The MIT Press series on Economic Learning and Social Evolution reflects the widespread renewal of interest in the dynamics of human interaction. This issue has provided a broad community of economists, psychologists, biologists, anthropologists, and others with a sense of common purpose so strong that traditional interdisciplinary boundaries have begun to melt away. The books in this series vary in character from theory, to expository, to commentary, but all have two unifying themes. First is the rejection of the outmoded notion that what happens away from equilibrium can safely be ignored. Second is the recognition that it is no longer enough to speak in vague terms of bounded rationality and spontaneous order.
Edited by Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd and Ernst Fehr
ISBN: 9780262572378
Publisher: The MIT Press
Pub Date: August 11, 2006
Moral Sentiments and Material Interests presents an innovative synthesis of research in different disciplines to argue that cooperation stems not from the stereotypical selfish agent acting out of disguised...
In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The traditional explanation for when and why equilibrium arises is...
In Volume 1 of Game Theory and the Social Contract, Ken Binmore restated the problems of moral and political philosophy in the language of game theory. In Volume 2, Just Playing, he unveils his own...
A collection of Ken Binmore's influential papers on bargaining experiments, with the author's newly written commentary addressing the challenges to game theory posed by the behavioral school of economics.
Economists have traditionally studied aggregate behavior as the outcome of individual decisions made interactively, while sociologists have focused on the role of social influences on individual behavior....
Economists have traditionally studied aggregate behavior as the outcome of individual decisions made interactively, while sociologists have focused on the role of social influences on individual behavior....
