Monetary Policy in Interdependent Economies
Monetary Policy in Interdependent Economies provides the first comprehensive overview of the implications of using game theory to analyze interactions among national monetary policymakers. It synthesizes the pessimistic view of sovereign policymaking that results from the analysis of one-shot games with the optimistic view derived from the analysis of quid pro quo strategies in repeated games.
Good outcomes, the authors conclude, require coordination among noncooperative policymakers, and that sometimes policymakers, must be forced to cooperate. They suggest two roles for supranational institutions such as the International Monetary Fund: the IMF can provide a forum where noncooperative policymakers, can work to achieve good outcomes, and it can police agreements among cooperative policymakers
Canzoneri and Henderson take clear stands on controversial issues and make recent advances in game theory accessible by using a single unified framework to explain a wide range of concepts. They begin by analyzing one-shot interactions between two policymakers, In subsequent chapters they extend their analysis to allow for more policymakers, and coalitions, for repeated interactions among policymakers, and for the possibility of time inconsistency.