These seventeen contributions take up the most recent research in game theory, reflecting the many diverse approaches in the field today. They are classified in five general tactical categories - prediction, explanation, investigation, description, and prescription - and wit in these along applied and theoretical divisions. The introduction clearly lays out this framework.
Ken Binmore is Professor of Economics at the University of Michigan, Alan Kirman is Professor of Economics at European University Institute, and Piero Tani is Dean of the Faculty at the University of Florence.
Contents: Famous Gamesters, Ken Binmore, Alan Kirman, and Piero Tani. Cognition and Framing in Sequential Bargaining for Gains and Losses, Cohn F. Camerer, Eric J. Johnson, Talia Rymon, Sankar Sen. Explaining the Vote: Constituency Constraints on Sophisticated Voting, David Austen Smith. The Dynamics of Learning in N-Person Games with the Wrong N, Vincent Brousseau and Alan Kirman. Stationary Equilibria for Deterministic Graphical Games, Steve Alpern. Stable Coalition Structures in Consecutive Games, Joseph Greenberg and Shlomo Weber. The General Nucleolus and the Reduced Game Property, Michael Maschler, Jos Potters, Stef Tijs. Some Thoughts on Efficiency and Information, Françoise Forges. On the Fair and Coalitionstrategyproof Allocation of Private Goods, Hervé Moulin. From Repeated to Differential Games: How Time and Uncertainty Pervade the Theory of Games, Alain Haurie. Unraveling in Games of Sharing and Exchange, Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour, Morton D. Davis. Does Evolution Eliminate Dominated Strategies? Larry Samuelson. Equilibrium Selection in Stag Hunt Games, Hans Carlsson and Eric van Damme. Variable Universe Games, Michael Bacharach. Aspects of Rationalizable Behavior, Peter J. Hammond. Normative Validity and Meaning of von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities, John C. Harsanyi. DeBayesing Game Theory, Ken Binmore.
About the Editor
Ken Binmore is Emeritus Professor at University College London. A Fellow of the Econometric Society and the British Academy, he is the author of Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 1: Playing Fair (1994) and Volume 2: Just Playing (1998), and the coeditor of Frontiers of Game Theory (1993), all three published by The MIT Press.