M. A. Adelman is one of the preeminent authorities on the economics of mineral resources. This book brings together his work, written over the past thirty years, on mineral depletion and the nature of monopoly in world oil. Organized into three groups, the twenty-seven papers cover theory and measurement of mineral scarcity and depletion, analysis of the OPEC cartel and control of the oil market, and public policy problems and options.
This landmark theoretical book is about the mechanisms by which special interest groups affect policy in modern democracies. Defining a special interest group as any organization that takes action on behalf of an identifiable group of voters, Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman ask: How do special interest groups derive their power and influence? What determines the extent to which they are able to affect policy outcomes? What happens when groups with differing objectives compete for influence?
The underlying theme of Rudi Dornbusch's work is unabashedly Chicago, namely, the University of Chicago belief that markets solve problems best and that most bureaucrats, even when well-intentioned, are distracted by politics or excessive zeal for perfect solutions. Dornbusch seeks to challenge those in charge with alternative answers and to limit their ambitions. He takes aim at central bankers, bureaucrats, unions, do-gooders, and politicians from Brazil, Japan, Russia, and other scenes of economic disaster.
Network utilities, such as electricity, telephones, and gas, are public utilities that require a fixed network to deliver their services. Because consumers have no choice of network, they risk exploitation by network owners. Once invested, however, a network's capital is sunk, and the bargaining advantage shifts from investor to consumer. The investor, fearing expropriation, may be reluctant to invest. The tension between consumer and investor can be side-stepped by state ownership.
Until the 1980s, it was presumed that technical change in most communications services could easily be monitored from centralized state and federal agencies. This presumption was long outdated prior to the commercialization of the Internet. With the Internet, the long-forecast convergence of voice, video, and text bits became a reality. Legislation, capped by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, created new quasi-standards such as "fair" and "reasonable" for the FCC and courts to apply, leading to nonstop litigation and occasional gridlock.
"This book is about the relationship between law, a quasi-judicial administrative agency, and politics, in the volatile arena of labor policy and the balance of power between labor and management.... It is about the rule of law and the role of labor law in a modern economy."
—from the Introduction
Generations at Risk presents compelling evidence that human exposure to some toxic chemicals can have lifelong and even intergenerational effects on human reproduction and development. The result of a collaboration involving public health professionals, physicians, environmental educators, and policy advocates, this book examines how scientific, social, economic, and political systems may fail to protect us from environmental and occupational toxicants.
Public and private pensions control almost a quarter of the United States' tangible wealth—equivalent to all of the country's residential real estate. They account for most current saving in the country, are a crucial component of household retirement resources, and have significant effects on labor market mobility and efficiency. Collectively, they hold a tremendous proportion of all common stock.
Since 1991, Robert Barro has been a lively contributor to the Wall Street Journal and other popular financial media. Getting It Right brings together, updates, and expands upon these writings that showcase Barro's agility in applying economic understanding to a wide array of social issues.