
I

The task of universal pragmatics is to identify and reconstruct universal conditions of possible mutual understanding (Verständigung). In other contexts, one also speaks of “general presuppositions of communication,” but I prefer to speak of general presuppositions of communicative action because I take the type of action aimed at reaching understanding to be fundamental. Thus I start from the assumption (without undertaking to demonstrate it here) that other forms of social action—for example, conflict, competition, strategic action in general—are derivatives of action oriented toward reaching understanding (Verständigung). Furthermore, since language is the specific medium of reaching understanding at the sociocultural stage of evolution, I want to go a step further and single out explicit speech actions from other forms of communicative action. I shall ignore nonverbal actions and bodily expressions.

The Validity Basis of Speech

Karl-Otto Apel proposes the following formulation in regard to the general presuppositions of consensual speech acts: to identify such presuppositions we must, he thinks, leave the perspective of the observer of behavioral facts and call to mind “what we must necessarily always already presuppose in regard to ourselves and others as
normative conditions of the possibility of reaching understanding; and in this sense, what we must necessarily always already have accepted."³ Apel here uses the aprioristic perfect (immer schon: always already) and adds the mode of necessity in order to express the transcendental constraint to which we, as speakers, are subject as soon as we perform or understand or respond to a speech act. In or after the performance of this act, we can become aware that we have involuntarily made certain assumptions, which Apel calls “normative conditions of the possibility of reaching understanding.” The adjective “normative” may give rise to misunderstanding. One can say, however, that the general and unavoidable—in this sense transcendental—conditions of possible mutual understanding have a normative content when one thinks not only of the validity dimension of norms of action or evaluation, or even of the validity dimension of rules in general, but also of the validity basis of speech across its entire spectrum. As a preliminary, I want to indicate briefly what I mean by the “validity basis of speech.”

I shall develop the thesis that anyone acting communicatively must, in performing any speech act, raise universal validity claims and suppose that they can be vindicated (einhören). Insofar as she wants to participate in a process of reaching understanding, she cannot avoid raising the following—and indeed precisely the following—validity claims. She claims to be

a. uttering something intelligibly,
b. giving (the hearer) something to understand,
c. making herself thereby understandable, and
d. coming to an understanding with another person.

The speaker must choose an intelligible (verständlich) expression so that speaker and hearer can comprehend one another. The speaker must have the intention of communicating a true (wahr) proposition (or a propositional content, the existential presuppositions of which are satisfied) so that the hearer can share the knowledge of the speaker. The speaker must want to express her intentions truthfully (wahrhaftig) so that the hearer can find the utterance of the speaker credible (can trust her). Finally, the speaker must choose an utter-
ance that is right (richtig) with respect to prevailing norms and values so that the hearer can accept the utterance, and both speaker and hearer can, in the utterance, thereby agree with one another with respect to a recognized normative background. Moreover, communicative action can continue undisturbed only as long as all participants suppose that the validity claims they reciprocally raise are raised justifiably.

The aim of reaching understanding (Verständigung) is to bring about an agreement (Einverständnis) that terminates in the intersubjective mutuality of reciprocal comprehension, shared knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one another. Agreement is based on recognition of the four corresponding validity claims: comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness, and rightness. We can see that the word “Verständigung” is ambiguous. In its narrowest meaning it indicates that two subjects understand a linguistic expression in the same way; in its broadest meaning it indicates that an accord exists between two subjects concerning the rightness of an utterance in relation to a mutually recognized normative background. In addition, the participants in communication can reach understanding about something in the world, and they can make their intentions understandable to one another.

If full agreement, embracing all four of these components, were a normal state of linguistic communication, it would not be necessary to analyze the process of reaching understanding from the dynamic perspective of bringing about an agreement. The typical states are in the gray areas between, on the one hand, lack of understanding and misunderstanding, intentional and involuntary untruthfulness, concealed and open discord, and, on the other hand, preexisting or achieved consensus. Reaching understanding is the process of bringing about an agreement on the presupposed basis of validity claims that are mutually recognized. In everyday life, we start from a background consensus pertaining to those interpretations taken for granted among participants. As soon as this consensus is shaken, and as soon as the presupposition that the validity claims are satisfied (or could be vindicated) is suspended in the case of at least one of the four claims, communicative action cannot be continued.
The task of mutual interpretation, then, is to achieve a new definition of the situation that all participants can share. If this attempt fails, one is basically confronted with the alternatives of switching to strategic action, breaking off communication altogether, or recommencing action oriented toward reaching understanding at a different level, the level of argumentative speech (for purposes of discursively examining the problematic validity claims, which are now regarded as hypothetical). In what follows, I shall take into consideration only consensual speech acts, leaving aside both discourse and strategic action.

In communicative action, participants presuppose that they know what mutual recognition of reciprocally raised validity claims means. If in addition they can rely on a shared definition of the situation and thereupon act consensually, the background consensus includes the following:

a. Speaker and hearer know implicitly that each of them has to raise the aforementioned validity claims if there is to be communication at all (in the sense of action oriented toward reaching understanding).

b. Both reciprocally suppose that they actually do satisfy these presuppositions of communication, that is, that they justifiably raise their validity claims.

c. This means that there is a common conviction that any validity claims raised either are already vindicated, as in the case of the comprehensibility of the sentences uttered, or, as in the case of truth, truthfulness, and rightness, could be vindicated because the sentences, propositions, expressed intentions, and utterances satisfy the corresponding adequacy conditions.

Thus I distinguish (i) the conditions for the validity of a grammatical sentence, true proposition, truthful intentional expression, or normatively correct utterance appropriate to its context from (ii) the claims with which speakers demand intersubjective recognition for the well-formedness of a sentence, truth of a proposition, truthfulness of an intentional expression, and rightness of a speech act, as well as from (iii) the vindication of justifiably raised validity claims. Vindication means that the proponent, whether through appeal to
intuitions and experiences or through arguments and action consequences, justifies the claim’s worthiness to be recognized and brings about a suprasubjective recognition of its validity. In accepting a validity claim raised by the speaker, the hearer recognizes the validity of the symbolic structures; that is, he recognizes that a sentence is grammatical, a statement true, an intentional expression truthful, or an utterance correct. The validity of these symbolic structures is justified by virtue of the fact that they satisfy certain adequacy conditions; but the meaning of the validity consists in their worthiness to be recognized that is, in the guarantee that intersubjective recognition can be brought about under suitable conditions.4

I have proposed the name “universal pragmatics”5 for the research program aimed at reconstructing the universal validity basis of speech.6 I would now like to delimit the theme of this research program in a preliminary way. Thus before passing on (in part II) to the theory of speech acts, I shall prefix a few guiding remarks dealing with (i) an initial delimitation of the object domain of the proposed program of universal pragmatics; (ii) an elucidation of the procedure of rational reconstruction, as opposed to an empirical-analytic procedure in the narrower sense; (iii) a few methodological difficulties resulting from the fact that linguistics claims the status of a reconstructive science; and finally (iv) the question of whether the proposed universal pragmatics assumes the status of a transcendental theory of reflection or that of an empirically substantive reconstructive science. I shall restrict myself to guiding remarks because, while these questions are fundamental and deserve to be examined independently, they form only the context of the topic I shall treat and must thus remain in the background.

Preliminary Delimitation of the Object Domain

In several of his works, Apel has pointed to the abstractive fallacy that underlies the approach to the logic of science favored by contemporary analytic philosophy.7 The logical analysis of language that originated with Carnap focuses primarily on syntactic and semantic properties of linguistic formations. Like structuralist linguistics, it delimits its object domain by first abstracting from the pragmatic
properties of language, and subsequently introducing the pragmatic dimension in such a way that the constitutive connection between the generative accomplishments of subjects capable of speaking and acting, on the one hand, and the general structures of speech, on the other, cannot come into view. It is certainly legitimate to draw an abstractive distinction between language as structure and speaking as process. A language will then be understood as a system of rules for generating expressions, such that all well-formed expressions (e.g., sentences) may count as elements of this language. On the other hand, subjects capable of speaking can employ such expressions as participants in a process of communication; for instance, they can utter sentences as well as understand them and respond to them. This abstraction of language from the use of language in speech (langue versus parole), which is made in both the logical and the structuralist analysis of language, is meaningful. Nonetheless, this methodological step is not sufficient reason for the view that the pragmatic dimension of language from which one abstracts is beyond formal (or linguistic) analysis. An abstractive fallacy arises in that the successful, or at least promising, reconstruction of linguistic rule systems is seen as justification for restricting formal analysis to this object domain. The separation of the two analytic levels, language and speech, should not be made in such a way that the pragmatic dimension of language is left to exclusively empirical analysis—that is, to empirical sciences such as psycholinguistics and sociolinguistics.

I would like to defend the thesis that not only language but speech too—that is, the employment of sentences in utterances—is accessible to formal analysis. Like the elementary units of language (sentences), the elementary units of speech (utterances) can be analyzed from the methodological stance of a reconstructive science.

Approaches to a general theory of communication have been developed from the semiotics of Charles Morris. In their framework of fundamental concepts they integrate the model of linguistic behaviorism (the symbolically mediated behavioral reaction of the stimulated individual organism) with the model of information transmission (encoding and decoding signals between sender and receiver for a given channel and an at least partially common store
of signs). If the speaking process is conceptualized in this way, the fundamental question of universal pragmatics concerning the general conditions of possible mutual understanding (Verständigung) cannot be posed in an appropriate way. For example, the intersubjectivity of meanings that are identical for at least two speakers does not even become a problem (i) if the identity of meanings is reduced to extensionally equivalent classes of behavioral properties, as is done in linguistic behaviorism, or (ii) if it is preestablished at the analytic level that there exists a common code and store of signs between sender and receiver, as is done in information theory.

In addition to empiricist approaches that issue, in one way or another, from the semiotics of Morris, there are interesting approaches to the logical analysis of general structures of speech and action. The following analyses can be understood as contributions along the way to a universal pragmatics. Bar-Hillel pointed out quite early the necessity for a pragmatic extension of logical semantics. Also of note are the proposals for a deontic logic (Hare, H. von Wright, N. Rescher) and corresponding attempts at a formalization of speech acts such as assertions and questions (Apostel); approaches to a logic of nondeductive argumentation (Toulmin, Botha) belong here as well. From the side of linguistics, the investigation of presuppositions (Kiefer, Petöfi), conversational postulates (Grice, Lakoff), speech acts (Ross, McCawley, Wunderlich), and dialogues and texts (Fillmore, Posner) lead to a consideration of the pragmatic dimension of language from a reconstructionist point of view. The difficulties in semantic theory (Lyons, Katz) point in the same direction. From the side of formal semantics, in particular the discussion—going back to Frege and Russell—of the structure of propositions, of referential terms and predicates (Strawson) is significant for a universal pragmatics. The same holds for analytic action theory (Danto, Hampshire, Schwayder) and for the discussion that has arisen in connection with the logic of the explanation of intentional action (Winch, Taylor, von Wright). The use theory of meaning introduced by Wittgenstein has universal-pragmatic aspects as does the attempt by Grice to trace the meaning of sentences back to the intentions of the speakers (Bennett, Schiffer). As the most promising point of departure for a universal
pragmatics, I shall draw primarily on the theory of speech acts initiated by Austin (Searle, Wunderlich).24

These approaches developed from logic, linguistics, and the analytic philosophy of language have the common goal of clarifying processes of language use from the viewpoint of formal analysis. However, if one evaluates them with regard to the contribution they make to a universal pragmatics, their weaknesses also become apparent. In many cases I see a danger that the analysis of conditions of possible mutual understanding is foreshortened, either

a. because these approaches do not generalize radically enough and do not push through the level of fortuitous contexts to general and unavoidable presuppositions—as is the case, for instance, with most of the linguistic investigations of semantic and pragmatic presuppositions; or

b. because they restrict themselves to the instruments developed in logic and grammar, even when these are inadequate for capturing pragmatic relations—as, for example, in syntactic explanations of the performative character of speech acts;25 or

c. because they mislead one into a formalization of basic concepts that have not been satisfactorily analyzed—as can, in my view, be shown in the case of the logics of norms which trace norms of action back to commands; or finally

d. because they start from the model of the isolated, purposive-rational actor and thereby fail—as do, for instance, Grice and Lewis26—to reconstruct in an appropriate way the specific moment of mutuality in the understanding of identical meanings or in the recognition of intersubjective validity claims.

It is my impression that the theory of speech acts is largely free of these and similar weaknesses.

Some Remarks on the Procedure of Rational Reconstruction

I have been employing the expression “formal analysis” in opposition to empirical-analytic procedures (in the narrower sense) without providing a detailed explanation. This is, at least, misleading. I
am not using formal analysis in a sense that refers, say, to the standard predicate logic or to any specific logic. The tolerant sense in which I understand formal analysis can best be characterized through the methodological attitude we adopt in the rational reconstruction of concepts, criteria, rules, and schemata. Thus we speak of the explication of meanings and concepts, of the analysis of presuppositions and rule systems, and so forth. Of course, reconstructive procedures are also important for empirical-analytic research, for example, for explicating frameworks of basic concepts, for formalizing assumptions initially formulated in ordinary language, for clarifying deductive relations among particular hypotheses, for interpreting results of measurement, and so on. Nonetheless, reconstructive procedures are not characteristic of sciences that develop nomological hypotheses about domains of observable objects and events; rather, these procedures are characteristic of those sciences that systematically reconstruct the intuitive knowledge of competent subjects.

In clarifying the distinction between empirical-analytic and reconstructive sciences, I would like to begin with the distinction between sensory experience or observation and communicative experience or understanding (Verstehen). Observation is directed toward perceptible things and events (or states); understanding is directed toward the meaning of utterances. In experiencing, the observer is in principle alone, even if the categorial net in which experiences are organized as experiences laying claim to objectivity is always already shared by several (or even all) individuals. In contrast, the interpreter who understands meaning undergoes her experiences fundamentally as a participant in communication, on the basis of an intersubjective relation established through symbols with other individuals, even if she is in fact alone with a book, a document, or a work of art. I shall not here analyze the complex relationship between observation and understanding any further; I would like to direct attention to just one aspect of this: the difference in level between perceptible reality and the understandable meaning of a symbolic formation. Sensory experience is related to segments of reality without mediation, communicative experience only mediately, as illustrated in the diagram below:
a. Epistemic relations between experiential acts and their objects. In this sense, the act of understanding relates to the symbolic expression (here of the observation sentence), in a way similar to how the act of observation relates to the objects and events observed.

b. Relations of representing an aspect of reality in a propositional sentence. In this sense, the interpretation represents the semantic content (here of the observation sentence), in a way similar to how the observation sentence represents certain objects and events.

c. Relations of expressing intentional acts. In this sense, the understanding (here of the observation sentence) is expressed in the propositional content of the interpretation, just as the observation is expressed in the propositional content of the observation sentence.

Apart from the fact that all three types of relation simply point to fundamental problems, there is an additional difficulty in specifying the precise differences between the epistemic relations of the observer and the interpreter to their respective objects and between the representational relations of the observation sentence to reality, on the one hand, and that of the interpretation sentence to (symbolically prestructured) reality, on the other. This specification would require a comparison between observation and interpretation, between description and explication. For the time being, the diagram is intended merely to illustrate the two levels of reality to which sensory and communicative experience respectively relate. The difference in level between perceptible and symbolically prestructured reality is reflected in the gap between direct access through observation of reality and communicatively mediated access through understanding an utterance concerning reality.
The two pairs of concepts—“perceptible reality” versus “symbolically prestructured reality” and “observation” versus “understanding”—can be correlated with another pair: “description” versus “explication.” With the aid of a sentence that represents an observation, I can describe the observed aspect of reality. With the aid of a sentence that represents an interpretation of the meaning of a symbolic formation, I can explicate the meaning of such an utterance. Naturally, only when the meaning of the symbolic formation is unclear does the explication need to be set off as an independent analytic step. In regard to sentences that we use to describe objects and events, there can be a lack of clarity at various levels. Depending on the level, we demand explications of different kinds. If the phenomenon described is in need of explanation, we demand an explication that makes clear how reality operates and how the phenomenon in question comes about. If, by contrast, the description itself is incomprehensible, we demand an explication that makes clear what the observer meant by his utterance and how the symbolic expression in need of elucidation comes about. In the first case, a satisfactory explication will have the form of an explanation we undertake with the aid of a causal hypothesis. In the second case, we speak of explication of meaning. (Of course, explications of meaning need not be limited to descriptive sentences; any meaningfully structured formation can be subjected to the operation of meaning explication.)

Descriptions and explications have different ranges; they can begin on the surface and push through to underlying structures. We are familiar with this fact from the explanation of natural phenomena—the more general the theories are with which we explain natural phenomena, the more penetrating the corresponding theoretical descriptions. The same is true of explications of meaning. Of course, in the case of meaning explications, the range of explication does not depend on the level of generality of theoretical knowledge about the structures of an external reality accessible to observation but on knowledge of the deep structures of a reality accessible to understanding—a reality of symbolic formations produced according to rules. The explication of natural phenomena pushes in a different direction from the explication of the meaning of expressions.
Furthermore, I want to distinguish two levels of explication of meaning. If the meaning of a written sentence, action, gesture, work of art, tool, theory, commodity, transmitted document, and so on is unclear, the explication of meaning is directed first to the semantic content of the symbolic formation. In trying to understand its content, we take up the same position as the “author” adopted when he wrote the sentence, performed the gesture, used the tool, applied the theory, and so forth. Often, too, we must go beyond what was meant and intended by the author and take into consideration a context of which he was not conscious. Typically, however, the understanding of content pursues connections that link the surface structures of the incomprehensible formation with the surface structures of other, familiar formations. Thus, linguistic expressions can be explicated through paraphrase in the same language or through translation into expressions of another language; in both cases, competent speakers draw on intuitively known meaning relations that obtain within the lexicon of one language or between the lexica of two languages.

If she cannot attain her end in this way, the interpreter may find it necessary to alter her attitude. She then exchanges the attitude of understanding content (directed toward surface structures)—in which she, as it were, looks through symbolic formations to the world about which something is uttered—for an attitude in which she focuses on the generative structures of the expressions themselves. The interpreter then attempts to explicate the meaning of a symbolic formation with the help of the rules according to which the author must have produced it. In normal paraphrase and translation, the interpreter draws on semantic meaning relations (for instance between the different words of a language) in an ad hoc manner, so to speak, in that she simply applies a knowledge shared with competent speakers of that language. In this sense, the role of interpreter can (under suitable conditions) be attributed to the author himself. The attitude changes, however, as soon as the interpreter tries not only to apply this intuitive knowledge of speakers but to reconstruct it. She then turns away from the surface structure of the symbolic formation; she no longer looks through it intentione recta to the world. She attempts instead to peer into the symbolic
formation—penetrating through its surface, as it were—in order to discover the rules according to which this symbolic formation was produced (in our example, the rules according to which the lexicon of a language is constructed). The object of understanding is no longer the content of a symbolic expression or what specific authors meant by it in specific situations but rather the intuitive rule consciousness that a competent speaker has of his own language.

Following a suggestion made by Ryle,29 we can distinguish between know-how, the ability of a competent subject who understands how to produce or accomplish something, and know-that, the explicit knowledge of how it is that he is able to do so. In our case, what the author means by an utterance and what an interpreter understands of its content are a first-level know-that. To the extent that his utterance is correctly formed and thus comprehensible, the author produced it in accordance with certain rules or on the basis of certain structures. He knows how to use the system of rules of his language and understands their context-specific application; he has a pretheoretical knowledge of this rule system, which is at least sufficient to enable him to produce the utterance in question. This implicit rule consciousness is a know-how. The interpreter, in turn, who not only shares but wants to understand this implicit knowledge of the competent speaker, must transform this know-how into explicit knowledge, that is, into a second-level know-that. This is the task of reconstructive understanding, that is, of meaning explication in the sense of rational reconstruction of generative structures underlying the production of symbolic formations. Since the rule consciousness to be reconstructed is a categorial knowledge, the reconstruction depends first of all on the operation of conceptual explication.

Carnap put forward four requirements that the explication of a concept must fulfill in order to be adequate:

i. The explicans should be similar to the explicandum, that is, from now on the explicans should be able to be used in place of the explicandum in all relevant cases.

ii. Rules should be provided that fix the use of the explicans (in connection with other scientific concepts) in an exact manner.

iii. The explicans should prove to be fruitful with respect to the formulation of general statements.
iv. (Presupposing that requirements i–iii can be met) the explicans should be as simple as possible.30

Wunderlich sums up his reflections on the status of concept explication as follows:

Explication always proceeds (in conformity with Carnap’s requirements i–iv) with regard to theories; either such central concepts (as “meaning”) are explicated that entire theories correspond to them as explicans, or different concepts are explicated interconnectingly.

We explicate always with regard to clear cases, so as to be able (in connection with these) to replace our intuitions with exact arguments. However, the theory can then also provide answers to borderline cases; or we explicate separately what a clear borderline case is.

The language of explication is at the same level as the explicandum language (e.g., ordinary language or a standardized version derived from it). Accordingly, it is not a question here of a descriptive language or a metalanguage relative to the language of the explicandum (the explicans does not describe the explicandum).31

In these reflections on the explication of concepts, one point strikes me as insufficiently worked out—the evaluative accomplishments of rule consciousness. Reconstructive proposals are directed toward domains of pretheoretical knowledge, that is, not to just any implicit opinion, but to a proven intuitive preknowledge. The rule consciousness of competent speakers functions as a court of evaluation, for instance with regard to the grammaticality of sentences. Whereas the understanding of content is directed toward any utterance whatever, reconstructive understanding refers only to symbolic objects characterized as “well formed” by competent subjects themselves. Thus, for example, syntactic theory, propositional logic, the theory of science, and ethics start with syntactically well formed sentences, correctly fashioned propositions, well-corroborated theories, and morally unobjectionable resolutions of norm conflicts, in order to reconstruct the rules according to which these formations can be produced. To the extent that, as in the following examples, universal validity claims (the grammaticality of sentences, the consistency of propositions, the truth of hypotheses, the rightness of norms of action) underlie intuitive evaluations, reconstructions relate to pretheoretical knowledge of a general sort, to universal capabilities, and not merely to
particular competencies of individual groups (e.g., the ability to utter sentences in a Low-German dialect or to solve problems in quantum physics) or, indeed, to the ability of particular individuals (e.g., to write an exemplary Entwicklungsroman even in the middle of the twentieth century). When the pretheoretical knowledge to be reconstructed expresses a universal capability, a general cognitive, linguistic, or interactive competence (or subcompetence), then what begins as an explication of meaning aims at the reconstruction of species competencies. In scope and status, these reconstructions can be compared with general theories.

It is the great merit of Chomsky to have developed this idea in the case of grammatical theory (for the first time in Syntactic Structures, 1957). Roughly speaking, it is the task of grammatical theory to reconstruct the intuitive rule consciousness common to all competent speakers in such a way that the proposals for reconstruction represent the system of rules that permits potential speakers, in at least one language $L$, to acquire the competence to produce and to understand any sentences that count as grammatical in $L$, as well as to distinguish these sentences well-formed in $L$ from ungrammatical sentences.

Reconstructive versus Empiricist Linguistics

I hope I have sufficiently characterized the reconstructive procedure of sciences that transform a practically mastered pretheoretical knowledge (know-how) of competent subjects into an objective and explicit knowledge (know-that), so that it is clear in what sense I am using the expression “formal analysis.” Before mentioning some methodological difficulties with reconstructive linguistics, I would like to contrast, in broad strokes, two versions of linguistics, one empirical-analytic and one reconstructive. (Wunderlich speaks of an empirical-descriptive and an empirical-explicative linguistics.) I will compare both approaches under four headings.

Data
To the extent that the experiential basis is supposed to be secured through observation alone, the data of linguistics consist of meas-
ured variables of linguistic behavior. By contrast, insofar as reconstructive understanding is permitted, the data are provided by the rule consciousness of competent speakers, maieutically ascertained (i.e., through suitable questioning with the aid of systematically ordered examples). Thus the data are distinguished, if you will, according to their ontological level: actual linguistic behavior is part of perceptible reality, and rule consciousness points to the production of symbolic formations in which something is uttered about reality.

Furthermore, observations always mean a knowledge of something particular, whereas rule consciousness contains categorical knowledge. Finally, observational data are selected only from the analytic viewpoints of the linguist, whereas, in the other case, competent speakers themselves evaluate and preselect possible data from the point of view of their grammatical well-formedness.

Theory and Object Domain

As long as natural languages count as the object of linguistic description and not as the form of representation of a reconstructible pretheoretical knowledge, linguistic theory relates to its object domain as a causal-analytic theory that explains linguistic descriptions of linguistic reality with the aid of nomological hypotheses. If, on the contrary, linguistic theory is supposed to serve to reconstruct pretheoretical knowledge, theory relates to its object domain as an explication of meaning to its explicandum. Whereas in the empiricist version the relation of linguistic theory to the language to be explained is basically indistinguishable from that between theory and reality in other nomological sciences, in the explicative version the linguistic character of the object necessitates a relation that can hold only between different linguistic expressions: the relation between explication and explicandum, whereby the language of explication (that is, the construct language of linguistics, which is a standardized version of ordinary language) belongs in principle to the same level as the natural language to be explicated. (Neither in the empiricist nor in the explicative case of theory formation can the relation of linguistic theory to its object domain be conceived as that of metalanguage to object language.)
Theory and Everyday Knowledge

There is yet another peculiarity arising from these differently oriented conceptualizations. An empirical-analytic theory in the narrow sense can (and as a rule will) refute the everyday knowledge of an object domain that we initially possess prior to science and replace it with a correct theoretical knowledge regarded provisionally as true. A proposal for reconstruction, by contrast, can represent pre-theoretical knowledge more or less explicitly and adequately, but it can never falsify it. At most, the representation of a speaker’s intuition can prove to be false, but not the intuition itself.37 The latter belongs to the data, and data can be explained but not criticized. At most, data can be criticized as being unsuitable, that is, either erroneously gathered or wrongly selected for a specific theoretical purpose.

To a certain extent, reconstructions make an essentialist claim. One can say, of course, that theoretical descriptions “correspond” (if true) to certain structures of reality in the same sense as reconstructions “bear a likeness” (if correct) to the deep structures explicaded. On the other hand, the asserted correspondence between a descriptive theory and its object admits many epistemological interpretations apart from the realistic (e.g., instrumentalist or conventionalist) ones. Rational reconstructions, by contrast, can reproduce the pretheoretical knowledge that they explicate only in an essentialist sense; if they are true, they have to correspond precisely to the rules that are operatively effective in the object domain—that is, to the rules that actually determine the production of surface structures.38 Thus Chomsky’s correlation assumption, according to which linguistic grammar is represented on the part of the speaker by a mental grammar that corresponds exactly to it, is, at least in the first instance, consistent.

Methodological Difficulties

To be sure, serious methodological difficulties have arisen in connection with the Chomskian program for a general science of language as the rational reconstruction of linguistic competence. I would like to consider, from a methodological perspective, two of
the problem complexes that have developed. One concerns the status and reliability of the intuitive knowledge of competent speakers; the other, the aforementioned relation between linguistic and mental grammar.

There have been two principal objections against choosing speakers’ intuitions as the starting point for reconstructive theory formation. First, the question has been raised whether a reconstructive linguistics can ever arrive at a theory of linguistic competence; whether on the chosen data basis it is not limited to developing, at best, a theory of the intuitive understanding that competent speakers have of their own language. Since the metalinguistic use of one’s own ordinary language, to which a science that appeals to speakers’ judgments must have recourse, is something other than the direct use of language (and is probably subject to different laws), a grammatical theory of the Chomskian type can at best reconstruct that special part of linguistic competence that regulates the metalinguistic use; it cannot reconstruct the competence that directly underlies speaking and understanding a language.

The empirical question is whether a complete theory of linguistic intuitions is identical with a complete theory of human linguistic competence. . . . Chomsky has no doubt as to this identity. . . . The theory of one kind of linguistic behavior, namely metalinguistic judgment on such things as grammaticality and paraphrase, would then as a whole be built into theories on other forms of linguistic behavior such as speaking and understanding. . . . If we wish to think in terms of primary and derived forms of verbal behavior, the speaking and the understanding of language fall precisely into the category of primary forms, while metalinguistic judgments will be considered highly derived, artificial forms of linguistic behavior, which moreover are acquired late in development. . . . The empirical problem in the psychology of language is in turn divided in two, the investigation of psychological factors in primary language usage, and the psychological investigation of linguistic intuitions.40

I think this objection is based on a confusion of the two research paradigms elucidated above, the empirical-analytic and the reconstructive. I wish to make three comments in this regard:

i. Reconstruction relates to a pretheoretical knowledge of competent speakers that is expressed, on the one hand, in the production of sentences in a natural language and, on the other, in the appraisal
of the grammaticality of linguistic expressions. The object of reconstruction is the process of production of those sentences held by competent speakers to belong to the set of grammatical sentences. By contrast, the metalinguistic utterances in which competent speakers evaluate the sentences put before them are not the object of reconstruction but part of the data gathering.

ii. Because of the reflexive character of natural languages, speaking about what has been spoken, direct or indirect mention of speech components, belongs to the normal linguistic process of reaching understanding. The expression “metalinguistic judgments” in a natural language about sentences of the same language suggests a difference in level that does not exist. It is one of the most interesting features of natural languages that they can be used as their own languages of explication. (I shall come back to this point below.)

iii. However, it seems to me that the misunderstanding lies, above all, in Levelt’s considering the recourse to speakers’ intuitions in abstraction from the underlying research paradigm. Only if one presupposes an empirical-analytic approach (in the narrow sense) to the reality of a natural language and the utterances in it can one view speaking and understanding language, on the one hand, and judgments in a language about that language, on the other, as two different object domains. If one chooses a reconstructive approach, then one thereby chooses a conceptualization of the object domain according to which the linguistic know-how of a competent speaker is at the root of the sentences she produces with the help of (and only with the help of) this know-how. While this research paradigm may prove to be unfruitful, this cannot be shown at the level of a critique that already presupposes a competing paradigm; it may be shown only in terms of the success or failure of the theories and explanations the competing research paradigms make possible.

The second objection is directed toward the unreliability of intuitively founded speakers’ judgments, for which there exists impressive empirical evidence. Nonetheless, it seems to me here that once again an empiricist interpretation of speakers’ judgments stimulates false expectations and suggests the wrong remedies. The expression “intuitive knowledge” should not be understood as meaning that a
speaker’s pretheoretical knowledge about the grammaticality of a sentence (about the rigor of a derivation, about the cogency of a theory, and so forth) is the kind of directly ascertainable intuition that is incapable of being discursively justified. On the contrary, the implicit knowledge has to be brought to consciousness through the choice of suitable examples and counterexamples, through contrast and similarity relations, through translation, paraphrase and so on—that is, through a well-thought-out, maieutic method of interrogation. Ascertaining the so-called intuitions of a speaker is already the first step toward their explication. For this reason, the procedure practiced by Chomsky and many others seems to me to make sense and to be adequate. One starts with clear cases, in which the reactions of the subjects converge, in order to develop structural descriptions on this basis; then, in the light of the hypotheses gained, one attempts to render the less clear cases more precise in such a way that the process of interrogation can lead to an adequate clarification of these cases as well. I do not see anything wrong in this circular procedure; every research process moves in such a circle between theory formation and a more precise rendering of the object domain.42

The second methodological question is more difficult. It is one that has been treated as an empirical question in the psycholinguistics of the past decade, and as such has inspired a great amount of research: it asks whether there is a direct correspondence between the linguistic theory of grammar and the mental grammar that is, so to speak, “in the mind” of the speaker.43 According to the correlation hypothesis, linguistic reconstructions are not simply lucid and economical representations of linguistic data; instead, there is a psychological complexity of the actual production process that corresponds, supposedly, to the transformational complexity that can be read off the structural description of linguistic expressions. I cannot deal with the individual research projects and the various interpretations here. Apparently, in psycholinguistics there is a growing tendency to move away from the original correlation hypothesis; the mental grammar that underlies the psychologically demonstrable production of language and the corresponding processes of
understanding cannot, in the opinion of Bever, Watt, and others, be explained in the framework of a competence theory, that is, of a reconstrucively oriented linguistics. I am not very certain how to judge this controversy; but I would like to suggest two points of view that have not, so far as I can see, been sufficiently taken into account in the discussion.

i. How strong do the essentialist assertions of a reconstructive linguistics regarding the psychic reality of reconstructed systems of rules have to be? Chomsky’s maturationist assumption—that grammatical theory represents exactly the innate dispositions that enable the child to develop the hypotheses that direct language acquisition and that process the linguistic data in the environment—seems to me too strong.44 Within the reconstructivist conceptual strategy, the more plausible assumption that grammatical theory represents the linguistic competence of the adult speaker is sufficient. This competence in turn is the result of a learning process that may even—in a manner similar to cognitive development or the development of moral consciousness—follow a rationally reconstructible pattern.45 As Bever suggests, even this thesis can be weakened to allow for restrictions placed on the acquisition and application of grammatical rule-knowledge by nonlinguistic perceptual mechanisms or non-linguistic epistemic systems in general, without surrendering the categorial framework of a competence theory.

ii. It is not clear to me to what extent the psycholinguistic critique of the admittedly essentialist implications of Chomsky’s competence theory can be traced back to a confusion of research paradigms. This could be adequately discussed only if there were clarity about the way in which competence theories can be tested and, as the case may be, falsified. I have the impression that psycholinguistic investigations proceed empirically and analytically, and neglect a limine the distinction between competence and performance.46

Universal Pragmatics versus Transcendental Hermeneutics

Having presented the idea of a reconstructive science and briefly elucidated it through a consideration of reconstructive linguistics
(and two of its methodological difficulties), I would like to touch on one further question: What is the relation of a universal-pragmatic reconstruction of general and unavoidable presuppositions of possible processes of reaching understanding to the type of investigation that has, since Kant, been called transcendental analysis? Kant terms "transcendental" an investigation that identifies and analyzes the a priori conditions of possibility of experience. The underlying idea is clear: in addition to the empirical knowledge that relates to objects of experience, there is, supposedly, a transcendental knowledge of concepts of objects in general that precede experience. The method by which these a priori concepts of objects in general can be shown to be valid conditions of possible experience is less clear. There is already disagreement concerning the meaning of the thesis: "[T]he a priori conditions of possible experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of objects of experience." 47

The analytic reception of the Kantian program (Strawson’s work is a well-known example) 48 leads to a minimalist interpretation of the transcendental. Every coherent experience is organized in a categorial network; to the extent that we discover the same implicit conceptual structure in any coherent experience whatsoever, we may call this basic conceptual system of possible experience “transcendental.” This conception renounces the claim that Kant wanted to vindicate with his transcendental deduction; it gives up all claim to a proof of the objective validity of our concepts of objects of possible experience in general. 49 The strong apriorism of Kantian philosophy gives way to a weaker version. From now on, transcendental investigation must rely on the competence of knowing subjects who judge which experiences may be called coherent experiences in order then to analyze this material with a view to finding general and necessary categorial presuppositions. Every reconstruction of a basic conceptual system of possible experience has to be regarded as a hypothetical proposal that can be tested against new experiences. As long as the assertion of its necessity and universality has not been refuted, we term “transcendental” the conceptual structure recurring in all coherent experiences. In this weaker version, the claim that this structure can be demonstrated a priori is dropped.
From this weaker interpretation, consequences ensue that are scarcely compatible with the original program. We can no longer exclude the possibility that our concepts of objects of possible experience can be applied successfully only under contingent boundary conditions that have, for example, heretofore regularly been fulfilled by natural constants. Further, we can no longer exclude the possibility that the basic conceptual structure of possible experience has developed phylogenetically and arises anew in every normal ontogenesis, in a process that can be analyzed empirically. We cannot even exclude the possibility that an a priori of experience that is relativized in this sense is valid only for specific, admittedly anthropologically deep-seated, behavioral systems, each of which makes possible a specific strategy for objectivating reality. The transcendentally oriented pragmatism inaugurated by C. S. Peirce attempts to show that there is such a structural connection between experience and instrumental action; the hermeneutics stemming from Dilthey attempts—over against this a priori of experience—to do justice to an additional a priori of understanding or communicative experience.

From the perspective of a transformed transcendental philosophy (in Apel’s sense), two further renunciations called for by the analytic reception of Kant seem precipitate: the renunciation of the concept of the constitution of experience and the renunciation of an explicit treatment of the problem of validity. In my opinion, the reservation regarding a strong apriorism in no way demands limiting oneself to a logical-semantic analysis of the conditions of possible experiences. If we surrender the concept of the transcendental subject—the subject that accomplishes the synthesis and that, together with its knowledge-enabling structures, is removed from all experience—this does not mean that we have to renounce the universal-pragmatic analysis of the application of our concepts of objects of possible experience, that is, renounce investigation of the constitution of experience. It is just as little a consequence of giving up the project of a transcendental deduction that one must hand over problems of validity to other domains of investigation, for instance, to the theory of science or of truth. Of course, the relation between the objectivity of possi-
ble experience and the truth of propositions looks different than it does under Kantian premises. A priori demonstration is replaced by transcendental investigation of the conditions for argumentatively redeeming the validity claims that lend themselves to possible discursive vindication.\(^{55}\)

To be sure, in my view the question is more than simply terminologically interesting whether we may still call such investigations of general and unavoidable presuppositions of communication "transcendental" (in this case, presuppositions of argumentative speech). If we want to subject processes of reaching understanding ("speech") to a reconstructive analysis oriented to general and unavoidable presuppositions in the same way as has been done for cognitive processes,\(^{56}\) then the model of transcendental philosophy undeniably suggests itself—all the more so since the theory of language and action has not (despite Humboldt) found its Kant. Naturally, recourse to this model is understandable only if one has in view one of the weaker versions of transcendental philosophy mentioned above. In this sense, Apel—in order to characterize his approach programmatically—speaks of “transcendental hermeneutics” or “transcendental pragmatics.” I would like to mention two reasons for hesitating to adopt this usage.

a. Something like a transcendental investigation of processes of reaching understanding seems plausible to me as long as we view these under the aspect of processes of experience. It is in this sense that I speak of communicative experience; in understanding the utterance of another speaker as a participant in a communication process, the hearer (like the observer who perceives a segment of reality) has an experience. From this comparative perspective, concrete utterances would correspond to empirical objects, and utterances in general to objects in general (in the sense of objects of possible experience). Just as we can analyze our a priori concepts of objects in general—that is, the conceptual structure of any coherent experience whatsoever—we would also be able to analyze our a priori concepts of utterances in general—that is, the basic concepts of situations of possible mutual understanding (Verständigung), the conceptual structure that enables us to employ sentences in correct
utterances. Concepts such as meaning and intentionality, the ability to speak and act (agency), interpersonal relationships and the like, would belong to this conceptual framework.

The expression “situation of possible mutual understanding” that, from this point of view, would correspond to the expression “object of possible experience,” already shows, however, that acquiring the experiences we have in processes of communication is secondary to the goal of reaching understanding that these processes serve. The general structures of speech must therefore first be investigated from the perspective of reaching understanding and not from that of experience. As soon as we admit this, however, the parallels with transcendental philosophy (however conceived) recede into the background. The idea underlying transcendental philosophy is—to oversimplify—that we constitute experiences by objectivating reality from invariant points of view. This objectivation shows itself in the objects in general that necessarily are presupposed in every coherent experience; these objects in turn can be analyzed as a system of basic concepts. However, I do not find any correspondent to this idea under which the analysis of general presuppositions of communication might be carried out. Experiences are, if we follow the basic Kantian idea, constituted; utterances are, at most, generated. A transcendental investigation transposed to processes of reaching understanding would thus have to be guided by another model—not the epistemological model of the constitution of experience but perhaps the model of deep and surface structure.

b. Moreover, adopting the expression “transcendental” might conceal the break with apriorism that has been made in the meantime. Kant had to sharply separate empirical and transcendental analysis. If we now understand transcendental investigation in the sense of a reconstruction of general and unavoidable presuppositions of experiences that can lay claim to objectivity, then there certainly remains a difference between reconstructive and empirical-analytic analysis. Against this, the distinction between drawing on a priori knowledge and drawing on a posteriori knowledge becomes blurred. On the one hand, the rule consciousness of competent speakers is for them an a priori knowledge; on the other hand, the reconstruction of this
knowledge calls for inquiries undertaken with empirical speakers—the linguist procures for herself a knowledge a posteriori. The implicit knowledge of competent speakers is so different from the explicit form of linguistic description that the individual linguist cannot rely on reflection on her own speech intuitions. The procedures employed in constructing and testing hypotheses, in appraising competing reconstructive proposals, in gathering and selecting data, are in many ways like the procedures customarily used in the nomological sciences. Methodological differences that can be traced back to differences in the structure of data (observable events versus comprehensible signs) and to differences between the structures of laws and rules do not suffice, for example, to banish linguistics from the sphere of empirical science.

This is particularly true for ontogenetic theories that, like Piaget’s cognitivist developmental psychology, connect the structural description of competencies (as well as of reconstructed patterns of development of these competencies) with assumptions concerning causal mechanisms. The paradigms introduced by Chomsky and Piaget have prompted a type of research determined by a peculiar connection between formal and empirical analysis rather than by their classical separation. The expression “transcendental,” with which we associate a contrast to empirical science, is thus unsuited to characterizing, without misunderstanding, a line of research such as universal pragmatics. Behind the terminological question can be found the systematic question concerning the as-yet insufficiently clarified status of nonnomological empirical sciences of the reconstructive type. I shall have to leave this question aside here. In any case, the attempt to play down the interesting methodological differences that arise here, and to interpret them away in the sense of the unified science program, seems to have little prospect of success.

II

The discussion of the theory of speech acts has given rise to ideas on which the fundamental assumptions of universal pragmatics can be based. The universal-pragmatic point of view from which I shall
select and discuss these ideas leads, however, to an interpretation that diverges in several important respects from Austin’s and Searle’s understanding of speech-act theory, which remains a semantically determined one.

Three Aspects of Universal Pragmatics

The basic universal-pragmatic intention of speech-act theory is expressed in the fact that it thematizes the elementary units of speech (utterances) from a stance similar to that from which linguistics thematizes the units of language (sentences). The goal of reconstructive language analysis is an explicit description of the rules that a competent speaker must master in order to form grammatical sentences and to utter them in an acceptable way. The theory of speech acts shares this task with linguistics. Whereas the latter starts from the assumption that every adult speaker possesses a reconstructible implicit knowledge in which his linguistic rule competence (to produce sentences) is expressed, speech-act theory postulates a corresponding communicative rule competence, namely the competence to employ sentences in speech acts. It is further assumed that communicative competence has just as universal a core as linguistic competence. A general theory of speech acts would thus describe precisely that fundamental system of rules that adult speakers master to the extent that they can fulfill the conditions for a happy employment of sentences in utterances, no matter to which particular language the sentences may belong and in which random contexts the utterances may be embedded.

The proposal to investigate language use in competence-theoretic terms calls for a revision of the concepts of competence and performance. Chomsky initially understands these concepts in such a way that it makes sense to require that the phonetic, syntactic, and semantic properties of sentences be investigated linguistically within the framework of a reconstruction of linguistic competence and that the pragmatic properties of utterances be left to a theory of linguistic performance. This conceptualization gives rise to the question of whether “communicative competence” is not a hybrid concept. I
have, to begin with, based the demarcation of linguistics from universal pragmatics on the current distinction between sentences and utterances. The production of sentences according to the rules of grammar is something other than the use of sentences in accordance with pragmatic rules that shape the infrastructure of speech situations in general. But this raises the following two questions. (i) Could not the universal structures of speech—what is common to all utterances independently of their particular contexts—be adequately determined through universal sentential structures? In this case, with his linguistically reconstructible linguistic competence, the speaker would also be equipped for mastering situations of possible mutual understanding (Verständigung), for the general task of uttering sentences; and the postulate of a general communicative competence distinguishable from linguistic competence could not be justified. In addition to this there is the question (ii) whether the semantic properties of sentences (or words) may not, in the sense of the use theory of meaning, be explicated in any case only with reference to situations of possible typical employment. Then the distinction between sentences and utterances would be irrelevant, at least to semantic theory (so long as sufficiently typical contexts of utterance were taken into consideration). As soon as the distinction between the linguistic analysis of sentences and the pragmatic analysis of utterances becomes hazy, however, the object domain of universal pragmatics is also in danger of becoming blurred.

With regard to the first question, I would agree, with certain qualifications, that a speaker, in transposing a well-formed sentence into an act oriented toward reaching understanding, merely actualizes what is inherent in the sentence structures. But this is not to deny the difference between the production of a grammatical sentence and the use of that sentence in a situation of possible mutual understanding, or the difference between the universal presuppositions that a competent speaker has to fulfill in each case. In order to utter a sentence, the speaker must fulfill general presuppositions of communication. Even if she fulfills these presuppositions in conformity to the structures that are already given with the sentence employed, she may very well form the sentence itself without
at the same time fulfilling the presuppositions specific to speech. This can be made clear by looking at the relations to reality in which every sentence is first embedded through the act of utterance. In being uttered, a sentence is placed in relation to (a) the external reality of that which can be perceived, (b) the internal reality of that which a speaker would like to express as her intentions, and (c) the normative reality of that which is socially and culturally recognized. It is thereby subjected to validity claims that it need not and cannot fulfill as a nonsituated sentence, as a purely grammatical formation. A chain of symbols “counts” as a sentence of a natural language, $L$, if it is well formed according to the system of grammatical rules, $GL$. The grammaticality of a sentence means (from a pragmatic perspective) that the sentence, when uttered by a speaker, is comprehensible to all hearers who have mastered $GL$. Comprehensibility is the only universal claim that is to be fulfilled immanently to language that can be raised by participants in communication with regard to a sentence. The validity of a stated proposition, by contrast, depends on whether the proposition represents a fact or experience (or on whether the existential presuppositions of the mentioned propositional content hold); the validity of an expressed intention depends on whether it corresponds to what is actually intended by the speaker; and the validity of the speech act performed depends on whether this action conforms to a recognized normative background. Whereas a grammatical sentence fulfills the claim to comprehensibility, a successful utterance must satisfy three additional validity claims: it must count as true for the participants insofar as it represents something in the world; it must count as truthful insofar as it expresses something intended by the speaker; and it must count as right insofar as it conforms to socially recognized expectations.

We can, of course, identify features in the surface structures of sentences that have a special significance for the three general pragmatic functions of the utterance: to represent something, to express an intention, to establish an interpersonal relationship. Sentences with propositional content are used to represent an experience or a state of affairs (or to refer to these indirectly); intentional expressions, modal forms, and so on are used to express the speaker’s
intentions; performative phrases are used to establish interpersonal relations between speaker and hearer. Thus, the general structures of speech are also reflected at the level of sentence structure. But insofar as we consider a sentence as a grammatical formation, that is, independently of speech situations in which it can be uttered, these general pragmatic functions are not yet “occupied.” In order to produce a grammatical sentence—as an example, say, for linguists—a competent speaker need satisfy only the claim to comprehensibility. He has to have mastered the corresponding system of grammatical rules; this we call his linguistic ability, and it can be analyzed linguistically. It is a different matter with regard to his ability to communicate; this is susceptible only to pragmatic analysis. By “communicative competence,” I understand the ability of a speaker oriented toward reaching understanding to embed a well-formed sentence in relations to reality—that is,

i. to choose the propositional sentence in such a way that either the truth conditions of the proposition stated or the existential presuppositions of the propositional content mentioned are supposedly fulfilled (so that the hearer can share the knowledge of the speaker);

ii. To express his intentions in such a way that the linguistic expression represents what is intended (so that the hearer can trust the speaker); and

iii. To perform the speech act in such a way that it conforms to recognized norms or to accepted self-images (so that the hearer can be in accord with the speaker in shared value orientations).

To the extent that these decisions do not depend on particular epistemic presuppositions and changing contexts but cause sentences in general to assume the universal-pragmatic functions of representation, expression, and the production of interpersonal relationships, what is expressed in them is precisely the communicative competence for which I am proposing a universal-pragmatic investigation.

The part of universal pragmatics that is furthest developed is that related to the representational function of utterances, for example to the use of elementary propositional sentences. This classic
domain of formal semantics has been pursued within analytic philosophy from Frege to Dummett. That this is a matter of universal-pragmatic investigation can be seen in the fact that the truth value of propositions is systematically taken into account. The theory of predication does not investigate sentences in general (as does linguistics) but sentences in their function of representing facts. Analysis is directed above all to the logic of using predicates and those expressions that enable us to refer to objects. To be sure, this part of universal pragmatics is not the most important for a theory of communication. The analysis of intentionality, the discussion of avowals, and the debate on private speech, in so far as they clear the way to a universal pragmatics of the expressive function of utterances, are only beginnings. Finally, speech act theory provides a useful point of departure for the part of universal pragmatics related to the interpersonal function of utterances.

With regard to the second question raised above, one might see a further difficulty with my proposal for conceptualizing universal pragmatics in the fact that formal semantics does not fit well into the distinction between a linguistic analysis concerned with sentences and a pragmatic analysis concerned with utterances. There is a broad spectrum of different approaches to semantic theory. Linguistically oriented theories of meaning try to grasp systematically the semantic content of linguistic expressions. In the framework of transformational grammar, explanations of the surface structures of sentences either start with semantic deep structures or rely on semantic projections into syntactic structures. This approach leads as a rule to a combinatory system, constructed using elementary sentences, of general semantic markers. Lexical semantics proceeds in a similar manner; it clarifies the meaning structures of a given lexicon by way of a formal analysis of meaning relations. The weakness of these linguistic approaches lies in the fact that they accommodate the pragmatic dimension of the use of sentences only in an ad hoc way. However, the use theory of meaning developed from the work of Wittgenstein has provided good reasons for holding that the meaning of linguistic expressions can be identified only with reference to situations of possible employment.
For their part, **pragmatic theories of meaning** are faced with the difficulty of delimiting a linguistic expression’s typical situations of employment from contexts that happen by chance to have additional meaning-generating power but do not affect the semantic core of the linguistic expression. According to which criteria may we extrapolate typical behavior from actual linguistic behavior?

Reference semantics, whether framed as a theory of extensional or of intensional denotation, determines the meaning of an expression by the class of objects to which it can be applied in true sentences. On this premise, one can explicate the meaning of expressions that appear in sentences with a representational function. I do not see, however, why semantic theory should monopolistically single out the representational function of language and neglect the specific meanings that language develops in its expressive and interpersonal functions.

These preliminary reflections are intended merely to support the conjecture that semantic theory cannot fruitfully be developed as a unified theory. But if it is heterogeneously composed, no objection to the methodological separation of the analysis of sentence structures from that of utterance structures can be inferred from the difficulties of demarcating semantics from pragmatics (difficulties that are equally present in demarcating semantics from syntax). The analysis of general structures of speech can indeed begin with general sentence structures. However, it is directed to formal properties of sentences only from the perspective of the possibility of **using sentences as elements of speech**, that is, for representational, expressive, and interpersonal functions. Universal pragmatics, too, can be understood as semantic analysis. But it is distinguished from other theories of meaning in that the meanings of linguistic expressions are relevant only insofar as these expressions are used in speech acts that satisfy the validity claims of truth, truthfulness, and normative rightness. On the other hand, universal pragmatics is distinguished from empirical pragmatics, for example, sociolinguistics, in that the meaning of linguistic expressions comes under consideration only insofar as it is determined by **formal properties of speech situations in general**, and not by particular situations of use.
I would now like to sum up the different levels of analysis and corresponding object domains of semiotics.

Sentences versus Utterances
If we start with concrete speech acts embedded in specific contexts and then disregard all aspects that these utterances owe to their pragmatic functions, we are left with linguistic expressions. Whereas the elementary unit of speech is the speech act, the elementary unit of language is the sentence. The demarcation is obtained by attending to conditions of validity: a grammatically well-formed sentence satisfies the claim to comprehensibility; a communicatively successful speech act requires, beyond the comprehensibility of the linguistic expression, that the participants in communication be prepared to reach an understanding and that they raise claims to truth, truthfulness, and rightness, and reciprocally impute their satisfaction. Sentences are the object of linguistic analysis, speech acts of pragmatic analysis.

Individual Languages versus Language in General
The first task of linguistics is to develop a grammar for each individual language so that a structural description can be correlated with any sentence of the language. On the other hand, general grammatical theory is concerned with reconstructing the rule system that underlies the ability of a subject to generate well-formed sentences in any language whatsoever. Grammatical theory claims to reconstruct the universal linguistic ability of adult speakers. (In a strong version, this linguistic competence means the ability to develop hypotheses that guide language acquisition on the basis of an innate disposition; in a weaker version, linguistic competence represents the result of learning processes interpreted constructivistically in Piaget’s sense.)

Aspects of Linguistic Analysis
Every linguistic expression can be considered from at least three analytic viewpoints. Phonetics examines linguistic expressions as inscriptions in an underlying medium (i.e., as formations of sound).
Syntactic theory investigates linguistic expressions with regard to the formal connections of the smallest meaningful units. Semantic theory examines the meaning content of linguistic expressions. Evidently, only phonetic and syntactic theory are self-sufficient linguistic theories; semantic theory, by contrast, cannot be conducted solely in the attitude of the theoretician of language, that is, in disregard of pragmatic aspects.

**Particular versus Universal Aspects of Speech Acts**

The task of empirical pragmatics consists, to begin with, in describing speech acts typical of a certain milieu, which can in turn be analyzed from sociological, ethnological, and psychological points of view. General pragmatic theory, on the other hand, is concerned with reconstructing the rule system that underlies the ability of a subject to utter sentences in any relevant situation whatsoever. Universal pragmatics thereby raises the claim to reconstruct the ability of adult speakers to embed sentences in relations to reality in such a way that they can take on the general pragmatic functions of representation, expression, and establishing legitimate interpersonal relations. This communicative competence is expressed inter alia in those accomplishments that hermeneutics stylizes to an art (*Kunstlehre*), namely paraphrasing utterances by means of context-similar utterances of the same language or translating them into context-comparable utterances in a foreign language.

**Universal-Pragmatic Aspects**

The three general pragmatic functions of an utterance—to represent something in the world using a sentence, to express the speaker’s intentions, and to establish legitimate interpersonal relations—are the basis of all the particular functions that an utterance can assume in specific contexts. The fulfillment of those general functions is measured against the validity conditions for truth, truthfulness, and rightness. Thus every speech act can be considered from the corresponding analytic viewpoints. Formal semantics examines the structure of elementary propositions and the acts of reference and predication. A still scarcely developed theory of intentionality
examines intentional expressions insofar as they function in first-person sentences. Finally, the theory of speech acts examines illocutionary force from the viewpoint of the establishment of legitimate interpersonal relations. These semiotic distinctions are summarized in the following table:

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<tr>
<th>Theoretical level</th>
<th>Object domain</th>
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<tr>
<td>Linguistics</td>
<td>Sentences</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grammar</td>
<td>Sentences of an individual language</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grammatical theory</td>
<td>Rules for generating sentences in any language</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aspects of linguistic analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phonetic theory</td>
<td>Inscriptions (language sounds)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syntactic theory</td>
<td>Syntactical rules</td>
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<tr>
<td>Semantic theory</td>
<td>Lexical units</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pragmatics</td>
<td>Speech acts</td>
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<td>Empirical pragmatics</td>
<td>Context-bound speech acts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Universal pragmatics</td>
<td>Rules for using sentences in utterances</td>
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<td>Aspects of universal-pragmatic analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Theory of elementary propositions</td>
<td>Acts of reference and predication</td>
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<tr>
<td>Theory of first-person sentences</td>
<td>Linguistic expression of intentions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory of illocutionary acts</td>
<td>Establishment of interpersonal relations</td>
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For a theory of communicative action, the third aspect of utterances, namely the establishment of legitimate interpersonal relations, is central. I shall therefore take the theory of speech acts as my point of departure.
The Standard Form of the Speech Act—Searle’s Principle of Expressibility

The principal task of speech-act theory is to clarify the performative status of linguistic utterances. Austin analyzed the sense in which I can utter sentences in speech acts as the *illocutionary force* of speech acts. In uttering a promise, an assertion, or a warning, I simultaneously execute an action with the corresponding sentences: I try to *make* a promise, to *put forward* an assertion, to *issue* a warning—I do things by saying something. Although there are other modes of employing language—Austin mentions, among others, writing poems and telling jokes—the illocutionary use seems to be the foundation on which these other kinds of employment rest. To be understood in a given situation, every utterance must at least implicitly establish and give expression to a certain *relation* between the speaker and her counterpart. We can also say that the illocutionary force of a speech act consists in fixing the communicative function of the content uttered.

The current distinction between the content and the relational aspects of an utterance has, to begin with, a trivial meaning. It says that, in being uttered, the sentence used is embedded in a context, more precisely, in specific interpersonal relations. In a certain way, every explicitly performative utterance both establishes and represents an interpersonal relation between at least two subjects capable of speech and action. This circumstance is trivial so long as under the relational aspect we merely contrast the utterance character of speech with its semantic content. If nothing more were meant by the illocutionary force of a speech act, the concept “illocutionary” could serve at best to elucidate the fact that linguistic utterances have the character of actions, that is, are speech *actions*. The point of the concept cannot lie therein. I find it rather in the peculiarly generative power of speech acts.

It is to this generative power that I trace the fact that a speech act can succeed (or fail). We can say that a speech act succeeds if a relation between the speaker and hearer comes to pass—the relation intended by the speaker—and if the hearer can *understand and accept* the content uttered by the speaker in the sense indicated (e.g., as a
promise, assertion, suggestion, and so forth). Thus the generative power consists in the fact that the speaker, in performing a speech act, can influence the hearer in such a way that the latter can take up an interpersonal relation with her. It can, of course, be said of every interaction, and not only of speech acts, that they establish interpersonal relations. Whether or not they have an explicitly linguistic form, communicative actions are related to a context of action norms and values. Without the normative background of routines, roles, habitualized forms of life—in short, conventions—the individual action would remain indeterminate. All communicative actions satisfy or violate normative social expectations or conventions. Satisfying a convention in acting means that a subject capable of speaking and acting takes up an interpersonal relation with at least one other such subject. Thus the establishment of an interpersonal relation is a criterion that is not selective enough for our purposes. I emphasized at the start that I am restricting my analysis to paradigmatic cases of linguistically explicit action that is oriented toward reaching understanding. This restriction must now be drawn somewhat more precisely. In doing so, we can begin with the standard examples from which speech-act theory was developed. The following are typical speech-act forms:

“I . . . you that . . . .”
[verb] [sentence]
e.g., “I (hereby) promise you that I will come tomorrow.”

“You are . . . . . . . . .”
[verb] [p. part.] [sentence]
e.g., “You are requested to stop smoking.”

“I . . . . . . . you that . . . . . . .”
[auxiliary verb] [verb] [sentence]
e.g., “I can assure you that it wasn’t I.”

I shall hold to the following terminological rules. An explicit speech act satisfies the standard form in its surface structure if it is made up of an illocutionary and a propositional component. The illocutionary component consists in an illocutionary act carried out with the aid of a performative sentence. This sentence is formed in the
present indicative, affirmative, and has as its logical subject the first person and as its logical (direct) object the second person; the predicate, constructed with the help of a performative expression, permits in general the particle “hereby.” This performative component needs to be completed by a propositional component constructed with the help of a sentence with *propositional content*. Whenever it is used in constative speech acts, the sentence with propositional content takes the form of a *propositional sentence* (*Aus- sage*). In its elementary form, the propositional sentence contains (i) a name or a referring expression, with the aid of which the speaker denotes an object about which she wants to assert something; and (ii) a predicate expression for the general specification that the speaker wants to grant or deny to the object. In nonconstative speech acts, the propositional content is not stated, but mentioned, in this case, propositional content coincides with what is usually called the unasserted proposition. (Thus I distinguish between the nominalized proposition “that \( p \),” which expresses a state of affairs, and the proposition “\( p \),” which represents a fact and which owes its assertoric force to the circumstance that it is embedded in a speech act of the type “assertion,” and is thereby connected with an illocutionary act of asserting. In formal logic, of course, we treat propositions as autonomous units. Only the truth value we assign to “\( p \)” in contradistinction to “that \( p \)” is a reminder of the embedding of the proposition in some constative speech act, an embedding that is systematically neglected.)

I shall call speech acts that have this structure *propositionally differentiated*. They are distinguished from symbolically mediated interactions—for instance, a shout of “Fire!” that releases complementary actions, assistance or flight—in that a propositional component of speech is uncoupled from the illocutionary act, so that (i) the propositional content can be held invariant across changes in illocutionary potential, and (ii) the holistic mode of speech, in which representation, expression, and behavioral expectation are still one, can be replaced by differential modes of speech. I shall return to this point in the following section. For the present, it suffices to point out that this level of differentiation of speech is a precondition for an action’s ability to take on representational functions, that is,
to state something about the world, either directly in the form of an assertion or indirectly, in nonconstative speech acts, through mentioning a propositional content.

Explicit speech acts always have a propositional component in which a state of affairs is expressed. Nonlinguistic actions normally lack this component; thus they cannot fulfill representational functions. Signaling to a taxi so that I can begin work in my office by eight in the morning, reacting to the news of my child’s miserable school grades with a desperate look, joining a demonstration march, expressing nonacceptance of an invitation by not showing up, shaking a candidate’s hand after he has passed the exam, and so on and so forth, I observe or violate conventions. Naturally, these normative expectations have a propositional content; however, the propositional content must already be known to the participants if the expressed behavior is to be comprehensible as arriving at work, a parent’s reacting, taking part in a demonstration—in short as an action. The nonverbal utterance itself cannot bring the propositional content of the presupposed norm to expression because it cannot take on representational functions. It can, of course, be understood as an indicator that calls to mind the propositional content of the presupposed norm.

Owing to their representational function, propositionally differentiated speech acts allow the actor a greater degree of freedom in following norms. If work begins at eight in the morning, there is the option only of appearing or not appearing; in the former case, to be on time or to be late; in the latter case, to be excused or not excused, and so on. Nonverbal actions are often the result of such “trees” of “yes” or “no” decisions. But if the actor can express herself verbally, her situation is rich with alternatives. She can express the same speech act, say a command, in a very differentiated way; she will fulfill the same role segment, say that of an English teacher during class dictation, with very different speech acts. In short, propositionally differentiated speech leaves the actor more degrees of freedom in relation to a recognized normative background than does a nonlinguistic interaction.

Of course, propositionally differentiated utterances do not always have a linguistic form, as is shown by the example of a grammatical-
ized sign language, for instance, the standardized language of the deaf and mute. In this connection, one might also mention pointing gestures, which represent an equivalent for the use of referential terms, thereby supplementing propositional speech. On the other hand, there are also speech acts that are not propositionally differentiated, for example, illocutionarily abbreviated speech acts such as “Hello!” as a greeting formula, or “Check!” and “Checkmate!” as performative expressions for moves in a game of chess and their consequences. The circumstance that a propositional component is lacking places these verbal utterances on a level with normal non-verbal actions; while the latter actions do refer to the propositional content of a presupposed convention, they do not represent it.

As a first step in delimiting the pragmatic units of analysis, we can specify—out of the set of communicative actions that rest on the consensual foundation of reciprocally raised and recognized validity claims—the subset of propositionally differentiated speech acts. But even this specification is not yet selective enough; for among these utterances we find such speech acts as “betting,” “christening,” “appointing,” and so on. Despite their propositionally differentiated content (betting on/for . . . , christening as/with . . . , appointing to . . . ), they are bound to a single institution (or to a narrowly circumscribed set of institutions); they can therefore be seen as the equivalent of actions that fulfill presupposed norms, either nonverbally or in an illocutionarily abbreviated way. That these speech acts are institutionally bound can be seen in (among other things) the fact that the permissible propositional contents are narrowly limited by the normative meaning of betting, christening, appointing, marrying, and so on. One bets for stakes, christens with names, appoints to official positions, marries a partner, and so on. With institutionally bound speech acts, specific institutions can always be specified. With institutionally unbound speech acts, only general contextual conditions can be specified—conditions that typically must be met for a corresponding act to succeed. Institutionally bound speech acts express a specific institution in the same unmediated way that propositionally nondifferentiated and nonverbal actions express a presupposed norm. To explain what acts of betting or christening mean, I must refer to the institutions of betting or christening. By
contrast, commands or advice or questions do not represent institutions but types of speech acts that can fit very different institutions. To be sure, the criterion of being institutionally bound does not always permit an unambiguous classification. Commands can exist wherever relations of authority are institutionalized; appointments presuppose special, bureaucratically developed organizations; and marriages require a single institution (which is, however, to be found universally). But this does not devalue the usefulness of the analytic viewpoint. Institutionally unbound speech acts, insofar as they have any regulative meaning at all, refer to general aspects of action norms; they are not, however, defined by particular institutions.

We can now define the desired analytic units as propositionally differentiated and institutionally unbound speech acts. To be sure, only those with an explicitly linguistic form are suitable for analysis. Frequently, of course, the context in which speech acts are embedded makes standard linguistic forms superfluous; for example, when the performative meaning is determined exclusively by the context of utterance; or when the performative meaning is merely indicated, that is, expressed through inflection, punctuation, word position, or particles such as “isn’t it?,” “right?,” “indeed,” “clearly,” “surely,” and similar expressions.

Finally, we shall exclude those explicit speech acts in standard form that appear in contexts that produce shifts of meaning. This is the case when the pragmatic meaning of a context-dependent speech act diverges from the meaning of the sentences used in it (and from the indicated general contextual conditions that have to be fulfilled for the type of speech act in question). Searle’s “principle of expressibility” takes this requirement into account: assuming that the speaker expresses his intention precisely, explicitly, and literally, it is possible in principle for every speech act carried out or capable of being carried out to be specified unequivocally by a complex sentence.

Kanngiesser has given this principle the following form: “For every meaning x, it is the case that, if there is a speaker S in a language community P who means (meint) x, then it is possible that there be an expression in the language spoken by P which is an exact expression of x.”72 For our purposes, we can weaken this postulate to
require that in a given language, for every interpersonal relation that a speaker wants to take up explicitly with another member of his language community, a suitable performative expression is either available or, if necessary, can be obtained through a specification of available expressions or newly introduced. With this modification, we can take into account reservations that have been expressed concerning Searle’s principle. In any case, the heuristic meaning is clear—if the postulate of expressibility is valid, analysis can be limited to institutionally unbound, explicit speech acts in standard form.

The following diagram sums up the viewpoints from which I have delimited the class of speech acts basic for analysis.

Derivation of the Analytic Units of the Theory of Speech Acts

Instrumental actions \quad Social actions

Symbolic actions \quad Communicative actions \quad Strategic actions

Not propositionally differentiated \quad Propositionally differentiated

Nonverbal \quad Verbal (illocutionarily abbreviated speech acts)

Nonverbal \quad Institutionally bound

Institutionally unbound

Implicit \quad Explicit

Context-dependent \quad Context-independent

Analytic units
I have not elucidated the embedding of communicative action (“action oriented toward reaching understanding”) in other types of action. It seems to me that strategic action (“action oriented toward the actor’s success” such as competitive behavior or combat games—in general, modes of action that correspond to the utilitarian model of purposive rational action) as well as the still insufficiently analyzed category of symbolic action (such as action manifested in a concert or a dance—in general, modes of action that are bound to nonpropositional systems of symbolic expression) differ from communicative action in that individual validity claims are suspended (in strategic action, truthfulness, in symbolic action, truth).74 My previous analyses of “labor” and “interaction” have not yet adequately captured the most general differentiating characteristics of instrumental and social (or communicative) action. I cannot pursue this here.

On the Double Structure of Speech

I would like to return now to the characteristic double structure that can be read off from the standard form of speech acts. Obviously, the two components, the illocutionary and the propositional, can vary independently of one another. We can hold a propositional content invariant vis-à-vis the different types of speech acts in which it occurs. In this abstraction of propositional content from the asserted proposition, a fundamental accomplishment of our language is expressed. Propositionally differentiated speech distinguishes itself therein from the symbolically mediated interaction we can already observe among primates.75 Any number of examples of the invariance of propositional content despite variance in speech act mode can be provided—for instance, for the propositional content “Peter’s smoking a pipe,” there are the following:

“I assert that Peter smokes a pipe.”

“I beg you (Peter) to smoke a pipe.”

“I ask you (Peter), do you smoke a pipe?”

“I warn you (Peter) against smoking a pipe.”
In a genetic perspective, the speech-act invariance of propositional contents appears as an *uncoupling of the illocutionary and propositional components* in the formation and transformation of speech acts. This uncoupling is a condition for the differentiation of the double structure of speech, that is, for the separation of two communicative levels on which speaker and hearer must *simultaneously* come to an understanding if they want to communicate their intentions to one another. I would distinguish (i) the *level of intersubjectivity* on which speaker and hearer, through illocutionary acts, establish the relations that permit them to come to an understanding with one another, and (ii) the *level of propositional content* about which they wish to reach understanding in the communicative function specified in (i). Corresponding to the relational and the content aspects, from the point of view of which every utterance can be analyzed, there are (in the standard form) the illocutionary and the propositional components of the speech act. The illocutionary act fixes the sense in which the propositional content is employed, and the act-complement determines the content that is understood “as something . . .” in the communicative function specified. (The hermeneutic “as” can be differentiated on both communicative levels. With a proposition “p,” an identifiable object whose existence is presupposed can be characterized “as something”—e.g., as a “red,” “soft,” or “ideal,” object. In connection with an illocutionary act, that is, through being embedded in a speech act, this propositional content can, in turn, be *uttered* “as something”—e.g., as a command or assertion).

A basic feature of language is connected with this double structure of speech, namely, its inherent reflexivity. The standardized possibilities for directly and indirectly mentioning speech merely make explicit a self-reference that is already contained in every speech act. In filling out the double structure of speech, participants in dialogue communicate on two levels simultaneously. They combine communication of a content with “metacommunication”—communication about the sense in which the communicated content is used. The expression “metacommunication” might be misleading here because it could be associated with *metalinguage* and suggest an idea of language levels such that, at every higher level, metalinguistic statements about the object language of the next lower level can be
made. But the concept of a hierarchy of language was introduced for formal languages, in which just that reflexivity of ordinary language is lacking. Moreover, in a metalanguage one always refers to an object language in the objectivating attitude of someone asserting facts or observing events; one forms metalinguistic statements. By contrast, on the metacommunicative level of speech, it is precisely statements that are not possible. Instead, at this level, one chooses the illocutionary role in which the propositional content is to be used; and this metacommunication about the sense in which the sentence with propositional content is to be employed requires a performative attitude on the part of those communicating. Thus, the peculiar reflexivity of natural language rests in the first instance on the combination of a communication of content—effected in an objectivating attitude—with a metacommunication concerning the relational aspect—effected in a performative attitude—from the point of view of which the content is to be understood.

Of course, participants in dialogue normally have the option of objectifying every illocutionary act performed as the content of a further (constative) speech act. They can adopt an objectivating attitude toward the illocutionary component of an already performed speech act and shift this component to the level of propositional contents. Naturally, they can do so only by performing a new speech act that contains, in turn, a nonobjectified illocutionary component. The direct and indirect mention of speech standardizes this possibility of rendering explicit the reflexivity of natural language. The metacommunication that takes place on the level of intersubjectivity in a speech act \( tn \) can be depicted on the level of propositional content in a further (constative) speech act \( tn+1 \). On the other hand, it is not possible simultaneously to perform and to objectify an illocutionary act.\(^7\)

This option is sometimes the occasion for a descriptivist fallacy to which even pragmatic theories fall prey. We can analyze the structures of speech, just like every other object, only in an objectivating attitude. In doing so, the relevant accompanying illocutionary component cannot, as we saw above, become uno acto the object. This circumstance misleads many language theorists into the view that communication processes take place at a single level, namely that of
transmitting content (i.e., information). From this perspective, the relational aspect loses its independence vis-à-vis the content aspect; the communicative role of an utterance loses its constitutive significance and is counted as part of the information content. The pragmatic operator of the statement, which in formalized presentations (e.g., deontic logics) represents the illocutionary component of an utterance, is then no longer interpreted as a specific mode of reaching understanding about propositional contents but falsely as part of the information transmitted. I do not wish to analyze this fallacy here; I merely point to one of its consequences: that the constitutive meaning of the double structure of speech is neglected in theoretical approaches.

As opposed to this, I consider the task of universal pragmatics to be the rational reconstruction of the double structure of speech. Taking Austin’s theory of speech acts as my point of departure (in the next two sections) I would now like to render this task more precise in relation to the problems of meaning and validity.

Universal-Pragmatic Categories of Meaning

Austin’s contrasting of locutionary and illocutionary acts set off a broad discussion that has also brought some clarification to the theory of meaning. Austin reserved the concept meaning for the meaning of sentences with propositional content, while he used the concept force only for the illocutionary act of uttering sentences with propositional content. This leads to the following constellations:

Meaning: sense and reference, locutionary act

Force: attempt to reach an uptake, illocutionary act

Austin could point to the fact that sentences with the same propositional content could be uttered in speech acts of different types, that is, with differing illocutionary force or in different illocutionary modes. Nevertheless, the proposed distinction is unsatisfactory. If one introduces meaning solely in a linguistic sense, as sentence meaning (whereby either sentence meaning is conceived as a function of word meanings or, with Frege, word meanings are conceived
as functions of possible sentence meanings), the restriction to the propositional components of speech acts is not plausible. Obviously, their illocutionary components also have a meaning in a linguistic sense. In the case of an explicitly performative utterance, the performative verb employed has a lexical meaning, and the performative sentence constructed with its help has a meaning in a manner similar to the sentence with propositional content dependent on it. “What Austin calls the illocutionary force of an utterance is that aspect of its meaning which is either conveyed by its explicitly performative prefix, if it has one, or might have been so conveyed by the use of such an expression.”

This plausible argument neglects, however, the fact that force is something that, in a specific sense, belongs only to utterances and not to sentences. Thus, one might first hit upon the idea of reserving “force” for the meaning content that accrues to the sentence through its being uttered, that is, embedded in structures of speech. We can certainly distinguish the phenomenon of meaning that comes about through the employment of a sentence in an utterance from the phenomenon of sentence meaning. We can speak in a pragmatic sense of the meaning of an utterance, as we do in a linguistic sense of the meaning of a sentence. Thus Alston has taken the fact that the same speech act can be performed with very different sentences as a reason for granting pragmatic meaning a certain priority over linguistic meaning. In accordance with a consistent use theory of meaning, he suggests that sentence (and word) meanings are a function of the meaning of the speech acts in which they are “principally” used. The difficulty with this proposal is that it does not adequately take into account the relative independence of sentence meanings in relation to the contingent changes of meaning that a sentence can undergo when used in different contexts. Moreover, the meaning of a sentence is obviously less dependent on the intentions of the speaker than is the meaning of an utterance.

Even if a sentence is very often used with different intentions and in a context that pragmatically shifts meaning, its linguistic meaning does not have to change. Thus, for example, when certain social roles prescribe that commands be uttered in the form of requests, the pragmatic meaning of the utterance (as a command) in no way
alters the linguistic meaning of the sentence uttered (as a request). This is an additional reason for singling out the standard conditions under which the pragmatic meaning of an explicit speech act coincides with the linguistic meaning of the sentences employed in it. Precisely in the case of an explicit speech act in standard form, however, the categorial difference between the meaning of the expressions originally used in propositional sentences, on the one hand, and the meaning of illocutionary forces (as well as of expressed intentions), on the other, comes into view. This shows that it does not make sense to explicate the concepts “meaning” versus “force” with reference to the distinction between the linguistic meaning of a sentence and the pragmatic meaning of an utterance.

The linguistic analysis of sentence meaning tends to abstract from certain relations to reality into which a sentence is put as soon as it is uttered and from the validity claims under which it is thereby placed. On the other hand, a consistent analysis of meaning is not possible without some reference to situations of possible use. Every linguistic expression can be used to form statements. Even illocutionary phrases (and originally intentional expressions) can be objectified with the help of a further statement. This suggests that it makes sense to secure a certain uniformity for the linguistic analysis of the meanings of linguistic expressions by relating it in every case to the possibilities for using these expressions in propositions. But this makes sense only for such expressions as can appear exclusively in propositional components of speech. By contrast, the meaning of performative expressions should be clarified by referring to the possibilities for using them in illocutionary acts (and the meaning of originally intentional expressions by referring to the possibilities for using them to express intentions directly). The linguistic explication of the meaning of “to promise” should orient itself around the possibilities for using the sentence

(1) “I hereby promise you that . . .”

and not around the possibilities for using the sentence

(2) “He promises her that . . .”

Correspondingly, the explication of the meaning of “to hate” should refer to the sentence
What Is Universal Pragmatics?

(1’) “I hate you.”

instead of to the sentence

(2’) “He hates her.”

Only because and so long as the linguistic analysis of meaning is biased in favor of the propositionalized forms (2 or 2’) is it necessary to supplement the meaning of propositional sentences with the meaning of the illocutionary force of an utterance (and the intention of the speaker). No doubt this circumstance motivated Austin to draw his distinction between meaning and force. To my mind, it would be better to start with the linguistic meaning of an expression, as opposed to the pragmatic meaning of an utterance; the linguistic meaning of expressions would then be differentiated according to the universal possibilities for using them in speech acts (and according to the corresponding validity claims), with reference to the original occurrence of such expressions. But what does “original” mean in this context? Let us consider two sentences as examples:

(3) “I’m telling you that father’s new car is yellow.”

(4) “I’m asking you, is father’s new car yellow?”

Understanding the two (different) illocutionary acts is tied to other presuppositions than is understanding their (concordant) propositional content. The difference becomes perceptible as soon as one returns to the conditions that must be fulfilled by situations in which someone who does not know English might learn (i.e., originally understand) the meanings. A hearer can understand the meaning of the sentence with the propositional content “the being yellow of father’s car” on condition that he has learned to correctly use the propositional sentence:

(5) “Father’s new car is yellow”

in order, for example, to express a corresponding experience, in this case his observation that father’s new car is yellow. The ability to make this or a similar observation must be presupposed, for a proper use of the propositional sentence in (5) demands at least the following of the speaker:
a. The existential presupposition: that there is one and only one object to which the designation “father’s new car” applies.

b. The presupposition of identifiability: that the (denotationally employed) propositional content contained in the designation “father’s new car” is a sufficient indication, in a given context, for a hearer to select the (and only the) object to which the designation applies.

c. The act of predication: that the predicate “yellow” can be attributed to the object that is designated.

Correspondingly, understanding the meaning of the propositional sentence contained in (5) demands of the hearer that he

a’. share the speaker-presupposition,
b’. fulfill the speaker-presupposition, that is, actually identify the object designated, and
c’. undertake for his part the act of predication.

It is a different matter so far as the illocutionary components of utterances (3) and (4) are concerned. A hearer can understand the meaning of notifying or asking on condition that he has learned to take part in successful speech acts of the following type:

(6) “I (hereby) notify you that . . .”

(7) “I (hereby) ask you whether . . .”

The hearer, that is, has learned to assume both the role of the (acting) speaker as well as that of the (cooperating) hearer. The performance of an illocutionary act cannot serve to report an observation as the use of a propositional sentence can; nor must the ability to have perceptions essentially be presupposed here. Rather, conversely, the execution of a speech act is a condition of possibility of an experience, namely the communicative experience that the hearer has when he accepts the offer contained in the attempted speech act and enters into an interpersonal relation with the speaker, a relation between one who notifies or informs and one who receives the notification or information—or, alternatively, takes up the relation between a person who questions and a person who answers.
Understanding (5) presupposes the possibility of sensory experiences (experiences of the type, observation); by contrast, understanding (6) and (7) itself represents a communicative experience (an experience of the type, participatory observation): illocutionary understanding is an experience made possible through communication.

The difference between originally illocutionary and originally propositional meanings (“force” and “meaning” in Austin’s sense) can be traced back to differences in possible learning situations. We learn the meaning of illocutionary acts only in the performative attitude of participants in speech acts. By contrast, we learn the meaning of sentences with propositional content in the nonperformativ—objectivating—attitude of observers who correctly represent their experiences in propositional sentences.\(^7^9\) We acquire originally illocutionary meanings in connection with communicative experiences that we have in entering the level of intersubjectivity and establishing an interpersonal relation. We learn originally propositional meanings through reporting experiences with objects and events in the world.

Notwithstanding this difference, meanings learned in a performative attitude can, of course, also occur in sentences with propositional content:

(8) “I assure you that he notified me yesterday that . . .”

(9) “I’m reporting to you that she asked me yesterday whether . . .”

This fact may explain why the indicated difference between the two categories of meaning is often not noticed. In sentences with propositional content, however, we can distinguish the meanings of expressions that may be used in a performative attitude from the word meanings that—like the nominal and predicative expressions in (5)—are permitted only as meaning components in sentences with propositional content. In utterances like (8) and (9), “notify” and “ask” bear a shade of meaning derived from the power that they have only in illocutionary roles—as in (6) and (7).

We can retain Austin’s distinction between “force” and “meaning” in the sense of these two categories of meaning. “Force” then stands
for the meaning of expressions that are originally used in connection with illocutionary acts, and “meaning” for the meaning of expressions originally used in connection with propositions. Thus we distinguish “force” and “meaning” as two categories of meaning that arise with regard to the general pragmatic functions of communication: the establishment of interpersonal relations, on the one hand, and representation (reporting of facts or states of affairs), on the other. (I shall here leave to one side the third category of meaning, which corresponds to the function of expression, that is, to the disclosure of subjective experiences (Erlebnisse), although reflections similar to those carried out for illocutionary acts apply to intentional sentences as well.)

I would like to hold on to the following results:

a. It is not advisable to reserve the concept meaning for the propositional component of a speech act and to characterize the meaning of an illocutionary component only by a pragmatic operator (which designates a specific illocutionary force).

b. On the other hand, it is also unsatisfactory to reconstruct the meaning of a performative sentence in exactly the same way as the meaning of a sentence with propositional content; the illocutionary component of a speech act neither expresses a proposition nor mentions a propositional content.80

c. It is equally unsatisfactory to equate illocutionary force with the meaning component that accrues to the meaning of a sentence through the act of uttering it in a given context.

d. Rather, from a universal-pragmatic point of view, the meaning of linguistic expressions can be categorically distinguished according to whether they may appear only in sentences that take on a representational function or whether they can serve specifically to establish interpersonal relations or to express speaker intentions.81

Thematization of Validity Claims and Modes of Communication

Austin’s contrasting of locutionary and illocutionary acts has become important not only for the theory of meaning; the discussion
about basic types of speech acts and basic modes of language use has also taken this pair of concepts as its starting point. At first Austin wanted to draw the boundary in such a way that “the performative should be doing something as opposed to just saying something; and the performative is happy or unhappy as opposed to true and false.”

From this the following correlations resulted:

Locutionary acts: constatives, true/untrue

Illocutionary acts: performatives, happy/unhappy

But this demarcation of locutionary and illocutionary acts could not be maintained when it became apparent that all speech acts—the constatives included—contain a locutionary component (in the form of a sentence with propositional content) and an illocutionary component (in the form of a performative sentence). What Austin had initially introduced as the locutionary act was now replaced by (a) the propositional component contained in every explicit speech act, and (b) a special class of illocutionary acts—constative speech acts—that imply the validity claim of truth. Austin himself later regarded constative speech acts as only one among several different classes of speech acts. The two sentences

(1) “I assert that . . .”

(2) “I’m warning you that . . .”

equally express illocutionary acts. But this has the interesting consequence that the validity claim contained in constative speech acts (truth/falsity) represents merely a special case among the validity claims that speakers, in speech acts, raise and offer for vindication vis-à-vis hearers.

In general we may say this: with both statements (and, for example, descriptions) and warnings, etc., the question of whether, granting that you did warn and had the right to warn, did state or did advise, you were right to state or to warn or advise, can arise—not in the sense of whether it was opportune or expedient, but whether, on the facts and your knowledge of the facts and the purpose for which you were speaking, and so on, this was the proper thing to say.
In this passage, Austin emphasizes the claim to be right, or claim to validity, that we raise with any (and not just with constative) speech acts. But he distinguishes these only incidentally from the general contextual conditions—restricted according to speech-act type—that likewise must be fulfilled if a speech act is to succeed (that is, from happiness/unhappiness conditions in general). It is true of assertions, in the same way as it is of warnings, pieces of advice, promises, and so forth, that they can succeed only if both conditions are fulfilled: (a) to be in order, and (b) to be right.

But the real conclusion must surely be that we need . . . to establish with respect to each kind of illocutionary act—warnings, estimates, verdicts, statements, and descriptions—what if any is the specific way in which they are intended, first to be in order or not in order, and second, to be “right” or “wrong;” what terms of appraisal and disappaisal are used for each and what they mean. This is a wide field and certainly will not lead to a simple distinction of true and false; nor will it lead to a distinction of statements from the rest, for stating is only one among very numerous speech acts of the illocutionary class.86

Speech acts can be in order with respect to typically restricted contexts (a); but they can be valid (gültig) only with respect to the fundamental claim that the speaker raises with his illocutionary act (b). I shall come back to both of these classes of conditions that must be fulfilled in order for speech acts to succeed. At this point I am interested only in the fact that the comparison between constative and nonconstative speech acts throws light on the validity basis that manifestly underlies all speech actions.

To be sure, this does initially clarify the special position of constative speech acts. Assertions do not differ from other types of speech acts in their performative/propositional double structure, nor do they differ by virtue of general contextual conditions, for these vary in a typical way for all speech actions; but they do differ from (almost) all other types of speech acts in that they prima facie imply an unmistakable validity claim, a claim to truth. It is undeniable that other types of speech acts also imply some or other validity claim; but in determining exactly what validity claim they imply, we seldom encounter such a clearly defined and universally recognized validity claim as “truth” (in the sense of propositional truth). It is easy to see
the reason for this; the validity claim of constative speech acts is presupposed in a certain way by speech acts of every type. The meaning of the propositional content mentioned in nonconstative speech acts can be made explicit through transforming a sentence of propositional content, “that \( p \),” into the propositional sentence “\( p \);” and the truth claim belongs essentially to the meaning of the proposition thereby expressed. Truth claims are thus a type of validity claim built into the structure of possible speech in general. Truth is a universal validity claim; its universality is reflected in the double structure of speech.

Looking back, Austin assures himself of what he originally had in mind with his contrast of constative and nonconstative speech acts (constatives versus performatives):

With the constative utterances, we abstract from the illocutionary . . . aspects of the speech act, and we concentrate on the locutionary; moreover, we use an oversimplified notion of correspondence with the facts. . . . We aim at the ideal of what would be right to say in all circumstances, for any purposes, to any audience, etc. Perhaps this is sometimes realized. With the performative we attend as much as possible to the illocutionary force of the utterance, and abstract from the dimension of correspondence with facts.87

After he recognized that constative speech acts represent only one of several types of speech acts, Austin gave up the aforementioned contrast in favor of a set of unordered families of speech acts. I am of the opinion, however, that what he intended with the contrast “constative” versus “performative” can be adequately reconstructed.

We have seen that communication in language can take place only when the participants, in communicating with one another about something, simultaneously enter two levels of communication—the level of intersubjectivity on which they take up interpersonal relations and the level of propositional contents. However, in speaking, we can make either the interpersonal relation or the propositional content more centrally thematic; in so doing, we make a more interactive or a more cognitive use of our language. In the interactive use of language, we thematize the relations into which speaker and hearer enter—as a warning, promise, request—while we merely mention the propositional content of the utterances. In the cognitive use of language, by contrast, we thematize the content of the utterance
as a statement about something that is happening in the world (or that could be the case), while we express the interpersonal relation only indirectly. This incidental character can be seen, for example, in the fact that in English the explicit form of assertion (“I am asserting (to you) that . . .”), although grammatically correct, is rare in comparison to the short form that disregards the interpersonal relation.

As the content is thematized in the cognitive use of language, only speech acts in which propositional contents can assume the explicit form of propositional sentences are permitted. With these constative speech acts, we raise a truth claim for the proposition asserted. In the interactive use of language, in which the interpersonal relation is thematically stressed, we refer in various ways to the validity of the normative background of the speech act.

For this latter use, the (authorized) command has a paradigmatic significance similar to that of the assertion for the cognitive use of language. Truth is merely the most conspicuous—not the only—validity claim reflected in the formal structures of speech. The illocutionary force of the speech act, which generates a legitimate (or illegitimate) interpersonal relation between the participants, is derived from the binding and bonding force (bindende Kraft) of recognized norms of action (or of evaluation); to the extent that a speech act is an action, it actualizes an already established pattern of relations. The validity of a normative background of institutions, roles, socioculturally habituated forms of life—that is, of conventions—is always already presupposed. This by no means holds true only for institutionally bound speech acts such as betting, greeting, christening, appointing, and the like, each of which satisfies a specific norm of action (or a narrowly circumscribed class of norms). In promises, too, in recommendations, prohibitions, prescriptions, and the like, which are not regulated from the outset by institutions, the speaker implies a validity claim that must, if the speech acts are to succeed, be covered by existing norms, and that means by (at least) de facto recognition of the claim that these norms rightfully exist. This internal relation between the validity claims implicitly raised in speech acts and the validity of their normative background is emphasized in the interactive use of language, just as is the truth claim in the cognitive use of language.
Just as only constative speech acts are permitted for the cognitive use of language, so for the interactive use of language only those speech acts are permitted that characterize a specific relation that speaker and hearer can adopt to the normative contexts of their action. I call these regulative speech acts. With the illocutionary force of speech acts, the normative validity claim—rightness or appropriateness (Richtigkeit, Angemessenheit)—is built just as universally into the structures of speech as the truth claim. But the validity claim of a normative background is explicitly invoked only in regulative speech acts (in commands and admonitions, in prohibitions and refusals, in promises and agreements, notifications, excuses, recommendations, admissions, and so forth). The truth reference of the mentioned propositional content remains, by contrast, merely implicit; it pertains only to its existential presuppositions. Conversely, in constative speech acts, which explicitly raise a truth claim, the normative validity claim remains implicit, although these too (e.g., reports, explications, communications, elucidations, narrations, and so forth) must correspond to an established pattern of relations—that is, they must be covered by a recognized normative background—if the interpersonal relations intended with them are to come to pass.

It seems to me that what Austin had in mind with his (later abandoned) classification of speech acts into constative versus performative utterances is captured in the distinction between the cognitive and the interactive uses of language. In the cognitive use of language, with the help of constative speech acts, we thematize the propositional content of an utterance; in the interactive use of language, with the help of regulative speech acts, we thematize the kind of interpersonal relation established. The difference in thematization results from stressing one of the validity claims universally inherent in speech, that is, from the fact that in the cognitive use of language we raise truth claims for propositions and in the interactive use of language we lay claim to (or contest) the validity of a normative background for interpersonal relations. Austin himself did not draw this consequence because, on the one hand, he took only one universal validity claim into consideration, namely, propositional truth interpreted in terms of the correspondence theory of truth; but he wanted, on the other hand, to make this single validity claim
compatible with many types of speech acts (and not just constative speech acts). In his words: “If, then, we loosen up our ideas of truth and falsity we shall see that statements, when assessed in relation to the facts, are not so different after all from pieces of advice, warnings, verdicts and so on.” To be sure, this loosening up of the ideas of truth and falsity in favor of a broad dimension of evaluation, in which an assertion can just as well be characterized as exaggerated or precise or inappropriate as true or false, results, on the other hand, in the assimilation of all validity claims to the universal validity claim of propositional truth. “We see that, when we have an order or a warning or a piece of advice, there is a question about how this is related to fact which is not perhaps so different from the kind of question that arises when we discuss how a statement is related to fact.” It seems to me that Austin confuses the validity claim of propositional truth, which can be understood in the first instance in terms of a correspondence between statements and facts, with the validity claim of normative rightness, which cannot in any way be interpreted in terms of the correspondence theory of truth.

To the extent that warnings or pieces of advice rest on predictions, they are part of a cognitive use of language. Whether those involved were right to utter certain warnings or pieces of advice in a given situation depends in this case on the truth of the corresponding predictions. As part of an interactive use of language, warnings and pieces of advice can also have a normative meaning. Then the right to issue certain warnings and advice depends on whether the presupposed norms to which they refer are valid (that is, are intersubjectively recognized) or not (and, at a next stage, ought or ought not to be valid, that is, intersubjectively recognized).

Most types of speech acts, however, can be correlated with a single mode of language use. Whether an estimate is good or bad clearly depends on the truth of a corresponding statement; estimates usually appear in the cognitive use of language. Likewise, whether the verdict of a court, the reprimand of a person, or the command of a superior to a subordinate with regard to certain behavior are “justly” pronounced, “deservedly” delivered, or “rightfully” given depends just as clearly on whether a recognized norm has been correctly applied to a given case (or whether the right norm has been applied
to the case); legal verdicts, reprimands, and orders can only be part of an interactive use of language. Austin himself once considered the objection that different validity claims are at work in these cases:

Allowing that, in declaring the accused guilty, you have reached your verdict properly and in good faith, it still remains to ask whether the verdict was just, or fair. Allowing that you had the right to reprimand him as you did, and that you have acted without malice, one can still ask whether your reprimand was deserved. . . . There is one thing that people will be particularly tempted to bring up as an objection against any comparison between this second kind of criticism and the kind appropriate to statements, and that is this: aren’t these questions about something’s being good, or just, or fair, or deserved entirely distinct from questions of truth and falsehood? That, surely, is a very simple black-and-white business; either the utterance corresponds to the facts or it doesn’t, and that’s that. 91

In compressing the universal validity claim of truth together with a host of particular evaluative criteria into a single class, Austin blurred the distinction between the clear-cut universal validity claims of propositional truth and normative rightness (and truthfulness). But this proves to be unnecessary if in a given speech act we distinguish among

a. the implicitly presupposed general contextual conditions,
b. the specific meaning of the interpersonal relation to be established, and
c. the implicitly raised general validity claim.

Whereas a. and b. fix the distinct classes (different in different languages) of standardized speech acts, c. determines the universal modes of communication, that is, modes inherent in speech in general.

Before going into a. and b., I would like at least to remark that the Austinian starting point of the distinction between performative and constative utterances provides an overly narrow view; the validity spectrum of speech is not exhausted by the two modes of communication that I developed from this distinction. Naturally, there can be no mode of communication in which the comprehensibility of an utterance is thematically stressed; for every speech act must fulfill the presupposition of comprehensibility in the same way. If in some
communication there is a breakdown of intelligibility, the require-
ment of comprehensibility can be made thematic only through pass-
ing over to a hermeneutic discourse, and then in connection with
the relevant linguistic system. The *truthfulness* with which a speaker
expresses her intentions can, however, be emphasized at the level of
communicative action in the same way as the truth of a proposition
and the rightness (or appropriateness) of an interpersonal relation.
Truthfulness guarantees the transparency of a subjectivity repre-
senting itself in language. It is especially emphasized in the *expressive
use of language*. The paradigms are first-person sentences in which
the speaker’s wishes, feelings, intentions, etc. (which are expressed
incidentally in every speech act) are thematized as such, disclosing
subjective experiences such as

(3) “I long for you.”

(4) “I wish that . . .”

It is unusual for such sentences to be explicitly embedded in an
illocutionary act:

(3′) “I hereby express to you that I long for you.”

The interpersonal relation, which can take on the function of
self-representation, is not thematic in the expressive use of language
and thus need be mentioned only in situations in which the presup-
position of the speaker’s truthfulness is not taken for granted; for
this, avowals are the paradigm:

(5) “I must confess to you that . . .”

(6) “I don’t want to conceal from you that . . .”

For this reason, expressive speech acts such as disclosing, concealing,
revealing, and the like cannot be correlated with the expressive use
of language (which can, in a way, dispense with illocutionary acts)
in the same manner as constative speech acts are correlated with the
cognitive use of language and regulative speech acts with the inter-
active. Nevertheless, truthfulness, too, is a universal implication of
speech, as long as the presuppositions of communicative action in
general are not suspended. In the cognitive use of language the
speaker must, in a trivial sense, truthfully express his thoughts, opinions, assumptions, and so forth; however, in asserting a proposition, what matters is not the truthfulness of his intentions but the truth of the proposition. Similarly, in the interactive use of language, the speaker expresses the intention of promising, reprimanding, refusing, and so forth; but in bringing about an interpersonal relation with a hearer, the truthfulness of his intention is only a necessary condition, whereas what is important is that the action fit a recognized normative context.

Thus we have the following correlations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of communication</th>
<th>Type of speech act</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Thematic validity claim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive</td>
<td>Constatives</td>
<td>Propositional content</td>
<td>Truth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactive</td>
<td>Regulatives</td>
<td>Interpersonal relation</td>
<td>Rightness, appropriateness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expressive</td>
<td>Avowals</td>
<td>Speaker's intention</td>
<td>Truthfulness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B.: The modes of language use can be demarcated from one another only paradigmatically. I am not claiming that every sequence of speech acts can be unequivocally classified under these viewpoints. I am claiming only that every competent speaker has in principle the possibility of unequivocally selecting one mode because with every speech act she must raise four universal validity claims, so that she can single out one of three universal validity claims in order to thematize a component of speech.

The Rational Foundation of Illocutionary Force

Having elucidated the meaning structure and validity basis of basic types of speech acts, I would like to return to the question, in what does the illocutionary force of an utterance consist? At this stage, we know only what it results in if the speech act succeeds—in bringing about an interpersonal relation. Austin and Searle analyzed illocu-
tionary force by looking for conditions of success or failure of speech acts. An uttered content receives a specific communicative function through the fact that the standard conditions for the coming about of a corresponding interpersonal relation are fulfilled. With the illocutionary act, the speaker makes an offer that can be accepted or rejected. The attempt a speaker makes with an illocutionary act may founder for contingent reasons on the refusal of the addressee to enter into the proffered relationship. This case is of no interest in the present context. We shall be concerned with the other case, in which the speaker himself is responsible for the failure of the speech act because the utterance is unacceptable. When the speaker makes an utterance that manifestly contains no serious offer, he cannot count on the relationship intended by him coming about.

I shall speak of the success of a speech act only when the hearer not only understands the meaning of the sentence uttered but also actually enters into the relationship intended by the speaker. And I shall analyze the conditions for the success of speech acts in terms of their “acceptability.” Since I have restricted my examination from the outset to communicative action—that is, action oriented toward reaching understanding—a speech act counts as acceptable only if the speaker not merely feigns but sincerely makes a serious offer. A serious offer demands a certain commitment on the part of the speaker. But before going into this, I would like to mention additional reasons for the unacceptability of illocutionary acts.

Austin developed his doctrine of “infelicities” primarily on the basis of institutionally bound speech acts; for this reason, the examples of “misfires” (i.e., misinvocations, misexecutions, misapplications) are typical for all possible cases of rule violation. Thus, the unacceptability of speech acts can stem from transgressions of underlying norms of action. If in a wedding ceremony a priest recites the prescribed marriage formula incorrectly or not at all, the mistake lies at the same level as, let us say, the command of a university lecturer in class to one of her students, who can reply to her (rightly, let us assume): “You can indeed request a favor of me, but you cannot command me.” The conditions of acceptability are not fulfilled; but in both cases, these conditions are defined by the presupposed norms of action. We are looking, by contrast, for condi-
tions of acceptability that lie within the institutionally unbound speech act itself.

Searle analyzed the conventional presuppositions of different types of speech acts that must be fulfilled if their illocutionary force is to be comprehensible and acceptable. Under the title “preparatory rules,” he specifies generalized or restricted contexts for possible types of speech acts. A promise, for example, is not acceptable if the following conditions, among others, are not fulfilled: (a) \( H \) (the hearer) prefers \( S \)'s (the speaker’s) doing \( A \) (a specific action) to his not doing \( A \), and \( S \) moreover believes this to be the case; (b) it is not obvious to both \( S \) and \( H \) that \( S \) would do \( A \) anyhow in the normal course of events.\(^{93}\) If conventional presuppositions of this kind are not fulfilled, the act of promising is pointless, that is, the attempt by a speaker to carry out the illocutionary act anyway makes no sense and is condemned to failure from the outset.\(^ {94}\)

The general contextual conditions for institutionally unbound speech acts are to be distinguished from the conditions for applying established norms of action.\(^ {95}\) The two sets of conditions of application, those for types of speech acts and those for established norms of action, must vary (largely) independently of one another if (institutionally unbound) speech acts are to represent a repertory from which the acting subject, with the help of a finite number of types, can put together any number of norm-conformative actions.

To be sure, the peculiar force of the illocutionary—which in the case of institutionally unbound speech acts cannot be derived directly from the validity of established norms of action—cannot be explained by means of the speech-act-typical contextual restrictions. It is possible to explain this force only with the help of the specific presuppositions that Searle introduces under the title “essential rules.” In doing so, he admittedly appears to achieve no more than a paraphrase of the meaning of the corresponding performative verbs (for example, requests: “count as an attempt to get \( H \) to do \( A \);” or questions: “count as an attempt to elicit information from \( H \)”). It is interesting, however, that common to these circumscriptions is the specification, “count as an attempt. . . .” The essential presupposition for the success of an illocutionary act consists in the speaker’s taking on a specific commitment (Engagement), so that the hearer can
rely on him. An utterance can count as a promise, assertion, request, question, or avowal if and only if the speaker makes an offer that he is ready to make good insofar as it is accepted by the hearer. The speaker must commit himself, that is, indicate that in certain situations he will draw certain consequences for action. The type of obligation determines the content of the commitment, from which the sincerity of the commitment is to be distinguished.96 This condition, introduced by Searle as the “sincerity rule,” must always be fulfilled in the case of action oriented toward reaching understanding. Thus, in what follows I shall, in speaking of the speaker’s commitment, presuppose both that the commitment has a specific content and that the speaker sincerely is willing to take on his commitment. So far as I can see, previous analyses of speech acts have been unsatisfactory, as they have not clarified the commitment of the speaker on which the acceptability of his utterance specifically depends.

The discernible and sincere readiness of the speaker to enter into a specific kind of interpersonal binding and bonding relationship has, compared with the general contextual conditions, a peculiar status. The restricted contexts that specific types of speech acts presuppose must (a) exist and (b) be supposed to exist by those involved. Thus, the following two statements must hold: (a) a statement to the effect that certain contexts obtain, indeed those required by the type of speech act in question; and (b) a statement to the effect that speaker and hearer suppose these contexts to obtain. Interestingly, it does not make sense to analyze the specific presupposition of the speaker’s commitment in the same way, that is, so that the following two statements would hold: (a) a statement to the effect that there is a certain commitment on the part of the speaker; and (b) a statement to the effect that the hearer supposes this commitment on the part of the speaker to obtain. One could choose this strategy of analysis; but I regard it as unsuitable. It would suggest that we speak of the existence of a commitment on the part of a speaker in the same sense as we speak of the existence of restricted contexts. I can ascertain in an appropriate manner through observation or questioning whether certain contexts obtain; on the other hand, I can only test whether a speaker commits
herself in a specific way and takes on obligations concerning certain consequences for action; I can establish at best whether there are sufficient indicators for the conjecture that the offer would withstand testing.

The binding and bonding relationship into which the speaker is willing to enter with the performance of an illocutionary act signifies a guarantee that, in consequence of her utterance, she will fulfill certain conditions—for example, regard a question as settled when a satisfactory answer is given; drop an assertion when it proves to be false; follow her own advice when she finds herself in the same situation as the hearer; place emphasis on a request when it is not complied with; act in accordance with an intention disclosed by an avowal, and so on. Thus, the illocutionary force of an acceptable speech act consists in the fact that it can move a hearer to rely on the speech-act-typical obligations of the speaker. But if illocutionary force has more than a merely suggestive influence, what can motivate the hearer to base his action on the premise that the speaker seriously intends the commitment she indicates? When it is a question of institutionally bound speech acts, he can perhaps rely on the binding and bonding force of an established norm of action. In the case of institutionally unbound speech acts, however, illocutionary force cannot be traced back directly to the binding force of the normative background. I would thus like to propose the thesis that the illocutionary force with which the speaker, in carrying out her speech act, influences the hearer can be understood only if, over and above individual speech acts, we take into consideration the “yes” or “no” responses of the hearer to the validity claims raised at least implicitly by the speaker.

With their illocutionary acts, speaker and hearer raise validity claims and demand that they be recognized. But this recognition need not follow irrationally, since the validity claims have a cognitive character and can be tested. I would like, therefore, to defend the following thesis: In the final analysis, the speaker can illocutionarily influence the hearer, and vice versa, because speech-act-typical obligations are connected with cognitively testable validity claims—that is, because the reciprocal binding and bonding relationship has a rational basis. The speaker who commits herself normally connects the specific sense in which she would like to take up an interpersonal relation-
ship with a thematically stressed validity claim and thereby chooses a specific mode of communication. Thus, the content of the speaker’s commitment is determined by both of the following:

- the specific meaning of the interpersonal relation that is to be established, and
- a thematically stressed universal validity claim.

In this way, assertions, descriptions, classifications, estimates, predictions, objections, and the like have, respectively, specific modal meanings; but the claim put forward in these different interpersonal relations is, or is based on, the truth of corresponding propositions or on the ability of a subject to have cognitions. Correspondingly, requests, orders, admonitions, promises, agreements, excuses, admissions, and the like have a specific modal meaning; but the claim put forward in these different interpersonal relationships is, or refers to, the rightness of norms or to the ability of a subject to assume responsibility. We might say that in different speech acts the content of the speaker’s commitment is determined by a specific way of appealing to the same, thematically stressed, universal validity claim. And, since as a result of this appeal to universal validity claims, the speech-act-typical obligations take on the character of obligations to provide grounds or to prove trustworthy, the hearer can be rationally motivated by the speaker’s signaled commitment to accept the latter’s offer. I would like to elucidate this for each of the three modes of communication.

In the cognitive use of language, the speaker proffers a speech-act-immanent obligation to provide grounds (Begründungsverpflichtung). Constative speech acts contain the offer to recur if necessary to the experiential source from which the speaker draws the certainty that his statement is true. If this immediate grounding does not dispel an ad hoc doubt, the persistently problematic truth claim can become the subject of a theoretical discourse. In the interactive use of language, the speaker proffers a speech-act-immanent obligation to provide justification (Rechtfertigungswerpflichtung). Of course, regulative speech acts contain only the offer on the part of the speaker to indicate, if necessary, the normative context that gives him the conviction that his utterance is right. Again, if this immediate justification does not
dispel an ad hoc doubt, we can pass over to the level of discourse, in this case, practical discourse. In such a discourse, however, the subject of discursive examination is not the rightness claim directly connected with the speech act, but the validity claim of the underlying norm. Finally, in the expressive use of language, the speaker also enters into a speech-act-immanent obligation, namely, the obligation to prove trustworthy (Bewährungsverpflichtung)—that is, to show in the consequences of his action that he has expressed just that intention that actually guides him. In case the immediate assurance expressing what is evident to the speaker himself cannot dispel ad hoc doubts, the truthfulness of the utterance can be checked only against the consistency of his subsequent behavior. In the consequences of his action, the obligation taken on with the speech act itself is proven to have been met—and not the validity of a claim that, as in the case of the normative background, is anchored outside of the utterance.

Every speech-act-immanent obligation can be made good at two levels, namely, directly, in the context of utterance—whether through recourse to an experiential certainty, through indicating a corresponding normative background, or through assurance of what is subjectively evident—and indirectly, in discourse or in the sequel of consistent actions. But only in the case of the obligations to ground and to prove trustworthy, into which we enter with constative and with expressive speech acts, do we refer—on both levels—to the same truth and truthfulness claim. The obligation to justify, into which we enter with regulative speech acts, refers directly to the claim that the speech act performed fits an existing normative background; whereas with the entrance into practical discourse, the topic of discussion is the validity of the norm itself from which the speaker’s rightness claim is merely derived.

Our reflections have led to the following provisional results:

a. A speech act succeeds, that is, it brings about the interpersonal relation that S intends with it, if it is:
   • comprehensible and acceptable, and
   • accepted by the hearer.

b. The acceptability of a speech act depends on (among other things) the fulfillment of two pragmatic presuppositions:
• the existence of speech-act-typical restricted contexts (preparatory rule); and
• a recognizable commitment on the part of the speaker to enter into certain speech-act-typical obligations (essential rule, sincerity rule).

c. The illocutionary force of a speech act consists in its capacity to move a hearer to act under the premise that the commitment signalled by the speaker is seriously meant:
• in the case of institutionally bound speech acts, the speaker can borrow this force directly from the obligating force of existing norms;
• in the case of institutionally unbound speech acts, the speaker can develop this force by motivating the hearer to the recognition of validity claims.

d. Speaker and hearer can reciprocally motivate one another to recognize validity claims because the content of the speaker’s commitment is determined by a specific way of appealing to a thematically stressed validity claim, whereby the speaker, in a testable way, assumes:
• with a truth claim, obligations to provide grounds;
• with a rightness claim, obligations to provide justification; and
• with a truthfulness claim, obligations to prove trustworthy.

A Model of Linguistic Communication

The analysis of what Austin called the illocutionary force of an utterance leads us back to the validity basis of speech. Institutionally unbound speech acts owe their illocutionary force to a cluster of validity claims that must be raised reciprocally by speaker and hearer, and be recognized by them as justified, if grammatical (that is, comprehensible) sentences are to be employed in such a way as to result in successful communication. A participant in communication acts with an orientation toward reaching understanding only under the condition that, in employing comprehensible sentences, he raises with his speech acts three validity claims in an acceptable way.
He claims truth for the stated propositional content or for the existential presuppositions of a mentioned propositional content. He claims rightness (or appropriateness) for norms (or values) that, in a given context, justify an interpersonal relation that is to be established performatively. Finally, he claims truthfulness for the subjective experiences (Erlebnisse) expressed. Of course, individual validity claims can be thematically stressed: the truth of the propositional content comes to the fore in the cognitive use of language, the rightness (or appropriateness) of the interpersonal relation in the interactive, and the truthfulness of the speaker in the expressive. But in every instance of communicative action the system of all four validity claims comes into play; they must always be raised simultaneously and recognized as justified, although they cannot all be thematic at the same time.

The universality of the validity claims inherent in the structure of speech can perhaps be elucidated with reference to the systematic place of language. Language is the medium through which speakers and hearers realize certain fundamental demarcations. The subject demarcates herself (i) from an environment that she objectifies in the third-person attitude of an observer; (ii) from an environment that she conforms to or deviates from in the performative attitude of a participant; (iii) from her own subjectivity that she expresses or conceals in the first-person attitude; and finally (iv) from the medium of language itself. For these domains of reality I have proposed the somewhat arbitrarily chosen terms external nature, society, internal nature, and language. The validity claims unavoidably implied in every speech act show that in speech oriented toward reaching understanding these four regions must always simultaneously appear. I shall characterize the way in which these regions appear with a few phenomenological indications.

By external nature I mean the objectivated segment of reality that the adult subject (even if only indirectly) is able to perceive and manipulate. The subject can, of course, adopt an objectivating attitude not only toward inanimate nature but toward all objects and states of affairs that are directly or indirectly accessible to sensory experience. Society designates that symbolically prestructured segment of reality that the adult subject can understand in a nonobjec-
tivating attitude, that is, as one acting communicatively (as a participant in a system of communication). Legitimate interpersonal relations belong here, as do sentences and actions, institutions, traditions, cultural values, objectivations in general with a semantic content, as well as the speaking and acting subjects themselves. We can replace this performative attitude with an objectivating attitude toward society; conversely, we can switch to a performative attitude in domains in which (today) we normally behave objectivatingly—for example, in relation to animals and plants. I class as internal nature all wishes, feelings, intentions, and so forth to which an “I” has privileged access and can express as its own subjective experiences. It is precisely in this expressive attitude that the “I” knows itself not only as subjectivity but also as an authority that has always already transcended the bounds of mere subjectivity in cognition, language, and interaction simultaneously. To be sure, if the subject adopts an objectivating attitude toward herself, this distorts the sense in which intentions can be expressed as my intentions.97

Finally, I introduced the medium of our utterances as a region of its own; precisely because language (including nonpropositional symbol systems) remains in a peculiar half-transcendence in the performance of our communicative actions and expressions, it presents itself to the speaker and actor (preconsciously) as a segment of reality sui generis. Again, this does not preclude our being able to adopt, in regard to linguistic utterances or systems of symbols, either an objectivating attitude directed to the material substratum or a performative attitude directed to the semantic content of illocutionary acts.

The model intuitively introduced here is that of a communication in which grammatical sentences are embedded, by way of universal validity claims, in three relations to reality, thereby assuming the corresponding pragmatic functions of representation, establishing interpersonal relations, and expressing one’s own subjectivity.

External nature refers to everything that can be explicitly asserted as the content of statements. Here, “objectivity” might designate the way in which objectified reality appears in speech. And “truth” is the claim with which we assert validity for a corresponding proposition.
The social reality of norms of action and values enters speech by way of the illocutionary components of speech acts (penetrating through the performative attitude of the speaker and hearer, as it were) as a slice of nonobjectified reality. In the same manner, the internal nature of the subjects involved manifests itself in speech by way of speakers’ intentions as a further slice of nonobjectified reality. I would like to propose the terms “normativity” and “subjectivity” for the way in which nonobjectified society or, as the case may be, nonobjectified inner nature appears in speech. “Rightness” is the claim with which we assert validity for the normativity of an utterance; “truthfulness” is the claim with which we assert validity for the intention expressed in that utterance. In this way, the general structures of speech ensure not only a reference to objectified reality, they equally open up space for the normativity of utterances as well as the subjectivity of the intentions expressed therein. Finally, I use the term “intersubjectivity” to refer to the commonality established between subjects capable of speech and action by way of the understanding of identical meanings and the recognition of universal claims. With respect to intersubjectivity, the claim for which validity is asserted is comprehensibility—this is the validity claim specific to speech.

We can examine every utterance to see whether it is true or untrue, justified or unjustified, and truthful or untruthful because in speech, no matter what the emphasis, grammatical sentences are embedded in relations to reality in such a way that in an acceptable speech act segments of external nature, society, and internal nature always appear simultaneously. Language itself also appears in speech, for speech is a medium in which the linguistic means that are employed instrumentally are also reflected. In speech, speech sets itself off from the regions of external nature, society, and internal nature as a reality sui generis, as soon as the sign-substratum, meaning, and denotation of a linguistic utterance can be distinguished.

The following table represents schematically the correlations that obtain for

a. the domains of reality to which every speech act takes up relation,
b. the attitudes of the speaker prevailing in particular modes of communication,
c. the validity claims under which the relations to reality are estab-
   lished, and
d. the general functions that grammatical sentences assume in their relations to reality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domains of reality</th>
<th>Modes of communication: Basic attitudes</th>
<th>Validity claims</th>
<th>General functions of speech</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“The” world of external nature</td>
<td>Cognitive: Objectivating attitude</td>
<td>Truth</td>
<td>Representation of facts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Our” world of society</td>
<td>Interactive: Conformative attitude</td>
<td>Rightness</td>
<td>Establishment of legitimate interpersonal relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“My” world of internal nature</td>
<td>Expressive: Expressive attitude</td>
<td>Truthfulness</td>
<td>Disclosure of speaker’s subjectivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Comprehensibility</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Acknowledgment**

I would like to thank E. Tugendhat and G. Grewendorf for their helpful criticisms of a first draft of this essay. They will have their disagreements with this revised version as well. J. H.

**Notes**

1. [Added to 1979 English translation:] Hitherto the term “pragmatics” has referred to the analysis of particular contexts of language use and not to the reconstruction of universal features of using language (or of employing sentences in utterances). To mark this contrast, I introduced a distinction between “empirical” and “universal” pragmatics. I am no longer happy with this terminology; the term “formal pragmatics”—as an extension of “formal semantics”—would serve better. “Formalpragmatik” is the term preferred by F. Schütze, *Sprache Soziologisch Gesehen*, 2 vols. (Munich, 1975); cf. the summary, pp. 911–1024.
2. [Added to 1979 English translation:] I shall focus on an idealized case of communicative action, namely, “consensual interaction,” in which participants share a tradition and their orientations are normatively integrated to such an extent that they start from the same definition of the situation and do not disagree about the claims to validity that they reciprocally raise. The following schema locates the extreme case of consensual interaction in a system of different types of social action. Underlying this typology is the question of which categories of validity claims participants are supposed to raise and react to.

These action types can be distinguished by virtue of their relations to the validity basis of speech:

a. **Communicative versus Strategic Action.** In communicative action, a basis of mutually recognized validity claims is presupposed; this is not the case in strategic action. In the communicative attitude, it is possible to reach a direct mutual understanding oriented toward validity claims; in the strategic attitude, by contrast, only an indirect mutual understanding via determinative indicators is possible.

b. **Action Oriented toward Reaching Understanding versus Consensual Action.** In consensual action, agreement about implicitly raised validity claims can be presupposed as a background consensus by reason of common definitions of the situations; such agreement is supposed to be arrived at in action oriented toward reaching understanding. In the latter case strategic elements may be employed under the proviso that they are meant to lead to a direct mutual understanding.

c. **Action versus Discourse.** In communicative action, it is naively supposed that implicitly raised validity claims can be vindicated (or made immediately plausible by way of question and answer). In discourse, by contrast, the validity claims raised for statements and norms are hypothetically bracketed and thematically examined. As in communicative action, the participants in discourse retain a cooperative attitude.

d. **Manipulative Action versus Systematically Distorted Communication.** Whereas in systematically distorted communication at least one of the participants deceives himself about the fact that the basis of consensual action is only apparently being maintained, the manipulator deceives at least one of the other participants about her own strategic attitude, in which she deliberately behaves in a pseudoconsensual manner.

4. In the framework of Southwest German Neo-Kantianism, Emil Lask has earlier reconstructed the concept of “transsubjective validity”—in connection with the meaning of linguistic expressions, the truth of statements, and the beauty of works of art—as worthiness to be recognized. Lask’s philosophy of validity combines motifs from Lotze, Bolzano, Husserl, and, naturally, Rickert. “Valid value (geltender Wert) is worthiness to be recognized, recognition-value, that which deserves devotion, that to which devotion is due, thus that which demands or requires devotion. To be valid is value, demand, norm. . . . All such terms as ‘worthiness,’ ‘deserve,’ ‘be due,’ ‘demand’ are correlative concepts; they point to a subjective behavior corresponding to validity: worthy to be treated or regarded in a certain way—this demands a certain behavior.” E. Lask, “Zum System der Logik,” Ges. Schriften, vol. 3 (Tübingen, 1924), p. 92.

5. [Editor’s note:] Cf. note 1 above.

6. Y. Bar-Hillel fails to appreciate this in his critique “On Habermas’s Hermeneutic Philosophy of Language,” Synthese 26 (1973): 1–12. His critique is based on a paper I characterized as provisional. “Vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der kommunikativen Kompetenz,” in J. Habermas and N. Luhmann, Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie (Frankfurt, 1971), pp. 101–141. Bar-Hillel has, I feel, misunderstood me on so many points that it would not be fruitful to reply in detail. I only hope that in the present sketch I can make my (still strongly programmatic) approach clear even to readers who are aggressively inclined and hermeneutically not especially open.


13. S. Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge, 1974); W. C. Salmon, The Foundation of Scientific Inference (Pittsburgh, 1967); cf. the summary chapter on “nondemon-


35. Botha, *Justification*, pp. 75ff., speaks in this connection of external versus internal linguistic evidence.


37. Botha, *Justification*, p. 224, thinks that a speaker can not only report correct linguistic intuitions falsely but can also have false linguistic intuitions; but the construct of pretheoretical knowledge does not permit this possibility. I think it makes sense to assume that linguistic intuitions can be “false” only if they come from incompetent speakers. Another problem is the interplay of grammatical and non-grammatical (for example, perceptual) epistemic systems in the formation of diffuse judgments about the acceptability of sentences, that is, the question of isolating expressions of grammatical rule consciousness or, as the case may be, of isolating genuinely linguistic intuitions. Cf. T. G. Bever, “The Ascent of the Specious,” in D. Cohen, ed., *Explaining Linguistic Phenomena* (New York, 1974), pp. 173–200.

38. In this connection, U. Oevermann points out interesting parallels with Piaget’s concept of reflecting abstraction (cf. J. Piaget, *The Principles of Genetic Epistemology* (New York, 1972)): perhaps the procedure of rational reconstruction is merely a stylized and, as it were, controlled form of the reflecting abstraction the child carries out when, for example, she “reads off” her instrumental actions the schema that underlies them.


41. Ibid., pp. 14ff.

42. In responding to the doubts that Botha raises against the “clear case principle” (Justification, p. 224), I would like to reproduce an argument that J. J. Katz and T. G. Bever have brought against similar doubts in a paper critical of empiricism, “The Fall and Rise of Empiricism,” in T. G. Bever, J. J. Katz, and D. T. Langendoen, eds., An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Ability (New York, 1976):

Such a theory . . . seeks to explicate intuitions about the interconnectedness of phonological properties in terms of a theory of the phonological component, to explicate intuitions about the interconnectedness of syntactic properties in terms of a theory of the syntactic component, and to explicate intuitions about the interconnectedness of semantic properties in terms of a theory of the semantic component. The theory of grammar seeks finally to explicate intuitions of relatedness among properties of different kinds in terms of the systematic connections expressed in the model of a grammar that welds its components in a single integrated theory of the sound-meaning correlation in a language.

These remarks are, of course, by way of describing the theoretical ideal. But as the theory of grammar makes progress toward this ideal, it not only sets limits on the construction of grammars and provides a richer interpretation for grammatical structures but it also defines a wider and wider class of grammatical properties and relations. In so doing, it marks out the realm of the grammatical more clearly, distinctly, and securely than could have been done on the basis of the original intuitions. As Fodor has insightfully observed, such a theory literally defines its own subject matter in the course of its progress:

There is then an important sense in which a science has to discover what it is about; it does so by discovering that the laws and concepts it produced in order to explain one set of phenomena can be fruitfully applied to phenomena of other sorts as well. It is thus only in retrospect that we can say of all the phenomena embraced by a single theoretical framework that they are what we meant, for example, by the presystematic term “physical event,” “chemical interaction,” or “behavior.” To the extent that such terms, or their employments, are neologistic, the neologism is occasioned by the insights that successful theories provide into the deep similarities that underlie superficially heterogeneous events. (J. A. Fodor, Psychological Explanation [New York, 1968], pp. 10–11.)


44. E. H. Lenneberg, Biologische Grundlagen der Sprache (Frankfurt, 1972), and “Ein Wort unter uns,” in Leuninger, Miller, and Müller, eds., Linguistik und Psychologie, pp. 53–72.


50. For example, the reception of Kant by the Erlangen school assumes a transcendental status for the basic concepts of protophysics only in a limited sense; cf. the discussion volume edited by G. Böhme, *Protophysik* (Frankfurt, 1975).

51. Piaget’s Kantianism is typical of this approach.


57. U. Oevermann, “Theorie der individuellen Bildungsprozesse” (Max-Planck-Institut für Bildungsforschung, 1974).


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60. Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, pp. 3ff.

61. These qualifications are stated below in the discussion of Searle’s principle of expressibility.


65. The work of P. W. Alston is a good example.


68. A communication theory that is supposed to reconstruct conditions of action oriented toward reaching understanding does not necessarily require as its basic unit of analysis pairs of complementary speech acts—that is, reciprocally performed and accepted speech acts; but it does require, at least, a speaker’s utterance that can not
only be comprehended but can also be accepted by at least one other subject capable of speech and action.

69. D. Wunderlich, “Zur Konventionalität von Sprechhandlungen,” in Wunderlich, ed., Linguistische Pragmatik, p. 16; cf. also the linguistic characterization of the standard form given there (which I do not deal with here), and Wunderlich’s analysis of advising in Grundlagen, pp. 349ff.

70. Exceptions are avowals that, when rendered explicit, can also take on a negative form, for example, “I do not want (hereby) to conceal from you that. . . .”

71. Deviating from a widespread practice, I do not think it advisable to distinguish propositions (Aussagen) from assertions (Behauptungen) in such a way that, although a proposition is embedded in a specific speech situation through being asserted, it does not receive its assertoric force therefrom. I am of the opinion, rather, that the assertoric force of a proposition cannot be reconstructed except through reference to the validity claim that anyone in the role of a competent speaker raises for it in asserting it. Whether this claim can, if necessary, be discursively vindicated, that is, whether the proposition is “valid” (true), depends on whether it satisfies certain truth conditions. We can, to be sure, view propositions monologically, that is, as symbolic formations with an abstract truth value without reference to a speaker; but then we are abstracting precisely from the speech situation in which a propositional content, owing to the fact that it is asserted as a proposition, receives a relation to reality, that is, fulfills the precondition of being true or false. This abstraction naturally suggests itself (and often remains hidden even from the logician) because the truth claim raised by the speaker is universalist—that is, precisely of such a nature that, although it is raised in a particular situation, it could be defended at any time against anyone’s doubts.


73. Wunderlich, Grundlagen, pp. 337ff.

74. Cf. the schema in note 2 above.


76. In a letter to me, G. Grewendorf cites the following counterexample: signing a contract, petition, and so forth, while simultaneously objectifying the corresponding illocutionary act. But only the following alternative seems possible: either the contract signing is carried out, in such a way that it has legal force, with the help of a performative utterance—in which case there is no objectification—or the nonverbal contract signing is accompanied by a statement: “S signs contract x”—in which case it is a question of two independent illocutionary acts carried out parallel to one another (in such a way that there is, normally, a division of roles: the statesman signs, the reporter reports the signing).

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78. W. P. Alston, “Meaning and Use,” in Rosenberg and Travis, eds., Readings, p. 412: “I can find no cases in which sameness of meaning does not hang on sameness of illocutionary act.”


80. B. Richards argues against this in “Searle on Meaning and Speech Acts,” Foundations of Language 7 (1971): 536: “Austin argued that sentences such as Ra (I promise that I shall pay within one year) never assert anything that is either true or false, i.e., never assert propositions. Here we agree; but this in no way upsets the claim that Ra nevertheless expresses a proposition . . . viz. the proposition that Ra.” Richards does not equate the propositional content of the speech act, Ra, with the propositional content of the dependent sentence: “I shall pay within one year,” but with the content of the objectified speech act, Ra, which must, however, then be embedded in a further speech act, Rv; for example, “I tell you, I promised him that I shall pay within one year.” I regard the confusion of performative sentences with the assertoric reporting of their content as a category mistake (which, incidentally, diminishes the value of Richards’s argument against Searle’s principle of expressibility, in particular against his proposal to analyze the meaning of speech acts in standard form in terms of the meaning of the sentences used in the speech acts).

81. It follows from this proposal that each of the universal-pragmatic subtheories, that is, the theory of illocutionary acts as well as the theory of elementary sentences (and that of intentional expressions) can make its specific contribution to the theory of meaning. In Austin’s choice of the terms “meaning” and “force,” the descriptivist prejudice continues to resonate; it is a prejudice, I might add, that has been out of date since Wittgenstein at the latest, if not since Humboldt, according to which the theory of the elementary sentence, which is to clarify sense and reference, can claim a monopoly on the theory of meaning. (Of course, this prejudice also keeps reference semantics alive.)

82. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 132.

83. Ibid., pp. 147–148; Searle, Speech Acts, pp. 64ff.


85. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 144.

86. Ibid., pp. 145ff. Cf. also Austin, “Performative-Constative,” p. 31:

To begin with, it is clear that if we establish that a performative utterance is not unhappy, that is, that its author has performed his act happily and in all sincerity, that still does not suffice to set it beyond the reach of all criticism. It may always be criticized in a different dimension. Let us suppose that I say to you “I advise you to do it;” and let us allow that all the circumstances are appropriate, the conditions for success are fulfilled. In saying that, I actually do advise you to do
it—it is not that I state, truely or falsely, that I advise you. It is, then, a performative utterance. There does still arise, all the same, a little question: was the advice good or bad? Agreed, I spoke in all sincerity, I believed that to do it would be in your interest; but was I right? Was my belief, in these circumstances, justified? Or again—though perhaps this matters less—was it in fact, or as things turned out, in your interest? There is confrontation of my utterance with the situation in, and the situation in respect to which, it was issued. I was fully justified perhaps, but was I right?

87. Austin, How to do Things with Words, pp. 144–145.
90. Ibid., p. 251.
92. [Added in 1983:] In casually mentioning this restriction, I was unaware of the problems connected with it. What I took at the time to be trivial is in fact in need of careful justification: the thesis that the use of language oriented toward reaching understanding represents the original mode of language use. Cf. chapter 2 in the present volume, pp. 122ff.
94. On Wunderlich’s analysis of advising (Grundlagen, pp. 349ff.) the general contextual conditions would be as follows:

(A) S makes it understood in a conventional manner that (that is, S should give the advice only if these conditions obtain, and H should accordingly believe that they obtain):

1. S knows, believes, or assumes (depending on preceding communication) that
   a. H finds himself in an unpleasant situation Z;
   b. H wants or desires to reach some other, more pleasant situation Z′ ≠ Z;
   c. H does not know how Z′ can be reached;
   d. H is in a position to do a.
2. S believes or assumes that
   c. H does not already want to do a;
   f. H can reach a more pleasant situation Z″ (relative optimum) with a than with any alternative action a′.
3. The following obligations are established for H:
   (7) if one of the subconditions listed under (a) through (f) does not obtain (or, more precisely, if H knows, believes, or assumes that it does not obtain), then H will make this understood to S in a conventional manner.