In 1961 a rebellion suddenly flared up in Portugal's African colony of Angola with an intensity that took even the rebels of surprise, Although suppressed by a world opinion that was superficially sympathetic, the rebel cause withdrew to the natural sanctuary of the jungle to persist rather than die, to settle in for a long struggle continues to this day, although it is confirmed mainly to the rural north and east, far from the coastal cities where most of the Portuguese colonists reside.
The rebellion and its background consequences are the subjects of this authoritative volume. (A second volume will be published later, carrying the story from 1962 to 1968.) The author here describes the action in Angola and in Lisbon, and also the world-wide diplomatic responses, including those of the United Nations, the United States, and Brazil.
Especially valuable is the detailed picture Marcum presents of the rebel organizations. Unlike, for example, the tightly bound units of a Viet Cong, these organizations are various in their makeup and purpose, and are ethnically and socially distinct. Sometimes forming weak coalitions, they at other times act as separate, competing groups, and even clash military with one another. Two principal groups described are the MPLA and the GRAE – the first (to over-simplify) urban, ideological, multiracial; the second rural, less ideological, and exclusively African. Since 1962 their rivalry has intensified, and a third movement, UNITA, has entered the picture. But at the same time, the geographical range of rebellion has widened, one more sign that Portugal's lease on the African continent may eventually expire.
Portugal adamantly refused and concessions to African nationalism – unlike Britain and Belgium, and finally, after long struggle, the French in Algeria. But the act of stamping out the rebellion served only to scatter its sparks to smolder and ignite in other places, other times. However long deferred, a high human and material cost is likely to be exacted of Portugal unless her post-Salazar policies bend toward moderation. Not even a rich country can afford an endless “Vietnam,” and after a point the price of suppression begins to exceed the productive value of a colony.
