serve to encode ideas,13 is merely to describe the phenomenon; it provides no explanation of how it occurs.14

It was questions like these that led to much criticism of ideational theories in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. According to Michael Dummett, this conception of language was “first clearly repudiated by Frege.”15 Frege’s criticism was closely followed by Wittgenstein’s.16 Grice’s work on meaning was published after these criticisms were well established, yet it is not entirely clear how to place Grice’s work with respect to them. The issue is pressing owing to the central role allotted to speakers’ psychological states in Grice’s account of meaning. Consideration of ideational theories and criticism of them raise several specific questions about Grice’s work. First of all, what account are we to give of the intentions and beliefs that are mentioned on the right-hand side of the analytic biconditional?17 As we consider this question, another, more fundamental question arises: if we say that the way meaning attaches to utterances can be analyzed in terms of speakers’ intentions to produce certain beliefs in an audience, what are we to say about what is meant? It looks as if the theorist of meaning can be seen as having two tasks: one is to say how utterances have meaning; the other is to say something about that meaning. If this is right, we can ask which task Grice saw himself as discharging. I would argue that Grice’s concern is not
with the issue of content per se but with understanding how utterances have their content. His suggestion is that to understand how utterances have their content we must understand how intentions and beliefs have their content, for the former is definable in terms of the latter. Understood in this way, Grice’s work still leaves open a very important issue: how is it that intentions and beliefs have their content?

Understanding how Grice’s work relates to ideational theories is far from a straightforward matter. It requires first that we understand how to interpret Grice’s work. In sections 3 and 4 of this chapter I discuss different possible interpretations of Grice’s analysis. In chapter 3 I proceed to investigate one prominent interpretation in some depth. It is not until I have done this that I return in chapter 4 to the question of the relation Grice’s work has to ideational theories of meaning.

Frege’s work in the philosophy of language is sometimes thought to mark a shift from ideational or code conceptions of language to a more formal approach. In the first half of the twentieth century the logical apparatus developed largely by Frege and Russell was brought to bear on language. The formal semanticists were interested not in natural language as such but in a purely formal structure, which may or may not be abstracted from natural language. Their concern was mainly with the sentences of this abstract and formal language and with the entailment relations that hold between them. From Frege onward these formal philosophers insisted that the job of any adequate theory of meaning was to give an account of the following features of language: (1) that the sentence is the primary bearer of meaning; (2) that the sense of a sentence is determined by the sense of its constituent elements; and (3) that the sense of a sentence constituent is determined by its contribution to the sense of any sentence in which it occurs.18 The second of these features is what accounts for the property often thought to be most distinctive of language, namely, that from a finite stock of semantic primitives a language user can understand and construct a potentially infinite variety of sentences.19

Around the 1950s purely formal theories came under attack. The attack is to be found in the work of the later Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin. Whereas the formal theorists had concentrated on the structure and interrelations among sentences in the indicative mood, abstracting from the ambiguity and imprecision of natural languages, these use theorists, as they came to be called, argued that imprecision and ambiguity are of the essence of the expressive power of language, that the use of language to describe the world is only one among
many of its uses, and that language cannot properly be studied in abstraction from its daily use. Despite their differences, formal theorists and use theorists concurred in at least one thing: both agreed that the sentence is the primary bearer of meaning. However, in the shift of emphasis from words to sentences, use theorists took the opportunity also to emphasize the role of speakers. John Searle writes that the influence of the later Wittgenstein and Austin “recasts the discussion of many of the problems in the philosophy of language into the larger context of the discussion of human action and behaviour generally. . . . Instead of seeing the relations between words and the world as something existing in vacuo, one now sees them as involving intentional actions by speakers.”

It is natural to locate Grice in this tradition.

Clearly Grice’s account of meaning does bring the philosophy of language within the scope of the philosophy of mind and the theory of action. His account may be said to have its roots in the simple observation that noises and marks have meaning only insofar as they are the expression of some individual’s intention to communicate. Donald Davidson also draws on this observation when he writes:

"Someone who utters the sentence “The candle is out” as a sentence of English must intend to utter words that are true if and only if an indicated candle is out at the time of utterance, and he must believe that by making the sounds he does he is uttering words that are true only under those circumstances. These intentions and beliefs are not apt to be dwelt on by the fluent speaker. But though they may not normally command attention, their absence would be enough to show that he was not speaking English, and the absence of any analogous thoughts would show that he was not speaking at all."

Observations such as these suggest that it must be right to bring the philosophy of language within the scope of the philosophy of mind. However, in recognizing this important feature of language one must not lose sight of another, equally important feature: the fact that the meaning of a sentence is built up from the meanings of words, in accordance with the rules of combination governing the language. Formal theorists may have erred in their apparent omission of any mention of the beliefs and intentions of speakers in their account of meaning, but in correcting this omission use theorists must not lose sight of the fact that any adequate account of language must give an account of its structural and recursive features.
Now if one looks at Grice’s 1957 paper on meaning, one finds no mention of structure. One thing that might be said to explain the omission is the following: Grice is concerned primarily with meaning, a phenomenon which occurs both in language and outside it. But the kind of structure emphasized and so well understood by the formal semanticists is only found in language. As one Gricean writes: “The notion defined is intended to be fully general, and to cover all communication, from a caveman’s tentative grunts to the orations of Cicero.” An account wide enough to cover meaning quite generally may be one that can relegate the question of structure to secondary status. It is arguable that this is Grice’s strategy. Grice never denies the importance of structure to language, and it is clear that Grice intends his account of meaning to serve as an account of linguistic meaning. Nevertheless, his primary purpose is to give an account of the more general feature of meaning.

Once Grice’s strategy is understood, it is less clear whether he is solely a use theorist. Indeed, it is unclear whether anyone was or is solely a use or solely a formal theorist of meaning. Neither the structural features of a language nor the obvious connections with speakers’ psychological states can ultimately be ignored when giving an account of meaning. In fact several philosophers have thought that formal semanticists and use theorists are not really in direct competition. David Wiggins writes: “Nothing that has happened since J. L. Austin’s 1950 lectures ‘Words and Deeds’ or their publication [1962] seems to me to have undermined or made obsolete the kind of semantic theory typified by Frege or Russell or, in our times, by Carnap.” And Searle echoes this: “Although historically there have been sharp disagreements between practitioners of these two approaches [one which concentrates on the use of expressions in speech situations and one which concentrates on the meaning of sentences], it is important to realize that the two approaches...are complementary and not competing.”

It is easy to see that some reconciliation is necessary; it is much harder to explain how that reconciliation is to proceed. If we think of the program of accounting for meaning as the wider enterprise of which giving a Gricean account of use is only one part, while some more formal theory accounting for structure is another part, then we must ask how these parts fit together. There is no quick answer to this question. I believe that this question compels us to reflect upon our general conception of the semantic and the psychological, both individually and as part of a larger whole. This conceptual issue determines which interpretation we choose to give of the Gricean analysis, and the interpretation we give will determine our view of the re-
coniliation. The question of interpretation, then, is prior to that of reconciliation.

However, when the concept we seek to understand is meaning, we can address the question of interpretation only after we agree that the method of analysis is appropriately applied. Some philosophers have argued that our concept of meaning is one that the method of analysis does not suit. Obviously, such an argument would, if correct, completely undermine Grice’s work on meaning. In the next section I shall consider some of these arguments. In section 3 I consider the question of interpretation, and in section 4 I discuss reconciliation. It is not until chapter 3 that I fully explain my claim that interpretation is affected by one’s general conception of the semantic and the psychological.

2 Two Approaches to the Problem of Meaning

The problem of meaning is not the problem of giving an account of the meaning of the words and sentences in this or that particular language. The problem is a more general one. The question is: how are we to understand the obvious fact that certain noises and marks have significance for individuals, that they can be used to convey information, command another to act, and much more? This phenomenon, so familiar to us, remains elusive to our understanding.

It has been the view of some more recent philosophers of language that the problem should be approached indirectly. Rather than attempting to say what meaning is, these philosophers choose to ask: what form should a theory of meaning take? This method has been adopted by philosophers of language as different as Davidson and Dummett.30 The latter writes, “Once we can enunciate the general principle in accordance with which such a construction [of a theory of meaning] could be carried out, we shall have arrived at a solution to the problems concerning meaning by which philosophers are perplexed.”31 Once such a theory has been constructed we can say the following: meaning is what a theory of meaning is a theory of.

This indirect approach to the problem of meaning chosen by the theory builders stands in stark contrast to the more direct method chosen by Grice. In the latter’s work there is no mention of general principles or of theories. Rather, Grice sets out in a quite straightforward way to elucidate our concept of meaning in terms of various beliefs and intentions of speakers and hearers.32 Such elucidation is common in philosophy: one takes the concept one is interested in and analyzes it in terms of other concepts whose joint application is both necessary and sufficient for its application.33
The theory builders are doing more than considering a different approach to the problem. Many of them argue that the method of analysis is unsuited to the concept of meaning. I want to take a brief look at their method, and to consider some of their reasons for rejecting analysis when the concept in question is meaning. I hope to show that the pessimism of the theory builders is either premature or unfounded.

Davidson has said that when the problem is to understand the phenomenon of meaning, our strategy should be to accumulate requirements which any theory purporting to be a theory of meaning for a language should meet. These requirements are thought to give us the shape of our concept. Davidson suggests that any adequate theory of meaning for a language should meet the following requirements: (1) the theorems of the theory must be such that they are recognizable by any speaker of the language as expressing what he knows in virtue of being a speaker of that language; (2) the account must make clear how we can generate an unlimited number of sentences from a finite stock of semantic primitives; and a related point, (3) the account must be one that explains the systematic contribution words make to the sentences in which they figure. Davidson then points out that there already exists a method for constructing theories which meet these requirements, viz. Tarski’s approach to truth.34 “To know the semantic concept of truth for a language is to know what it is for a sentence—any sentence—to be true, and this amounts, in one good sense we can give of the phrase, to understanding the language.”

Dummett follows Davidson’s method, but it leads him to somewhat different conclusions. Dummett too believes that the best way of approaching the philosophical problems that surround the concept of meaning is to enunciate general principles (compare Davidson’s requirements) that must govern the construction of a theory of meaning, a theory that is “a detailed specification of the meanings of all words and sentence-forming operations of the language, yielding a specification of the meaning of every expression and sentence of the language.”36 The principles Dummett enunciates, however, lead him to reject a theory of meaning based on truth conditions in favor of one based on verification conditions. Dummett begins with the observation that “philosophical questions about meaning are best interpreted as questions about understanding.”37 In another place he writes, “What a theory of meaning has to give an account of is what it is that someone knows when he knows the language.”38 Dummett observes that someone who knows a language has a straightforward practical
ability, the ability to use the language to communicate with others. So whatever it is the speaker who knows a language knows, that something must be manifested in, and recoverable from, his use of expressions of that language, or else communication cannot take place. It is this practical ability that the theory seeks to represent. These, then, are the general principles in accordance with which Dummett sees the theory of meaning being formed, and he cannot see that a theory based on a realistically interpreted notion of truth (compare Davidson's theory) can meet them.

Now my concern is not to adjudicate between alternative general conceptions of what theories of meaning should be. Rather, it is to contrast the method of theory building and the method of analysis for the concept of meaning. On this issue of analysis versus theory building Dummett compares our concept of meaning with that of knowledge. He observes that although the indirect method of theory building is well tried in the philosophy of language, no one has so much as suggested a parallel way of proceeding in epistemology. When the question is, How are we to understand our concept of knowledge? philosophers do not begin by constructing a theory of knowledge which would serve as a detailed specification of what every individual knows who has knowledge. Analysis seems more suited to this concept. This is Dummett's explanation of the difference in our approach to these two concepts:

Our grasp on the concept of knowledge is rather more secure than our grasp on the concept of meaning. . . . At least we are quite certain [with respect to our concept of knowledge] which are the sentences whose logical form and whose truth conditions we are seeking to analyse. By contrast, while most of us . . . would agree that the concept of meaning is a fundamental and indispensable one, we are unclear even about the surface structure of statements involving that concept. What kind of sentence, of natural language, should be taken as the characteristic form for an attribution of a particular meaning to a given word or expression? Not only do we not know the answer to this: we do not even know whether it is the right question to ask. . . . It is precisely because, in this area of philosophy, we know even less what it is that we are talking about than we do in other areas that the proposal to approach our problem by considering how we might attempt to specify the meanings of the expressions of an entire language does not appear the waste of time that an analogous proposal would seem to be within epistemology.39
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John Wisdom has said, "The first precept for philosophic analysing is this: Know clearly what it is you propose to analyse." What Dummett seems to be suggesting in the passage quoted above is that fulfilling this precept is possible when the concept is knowledge but difficult when the concept is meaning. Hence, we require an alternative method to analysis when the concept is meaning.

But is Dummett right to think that it is not possible to meet Wisdom's precept when the concept in question is meaning? To be fair, Dummett does preface his discussion of this matter with the claim that although he believes theory building to be the most fruitful approach to the problem of meaning, he "should not feel capable of giving a demonstration that this was so to someone who denied it." The contrast between the concepts of meaning and knowledge is meant as an attempt to give some reason for his preference for theory building. This attempt to give support to his preference raises interesting and important issues, and the comparison with the concept of knowledge is illuminating. Nevertheless, I shall argue that Dummett's reasons, insofar as I understand them, are unpersuasive, and his preference for theory building remains a mere preference.

It is certainly true that the word "means" is used in many connections other than linguistic ones (e.g., "She means to leave him," "I mean what I say," etc.). And even within language we find such phenomena as speaker meaning, word meaning, sentence meaning, meaning on a particular occasion, and meaning over time. But perhaps there is some recognizable order in all this apparent chaos. After all, "know" also is an expression with varied uses (e.g., "knows how," "knows that," "knows Tom"). It does seem that the linguistic promiscuity of the latter expression is tamer than that of the former, but we may ask whether this observation is sufficient to warrent such substantially different approaches to the philosophical problems that each concept raises. Perhaps what is needed is some sentence form with which one can begin one's analysis of meaning, a sentence form that will serve the function for the concept of meaning that "x knows that p" has traditionally served for the concept of knowledge.

Grice's suggestion is that we begin with speaker meaning on an occasion, that we provide an analysis of this concept in terms of the psychological states of the speaker and the hearer, and that we reconstruct such notions as meaning over time and the meaning of words and sentences on the basis of this basic notion. By drawing attention to such distinctions as that between sentence meaning and speaker meaning, and that between timeless meaning and occasion meaning, Grice is able to clear the ground sufficiently to find the starting point that is needed for analysis. The suggestion, then, is that the sentence
form that captures some central use of our concept of meaning, to which all other uses are related, and that can serve as the focus of an analysis is this: Speaker $S$ means on an occasion that $p$.\textsuperscript{43} If the linguistic promiscuity of “means” is the problem Dummett is concerned with, I cannot see that Grice (and others) have not clarified matters sufficiently to allow for the possibility of an analysis of our concept of meaning. And I might add that work relating the various uses of the expression “knows” is far less developed.

It is, of course, possible that Dummett’s animadversions on the analysis of our concept of meaning extend beyond anything with which this logical ordering of priorities can help. For in the same place he writes:

Perhaps it is impossible, in general, to state the meaning of an expression: perhaps we ought, rather, to inquire by what linguistic means, or possibly even non-linguistic means, it is possible to convey the meaning of an expression other than by explicitly stating it. Or perhaps even this is wrong: perhaps the question should be, not how we express that a particular expression has a certain meaning, but how we should analyse sentences which involve the concept of meaning in some different way.\textsuperscript{44}

But I cannot see that these problems are confined to the concept of meaning. Perhaps, it will ultimately prove fruitless to aim to determine conditions necessary and sufficient for knowledge; perhaps we will find that to explain how a creature comes to have knowledge and subsequently to manifest it is all philosophers can hope to do. If there is something wrong with the analytic approach to meaning, I do not think that Dummett has said enough to locate the difficulty.

Can anything explain the fact that some philosophers reject analysis in favor of theory building when the concept is meaning? And can anything explain the divergence of method by these same philosophers when the concept is, for example, knowledge? I believe we do better to ask not why the method of analysis has no application to the concept of meaning but rather why the method of theory building has application to the concept of meaning and not, for example, to a concept like knowledge. Putting the question this way around leaves it open whether analysis is applicable to the concept of meaning, as well as whether theory building is. Once we have fulfilled Wisdom’s first precept of analysis (pace Dummett), analysis may be viewed as a harmless enterprise potentially applicable to all concepts. Theory building, on the other hand, may be thought to have a place with only some concepts. As Dummett quite rightly points out, no one
would proceed in epistemology by constructing a theory that would serve as a specification of what every individual knows who has knowledge. What Dummett does not do is to say why no one would proceed in this way with the concept of knowledge. It seems to me that the reason is that such a theory would in no way further our understanding of that concept. When we want to further our understanding of linguistic meaning, the sort of thing a theory could exhibit would be helpful. One of the most important things the theory would do is to show how it is that the meanings of sentences depend on the meanings of the words that compose them. Relatedly, the theory would make it clear how it is that from a finite stock of semantic primitives speakers of a language are able to generate an infinite variety of new sentences. These are very important features of language, and it is hard to see how analysis alone can explain them. As far as I can see there are no analogous features of knowledge to be explained.

Dummett is not the only theorist of meaning who has explicitly opposed the analysis of the concept. John McDowell indicates opposition to the analysis of meaning in several of his papers. In a relatively recent paper McDowell writes, “We lack an argument that meaning constitutes the sort of philosophical problem which requires analysis for its solution.” This is just as well, for McDowell foresees a problem for the analytic approach to the concept of meaning.

The problem in its most general form is this: after we provide an analysis of meaning in terms of something else, we cannot rest content until this something else is, in its turn, accounted for. McDowell is especially concerned with philosophers who accept Davidson’s suggestion that we look to a theory of truth for a language when we seek to find a theory of meaning for it and then argue that such a theory is crucially incomplete until we can provide an account of what a theory of truth is for a language, for any language. McDowell argues that there is an appearance of incompleteness here only if we understand the appeal to truth along the lines of an analysis; theorists who make this appeal, however, are not engaged in an analysis of the concept of meaning (see the discussion of direct versus indirect approaches above).

McDowell suggests that we abandon the direct approach of analysis altogether and rest content with a more indirect approach to the problem of meaning. Rather than ask, What is meaning? McDowell suggests that we change tack and consider what is involved in understanding a language. As he sees it, what one wants from a theory of understanding is this: the theory must take a possessor of it from an
uninterpreted description of marks and sounds to a description of them as speech acts with a certain content, and it must do this in such a way as to reveal how the meanings of the parts, the words, contribute to the meaning of the whole, the sentence. To fulfill the latter requirement, we employ a suitable theory of truth, and to fulfill the first requirement we must construct this theory so as to make the overall behavior of speakers of the language intelligible. Nowhere in this do we need to appeal to analysis, according to McDowell. What we have in place of an analysis is “a perspicuous mapping of interrelations between concepts which, as far as the exercise goes, can be taken to be already perfectly well understood.” And McDowell notes: “It is a striking fact that in the mapping offered by my theorist the concept of meaning as such does not even appear. So far from analysing the notion of meaning, he suggests the radical thought that in describing the understanding of a language we can get along without it.”

McDowell has suggested one way of bringing the philosophy of language within the scope of the philosophy of mind, but I cannot see that he has given any reason yet to reject the alternative of a Gricean analysis of meaning. McDowell seems to be suggesting that the method of analysis is incompatible with something which provides “a perspicuous mapping of interrelations between concepts which . . . can be taken to be already perfectly well understood,” but this need not be the case. It depends upon the interpretation we choose to give of the analysis. In this chapter, section 3, I suggest that there is a strong, reductive interpretation of the analytic biconditional and a weak, nonreductive interpretation of it. As far as I can see, everything McDowell says about analysis is true only of the strong, reductive interpretation of it. Under its weak reading, an analysis is the statement of conditions necessary and sufficient for the analysandum concept to apply; there is no requirement that the concepts in the analysandum reduce to those in the analysans. What is needed is an account of meaning that does the following two things: (1) relates utterances to speakers of them; and (2) carries out (1) so as to reveal a relevant structure in the process. One way to fulfill the first of these requirements is to spell out precisely which psychological states are the ones that relate speakers to their utterances. According to the weak, nonreductive interpretation of the analysis, specifying this relation is just what we may take Grice’s analysis to be doing. In his work McDowell offers an alternative, nonanalytic approach to (1); I cannot see, however, that McDowell has yet given us a good reason to choose his approach over Grice’s.
Pending a workable argument against analysis, it may be wise to leave ourselves open to its merits. The analytic method may prove useful in providing some understanding of our concept of meaning.\textsuperscript{54}

In another place, and in conjunction with Gareth Evans, McDowell does put forward another argument, which if correct, would count against even a weak, nonreductive interpretation of Grice’s analysis.\textsuperscript{55} Accepting the need to bring the philosophy of language within the scope of the philosophy of mind, McDowell and Evans consider Grice’s work as providing “a richer set of constraints, imposed, not necessarily in a reductive spirit, by bringing general psychological principles to bear upon determinations of meaning in order to make the constructed theory fit the data on the basis of which it was constructed.”\textsuperscript{56} They reject this suggestion for the following reason: Grice’s analysis, even under this weak interpretation, does not properly reflect the “phenomenology of language.” The phenomenology of language is habitual and unreflective, while the analysis is rather complex and suggests a highly reflective form of behavior. That is to say, Grice’s account of the relations meaningful utterances bear to the psychological states of the speakers of a language is inaccurate in its spelling out of necessary and sufficient conditions: it can never be brought to square with how things seemed to the speaker at the time of speaking.

Grice and Griceans have had much to say about this matter. As far as I know, all Griceans accept the observation that the phenomenology of language is as McDowell and Evans describe. They would agree with their critics that the complexity reflected in their analysis is not matched by any conscious processes in speakers. However, Griceans have made various suggestions that accommodate this observation.

Against this charge of imposing too complex a psychological life upon the ordinary linguistic behavior of individuals, Stephen Schiffer has argued that the case under consideration is very similar to the explanation of nonlinguistic behavior more generally by citing certain and in some cases highly complex beliefs, desires, and intentions.\textsuperscript{57} Schiffer gives the following example. Janet sees a dog threatening to menace her garden and smacks the book she happens to be reading in order to scare off the intruder. This behavior (like ordinary linguistic behavior) is done quite unreflectively. Nevertheless, we might choose to give the following account of Janet’s behavior: Janet’s primary intention in smacking the book was to get rid of the dog; she also intended to produce a sharp noise that would startle the dog and intended the dog’s being startled to cause it to run off. Now consider the case of Janet’s telling John that there is a vicious dog in the garden
by uttering the words, "There is a vicious dog in the garden." According to the Gricean, for Janet to tell John that there is a vicious dog in the garden is for Janet to utter "There is a vicious dog in the garden" with the primary intention of informing John that there is a vicious dog in the garden. Furthermore, Janet intends the satisfaction of her primary intention to be achieved, at least in part, because John believes (1) that "There is a vicious dog in the garden" is related in a certain way to there being a vicious dog in the garden, (2) that Janet uttered what she did with the intention of informing John that there is a vicious dog in the garden, and at least partly on the basis of this, (3) that Janet believes that there is a vicious dog in the garden, and partly on the basis of this, (4) that there is a vicious dog in the garden. The Gricean account of linguistic behavior requires, then, the plausibility of attributing to the speaker certain tacit expectations about her audience. In this case what is at issue is the plausibility of attributing to Janet the tacit expectation that (1) John believes that the words "There is a vicious dog in the garden" bears a conventional relation to their being a vicious dog in the garden, (2) at least in part because of this convention John will believe that Janet uttered the sentence intending to inform him that there is a vicious dog in the garden, (3) John will believe at least partly on the basis of his recognition of her intention that Janet believes that there is a vicious dog in the garden, and (4) John will believe partly as a result of (3) that there is a vicious dog in the garden.

Complex though such attributions are, it is hard to see how any account of communication can omit them. The reasons are as follows: First of all, without expectations concerning John's knowledge of the conventions of English, Janet would not have chosen those particular sounds to convey the information that there is a vicious dog in the garden. Furthermore, without expectations about John's beliefs concerning her intentions in producing the utterance, Janet might not have chosen this way of conveying this information to John (if, for example, she expected that John would take her to be joking or teasing). Also, without expectations about John's belief that she believed that there is a vicious dog in the garden (i.e., without the expectation that John would not take her to be lying), Janet might not have spoken. And finally, without expectations that at least in part on the basis of (1) through (3) John would come to believe that there is a vicious dog in the garden, Janet might not have spoken at all.

Those that find the attribution of such tacit expectation to speakers implausible sometimes add another objection, this time about the Gricean picture of audiences. On the Gricean view, an audience's understanding of an utterance is a process of inference from a string
of uttered noises to the intentions of the utterer, and from there to a piece of information or knowledge about the world. The objection to this view of understanding as a process of inference appears to be the other side of the objection that Griceans attribute too much psychological complexity to speakers. In reply the Gricean could simply adapt what was already said in defence of tacit expectations to serve as a defence of the Gricean picture of understanding. P. F. Strawson may be thought to have summed up the Gricean position on this matter when he wrote:

Only a very naive, a far from mature, audience would be quite unaware of the possibility of honest mistake, or of intention to mislead or of sheer casualness or carelessness, on the part of the communicator; and only a very naive communicator would be unaware of the audience's awareness of these possibilities. And if this is so, it seems hardly too much to say that it is a part, though normally a subdued or submerged part, of the genuine communication intentions, that the audience's response to his performance should be governed by certain (normally subdued or submerged) assumptions regarding his (the communicator's) sincerity and reliability.  

Once again, the claim is that we need not think of such inferences as there may be as conscious or explicit.

Talk of tacit expectations and implicit inference is in effect a defence of the psychological reality of certain states in speakers and their audiences. Some Griceans, however, go so far as to suggest that we needn't think in terms of psychological reality at all in order to support the proposed analysis. In one short passage David Armstrong suggests that it may be a matter of "rational reconstruction rather than psychological reality." Talk of rational reconstruction has recently been attributed to Grice himself. Basing their remarks on Grice's John Locke lectures, Grandy and Warner suggest that a speaker or an audience may be held to reason from a particular premise to a particular conclusion without ever having entertained an argument linking that premise and that conclusion either explicitly or implicitly. Rather, if the speaker or audience is to be correctly described as having reasoned from premise to conclusion, then he must at least intend that there be some sequence of propositions that constitute an argument from the premise to the conclusion.

Evans and McDowell continue to balk. They refuse to accept that communication involves any ratiocination, explicit, implicit, or reconstructed. They insist that the phenomenological facts exclude anything along Gricean lines. But what they offer is not so much an
argument as an alternative. They write, "Our understanding of meanings should normally be perception of meaning, and hence precisely not a matter of inference." Evans and McDowell offer here an extremely interesting alternative to a Gricean account of communication. Adjudicating between different accounts of communication, however, is not my purpose. My interest here is to find a workable argument against the Gricean approach. Without such an argument the Gricean account remains an option.

One Gricean chooses to modify the analysis of meaning in order to accommodate the problems I have been discussing. Jonathan Bennett formulates the problem in the following way. On Grice's picture of things, communication relies on the speaker's expectation that his audience can discover, through the speaker's use of a particular utterance, what the speaker's communicative intentions are. That is, communication involves the speaker's intentions and the hearer's recognition of the speaker's intentions. Bennett proposes for our consideration a community of speakers which uses a communication system that does not seem to rely on Grice's mechanism of beliefs and intentions. He labels this system "Plain Talk." It is a characteristic of users of plain talk that speakers rely on their audiences' belief in the following generalization: whenever a particular utterance, \( U \), is uttered, a particular proposition, \( p \), is true. In this way the route of communication does not need to pass through the speaker's intentions. Bennett then proposes the following challenge to the Gricean: "If the facts will accommodate that simpler diagnosis of how A came to believe \( p \), then we should prefer it to the more complex one which says that he followed the sophisticated Gricean route."

Bennett believes the Gricean can meet this challenge. He points out that the facts about communication may not seem to point in the direction of Grice's analysis because we are overlooking what he calls "the crucial background fact." That fact is that any communication system must be at least indirectly dependent on the intentions of speakers. Of course, once a language is established, the audience may simply rely on the generalization that whenever \( U \) is uttered, \( p \) is true, but this is possible because of the intentions of past \( U \) utterers. We see this once we realize that "if the speaker had not intended to communicate \( p \) when he uttered \( U \), it would have been inappropriate to bring his utterance of \( U \) under the generalization that whenever \( U \) is uttered \( p \) is true."

Consideration of plain talk thus does not lead Bennett to reject Grice's analysis of meaning. It does, however, lead him to modify it. His modification is designed to emphasize this "background fact" in communication without excessive reliance on the speaker's intentions.
in any given case of communication. Bennett’s modification involves omitting the mention of complex propositional attitudes in the analysis, and substituting instead something along these lines: a speaker intends to communicate the proposition that \( p \) to an audience by offering the audience intention-dependent evidence that \( p \).\(^{69}\) But it is not clear that any modification is necessary. One could simply say that Grice’s original analysis of meaning captures this “crucial background fact.” The analysis is not meant to capture the way things seem; it is just a statement of the way things must be. In keeping with the defence discussed earlier, Brian Loar responds to Bennett’s modification thus: “But not only is that economy not necessary for a realistic theory; to eliminate the alleged intentions eliminates something that seems fundamental to communication once one notices it. That the intentions, expectations, and beliefs of ordinary communication and personal relations are simple appears so improbable that it puzzles me why it should be thought to be the more realistic view.”\(^{70}\)

Whatever the outcome of this debate, we should note that objections to what I have called the weak, nonreductive interpretation of Grice’s analysis are not objections to the method of analysis as such. What is being objected to is a particular proposed analysis. Even if the objections should succeed and communication not be what the Gricean says it is, there may still be room for some analysis of the concept of meaning.\(^{71}\) It is important to notice this, as it is often the analytic approach to meaning in general that is assumed to be the casualty of such considerations.

My purpose in this section has been to show that those who reject analysis in favor of theory building for the concept of meaning may have a preference, but they do not have an argument.\(^{72}\) Dummett contrasts philosophers’ approach to the concept of meaning with their approach to the concept of knowledge. Our more secure grasp on the latter leads Dummett to conclude that analysis may suit it, but an insecurity in our grasp of the former concept makes theory building a more suitable approach here. I can see no reason in what Dummett says for different approaches to these concepts. McDowell too suggests that we should turn away from analysis when our concern is with the concept of meaning. He suggests that we seek in the place of analysis an account that will provide “a perspicuous mapping of the interrelations between concepts which . . . can be taken to be already perfectly well understood.” I pointed out that a nonreductive interpretation of the method of analysis can give McDowell what he is looking for. Finally, I turned to an argument designed to show that a Gricean analysis of meaning, even on a weak interpretation, yields a mistaken account of that concept. Here the defender of analysis need
only reply that squaring with how things seem to the speaker at the
time of speaking is not his primary concern. His concern is with how
things are, and if they turn out to differ from the way things seem,
there is no cause in this to turn away from the analysis. And an
appeal to tacit expectations or reconstructed reasoning can help to
make the results of a Gricean analysis more palatable.

This last point is clearly not meant to be decisive. The issue is not
one I shall pursue here (though, as we shall see in section 4 of this
chapter, the issue is relevant to the reconciliation of Gricean and more
formal approaches to meaning). As I said, my primary purpose in this
section has been to show that there are no good reasons for rejecting
the method of analysis as unsuited to the concept of meaning. If one
is impressed by McDowell’s appeal for “a perspicuous mapping of
interrelations between concepts . . .,” one need only reject an inter-
pretation of Grice’s analysis. And even one who goes so far as to
reject the weak, nonreductive interpretation of Grice’s analysis need
not reject the method of analysis per se. Analysis may not provide the
whole story about meaning, but it may turn out to provide a valuable
piece in a very difficult puzzle.\footnote{3}

3 Two Kinds of Analysis

I have on several occasions now referred to the possibility of two
quite different interpretations of the method of analysis. In discussing
McDowell’s proposal for understanding meaning, I had cause to dis-
tinguish a strong, reductive interpretation of analysis from something
much weaker. In section 1, I suggested that how one reconciles a
Gricean account of use with a more formal theory revealing structure
depends upon which interpretation of Grice’s work one is prepared
to defend. Related to this, I also suggested that each interpretation of
Grice’s work is bound up with a radically different conception of the
psychological and of the semantic, and of the relationship between
the two. In this section I want to explain what is involved in each of
these interpretations of the analytic method.

The most straightforward and least controversial thing that can be
said about an analysis is that it is represented by a biconditional, the
right-hand side of which gives conditions necessary and sufficient for
the application of the concept in which we are interested on the left-
hand side. I shall take it that analysis is a method philosophers en-
gage in to further our understanding of some given concept. It can
equally be said that analysis helps us to get clearer about a certain
concept.
Chapter 1

Compare this with what G. E. Moore says in his paper "The Justification of Analysis." In that paper Moore considers two uses of analysis: the first is to relieve puzzlement about some concept; the second is to make our thoughts clearer. Moore cites Broad as a champion of the first of these two uses of analysis. According to Broad, we are puzzled by the obscurity which surrounds certain concepts, and this puzzlement leads us into various difficulties. Providing an analysis reduces obscurity and helps us to avoid these difficulties. Moore, on the other hand, believes that analysis has very little to do with the relief of puzzlement and has much more to do with the business of making our thoughts clearer. Moore does not think that the clarification which analysis can bring can help us live our ordinary lives, nor does he think it can help us to avoid difficulties. Rather, Moore believes that "the chief use of analysis in the way of clearness, is only the clearness which it produces when you're doing philosophy itself." In saying this, Moore is keen to emphasize that he believes that it is a mistake to think of analysis as useful for the sake of something else.

There exists a much more radical opposition to Moore's view of analysis than Broad's. John Wisdom, for example, has argued that the aim of analysis is to reach another level of concepts, concepts that are more basic, more fundamental, than the ones under analysis. This kind of analysis is sometimes called "new-level analysis," and Wisdom contrasted it with Moore's sort, which he labeled "same-level analysis." For instance, Wisdom and others have claimed that an analysis of nations reveals that individuals are more basic than nations, and that an analysis of individuals reveals that sense data and mental states are more basic than individuals.

Moore's view of analysis is certainly to be contrasted with Wisdom's, and yet one cannot deny that moving to a new level of concepts in the way Wisdom envisages would be one way of achieving the clarity about a concept that Moore is after. What Moore needs to do is explain how a same-level analysis produces clarity. I want to suggest that one way of achieving clarity without moving to another level of concept would be to discover interdependencies among concepts. It can be clarifying to see the place a concept holds in our system of (same level) concepts. To put the same thought in a slightly different way, it can help us to understand what is involved in our grasp of one concept to be told that it is inextricably bound up with our grasp of some other concept or concepts. This interrelationship in its precise detail is what analysis reveals.

Drawing on the ideas of both Moore and Wisdom, we can now say that the method of analysis in general is concerned with the clarification and understanding of concepts. One way analysis can
clarify our concepts (and here I follow Wisdom) is by revealing that certain concepts are, in a sense to be explained, less basic or less fundamental in our scheme of concepts than some other concepts. Such an analysis would show that our grasp of certain concepts could be broken down into elements (other concepts) that could replace the originals in our general scheme of concepts without loss (other than that of simplicity perhaps). But there is another way in which analysis can clarify our concepts (and here I follow and develop Moore): by revealing precisely how those concepts are related to others in our overall scheme of concepts. The concepts mentioned on either side of the analytic biconditional have to be thought of as on a par (in a sense I shall discuss in chapter 3 below). Neither set of concepts would be more basic or fundamental than the other.

One could think of these two ways of achieving clarity as two kinds of analysis, each kind distinguished by the sort of understanding it reveals of a particular concept. In terms of understanding, then, we may say that one kind of analysis reveals that understanding some particular concept is to be achieved by understanding some other concepts. The other sort of analysis tells us that understanding a certain concept is to be gained only by discerning its place in a system of interrelated concepts. I shall call the first sort of analysis “reductive” and the second “reciprocal.”

When I say that there are two kinds of analysis, I do not mean to imply that one constructs the biconditional in two different ways. The difference lies only in the interpretation we give of the analytic biconditional that any analysis produces: are we to see the concepts mentioned on either side of the biconditional as, in Wisdom’s words, on the same level or on different levels? We can ask the same question in a slightly different way: is there a symmetry between the concepts mentioned on either side of the analytic biconditional, or are there some grounds for claiming an asymmetry between these concepts?

Thus, when presented with an analysis, Grice’s analysis of meaning, for example, we must ask what kind of analysis it is; how is that analysis to be interpreted? Because of the connection between understanding and analysis, we find that how we should interpret the analysis depends upon the kind of understanding possible of the concept in question. This means that the concept itself determines the kind of understanding we may have of it, and hence, the kind of analysis we may give of it. Presented with an analysis, we need to ask whether the concepts mentioned on either side of the biconditional are on the same or different levels. Or as I prefer to put it: we need to ask whether there is a symmetry between the concepts mentioned in the analysans and those in the analysandum, or whether there is
some ground for claiming an asymmetry. Of course, talk of symmetry is hardly less obscure than talk of levels. What we need to understand is what lies behind any claim of symmetry or asymmetry. It is the central work of this book to explore what such a claim amounts to in the case of the semantic and the psychological. In chapter 3 I discuss various kinds of asymmetry which might be claimed by those who propose a reductive interpretation of Grice’s analysis of meaning. Once the relevant asymmetry is established, we must return to conceptual investigation and ask whether the proposed asymmetry is really true of the concepts of semantics and psychology. I do this in chapters 3 and 4. If that investigation does reveal the relevant asymmetry, the analysis in question may be considered reductive; if it does not, then the analysis must be considered to be of the weaker, reciprocal sort, if it is to be maintained at all.

Let us now consider how the analytic biconditional may register the distinction I have just drawn. So far I have said that any analysis will provide conditions necessary and sufficient for some given concept to apply. Now if this is all that we can find to say about analysis, then biconditionals of the following sort will have to be accepted as analyses: $p$ if and only if $p$. What this sort of biconditional reveals is that we need to say something more about an analysis than that it provide conditions necessary and sufficient for some given concept to hold. We need some principled way of ruling out a biconditional which merely repeats the concept in question on its right-hand side. If we return to Moore’s discussion of analysis, we find that he stipulated that an analysis must meet the following three conditions: (1) philosophical analyses must be analyses of concepts or propositions; (2) the concepts susceptible of analysis must be of an entirely general nature; and (3) the phrases or expressions employed on the right-hand side of the analytic biconditional must be more complex than those on the left-hand side, more complex in the sense of possessing a greater number of symbols each of which has a separate meaning. The last of these conditions provides a rather mechanical way of ruling out, inter alia, the trivial biconditional under discussion. Since we analyze a concept to further our understanding of it, we can also give an explanation of why such a rule should exist: such an analysis would not further our understanding of the concept mentioned on the left-hand side of the analytic biconditional.

Say, then, that we have before us an analysis of concept $C_1$ in terms of concepts $C_2$, ..., $C_n$. In the case of Grice’s analysis of meaning, $C_1$ is some semantic concept (e.g., speaker meaning on an occasion), and $C_2$ through $C_n$ are various psychological concepts (e.g., intention, belief, etc.). The unavailability of the kind of asymmetry that would
support a reductive analysis of the semantic is reflected in the analytic biconditional in one of two ways. (1) We may find that it is not possible to put together a set of other concepts which will add up to conditions necessary and sufficient for $C_1$, and that the only thing which will complete the analysis is an outright injection of $C_1$ into its own analysans. Or (2), we find that further attention to $C_2$ through $C_n$ reveals that $C_1$ must play a part in the understanding of some (or all) of these concepts. The first way should be obvious from a cursory glance at a completed analysis; the second is much more difficult to detect. Until such time as philosophers turn their attention to the further understanding of the concepts mentioned on the right-hand side of the analytic biconditional, there will be nothing to suggest that $C_1$ will or will not reappear in this way.

When the analysis is reductive rather than reciprocal, one tends to envisage a chain of analyses proceeding, as it were, in one unchanging direction: the analysandum of some previous analysis does not show up in some succeeding analysans. The chain must come to an end at some point, however, and it is important to consider the limiting case, the case where the end of the analytic “chain” is reached with the very first analysis. In other words, although an analysis of $C_1$ may be forthcoming, it may turn out that none of $C_2$ through $C_n$ are susceptible of analysis. Nothing I have said thus far requires that analysis be our method of understanding $C_2$ through $C_n$. Whatever our method of understanding these concepts, in order to assess the status of our original analysis of $C_1$ we must ask the following: is it possible to understand $C_2$ through $C_n$ without reference to $C_1$? If we can, we may accept the original analysis as a reduction; if we cannot, we know that the original analysis must be considered reciprocal. A rather more dramatic conclusion may strike us once we realize that we cannot further analyze the analysans concepts: we may reconsider the appropriateness of the original analysis. It may be that we do better to think of the relationship between these concepts in some way other than as the analytic spelling out of necessary and sufficient conditions.

I have been arguing that there are two kinds of analysis, or two very different interpretations that can be given of the analytic biconditional. However, many philosophers write as though analysis can only be of one kind, namely reductive. The idea of analysis may connote a move toward, or resolution into, the simpler elements of which something is composed. To speak as I have, then, of a reductive analysis may appear to be pleonastic. On the other hand, to speak of a reciprocal analysis may strike some as a contradiction in terms: reciprocity connotes a relationship of mutual give and take,
where talk of hierarchy would appear to have no place. This may explain why analysis is often equated with reduction, and why analysis is held to be an inapplicable method of understanding when a more reciprocal relation is discerned among the concepts involved. I can see no good reason, however, to limit the method of philosophical analysis in this way, nor do I think that talk of “reciprocal analysis” is a contradiction in terms. This is clear if in those cases where a reduction is not suited to the concept, we think of the analysis as applying not to the analysandum concept alone but to the relationship that the concept has with the analysans concept. So, for example, a reciprocal analysis of the concept of meaning may be thought to apply not strictly to the concept of meaning alone but to the relationship meaning has to the psychological states of speakers. If we see the analysis to be of this relationship, we should be less prone to reject the reciprocal interpretation of it.

In his book Meaning, which is a development of Grice’s work, Schiffer briefly considers further analysis of the analysans concept in Grice’s original analysis of meaning. He writes:

I do not believe that psychological states such as believing and desiring are best analysed as being attitudes towards sentences. Indeed, I think this view false. However, since I cannot prove that this view is false, I will leave a discussion of this important issue for some other occasion. But assume that propositional attitudes are attitudes towards sentences. It would not follow from this that Grice’s account of S[peaker] meaning . . . is false, nor would it show that an account of utterance-meaning in terms of such an account is false. The most that would follow, if it does follow, is that the concept of S[peaker] meaning is not logically prior to the concept of utterance-meaning, and that an analysis of meaning along Gricean lines is in a peculiar way like “a closed curve in space.”

What Schiffer is responding to here is the possibility that the analysis of the propositional concepts used in Grice’s analysis of meaning requires a return to some semantic concept (beliefs turn out to be “attitudes towards sentences”). Schiffer writes here as if there is only one kind of analysis, and he considers just how problematic a discovery of the need for such a return would be for this analysis. Schiffer is in effect worried that Grice’s analysis of meaning should prove to be circular. His response to this possibility is to point out that in such an event Grice’s analysis of meaning must no longer be taken to show that the concept of speaker meaning (which is analyzed in terms of the psychological states of speakers) is logically prior to that
of utterance meaning. So it must also no longer be taken to show that psychological concepts are logically prior to semantic ones. We must conclude that an analysis of meaning along Gricean lines is "in a peculiar way like 'a closed curve in space.'" Circularity, then, is a problem for the analysis of meaning only if our aim was to exhibit logical priority among concepts. Discovery of a circularity need not force us to abandon the project of analysis; we need only modify our claims.

What Schiffer is saying here can perhaps be understood more clearly in terms of the distinction I drew between kinds of analysis. The problem of circularity plagues only reductive analyses. One cannot have succeeded in breaking up a concept into simpler or more basic components if those components require the original concept for their explication. If beliefs are attitudes towards sentences, the goal of achieving a new level of concepts must be abandoned, but this need not compel us to abandon analysis altogether. Rather, we must accept that our analysis is of another kind, namely, reciprocal. What the analysis shows is how in precise detail our psychological and semantic concepts fit together. Here the analysis is like "a closed curve in space."

In section 2 I defended Grice's proposed analysis of meaning against attacks aimed at showing that analysis is a method unsuited to the concept of meaning. In this section I suggested that two interpretations of any analysis are possible: reductive or reciprocal. There are those, however, who reject conceptual analysis as a legitimate exercise, not just under its reductive interpretation and not merely in application to the concept of meaning. Quine's doubts about the possibility of an analytic/synthetic distinction cast a shadow over any attempt to explicate, or analyse, concepts. Such doubts may even have affected Schiffer, who at one point appears to want to abandon the spirit, if not the letter, of Grice's original work. Schiffer writes: "Certain intention-theoretic writings have, unwittingly, tended to foster the misleading impression that the program was an exercise in conceptual analysis, the aim and the end of which was the definition of various ordinary language semantic idioms in terms of certain complexes of propositional attitudes. . . . In fact, the program need have no truck with conceptual analysis."87

The tone of this quotation strikes me as somewhat disingenuous. I do not think that earlier writers (Schiffer included) unwittingly fostered the impression that the exercise was one of conceptual analysis. It seems to me that Grice was clearly in the business of giving a conceptual analysis, and insofar as his followers thought about the matter at all, their work was also in this tradition. Conceptual investi-
gation was, and continues to be, what much philosophical work is about.  

Of course, nothing Quine has said requires that philosophers abandon the method of analysis. Analysis and explication are still a philosopher’s business; it is only how this should be understood that Quine sought to alter.  It is over the understanding of the method of analysis that consideration of the viability of an analytic/synthetic distinction are relevant. Of course, Grice and Quine take very different views of the viability of that distinction and hence understand analysis differently. Schiffer and also Loar clearly choose to follow Quine and not Grice on the interpretation of analysis.

It is not clear, however, that the attitude Schiffer expresses towards his earlier work in the above quotation is a reflection of Quine’s qualms. It seems more likely that Schiffer is reinterpreting his earlier work in the light of his later interests. In his 1981 and 1982 papers Schiffer acknowledges that he sees Grice’s work as one step on the road of providing a physicalist explication of both mind and meaning. From the standpoint of this larger enterprise it is perhaps unsurprising that Schiffer would prefer to reinterpret Grice’s work and his own along Quinean lines. But this is not necessary. One could equally well arrive at a physicalism like Schiffer’s as a result of conceptual investigation. It might be argued that such investigation reveals that our semantic concepts are nothing but a special case of our psychological ones, and that our psychological concepts are nothing but a special case of our physical ones. Grice’s work is, I believe, best understood in the way he conceived it: as an exercise in conceptual analysis. The real question is whether it is to be interpreted as a reductive or a reciprocal analysis of meaning.

4 The Place of Grice’s Work in an Overall Account of Meaning

In this section I want to return to the question: how does Grice’s analysis of meaning bring the philosophy of language within the scope of the philosophy of mind and the theory of action? I want to suggest a reply to this question which, at the same time, settles the question of how a Gricean account of meaning is to be reconciled with a more formal approach which uncovers the structural and recursive features of language.

David Wiggins has suggested that we adopt a layered or composite view of what in its entirety may be called a “theory of meaning.” Such a theory at its first level would isolate what is strictly and literally said and attempt to account for this in terms of, for example,
truth conditions. At the next level we proceed to account for the utterance's force and at subsequent levels to account for such things as perlocutionary effect, conversational implicature, and tone. Wiggins writes, "If we persist in bringing all these things together in an undifferentiated notion of meaning it seems hopeless to look for a systematic theory to account for such meaning." Using this model of a layered theory of meaning, Wiggins then suggests that we reconcile formal and use theories by allocating each to a different level within our overall theory of meaning. Formal theories account for things at the first level, the level of sense; use theories account for things at the next level, the level of force. If we take semantics to be the theory of what is strictly and literally said, and pragmatics as the theory of force, we can, on this model, locate Grice's analysis within pragmatics.

In what can be seen as a development of Wiggins's suggestion, John McDowell sets out two different ways in which we might think of the interaction between the different layers of such a composite theory of meaning; he discusses in particular the way the theory of sense interacts with the theory of force. One way is this: we begin by setting up a theory of sense—for McDowell this will be a theory which uses truth as its central notion—and then we develop a theory of force that supplements this original core theory. The other way is to start with a picture of the whole, which includes both sense and force, and then to work one's way back to the core theory of sense. Such a theory works to explain the structural and recursive features of language. Now the first picture seems to imply that the work of each theory is carried out in isolation from the work of the other, and that a complete account of meaning is the result of somehow bringing these theories together in the end. This raises the question of whether it is really plausible to think of a theory at the first level as being developed in such isolation. Is it really plausible to postpone any mention of the relation that utterances have to speakers until the next level is reached?

It was once argued that theories of truth conditions fail to serve as theories of meaning, since as far as purely extensional truth theories are concerned, the following are perfectly good theorems for the theory to turn out:

1. "Snow is white" is true if and only if grass is green.
2. "Hesperus is bright" if and only if Phosphorus is bright.
3. "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white and $2 + 2 = 4$. 
These may serve as adequate theorems of a truth theory, but they clearly will not serve as the results of a theory of meaning. The problem in (1) is more easily solved than that in either (2) or (3). It is usually accepted that attention to the axioms of the theory, together with the fact that the theory aims systematically to match truths with truths, will help solve the problem in (1). Any residual problem here will make (1) like (2) or (3). To solve the problem these raise it is necessary to recall the three requirements that Davidson explicitly places on any theory that aims to be an adequate theory of meaning (see section 2, above). The first of these requirements is that the results of the theory be such as to be recognizable by any speaker of the language as expressing what he knows in virtue of being a speaker of that language. Clearly, a theory which resulted in theorems (1) to (3) would not meet this requirement for the average English speaker. But to say that a theory does not meet certain requirements is not yet to say how those requirements are to be met. In this case the requirement itself provides the hint: to discover which truth theory will serve as our theory of meaning, we must pay attention to the speakers of the language.

Exploiting this hint, McDowell suggests that we see the problem arising in the first place because we are thinking of the relationship between the theory of sense and the theory of force in the first of the two ways of theory building outlined above. However, if we turn away from this picture and see the relationship between sense and force in the second of the two ways mentioned above, the problem disappears. We must begin by seeing our project to be that of making the best overall sense of the people in question. Part of this process will be to see the noises these people make as speech acts of a certain kind, and then to proceed to offer an account of the truth conditions of these utterances. In this way the truth theory we finally end up with will be one guaranteed to be a proper theory of meaning for these people. This is because of the constraints on the theory of having to fit in with an appropriate theory of force.

Consider the following:

Objection: It makes no sense to say that a mere string of sounds or of marks can bear a meaning or a truth-value. The proper bearers of meaning and truth-value are particular speech acts.

Reply: I do not say that a mere string of types of sounds or of marks, by itself, can bear a meaning or truth-value. I say it bears a meaning or truth-value relative to a language, or relative to a population.
The objection here is similar to the one I considered in the preceding paragraph. The passage is from David Lewis. Lewis’s reply to his objector is in the same spirit as McDowell’s reply to his objector. Lewis, however, is working with a slightly different model from that of McDowell. Rather than speaking of a layered theory of meaning, Lewis speaks of giving a general account of the meaning of various possible languages and then proceeding to explain what makes one such language the actual language of a given population. Only when discussing this relation to the actual language do the psychological states of speakers come into play. On Lewis’s model there is also the temptation to ask how one can speak of possible languages in isolation from speakers. Lewis’s reply to this objection is to point out that in a sense speakers and their psychological states are never far from view when the topic is meaning. One might say that to speak of doing one thing and then another is merely a heuristic device which orders the activities of philosophers; it does not reflect any actual or possible separation of language from its speakers.

One philosopher working within the Gricean tradition who has tended to favor Lewis’s model over the one adopted by Wiggins and McDowell is Loar. Loar explicitly rejects the model that both separates semantics and pragmatics and places Grice’s work squarely within the realm of pragmatics. He insists that it is not possible to carry on work in semantics without an immediate injection of psychological concepts. As far as Loar is concerned, Grice’s account operates at the first level in the theory of meaning. He writes: “There is a distinction between semantics and pragmatics, and where the line gets drawn is a hard question. Pragmatics is to be defined negatively, relative to the definition of semantics; the pragmatics of the language of a population is all the facts of a certain kind about language use in that population which are not semantic facts.” Semantic facts are, according to Loar, facts about what a sentence means in a language for a population, and Grice’s account is an account of such facts.

I should note that Loar’s distinction between semantics and pragmatics is not the standard one. The standard use of these terms is taken from Charles Morris in his book Foundations of the Theory of Signs. There Morris distinguishes three areas of study grouped together under the heading of semiotics, or the general study of signs: syntax (the study of the relations of signs to one another), semantics (the study of the relation between signs and what they are signs of), and pragmatics (the study of the relation between signs and their interpreters). Any study, then, that includes speakers would, for Morris, fall squarely within pragmatics. This clearly includes Grice’s
work. In drawing the distinction in the way he does, Loar is breaking with this standard way of drawing the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. On the other hand, the model of the relationship between the theory of sense and the theory of force that Wiggins and McDowell adopt is in keeping with Morris’s picture of the relation between semantics and pragmatics. Perhaps in part for this reason Loar finds it necessary to reject their model. He appears to prefer the model of Lewis. But it is unclear to me that anything is gained by such a move. Loar seems to hold the distinction between possible and actual languages as a distinction within semantics, and pragmatics is something over and above semantics. But another way of seeing Lewis’s model is as follows: the distinction between actual and possible languages is directly parallel to the semantic/pragmatic distinction as Morris drew it. The former is simply a fresh way of thinking about the latter, old distinction.

It seems to me that Loar’s rejection of the old distinction between semantics and pragmatics—and with it his rejection of the Wiggins and McDowell model of the relation between the theory of sense and the theory of force and his refusal to see Lewis’s distinction as in keeping with this model—can be traced to a misinterpretation. Loar seems to be under the impression that if we accept a layered conception of meaning, we must also hold that the work done at each level is carried out in complete isolation from the work at the other levels. Hence Loar’s fear that on this model of things, Grice’s work will come to be seen as contributing merely to pragmatics, isolated (at least temporarily) from semantics. On McDowell’s favored interpretation of the distinction, however, this is not so. On that interpretation, as we have seen, philosophers of language are taken to be working with an overall picture that includes both semantics and pragmatics, within which we can develop a core theory (call it “semantics”) that will reveal the structural and recursive features of the language. This interpretation does not leave a place for Loar’s fears to get a grip. On this picture of things, pragmatics, far from being banished, is at the very heart of the matter. Also, once we adopt this interpretation of the old semantics/pragmatics distinction, there seems little reason to see Lewis’s distinction between possible and actual languages as anything other than a new way of thinking about that old distinction.

Once we accept a layered or composite view of the theory of meaning we would seem to have an easy solution to the problem of how to reconcile a Gricean account of use with a more formal theory of meaning. It will be remembered from section 1 that some sort of reconciliation seemed desirable after we noticed that the defect of one kind of account of meaning was the virtue of the other: on the one hand,
formal theorists concentrate on giving an account of the structural and recursive features of a language, but in such a way that leaves speakers of the language aside; on the other hand, use theorists (including Gricean use theorists) stress the importance of speakers, while relegating the task of giving an account of structure to a position of secondary importance. The envisaged solution would take the form of assigning each theorist his proper place in a composite theory of meaning.

As we saw from section 1, the idea that formal and use theories be accepted as complementary and not competing is not a new one. And the idea has been resuscitated in recent years by philosophers who wish to bridge the gap between Davidson's work on meaning and Grice's. The idea is a good one, but we must be careful about the proposal. We must clarify certain details and background facts. And we must be sure that the reconciliation is acceptable to both sides.

First of all, there is the issue I have just been discussing between Loar's view of the place of Grice's work and the view of Davidsonians like Wiggins and McDowell. The question of whether Grice's work should be taken as a contribution to semantics or to pragmatics may seem to some to be a merely terminological matter, but, as we have just seen, this is not at all how at least one Gricean sees it. I have suggested that Loar's worries about placing Grice's work in pragmatics may be alleviated if one understands the interrelation between semantics and pragmatics in the way suggested by McDowell. However, Loar will likely still jib. As he says in the passage I quote in footnote 105: "The nature of the semantics/pragmatics distinction is no mere terminological matter, but involves the fundamental nature of semantic concepts."

Echoing the aim of many a use theorist of meaning, Loar writes, "What I want to show is that the theory of meaning is part of the theory of mind, and not the other way around." For Loar, then, we can understand the fundamental nature of our semantic concepts by reference to psychological concepts. In other words, Loar is adopting a reductive interpretation of the biconditional in Grice's analysis. Under a reductive interpretation we find that all questions about public-language meaning concern some complex of speakers' psychological states. It would seem that Loar sees the battle over where to place Grice's work in a layered "theory of meaning" as crucial to the interpretation of that work. For Loar, Grice's work belongs within semantics, and its purpose is to reduce semantics to psychology.

If we seek to reconcile this reductive kind of Gricean analysis with a formal theory of meaning, what we find is the following: the structure of sentences so rightly emphasized by the formal semanticists be-
comes the structure of certain propositional attitudes; and the insight that the meaning of a sentence can be specified by giving its truth conditions has to be reinterpreted: rather than map sentences directly onto truth conditions, there has to be an intermediate mapping of sentences onto beliefs and intentions. The reductionist attitude towards reconciliation is perhaps summed up by this passage from a more recent work of Loar’s:

Without doubt, there are interesting systematic correlations between utterances and the obtaining of states of affairs we count as their truth conditions. But such correlations would also be explained by communication intention regularities; while to leave the latter out of the picture simply fails to account for our seemingly fundamental conception of public language meaning as involving the goal directed use of language in communication.

The foregoing considerations imply that conventional regularities involving communication intentions are central in public language semantics—indeed, that they constitute sentential meaning.\textsuperscript{109}

Loar’s concern to make the philosophy of language part of the philosophy of mind pushes him in the direction of a reductive interpretation of Grice’s work. Loar appears to assume that unless we take psychological notions as basic in our account of meaning, those notions will end up being ignored or omitted from that account. This, however, is a non sequitur. Adopting a reciprocal interpretation of the biconditional in Grice’s analysis affords us another way of bringing the philosophy of language within the scope of the philosophy of mind. This nonreductive interpretation of the analysis would allow a part of the account of meaning autonomy from the philosophy of mind, though loosely it would fit under the umbrella concept of intentional action. Not all questions having to do with public language meaning turn out to be, strictly speaking, questions in the philosophy of mind. Reconciliation of a formal theory with Grice’s analysis understood in this way is a much more straightforward affair. The point of the analysis would be to specify the propositional attitudes in the light of which these truth conditions must be specified.

Those working toward a reconciliation starting from something like, for example, a Davidsonian formal theory would favor a reconciliation based on a reciprocal interpretation of Grice’s analysis. But there are those who would resist even this. As we saw in section 2, some theory builders reject analysis applied to the concept of meaning. For some, this is just the rejection of a reductive interpretation of the analysis, but for others the rejection extends even to the reciprocal
interpretation of Grice's analysis. To accept a reconciliation of more formal work with Grice's would allow the possibility that analysis may have some part to contribute to the overall understanding of our concept of meaning. The question of whether a reconciliation based on a weak, nonreductive interpretation of the analysis is acceptable or not may be seen to be the question of whether a Gricean account of communication is acceptable. As we have seen, analysis isn't required if all we want to do is to give an account of the relationship meaningful utterances have to their utterers. For this reason further discussion is needed to explain why it is thought that employing the analytic method is the best way of filling out the formal theory in question.

We thus see that although reconciliation between Gricean use theories and more formal theories of meaning is desirable in principle, achieving such reconciliation is a delicate matter. Certainly, those who speak of reconciliation from either side of the debate can be seen to have different ideas about how to interpret such an enterprise. And although Griceans appear to be content to accommodate formal theories, it is not always clear that all formal theorists would be content to accommodate Gricean analyses.

5 A Reductive Analysis of Meaning

In section 3 I began considering Grice's work by introducing a distinction between two different kinds of analysis, reductive and reciprocal. As we have seen, each kind of analysis raises somewhat different issues. One of my reasons for drawing this distinction between kinds of analyses, or interpretations of Grice's analysis, is so that I can place one kind, the reciprocal, to one side and concentrate my attention on the other, the reductive.

It is not altogether clear which interpretation Grice himself intended of his work. However, some of those who have worked most closely with Grice in developing the analysis have been more forthright about the way they see matters. They take Grice's analysis to effect a reduction of the semantical to the psychological. So we find Schiffer, for example, writing, "The definability of meaning in terms of thought, without the reducibility of meaning to thought, is barely of passing interest, a curious fact in need of no explanation, certainly no account of what meaning is." That Schiffer is so insistent upon a reductive interpretation of Grice's work may seem odd if we recall the remark I quoted in section 3 from his first book, Meaning, to the effect that the discovery that psychological concepts are not logically prior to semantic ones need
only commit us to viewing the analysis of meaning along Gricean lines as “in a peculiar way like ‘a closed curve in space.’” Schiffer’s later view, however, is not that such a discovery would invalidate Grice’s work; he just thinks that such a discovery would make that work less interesting. The reason for this is to be found in the role that Schiffer has allocated to Grice’s work on meaning in the larger program of providing a physicalist account of both mind and meaning. Schiffer is interested in reducing the psychological to the physical as well as in reducing the semantic to the psychological. And he admits that these interests are not unrelated: “I believe that the only viable reduction of the semantical and the psychological to the physical is via the reduction of the semantical to the psychological” (Schiffer’s italics). The program is clear: first we find that our concept of the semantic is replaceable by certain psychological concepts, and then we find that our physical theory of the world can explain even our concept of the psychological. Once we have the former, Gricean reduction, the task that the physical theory is called on to do is somewhat easier. A Gricean analysis reduces two troublesome concepts to one, and in the end some physical theory will sweep away the problem posed by that remaining troublesome concept.

Compare Schiffer’s interpretation of Grice’s analysis with Loar’s when the latter writes: “The point is not that the pragmatic concept of meaning for a person or population cannot be explicated within a physicalist framework; on the contrary. Rather it is that the only promising explication requires an independent explication of propositional attitudes.” So Loar too sees the overall program as one of giving a physicalist explication of our concept of meaning. When he says that the only promising physicalist explication of the semantic requires an independent explication of the propositional attitudes, what he means is this: Loar believes that the only way of reducing the semantic to the physical is by first reducing the semantic to the psychological. He also recognizes that the latter reduction cannot succeed unless it proves possible to provide an explication of the propositional attitudes that makes no mention of the concept of meaning. In other words, for the analysis of meaning to count as a reduction, it must not prove viciously circular. A physicalist explication of the propositional attitudes would, of course, avoid circularity in the original, Gricean analysis of meaning; it would provide the needed independent explication of the propositional attitudes. With a workable analysis of the concept of meaning in terms of propositional attitudes already present, a physicalist explication of the propositional attitudes would not only allow for a reductive interpretation of
the analysis, it would *eo ipso* be a physical explication of the semantic as well.

We should note that not all philosophers interested in a physicalist explication of the semantic choose to exploit the route offered by Grice. There are other suggestions for reducing the semantic to the physical, ones that do not require an *intermediate* reduction of the semantic to the psychological. It is fair to say that Schiffer and Loar adopt the line they do because of their independent commitment to intention-based semantics. Moreover, their further commitment to physicalism forces both Schiffer and Loar to adopt a *reductive* interpretation of Grice’s analysis of meaning.

Early work stimulated by Grice’s account of meaning tended to be concerned with specifying conditions necessary and sufficient for speaker meaning and accommodating counterexamples. Griceans like Schiffer and Loar who wanted to vindicate a reductive interpretation of Grice’s original analysis began to concentrate less on the analysis of meaning and more on the explication of the propositional attitudes mentioned on the right-hand side of the analytic biconditional. Each in his own way believed that he would advance the program of intention-based semantics by developing a functionalist account of propositional attitudes. As Loar quite candidly admits, “This all implies that much of the ‘theory of meaning’ has not been about *meaning* but about the *content* of the propositional attitudes.”

The requirement that a reductive interpretation of Grice’s analysis rely on an explication of the propositional attitudes that has no recourse to semantic concepts needs careful formulation. “Semantics” in the widest sense covers a range of concepts including meaning, truth, and reference; that is, the term may be used to cover any relation between words and the world. In its more narrow use it is roughly equivalent to “meaning.” Concepts like truth and reference will likely play a part in any account we give of the propositional attitudes, so it is semantics in the *narrow* sense of the term that concerns us when the issue is the reduction of the semantic to the psychological. And here another distinction must be drawn, this time between public-language semantics and the semantics of the language of thought. If propositional attitudes are taken to be attitudes toward sentences with meaning in a *public* language, reduction is threatened.

In one place Loar distinguishes between what he calls “strong Griceanism” and “modest Griceanism.” The strong Gricean holds that Grice’s analysis suffices to explain all the semantic properties of natural language, whether used in communication or not. The weak
Gricean restraints his claim; Grice’s analysis suffices to explain all the concepts of the semantics of language in communication: sentence meaning, illocutionary force, what makes a language the language of a population, and the like. The modest Gricean presupposes an independent account of the language of thought. Strong Griceanism is not only reductive; it is complete. Loar claims to be a modest Gricean; Schiffer is as well. Of course, the modest Gricean is far from modest in the claims he wants to make about the relationship of the semantic to the psychological, for he advocates a reductive interpretation of Grice’s analysis of meaning. In summary, then, the reductive Gricean is committed to giving a nonsemantic account of the propositional attitudes, but he is not committed to an account of them that makes no mention of truth, reference, or meaning in the language of thought. He is restricted by his commitment to reduction to an account of the propositional attitudes that makes no mention of public-language semantic concepts.

Before the issue of interpretation arises, philosophers may be content simply to hone the analysis in response to counterexamples. Once reductive ambitions come into play, attention focuses on the explication of the propositional attitudes mentioned on the right-hand side of the original biconditional. Attempts to reduce the semantic to the psychological raise another issue: Is it really plausible to hold that there is an asymmetry between semantic concepts and psychological ones? Is it true that psychological concepts are, in Wisdom’s words, “more fundamental” or “more basic” than semantic concepts in our overall scheme of concepts? This is not just the question of whether we can provide an explication of propositional attitudes that makes no mention of public-language semantic concepts. It concerns our conception of mind and of meaning.

Turning to this larger issue is, I suggest, the next stage in the development of the analysis first put forward by Grice in 1957. The first stage concentrates on the biconditional alone, the next raises the issue of the interpretation of the analysis, and the third stage investigates how appropriate a given interpretation of the analysis is to the concept in question. Central to the work at this third stage is an explanation of what this talk of symmetry versus asymmetry amounts to in the case of the concepts of semantics and psychology. Equally important is a conceptual investigation that would reveal whether such a claim of symmetry or asymmetry is in fact plausible.

I believe that after this work is done, it will be apparent that reduction is not suited to our concept of the semantic. A reductive analysis not only misrepresents the relationship that exists between the semantic and the psychological; it also forces us to have the wrong view
of the *psychological*. Indeed, I would say that because philosophers like Schiffer and Loar have a mistaken picture of the psychological, they entertain the possibility of reducing the semantic to it. A proper conception of the psychological would rule out a reductive account of the semantic. This is what I hope to show in chapters 3 and 4. Like Schiffer and Loar, I shall thus be concerned with the reductive interpretation of Grice’s analysis of meaning rather than the reciprocal one. But unlike Schiffer and Loar, I want to explain why I think the analysis under this interpretation is mistaken.

Loar explains the pressures that he sees forcing him into the position of looking for a physicalist explication of both mind and meaning in the following way. As theorists we are faced with a dilemma whose components are as follows: a theoretical framework $A$ (e.g., a physical theory); an imperialist inclination to accept $A$ as adequate for expressing all truths about a certain subject $S$; a set of propositions, $B$, within $S$ but not in $A$ that we have a strong inclination to accept (e.g., propositions about beliefs and desires; or meaning, etc.).

There are several responses one may have to this dilemma: (1) one could say that the propositions of $B$ are really equivalent in meaning to some of those in $A$; (2) one could give up the imperialist pretentions of $A$ to express all truths about $S$ and set to work constructing a new framework better suited to $B$; or (3) one could simply cease to accept the propositions of $B$. Like Schiffer, Loar rejects response (1), which he identifies with classical (he calls it “Moorean”) analysis. Like Quine, Loar prefers response (3), but Loar proposes a variation on this Quinean theme: allow that the propositions of $A$ have been replaced by those of $B$ but insist that nothing has changed thereby in people’s views about things. In particular, allow that the propositions of some physical theory have replaced propositions about beliefs, desires, and meaning but don’t let this change the way we think about one another. Loar calls this “conservative explication,” and he says about it: “The theorist for whom explication is conservative may have achieved the happier resolution of the dilemma—not exactly because he hasn’t changed any beliefs. . . . But his cognitive situation is as though he hasn’t changed any beliefs. How can that be? I can suggest no more detailed account of the phenomenon of conservative explication; but it occurs and can serve as a cognitive resolution to what is perceived as a serious theoretical problem.” Whether or not one is able to make sense of conservative explication with the dilemma at hand, one thing about it is clear: “For the replacement to be correct, the truths of $B$ must give way to the truths of $A$.”

As I propose to show why I think the reductive interpretation of Grice’s work is misguided, I must reject response (3) to Loar’s pro-
posed dilemma; I cannot accept that the truths of $B$ must give way to the truths of $A$. As I hope to be able to show in chapters 3 and 4, the reasons we have for clinging to the propositions of $B$ (meaning or belief) are reasons which should force us to give up the imperialist pretentions of $A$ (physicalism). This is along the lines of Loar’s response (2). Furthermore, whether one adopts response (2) or Loar’s preferred response (3), I see no reason entirely to reject response (1). As I said in section 3 above, whatever one’s interpretation of Grice’s explication of meaning, it is possible to accept it as an instance of classical philosophical analysis.

Now the position I intend to defend is blatantly antireductionist. Loar says about any such position, “To make a concept sacrosanct, not illuminable by reconstruction, may simply make it uninteresting in the light of ongoing theory; and, in any case, the drive towards explication may be irrepressible.” What is irrepressible may not always be correct, and I see nothing uninteresting about the possibility of providing a reciprocal analysis of meaning (that is, an account that shows how the semantic depends upon, without reducing to, the psychological). Some “ongoing theory” (like $A$) may be interesting and exciting, but the question of whether it is suited to account for a set of propositions like $B$ is a question that can only be answered after careful investigation into the concepts employed in both $A$ and $B$.

Reductionists like Schiffer and Loar insist that objections to their program must not come from any general prejudice one may have against reductions, nor from a reliance on the proven failure of other reductions (e.g., behaviorism and phenomenalism). They fail to see any specific objection that can be brought to bear on their reductive program. My objection will be entirely specific; it will proceed from a careful consideration of our pretheoretic grasp of our concepts of the semantic and the psychological. I believe that it is only this kind of consideration that can determine whether the concept of meaning can be understood by understanding some other concepts, as the reductive interpretation of Grice’s analysis suggests, or whether that concept is better understood by discerning its place in a system of interrelated concepts, as a reciprocal interpretation of Grice’s analysis would suggest. Even if in the end the reductive Gricean remains unconvinced by my arguments, I hope to make clear the picture of mind and meaning to which his reduction commits him.