Why Agree? Why Move?

Unifying Agreement-Based and Discourse-Configurational Languages

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1 Why Agree?

1.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I explore issues related to agreement in human language. Why does agreement occur? Why do some languages appear to have it while others don’t? I will begin by demonstrating the direct relation between agreement and movement. I will then make a proposal about the “agreement” and “agreementless” languages that minimizes the difference between them: they are identical in all respects except in what shows up at T or some related head that triggers A-movement. Both typically exhibit movement triggered by a grammatical feature at T; in agreement languages this is φ-feature agreement, whereas in agreementless languages it is topic/focus when such a feature occurs, the latter reflecting what É. Kiss (1995) has called discourse configurationality. I will hold in abeyance until chapter 2 a detailed discussion of why movement occurs.

1.2 The Extended Projection Principle

Chomsky (1981) proposed the Extended Projection Principle (EPP) because of the appearance of the expletive in existential constructions (There stands a statue in the town center). The agreement is between the verbal inflection and the postverbal nominal, and the expletive there fills Spec,TP. The expletive makes it possible for the existential construction with this “long-distance agreement” to have a subject. The EPP is, in fact, informally referred to as the requirement that a clause must have a subject. With the advent of the predicate-internal subject hypothesis (e.g., Kuroda 1988, Sportiche 1988; see also Fukui 1986, Kitagawa 1986), the theory had to account for the movement of the external argument from Spec,vP to Spec,TP, and it is the EPP that has been invoked to drive this operation (Chomsky 1995). To make the EPP applicable to T, Chomsky
(1995) argues that T has a D feature that has to be checked, and attracting a DP (e.g., the external argument) to Spec,TP accomplishes this. Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou (1998), who argue that this EPP property of T is universal, show that in pro-drop languages, rich agreement in the form of a head that contains a D feature raises to T to check this D requirement on T, making it unnecessary for a DP to move to Spec,TP.

Given that the EPP requirement can be met by movement of a DP to Spec,TP (or an agreement element to T) or by merging an expletive on T, one question that this general approach to the EPP raises is this: if there is a choice between movement and merger, is one favored over the other? Chomsky (1995) notes the following pair of examples as evidence that, when either merger or movement is possible to meet the EPP, merger is favored over movement:

(1) a. There seems [TP ____ to be a man in the garden].
   b. *There seems [TP a man to be ____ in the garden].

The lower clause has a T, hence the EPP requirement, and this requirement is filled in different ways in these two sentences. In the grammatical (1a), the expletive there is merged on this T to fulfill the EPP requirement, and subsequently moves to the matrix Spec,TP, where it again fulfills the EPP requirement, this time of the matrix T. In the ungrammatical (1b), the EPP requirement of the lower T is met by moving the DP a man to its specifier. Under the general approach to the EPP in Chomsky 1995, both options are theoretically available, but the pattern of grammaticality suggests that merger (as in (1a)) is favored over movement if there is a choice between the two, which suggests perhaps that merger is a simpler operation than movement. I will return to this pair later.

A question that arises with the above approach to the EPP concerns the fact that the EPP always appears to operate in tandem with some other element, a point noticed by a number of linguists. If we look at a typical EPP movement, whereby the external argument moves to Spec,TP, we see that two elements are involved besides the EPP: Case and agreement.

(2) [TP He is ____ eating pizza].

The subject, he, which has undergone movement to Spec,TP, agrees in Case (nominative) and number (singular) with T. This situation, in which both Case and agreement identify the target of the EPP movement, is typical—in fact, so typical that various linguists have proposed that the EPP should be combined with, or derived from, either Case or agreement. For example, Bošković (1997, 2002) and Martin (1999) argue that an expletive must have Case, and this, according to them, makes it possible to
predict its distribution. Behind their studies is the desire to derive the EPP from Case considerations, something they try to accomplish by assuming that Case can only be checked in the specifier position of the head responsible for valuing Case (e.g., T) (Boeckx 2000, Epstein and Seely 1999; see also Koopman 2003, Koopman and Sportiche 1991). In contrast, Chomsky (2000, 2005, 2007, 2008), Kuroda (1988), Pesetsky and Torrego (2001), and I (Miyagawa 2005b), among many others, suggest that the EPP is identified with agreement.

Which is the right answer for the EPP—Case or agreement? Or is the EPP simply an independent phenomenon, as previously and still widely assumed (e.g., see discussion in Landau 2007)? Looking only at languages such as English, which is the language in which the EPP has been most extensively studied, it is difficult to tease apart the different components to get at the exact identity of the EPP. To find compelling evidence, we have to go beyond the familiar languages whose EPP properties have been investigated.

A number of languages display a phenomenon called “agreement asymmetry” in which the agreement on the verb differs depending on whether the subject occurs pre- or postverbally.¹ In the Northern Italian dialects of Trentino (T) and Fiorentino (F), verbs do not agree with postverbal subjects; the verb instead has the unmarked neutral form (third person masculine singular) (Brandi and Cordin 1989:121–122).

(3) a. Gli è venuto delle ragazze. (F)  
   b. E’ vegnú qualche putela. (T)  
      is come some girls  
      ‘Some girls have come.’

Full agreement on the verb—agreement in number, in this case—is not allowed with postverbal subjects, as shown in (4).

(4) a. *Le son venute delle ragazze. (F)  
   b. *L’è vegnuda qualche putela. (T)  
      they are come some girls  
      ‘Some girls have come.’

In contrast, full agreement must occur, as in (5a–b), if the subject moves to preverbal position (presumably Spec,TP) (Brandi and Cordin 1989:113).²

(5) a. La Maria la parla. (F)  
   b. La Maria la parla. (T)  
      the Maria she speaks  
      ‘Maria speaks.’

¹
²
Presumably, the subject is Case-marked in both pre- and postverbal positions. Consequently, the pattern of grammaticality found in these Northern Italian dialects clearly shows that the occurrence of agreement correlates with movement. If agreement occurs, the subject must move to Spec, TP; but if there is no movement, agreement does not occur.

In certain agreement asymmetries, the asymmetry is between partial and full agreement. A well-known asymmetry of this type is found in Arabic: a postverbal subject triggers partial agreement of person and gender as in (6a) (the verb also has the default singular agreement form), whereas a preverbal subject triggers full agreement of person, gender, and number as in (6b) (e.g., Bahloul and Harbert 1993, Benmamoun 1992, Fassi Fehri 1993). The following examples are taken from Bahloul and Harbert 1993:15.

came-3ms came-mp the-boys-3mp
'The boys came.'

b. Al-ʔawlaadu qadim-uu (/qadim-a) [t].
the-boys-3mp came-3mp came-3ms
'The boys came.'

What we can deduce from these Arabic data is that, just as we saw with the two Northern Italian dialects, agreement triggers movement. Unlike in the Northern Italian dialects, where no agreement emerges if movement does not take place, in Arabic, person and gender agreement appears when there is no movement. Number agreement cannot occur if there is no movement, but number agreement, along with person and gender agreement, must occur if the subject moves to preverbal position. This clearly shows that number agreement is responsible for movement. Arabic demonstrates that, although it is correct to associate agreement with movement, not all agreement forms are equal in this regard. In this monograph, I abstract away from these interesting but complex issues regarding various types of agreement and focus by and large on the general point that agreement, not Case, triggers movement.

Returning to the pair in (1) from Chomsky 1995, repeated here, we can see that the “agreement” approach to the EPP provides an alternative account of these examples.

(7) a. There seems [TP ___ to be a man in the garden].
b. *There seems [TP a man to be ___ in the garden].

Given that the lower TP is nonfinite, it has no agreement; hence, there is no reason for anything to move to the specifier of this lower T. That is
why (7a) is grammatical; Spec,TP is not filled (the gap should in fact follow to to show that there is no “EPP” within this TP). In contrast, in (7b) a man has moved to this specifier—an instance of unmotivated movement, hence ungrammatical. On this account, we need not specify that merger takes precedence over movement, a desirable outcome given the recent assumptions about these two operations. Bošković (1997, 2002) offers an alternative to this pair based on Case considerations. If we limit our data only to English, it is difficult to choose between the two approaches, but the data from agreement asymmetries in Arabic and Northern Italian indicate that agreement is the correct option.

One of the achievements of the Minimalist Program (MP) has been to unify merger and movement under the general operation Merge, where external Merge covers what used to be the domain of phrase structure and X-bar theory, and internal Merge takes over what used to be the domain of movement (Chomsky 2000, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2008). Both are exactly the same operation, the only difference being what is merged. External Merge takes an item from the numeration, so that what is being merged is being merged for the first time. Internal Merge takes something that is already in the structure and remerges it. An important result of unifying the two operations is that the theory is able to account for a key insight from the Standard Theory era by Emonds (1976). Emonds observed that movement operations lead to structures that are identical to those produced by phrase structure rules, a phenomenon he called “structure preservation.” Given the pre-MP theory, there was no reason why structures that result from movement should be identical to those built by phrase structure rules. On the other hand, Merge, external or internal, predicts the structure-preserving nature of movement: movement is simply another instance of Merge. Ideally, then, we want to avoid making any qualitative distinction between the two types of Merge, such as a preference for one over the other when both are possible. We can accomplish this by adopting the agreement approach to the EPP. (Case would work, too, but recall the data from agreement asymmetries.) Of course, we have more to do to make this work; but both conceptually and empirically, there is ample justification for pursuing this line of reasoning. I now turn to the question of why agreement occurs in human language.

1.3 Why Agree?

What is the purpose of agreement? Many linguists have asked this question, from a variety of perspectives, but nothing close to a consensus has emerged. What is particularly striking about agreement is that, on the
face of it, it seems to be entirely superfluous. In its most basic form, the “agreement rule,” let us say, targets information in one position—the information contained in a nominal such as the subject—and reproduces it in another position, commonly as some form of an inflectional element on a verb or some such “head.” In (8a), the verb inflects for singular, whereas in (8b), the lack of overt inflection indicates plurality—in both cases reflecting the nature, singular or plural, of the subject.

(8) a. Mary walks.
   b. They walk.

This redundant nature of agreement is puzzling. Why should human language contain a rule that represents information redundantly? There are other domains of language where information is repeated—for instance, pronominalization—but the repetition is informative.

(9) John thinks that he will win the race.

John and he are repetitive, to the extent that they refer to the same entity in discourse, but they do not reproduce the same information: John is the subject of think and he is the subject of win, so these two occurrences provide distinct information.

The puzzling nature of agreement goes further. In the Russian example in (10) taken from Corbett 2006:2, not only is the singularity of the subject redundantly reproduced on the verbal inflection, but its grammatical gender is as well, and the choice of feminine gender for a lamp is patently arbitrary—there being nothing inherent about lamps that would make them feminine.

(10) Lamp-a stoja-l-a vugl-u.
    lamp(f)-sg stand-pst-f.sg in.corner-sg.loc
    ‘The lamp was standing in the corner.’

So, agreement is not only redundant, but sometimes entirely arbitrary in its content as well.

Given these puzzling properties, what could the purpose of agreement possibly be? Levin (2001) points to a variety of functional approaches that appear in the literature, most of which boil down to the idea that the redundancy helps the addressee accurately comprehend the information by repeating it across the expression. Such a proposal faces the difficulty of accounting for the wide variety of agreement systems that exist in languages, including, most critically, lack of agreement, as in the East Asian languages. Are East Asian languages simply nonredundant in communicating information relative to, say, subject-verb?
Although there is no consensus on the outer boundaries of what constitutes agreement, there is reasonable concurrence that agreement is a form of covariance between two elements, such as the covariance between the subject nominal and verbal inflection (Steele 1978:610). Various studies assume this notion of covariance for agreement (e.g., “feature sharing” in Pesetsky and Torrego 2007). Furthermore, many of these studies describe covariance as an asymmetric relation, whereby one element, the goal/controller, in some fashion is deemed the source of the information for the probe/target (e.g., Anderson 1992, Chomsky 1965, 2001, Gazdar et al. 1985, Keenan 1974, Pesetsky and Torrego 2007). There are other approaches, such as the unification-based frameworks (Pollard and Sag 1994, Shieber 1986), that reject the asymmetric, “copying” approach, instead positing that agreement emerges from an accumulation of information from a variety of sources in the structure. I do not pursue the unification approach in this monograph.

I am now ready to begin to answer the question, what precisely is the purpose of agreement? Up to now we have seen that the formal agreement system is redundant in that it comprises a covariance of two or more elements, each expressing the same information. It is asymmetric, in that one of the elements participating in the covariance relation provides the agreement information. Finally, the semantic content of the agreement information is apparently not significant, and may even be arbitrary, as in the case of the feminine gender on ‘lamp’ in Russian. We find all three properties represented in the probe-goal system of Chomsky’s work (Chomsky 2000, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2008). A probe (the “target” of agreement) is an uninterpretable feature by virtue of not having a full value for its feature; for example, it is unvalued for gender. The goal (the “controller” of the agreement) provides the value, thereby accounting for the covariance and the asymmetric nature of agreement. Finally, an uninterpretable feature must be deleted once it is valued so that it will not receive semantic interpretation, a fact that directly reflects the notion that the actual content of agreement is irrelevant. Although the probe-goal system captures the essential properties of formal agreement, it makes the notion of agreement all the more puzzling. Why would the computational system insert something into the derivation of an expression only to delete it so completely that nothing remains of it for semantic interpretation? It seems utterly counterintuitive.

The answer to the true identity of agreement, I suggest, is based on what is sometimes referred to as “the duality of semantics”: the well-established distinction between lexical and functional heads. Lexical
heads select their complements to create the argument structure of an expression. In contrast, functional heads, which are commonly merged higher than the basic argument structure, create an expression structure that "consists of the modes of expression of the language" (Bresnan 2001:9–10). The functional layer of a clause gives rise to such notions as topic-comment, subject of a clause, focus, and content questions, among many other modes of expression. In other words, functional heads substantially enhance the expressiveness of human language.\(^5\)

I will call the relations found in the argument structure lexical relations, for the obvious reason that these relations are defined over a lexical head and its argument, typically a head-complement relation. The nominal—and the complement is almost always a nominal, although in certain cases it is a PP or a CP—bears a particular relation to the lexical head such that its referent is understood to be a participant in the event or the situation described by the meaning of the head. I will call the second type functional relations, since they always involve a relation between a nominal and a functional head, such as C, T, or v. As noted above, the purpose of functional relations is to enhance the expressive power of language by providing the tools to express such notions as topic-comment, subject of a clause, focus, and content questions.

We can see the independence of functional relations from lexical relations in a number of constructions. For example, in Japanese, the reflexive anaphor zibun ‘self’ is subject oriented. In the following example, zibun can only take as its antecedent the subject Taroo:

\[(11)\text{ Taroo-i-ga Hanako-j-o zibun-i/-no-heya-de sikat-ta.}\]
\[
\begin{array}{l}
\text{Taro-nom Hanako-acc self-gen-room-in scold-past} \\
\text{‘Taro scolded Hanako in his/*her room.’}
\end{array}
\]

However, under direct passivization, the internal argument, Hanako, may function as the antecedent of zibun (Kuno 1973), which shows that the notion "subject" plays a crucial role independent of lexical relations.

\[(12)\text{ Hanako-j-ga Taroo-i/-ni zibun-i/-no-heya-de sikar-are-ta.}\]
\[
\begin{array}{l}
\text{Hanako-nom Taro-by self-gen-room-in scold-pass-past} \\
\text{‘Hanako was scolded by Taro in her/*his room.’}
\end{array}
\]

The original external argument, Taroo, no longer the subject of the overall expression, cannot function as the antecedent of zibun.

How are the two types of relations, lexical and functional, established in the linguistic structure? Lexical relations are thematic relations. They are established by external Merge, in which a lexical head (or v) combines
with its complement in a binary fashion (Chomsky 2001, 2005, 2008, Kayne 1984). Lexical relations are therefore defined by the binary-branching structure of sisterhood, itself created by external Merge. What about functional relations? There is no simple structural way to establish a relationship between, say, the external argument and T. T does not directly select the external argument, for example. (I discuss the expletive construction, which is ostensibly a counterexample, in chapter 2.) In the literature on this topic, a typical suggestion is that the relation that holds between a functional head such as T and the nominal with which it agrees (or assigns Case to) must be established by moving the nominal into Spec,TP (Koopman 2003, 2005, Koopman and Sportiche 1991). In the main, I believe that this intuition that agreement emerges as a specifier-head (Spec-head) relation is correct, although there are exceptions, one being pro-drop. Nevertheless, I will assume that agreement relations are established independently of movement, by a process Chomsky calls Agree (Chomsky 2000, 2001, 2005, 2008). We can thus state the purpose of agreement as follows:

(13) **Purpose of agreement**

Agreement occurs to establish a functional relation.

I will capture the Koopman-Sportiche intuition that agreement requires a Spec-head relation by showing that Agree takes place to establish functional relations. Such a functional relation, which is always nonlocal, must be transformed into a local relation by moving the goal to the probe. The purpose of this movement is to keep a record of the functional relation beyond narrow syntax so that semantic interpretation and information structure can make use of it. This, in effect, is Spec-head agreement, but implemented as two independently motivated operations—Agree and Move.6

Pesetsky and Torrego (2006) and Sigurðsson (2004, 2006) independently argue that Agree, or some form of probe-goal relation, exists for all instances of Merge, external and internal. These proposals in one way or another blur the distinction between lexical and functional relations. It is quite possible that something must trigger even external Merge, as these studies suggest. However, I will distinguish between functional and lexical heads, as noted earlier, and presume that the kind of Agree relation I wish to explore here is relevant only to functional heads. After all, we never see formal agreement inflection reflecting a relation between a lexical head and its argument; such inflection is found only between a functional head and some XP. This is the Agree relation I wish to capture.7
There is another proposal, very different in nature, that also blurs the distinction between lexical and functional relations. Chomsky (2007) suggests that the edge feature is responsible for Merge, both external and internal. Note that the edge feature is independent of Agree. The edge feature brings us back to something akin to GB in one respect: in principle, it allows free movement—free internal Merge—to any head. The grammar simply has to ensure that the movement is motivated. Although I will not include the edge feature in the narrow syntax, I assume with others that movement must be justified, and that where agreement is concerned, the justification is that movement brings the goal close to the probe. In chapter 2, I discuss the notion of closeness in detail and what precisely it accomplishes.

As a final note on why agreement occurs in human language, the picture I drew above provides a natural way to think about which categories count as phases (Chomsky 2001). In recent minimalist work, it is thought that computation in language, such as the numeration and Merge, occurs within specific local domains called phases. Once the computational system completes its work within one phase, the products of this computation are sent to PF and semantic interpretation, and the computation then goes on with its work in the next higher phase. What are these phase categories? Chomsky (2001, 2005, 2007, 2008) proposes that minimally they are CP and vP. From the perspective taken here, these two categories comprise the two principal parallel structures in language: the expression structure and the argument structure. CP is the complete expression structure, and vP is the complete argument structure. Chomsky (2001) uses the notion of completeness as well; in the approach taken here, phases have a highly specific and concrete underpinning—that is, the phases comprise the two principal structures that the computational system builds to create the expressions of a language.

I have given an explanation for why agreement occurs in human language. I now turn to the second question about agreement: why does it occur in some languages but not in others?

1.4 Agreement, Topic/Focus, and Strong Uniformity

1.4.1 Strong Uniformity

We saw that in subject-verb agreement languages such as English, a subject moves to Spec,TP if there is agreement inflection on T that agrees with it. Otherwise, there is no reason for the subject to move, and it stays in the position where it was externally merged. It was Kuroda (1988) who
proposed that movement is forced under agreement. Further, he proposed that agreementless languages such as Japanese do not force movement; instead, any movement that might be observed occurs as an entirely optional operation (see Saito 1989, 1992 for the view of scrambling as a purely optional operation). I agree with Kuroda that agreement, as opposed to Case, triggers “forced” movement. But does an agreementless language such as Japanese involve no forced movement at all? I will argue that in discourse-configurational languages, of which Japanese is one, something else that is computationally equivalent to \( f \)-feature agreement triggers forced movement.

I will argue that in discourse-configurational languages, topic/focus establishes functional relations in the same way as \( f \)-feature agreement in agreement languages. I hasten to add that it is not the case, for example, that agreement languages do not also have focus, or that discourse-configurational languages do not have \( f \)-features. In fact, we will see that all languages have both kinds of grammatical features: \( f \)-features and topic/focus features. Much of the monograph will address how particular languages deal with this uniform set of features. Work by Cinque (1999) and the cartography linguistics of Rizzi (1997, 2004) and others hint at this idea that all languages have essentially the same universal features/structures.

The overall approach that I adopt here rests on the Uniformity Principle (Chomsky 2001:2).

(14) \textit{Uniformity Principle}

In the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary, assume languages to be uniform, with variety restricted to easily detectable properties of utterances.

My approach is very much in line with that of Sigurðsson (2003), who assumes this Uniformity Principle literally for all languages and suggests the Silence Principle, by which he means that any given language shares the universal set of features with all other languages but does not pronounce all of them. This is, at least in part, the reason for the differences among languages. Here, I will adopt an even stronger interpretation of the Uniformity Principle and assume that, at least for grammatical features such as agreement and focus, every language not only shares a uniform set of features but also (contra Sigurðsson) overtly manifests these features in some fashion. Although this assertion is part of the Uniformity Principle—in fact, if I am right, it is a strong affirmation of this principle—I will give it a name for ease of exposition and call it \textit{Strong Uniformity}.
(15) Strong Uniformity

All languages share the same set of grammatical features, and every language overtly manifests these features.

For example, Japanese, which shows no agreement inflection except in rare cases such as subject honorification, nonetheless is predicted to have $\phi$-feature agreement in some form, as I will attempt to show. In chapter 2, I will show that Chinese, another “agreementless” language, in fact evidences person agreement.

This strong interpretation of the Uniformity Principle cannot be right for all features of a language. After all, languages do vary. In adopting the strong version at least for grammatical features, I intend to explore some of the outer bounds of the Uniformity Principle.

1.4.2 Discourse-Configurational Languages

It has long been observed that in many languages a phrase identified as topic or focus undergoes movement. Such a language is what É. Kiss (1995) describes as discourse-configurational.

(16) Discourse-configurational languages

a. “In a topic-prominent language, the topic is, in a way, an alternative to the subject [in a subject-prominent language] as the VP-external argument.” (É. Kiss 1995:4)

b. “Focus movement is triggered in some languages but not in others.” (É. Kiss 1995:5)

É. Kiss notes that in many discourse-configurational languages, both topic and focus are associated with movement, although there are languages where only one is. In a paper very much related to discourse configurationality, Grewendorf (2005) has argued that the movements in the German middle field that have typically been characterized as scrambling are nothing but topic or focus movement. Although I differ from Grewendorf in not assuming specific projections that host topic and focus, I will demonstrate that in Japanese both topic and focus trigger movement just as in German, and that the movement is equivalent to the movement caused by $\phi$-feature agreement—A-movement to Spec,TP or some related “A” position. In this way, in discourse-configurational languages, topic/focus has the same role as $\phi$-feature agreement: both establish a functional relation. Here, I will briefly describe the discourse-configurational nature of Japanese, holding a more extensive discussion in abeyance until chapter 3.
In Japanese, there are cases where movement is forced, but what forces it is not $\phi$-feature agreement. Rather, these movements are triggered by topic or focus. The term topic as I am using it refers to the entity the sentence is about. It is close to, but different from, discourse topic in that, for example, a topic need not refer to an anchored expression in the conversation; it simply needs to be characterizable as "what the sentence is about." A sentence with a topic falls into the class of expressions that Kuroda (1972–1973) calls "categorical" as opposed to "thetic," a distinction he bases on the logical theory of Marty (1918, 1965). Japanese has a topic construction where the topic, marked by wa, is always the discourse topic (Kuno 1973). The topic construction that I will discuss is different: here, something is moved and is given the property of topic in the broad sense of "topic of the sentence." I will argue that topic/focus in Japanese constitutes a grammatical feature that is computationally equivalent to $\phi$-feature agreement in forcing movement that results in A-chains. The idea that focus in some languages functions as a grammatical feature that drives movement has been suggested by a number of linguists (see, e.g., Brody 1990, Horvath 1981, 1986, 1995, É. Kiss 1995). Below, I will give one example of focus in Japanese that results in A-movement; in chapter 3, I will give evidence that these focus movements in Japanese undergo A- and not $\bar{A}$-movement.

In Japanese, a wh-phrase can be interpreted as an indeterminate pronoun in the context of the universal quantificational particle mo. This combination of wh-mo is a negative polarity item.

(17) Taroo-ga nani-mo kawa-nakat-ta.
  Taro-NOM what-mo buy-NEG-PAST
  ‘Taro didn’t buy anything.’

As is well known, the wh-phrase portion and mo can be separated (Kuroda 1965, Nishigauchi 1990).

(18) Taroo-ga nani-o kai-mo si-nakat-ta.
  Taro-NOM what-ACC buy-mo do-NEG-PAST
  ‘Taro didn’t buy anything.’

Here, the wh-phrase as an indeterminate pronoun occurs in object position with the accusative case marker -o, and the universal quantificational particle mo occurs on the verb stem. One distinct property of the indeterminate pronoun expression is that it is typically associated with focus—meaning something like ‘absolutely nothing/no one’. I will assume that the indeterminate pronoun is associated with the focus feature, which is
licensed by \textit{mo}; it is this focus feature that gives the indeterminate pronoun this “identificational focus” interpretation (but see note 8).

I will make use of Kishimoto’s (2001) analysis of the indeterminate pronoun. As noted above, the indeterminate pronoun is a \textit{wh}-phrase that is interpreted as an indeterminate pronoun in the context of the universal particle \textit{mo}. Kishimoto proposes that in order for the \textit{wh}-phrase to be interpreted as an indeterminate pronoun, it must be dominated by the same immediate maximum projection that dominates \textit{mo}; that is, \textit{mo} and the indeterminate pronoun must occupy the same minimal domain. As part of his analysis, Kishimoto argues that the verb raises to \textit{v} in Japanese, taking \textit{mo} with it, as shown in (19).

(19) \[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{vP} \\
\text{v'} \\
\text{VP} \\
\text{V-mo-v} \\
\text{t}_V
\end{array}
\]

In this structure, \textit{mo} can license any indeterminate pronoun in its local vP. In Kishimoto’s analysis, the object is assumed to move to Spec,vP. This is why it is fine to have an object indeterminate pronoun like the one in (18). As a piece of evidence for his analysis, Kishimoto observes that an indeterminate pronoun cannot occur in subject position.

(20) *\textit{Dare}-ga piza-o tabe-mo si-nakat-ta.

\textit{who-nom pizza-acc eat-MO do-NEG-PAST}

‘Anyone didn’t eat pizza.’

Kishimoto assumes the EPP here and argues that the subject indeterminate pronoun \textit{dare} ‘who’ raises to Spec,TP to satisfy the EPP requirement of T; this movement takes it outside the scope of \textit{mo}, which is on v. This, then, is a case of forced movement that takes a phrase to Spec,TP. Instead of \textit{\phi}-feature agreement, what is operative here is focus.\footnote{There is further evidence for this analysis beyond Kishimoto’s data. First, recall from (18), repeated here, that the indeterminate pronoun is fine in object position.}

There is further evidence for this analysis beyond Kishimoto’s data. First, recall from (18), repeated here, that the indeterminate pronoun is fine in object position.

(21) Taroo-ga \textit{nani-o} kai-mo si-nakat-ta.

\textit{Taro-nom what-ACC buy-MO do-NEG-PAST}

‘Taro didn’t buy anything.’
Now observe what happens if we scramble the object to the head of the sentence.

(22) *Nani-o; Taroo-ga t; kai-mo si-nakat-ta.
   what-ACC Taro-NOM buy-MO do-NEG-PAST
   ‘Taro didn’t buy anything.’

As shown, if the object indeterminate pronoun is scrambled to the left of the subject, the sentence becomes ungrammatical. What does this fact indicate? Kishimoto’s analysis does not predict this ungrammaticality. The problem is that this kind of scrambling may be A-movement, which is what we are attempting to analyze, but it may also be Ā-scrambling. Ā-scrambling allows reconstruction (Mahajan 1990, Saito 1992, Tada 1993), so that in (22), the moved object indeterminate pronoun nani should in principle be interpretable in its original complement position. This should lead to a grammatical sentence. We can see the Ā-scrambling possibility of local scrambling in (23), where an anaphor has been moved to the head of the sentence.

(23) Zibun-zisin-o; Taroo-ga t; hihansi-ta.
   self-ACC Taro-NOM criticize-PAST
   ‘Self, Taro criticized.’

The fact that the indeterminate pronoun in (22) cannot be so reconstructed indicates that it has undergone A-movement, which normally does not reconstruct. In Miyagawa 2001, 2003 (see also Hasegawa 2005, Kitahara 2002), I argued that the landing site of this kind of A-movement is Spec,TP. This is what we predict if focus in discourse-configurational languages like Japanese functions as a grammatical feature that triggers A-movement. In chapter 3, I will give evidence for the “A” nature of this movement. There, I will also revise the view that the movement always takes place to Spec,TP; I will suggest instead that it can sometimes move to an A-position above the TP, which I will call aP.

Let us return now to the agreement–topic/focus parameter. An immediate problem arises with the idea of such a parameter. Take focus, for example. Focus and agreement are usually thought to be located on fundamentally different heads. Focus is commonly postulated to occur on the focus head that is higher than T and in the region of C (e.g., Culicover and Rochemont 1983, Rizzi 1997), or, in languages such as Hungarian and Turkish, possibly lower (see É. Kiss 1995 for discussion of various approaches). In contrast, agreement in (for example) subject-verb agreement is normally construed as being located on T. Although it is not entirely implausible for two features on fundamentally different heads to
vary parametrically, the idea of an agreement–topic/focus parameter would be more plausible if focus and agreement were not found on such vastly different heads. There is sufficient evidence to associate focus with a head higher than T, so if we are to do anything about “head parity,” we need to look at agreement. To get right to the point, I suggest, following Chomsky (2007, 2008), that agreement in (for example) subject-verb agreement is associated with a head higher than T—namely, with C (see Boeckx 2003, Carstens 2003, Kornfilt 2000, 2004 for a similar idea). There are conceptual and empirical reasons for assuming this. Conceptually, merging the agreement feature on C means that grammatical features that are responsible for computations such as movement show up solely on phase heads—C, v, and possibly D, although I will limit my discussion largely to C. Given that any operation beyond initial Merge takes place within phases, it makes sense that the elements triggering these operations are merged on phase heads, φ-feature agreement being one such element.

There is also empirical evidence for assuming agreement to merge on C. First, in English, environments where agreement (and Case) is not assigned, such as the ECM (exceptional-Case-marking) construction, involve a “bare” TP that does not have a CP (Chomsky 2005, 2008). A simple way to view this is that C provides the agreement, and in its absence, T by itself cannot bear agreement (or Case). A second piece of empirical evidence is that agreement actually shows up on C in some languages. For example, Carstens (2003:393) notes the following West Flemish examples (from Haegeman 1992):

(24) a. Kpeinzen dan-k (ik) morgen goan.
   I.think that-I (I) tomorrow go
   ‘I think that I’ll go tomorrow.’

b. Kpeinzen da-j (gie) morgen goat.
   I.think that-you (you) tomorrow go
   ‘I think that you’ll go tomorrow.’

c. Kvinden dan die boeken te diere zyn.
   I.find that.pl the books too expensive are
   ‘I find those books too expensive.’

Although a number of linguists have proposed that the complementizer-subject agreement is an instance of the agreement on T raising to C (Hoekstra and Marácz 1989, Watanabe 2000, Zwart 1993, 1997), Carstens argues that the agreement originates on C (see Carstens 2003 for additional references for and against this idea). One piece of evidence is that
the complementizer must be adjacent to the subject it agrees with. In (24a–c), the embedded verb also inflects for agreement, which suggests that the agreement also shows up on T. Under my analysis, which closely follows Chomsky’s (2007, 2008) proposal, this suggests that the agreement on C may percolate down from C to T, a point I discuss later.

The picture that emerges is that both topic/focus and agreement initially occur on C, as shown in (25). (I use the generic term \( \phi \)-probe for the uninterpretable \( \phi \)-feature agreement at C.)

(25) Uniform set of features

```
CP
   /   \      C'
  /     \     /     \       
TP    C_\phi-probe  topic/focus
     /     \     
      T
```

Technically, what is merged on C is an uninterpretable feature. For agreement, it is an uninterpretable agreement feature, the \( \phi \)-probe, that must be valued by the interpretable feature on the goal (Chomsky 2000, Pesetsky and Torrego 2006). For focus, what is the nature of the uninterpretable feature? Expanding on a line of investigation in Holmberg and Nikanne 2002, I propose that there is just one feature for topic/focus, and it is the “default” topic feature, \( \text{-focus} \). If this feature enters into agreement with a focused element, it is turned into a \( +\text{focus} \) feature. Details will be given in chapters 3 and 4.

The topic/focus feature is matched with a relevant phrase in the structure—for example, the thematic subject. In most cases, this category is raised to Spec,TP because that is the head the probe ultimately ends up on by inheritance from C. One ostensible exception is long-distance agreement, where the goal appears to occur lower than the head with the \( \phi \)-probe. I will take up the issue of long-distance agreement in chapter 2 and show that for many cases, long-distance agreement in fact is not an exception to the need for agreement to form a Spec-head relation. Another exception to the idea that the \( \phi \)-probe and its goal occur in the Spec,TP region comes from Bantu: we will see instances where the \( \phi \)-probe occurs on a projection higher than TP, which I call \( zP \), the same projection I will posit for some of the topic/focus movements in Japanese (for detailed discussion, see chapter 3).
By initially placing agreement as well as topic/focus on a “high” head in the C region, we make it plausible for these two features to be the two polarities of the same parameter. Because agreement and topic/focus constitute the primary grammatical features in the proposed system, we also thereby isolate all such features on a phase head, C. This is a desirable outcome: agreement and topic/focus are two major elements of computation in narrow syntax, and the idea of isolating them initially on C means simply that we identify the major elements of computation with phase heads—C, v, and possibly D. Although I will not have much to say about v and D, I will explore this view in detail with regard to C. Indeed, if topic/focus and agreement are essentially two sides of the same coin as far as computation is concerned, we gain a conceptual argument that agreement should be associated with C. There is sufficient evidence that topic/focus is associated with the C domain (see, e.g., Culicover and Rochemont 1983 for focus). If agreement has the same formal function as topic/focus—to trigger movement—then it would be conceptually plausible to locate agreement at C as well.

But do topic/focus and agreement constitute a natural class independent of syntactic movement? If so, there is a plausibility argument to add to our empirical and theoretical arguments. Historical analysis suggests a relation between topic/focus and agreement. It is widely assumed that subject agreement morphology historically develops from subject pronouns (e.g., Givón 1976). Givón proposes that the process by which this happens relates to topicalization. When something is topicalized, it typically leaves a pronoun in its original position. The idea is that this pronoun in the topic construction gets reanalyzed and becomes part of the verbal morphology. Alternatively, Simpson and Wu (2001) suggest that the subject pronoun’s reanalysis as agreement morphology has to do with its being associated with focus. On either account, there is a clear link historically between agreement and topic/focus, which lends further credence to my claim that these features are computationally equivalent.

A major point I will illustrate is that in a discourse-configurational language, topic/focus, which occurs on C, ultimately shows up on a lower node such as T, triggering A-movement to this lower node. In certain cases, the head that ultimately hosts topic/focus may be a head higher than T and lower than C, as I demonstrate in chapter 3, but for the time being I will keep the picture simple and assume that in these languages topic/focus appears on T. This means that the topic/focus feature that starts out on C is inherited by T, as shown in (26).
The topic/focus feature is inherited by T in a discourse-configurational language

(26) The topic/focus feature is inherited by T in a discourse-configurational language

This agreement–topic/focus parameter boils down to whether the topic/focus feature is inherited by T. If it is, the structure will represent a discourse-configurational language as described by É. Kiss (1995, etc.) and others. I will discuss this inheritance of topic/focus by T in detail in chapters 3 and 4.

What about the \( \phi \)-probe? In earlier work (Miyagawa 2005b), I assumed that the \( \phi \)-probe also has the option of staying on C or being inherited by T. This assumption was based on an analysis of Kinande as described by Baker (2003). However, in chapter 4, I will present an alternative analysis of the Kinande facts that shows the \( \phi \)-probe being inherited by a lower head other than T. What this means is that the \( \phi \)-probe, if it occurs, is apparently always inherited by a lower head regardless of whether the topic/focus feature is also inherited (see Chomsky 2007, 2008), as shown in (27).

(27) The \( \phi \)-probe is always inherited by a lower head such as T

What is the reason for this inheritance? There are two questions here: why inheritance occurs at all, and why \( \phi \)-probes are always inherited by a lower head. Concerning the first, I will assume the reason Chomsky gave when he originally proposed feature inheritance (Chomsky 2005, 2008): it enables languages to have A-chains. Without inheritance by T,
all movement would be $\bar{A}$-movement; that is, all movement would be operator movement. Language would be deprived of movement for purposes of informational structure, such as creating subject-of relations, topic-comment relations, and so forth. From the perspective of the agreement–topic/focus parameter, this means that in some languages, such as English, $A$-chains are created on the basis of $\phi$-probe inheritance, but in the discourse-configurational languages, they are created on the basis of topic/focus. A central question of this monograph is, then, what happens in constructions in a discourse-configurational language where both the $\phi$-probe and topic/focus appear? I take up this question particularly in chapter 4 when I look at Kinande and Kilega (both Bantu languages) and at Finnish.

Let us turn to the second question: why $\phi$-probes are always inherited by a lower head. If the $\phi$-probe is always inherited in this way, an objection that one might raise to the overall approach outlined so far is, why not simply merge the $\phi$-probe at T to begin with? That was, in fact, the assumption prior to the recent works by Chomsky and others. We have seen conceptual and empirical arguments that favor merging the $\phi$-probe at C. When we look at Bantu and Finnish, we will see cases where the $\phi$-probe is not inherited by T; rather, it is inherited by a head higher than T but lower than C, which I call $\alpha P$.

(28)

\[
\begin{align*}
& CP \\
& \quad \downarrow C' \\
& \quad \downarrow \alpha P \quad C \\
& \quad \downarrow \alpha' \\
& \quad \downarrow TP \quad \alpha \\
& \quad \downarrow T' \\
& \quad \downarrow vP \quad T
\end{align*}
\]

This type of projection between TP and CP, illustrated in (28), has been proposed for a variety of languages, including Bantu (Baker 2003), Hungarian (É. Kiss 1995), and Romance (Uriagereka 1995). Particularly in
the case of Bantu, the \( \phi \)-probe at \( a \) gives rise to interactions between the \( \phi \)-probe and movement that differ sharply from the familiar Indo-European situation where the \( \phi \)-probe typically picks out the grammatical subject and it is this subject that moves to Spec,TP. Being inherited by a higher head, the \( \phi \)-probe in Bantu is able to pick out any DP in its search domain, so that what raises may be the subject, the object, or the locative (the locative in the Bantu languages we will look at is apparently a DP), and the raised phrase—the subject, the object, or the locative—is what enters into agreement with the \( \phi \)-probe. (The following examples are from Baker 2003:113.)

(29) a. Omukali mo-a-seny-ire olukwi (lw’-omo-mbasa). (SVO)  
   woman.1 AFF-1.s/T-chop-EXT wood.11 LK11-LOC.18-axe.9  
   ‘The woman chopped wood (with an axe).’

   b. Olukwi si-lu-li-seny-a bakali (omo-mbasa). (OVS)  
   wood.11 NEG-11.s-pres-chop-fv women.2 LOC.18-axe.9  
   ‘Women do not chop wood (with an axe).’

   c. ?Omo-mulongo mw-a-hik-a omukali. (LocVS)  
   loc.18-village.3 18.s-t-arrive-fv woman  
   ‘At the village arrived a woman.’

In (29a), the verb agrees with the subject ‘woman’; in (29b), it agrees with the raised object ‘wood’; and in (29c), it agrees with the raised locative ‘at the village’. We have to assume that for the object or the locative to be in the local search domain of the \( \phi \)-probe, it must occur at the edge of the vP (Carstens 2003). In chapter 4, I will draw on Baker’s (2003) work to show that the agreed-with phrase (subject, object, or locative) occurs higher than Spec,TP.10

Why is the \( \phi \)-probe that occurs at \( a \) in Bantu free to pick out any DP in its search domain, while a \( \phi \)-probe at T is limited to the grammatical subject? One possibility is that in “subject agreement” languages such as English, there is no reason for a DP within vP—typically the object—to move to Spec,vP, so that such a DP can never find itself in the local domain of the \( \phi \)-probe in the higher phase. On this account, the fact that the \( \phi \)-probe at T only picks out the grammatical subject is coincidental in the sense that it is only the grammatical subject that appears in its search domain. We can discount this approach by looking again at Bantu. We will see that in certain constructions, the \( \alpha \)P is disallowed, so that the \( \phi \)-probe is forced to be inherited by T. When this happens, a very different pattern emerges, exactly like the pattern in the familiar Indo-European languages: the \( \phi \)-probe must pick out the grammatical subject. Since we
know that the Bantu languages allow the object or the locative to enter into the search domain of the \( \phi \)-probe at \( \alpha \), it cannot be the case that when the \( \phi \)-probe occurs at T, the object and the locative are blocked from moving to Spec,vP to be visible to the \( \phi \)-probe.

A more promising idea is to view \( \phi \)-probes as incapable of identifying a goal by themselves. A goal must somehow be “activated” to be visible to a \( \phi \)-probe, and the mechanism that typically activates it is Case (Chomsky 2001). Let us assume the traditional view (somewhat different from the view in Chomsky 2001) that T assigns nominative Case; in minimalist parlance, T values the Case on its target, which is the grammatical subject (e.g., Pesetsky and Torrego 2001). The \( \phi \)-feature at T then picks out the target of this Case assignment—the nominative subject—as its goal. This is why the \( \phi \)-probe at T always picks out the grammatical subject.

What about the Bantu case? The \( \phi \)-probe is inherited not by T but by the higher head \( \alpha \), which is not a Case assigner. In chapter 4, I show how this \( \phi \)-probe on \( \alpha \) together with the topic feature, which is also inherited by \( \alpha \), accounts for the several possible goals the probe can seek—subject, object, or locative. As I also show, this analysis can explain Baker’s (2003) polysynthesis parameter without stipulating that Case does not play any role in Bantu.

The reason, then, that the \( \phi \)-probe is inherited by a lower head is that it must seek a way to find its goal, being unable to do so by itself. The situation is different for focus, for example. Focus is usually marked in discourse-configurational languages—in Japanese, for example, it is morphologically marked, as we will see in chapter 3 and especially in chapter 5. There is no need to activate the goal, and therefore the probe is able to pick out its goal without depending on some activation mechanism. What about topic? We will see in chapter 3 that topic is fundamentally different from focus and also from the \( \phi \)-probe in that it does not seek a goal in the sense of a probe-goal relation. It is similar to focus, though, in that the probe responsible for topicalization does not require activation of the goal.

Although I will not take up Case in this monograph, it does play an important role particularly in tandem with the \( \phi \)-probe. Case’s role in activation is prominently discussed in recent minimalist literature (e.g., Chomsky 2000, 2001). I assume that it has other roles to play as well, one of which is to make a nominal phrase visible for \( \theta \)-marking, an assumption from GB (Chomsky 1981). This is perhaps its main role. After all, while we find inherent Case, which is Case that comes with a par-
ticular θ-role, we never find inherent agreement. The so-called default agreement in antiagreement is a lack of agreement, not some inherent agreement. On this view, Case is primarily an entity in the domain of *lexical relations*, although it is typically assigned by a functional head such as T, whereas agreement is an entity in the domain of *functional relations*. Where the two come together is in those situations where a φ-probe, in establishing a functional relation, takes advantage of the ability of Case to make a nominal visible for θ-marking.

The above discussion makes clear when Agree takes place for the φ-probe and focus (regarding topic, see chapter 3). Whereas both the φ-probe and focus begin at C, the φ-probe does not enter into an Agree relation until it is inherited by a lower head that has an activation mechanism, most commonly Case. At this point, Agree takes place and a goal for the φ-probe is identified. In contrast, the focus feature requires no activation, so it enters into an Agree relation when it is at C. Notice that this raises an issue for complementizer agreement in West Flemish. How can the φ-probe at C be valued? I return to this problem in chapter 2.

The strong version of the Uniformity Principle that guides this work predicts that a language like Japanese, which is considered to lack φ-feature agreement, should manifest it in some fashion. Let us look next at this prediction.

### 1.4.3 Evidence for Person Agreement in Japanese

The strong interpretation of the Uniformity Principle assumes that all languages share the same essential components. This means that all languages share the features we are looking at, φ-features and topic/focus, which are both merged initially on a phase head. Recall that Strong Uniformity does not state that these two features must always be present. Rather, every language has both, and we should be able to find them in some given construction in every language.

Although Japanese does not show the typical subject-verb agreement found in many languages, it does exhibit person agreement involving elements that occur higher than T, in what Inoue (2006) calls D(iscourse)-modals. These modals, which arguably occur in the C domain, express some sort of attitude on the part of the speaker toward the utterance and also typically the hearer. Many traditional Japanese grammarians have examined issues of modality in the language and have found that these modalities often impose a limitation on the kind of subject that is allowed—person agreement, in other words. Examples (30)–(34) are
from Ueda (2006:168–169, 174), who based them on examples in Nitta 1991; see also Tenny 2006 for relevant discussion.

(30) Exhortative [first person, *second person, *third person]
\{Watasi/*Anata/*Yamada-sensei\}-ga Taroo-ni tegami-o
I/*you/*Prof. Yamada-NOM Taro-DAT letter-ACC
okuri-MASYOO.
send-let’s
‘Let’s (have) me/*you/*Prof. Yamada send Taro a letter.’

(31) oku [first person, *second person, *third person]
\{Watasi/*Anata/*Yamada-sensei\}-wa Taroo-ni tegami-o okutte
I/*you/*Prof. Yamada-TOP Taro-DAT letter-ACC send
OKU.
oku
‘I/*You/*Prof. Yamada will send a letter to Taro.’

(32) Prohibition [*first person, second person, *third person]
\{*Watasi/Anata/Yamada-sensei\}-wa Taroo-ni tegami-o
*I/you/*Prof. Yamada-TOP Taro-DAT letter-ACC
okuru-NA.
send-don’t
‘Don’t *I/you/*Prof. Yamada send Taro a letter.’

(33) Negative supposition [first person, *second person, third person]
\{Boku/*Kimi/Kare\}-wa iku-MAI.
I/*you/he-top go-probably.not
‘I/*You/He probably won’t go.’

(34) Assertion (see also Inoue 2006) [first person, *second person, third person]
\{Watasi/*Anata/Yamada-sensei\}-wa Taroo-ni tegami-o
I/*you/Prof. Yamada-TOP Taro-DAT letter-ACC
okut-TA.
send-PASTASSERT
‘Asserted: I/*You/Prof. Yamada sent a letter to Taro.’

Exhortative (see (30)) and oku (see (31)) only allow the first person; prohibition (see (32)) only allows the second person; negative supposition (see (33)) and assertion (see (34)) only allow first and third persons. There may be other such modalities. For example, Ueda (2006:174) lists questions as only allowing second and third person, but that may simply be a matter of the meaning—normally, a speaker does not ask about an action
or event whose subject is the speaker himself or herself, though in the right context, it should be possible.

Another example of φ-feature agreement in a discourse-configurational language is provided by the so-called force markers in Korean (examples from Pak 2006:295–296).

(35) a. Imperative
   Cemsim-ulmek-e-la!
   lunch-ACC eat-IMP
   ‘Eat lunch!’

b. Exhortative
   Icey kongpwuha-ca.
   now study-EXH
   ‘Now, let’s study.’

c. Promissive
   Nayil nay-ka cemsim-ul sa-ma.
   tomorrow I-NOM lunch-ACC buy-PRM
   ‘I will buy lunch tomorrow.’

Although earlier studies of these force markers treat them as distinct construction types, Pak notes that the markers share several syntactic traits: in embedding, none allows an overt subject; they do not allow mood particles; they allow a special negative marker, -mal; there is no tense marking; and they can be conjoined by -ko, which requires conjuncts to be the same type of clause. The following examples demonstrate the force markers’ ability to occur with -mal.

(36) a. Imperative
   Mek-ci mal-a-la.
   eat-NOM NEG-A-IMP
   ‘Do not eat.’

b. Exhortative
   Mek-ci mal-ca.
   eat-NOM NEG-EXH
   ‘Let’s not eat.’

c. Promissive
   Mek-ci mal-u-ma.
   eat-NOM NEG-U-PRM
   ‘I promise not to eat.’

Pak concludes that these particles all represent the same type of construction and, specifically, that they all involve agreement at C.
There are two further points to be made about these particles. First, as Pak notes, the restrictions found in person with these markers are imposed on the subject, and they appear best specified as ±speaker, ±addressee. This makes sense because at the C level, which is the interface with the universe of discourse, the two participants are the speaker and the addressee. Pak proposes the following characterizations:

(37) a. Imperative: –speaker, +addressee
    b. Exhortative: +speaker, +addressee
    c. Promissive: +speaker, –addressee

The imperative marker -la indicates that the subject is the addressee, the exhortative -ca indicates that the subject is the speaker and the addressee together (expressed using the first person inclusive of the addressee), and the promissive -ma indicates that the subject is the speaker. The same approach applies by and large to the person restrictions observed earlier for Japanese.

The second point has to do with how valuation of the $\phi$-probe proceeds. All of the Japanese and Korean examples of person agreement at C involve some element, typically associated with modality, such as the exhortative -masyoo and negative supposition -mai in Japanese and the force markers in Korean. It is the presence of one of these elements that imposes the person agreement/restriction. Crucially, it is not the subject that values the $\phi$-probe at C, as is commonly the case in agreement languages. Later I will speculate on why the subject does not value the $\phi$-probe in Japanese, but right now let us work through how valuation takes place. First, it is important to note that the kind of person restriction found in Japanese does not always occur; it emerges only when one of the relevant modal elements appears in the construction. If there is no such modal, there is no person restriction; hence, there is no $\phi$-feature agreement. This is still consistent with the Strong Uniformity interpretation of the Uniformity Principle: it simply shows that in Japanese, $\phi$-feature agreement does occur, but not in every clause.

When the $\phi$-probe does occur, I suggest that it is inherited by the modal head, as shown in (38), and the modal head, which contains the interpretable person feature, values it at that point. This suggestion is based on the intuition that it is the modal that imposes the person agreement.
I am supposing here that the φ-feature, by attaching directly to its goal, is able to undergo valuation because it does not have to seek the goal through some activation mechanism. Now the φ-feature has a value; let us say it has been valued as first person by the goal Mod. The valued φ-feature is now almost like a clitic in that it has an agreement value, and it needs to be able to impose this restriction. But given that it is a φ-probe, it cannot assert its value by itself; instead, it has to depend on some other mechanism. Case is the natural candidate, so the φ-probe is inherited by T, where the person restriction on the subject is imposed through the nominative Case assigned by T. This is shown in (39).

One final question regarding person agreement in Japanese and Korean is, why does it work the way it does? Unlike the typical φ-feature agreement, where a φ-probe seeks its goal inside TP, in Japanese and Korean a modal is the goal that values the φ-probe. I speculate that this is because nominals in Japanese and Korean are not associated with the appropriate
interpretable person features to value a $\phi$-probe. The only other possibility is Case, and the nominal phrase that is picked out is the “subject,” similarly to what happens in languages like English. Why does the Japanese and Korean nominal lack $\phi$-features? One possible answer could come from Chierchia’s (1998) nominal parameter. Chierchia argues that nominals are parameterized for whether they can refer to individuals (e.g., English) or just to kinds (e.g., Japanese). We might speculate that nominals that can only refer to kinds do not have the appropriate content for carrying interpretable $\phi$-features. We will see in chapter 2 that Chinese, the language that Chierchia uses to demonstrate the “kind” type of nominal system, turns out to have a robust person agreement similar to the ones found in Indo-European. But this will not negate the idea that the “kind” nominal cannot carry $\phi$-feature agreement. As we will see, the actual goal of the $\phi$-probe in Chinese is an empty agreement head, similar to those studied by Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou (1998) in Greek. Even in Chinese, the fully specified nominal does not appear capable of valuing the $\phi$-probe. I will leave this issue open.

1.5 Summary

In this chapter, I posed two questions about agreement: why does agreement occur, and why do some languages have it while others do not? I suggested that agreement establishes what I call a functional relation between a functional head and an XP. Unlike lexical relations, which are strictly local, any relation between a functional head and an XP must be established by some rule that can relate two points, often two distant points, in the structure. Agreement is tapped for this purpose in languages that have $\phi$-feature agreement. The relations that are established between functional heads and XPs are critical: they substantially enhance the expressive power of human language by making it possible to express such notions as topic-comment, subject of a clause, focus, and content questions.

To explain why agreement occurs in some languages but not others, I first proposed that all languages have a uniform set of features that includes $\phi$-features and topic/focus and that all languages should display overt evidence of both. I called this proposal Strong Uniformity, reflecting the idea that it is a stronger version of Chomsky’s (2001) Uniformity Principle. In some cases, such as person agreement in Japanese and Korean, $\phi$-feature agreement does not occur in every sentence; instead, it arises in constructions involving a variety of modals. Moreover, I argued
that topic/focus in discourse-configurational languages such as Japanese has a function equivalent to φ-feature agreement in agreement languages in triggering A-movement. So, the difference between agreement languages and discourse-configurational languages boils down to what triggers movement at T: the φ-probe or topic/focus. I suggested that topic/focus and φ-feature agreement are both merged on a phase head (C being the primary phase head that I dealt with) and that the φ-probe, if it occurs, is inherited by T or some related head.

The difference between agreement and discourse-configurational languages boils down to whether or not the topic/focus feature is also inherited by a lower head such as T. If it is inherited, we have a discourse-configurational language, but if not, we have an agreement language. Of course, agreement also occurs in discourse-configurational languages, and, as we will see, how it functions differs from one discourse-configurational language to the next. This issue of variability among discourse-configurational languages will be a focus of the discussion in chapters 2–4.