Markets are one of the most salient institutions produced by humans, and economists have traditionally analyzed the workings of the market mechanism. Recently, however, economists and others have begun to appreciate the many institution-related events and phenomena that have a significant impact on economic performance. Examples include the demise of the communist states, the emergence of Silicon Valley and e-commerce, the European currency unification, and the East Asian financial crises.
As computers advance from isolated workstations to linked elements in complex communities of systems and people, cooperation and coordination via intelligent agents become increasingly important. Examples of such communities include the Internet, electronic commerce, health institutions, electricity networks, and digital libraries.
The "oligopoly problem"—the question of how prices are formed when the market contains only a few competitors—is one of the more persistent problems in the history of economic thought. In this book Xavier Vives applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing.
The essays in this volume provide a comprehensive view of applications of the cost of capital. The cost of capital is the key concept in the analysis of taxation of business income. It is also critical to the formulation of a new system of national accounts, where it plays the role of the price of capital services. Empirical measurements of productivity and economic welfare generated by these accounts underlie recent innovations in the econometric modeling of consumer and producer behavior.
The objectives of econometric modeling of producer behavior are to determine the nature of substitution among inputs and outputs and of differences in technology, as well as the role of economies of scale in production. Recent advances in methodology, based on the dual formulation of the theory of production in terms of prices, have enabled econometricians to achieve these objectives more effectively. This volume summarizes the economic theory, the econometric methodology, and the empirical findings resulting from the new approach.
This is the second volume in a three-volume exposition of Martin Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics"—a term he coined in 1959 to describe the theoretical underpinnings needed for the construction of an economic dynamics. The goal is to develop a process-oriented theory of money and financial institutions that reconciles micro- and macroeconomics, using as a prime tool the theory of games in strategic and extensive form.
Game theory has become increasingly popular among undergraduate as well as business school students. This text is the first to provide both a complete theoretical treatment of the subject and a variety of real-world applications, primarily in economics, but also in business, political science, and the law. Strategies and Games grew out of Prajit Dutta's experience teaching a course in game theory over the last six years at Columbia University.
The greatest strength of this thoroughly revised and expanded edition of Lectures on International Trade is its rigorous algebraic and geometric treatment of the various models and results of trade theory. The authors, who now include Arvind Panagariya, offer both policy insights and empirical applications. They have added nine entirely new chapters as well as new sections to several existing chapters (e.g., a greatly expanded treatment of the growing theory of preferential trade agreements).
Evolutionary game theory is one of the most active and rapidly growing areas of research in economics. Unlike traditional game theory models, which assume that all players are fully rational and have complete knowledge of details of the game, evolutionary models assume that people choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. In games that are repeated many times, low-payoff strategies tend to be weeded out, and an equilibrium may emerge.