Psychology / Neuropsychology

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What Makes Us Social?

by Chris Frith and Uta Frith

ISBN: 9780262546270

Publisher: The MIT Press

Pub Date: September 12, 2023

Forthcoming from the MIT Press

Altered States of Consciousness

Experiences Out of Time and Self

by Marc Wittmann

Translated by Philippa Hurd

ISBN: 9780262546089

Publisher: The MIT Press

Pub Date: July 11, 2023

What altered states of consciousness—the dissolution of feelings of time and self—can tell us about the mystery of consciousness.

Body Am I

The New Science of Self-Consciousness

by Moheb Costandi

ISBN: 9780262046596

Publisher: The MIT Press

Pub Date: October 4, 2022

How the way we perceive our bodies plays a critical role in the way we perceive ourselves: stories of phantom limbs, rubber hands, anorexia, and other phenomena.

Ketamine

by Bita Moghaddam

ISBN: 9780262542241

Publisher: The MIT Press

Pub Date: February 16, 2021

The emergence of ketamine—previously known as a combat anesthetic and club drug—as a treatment for depression.

Memory as Prediction

From Looking Back to Looking Forward

by Tomaso Vecchi and Daniele Gatti

ISBN: 9780262044752

Publisher: The MIT Press

Pub Date: November 24, 2020

Theoretical reflections on memory and prediction, linking these concepts to the role of the cerebellum in higher cognition.

The Cognitive Neurosciences, sixth edition

The Cognitive Neurosciences

Edited by David Poeppel, George R. Mangun and Michael S. Gazzaniga

ISBN: 9780262043250

Publisher: The MIT Press

Pub Date: May 12, 2020

The sixth edition of the foundational reference on cognitive neuroscience, with entirely new material that covers the latest research, experimental approaches, and measurement methodologies.

Radicalizing Enactivism

Basic Minds without Content

by Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin

ISBN: 9780262534642

Publisher: The MIT Press

Pub Date: August 25, 2017

A book that promotes the thesis that basic forms of mentality—intentionally directed cognition and perceptual experience—are best understood as embodied yet contentless.